fredgell said:Two points arise - the HP Victor had the best conventional performance, and it's just possible that there may have been a secret anex re weapons as part of the trials programmes for nuclear weapons in Australia. Given that this was still going on, to some extent, as late as 1979.
rickshaw said:fredgell said:Two points arise - the HP Victor had the best conventional performance, and it's just possible that there may have been a secret anex re weapons as part of the trials programmes for nuclear weapons in Australia. Given that this was still going on, to some extent, as late as 1979.
You have some evidence of this? Considering that the Australian Government abandoned all effort at acquiring Nuclear Weapons with the ascension of the McMahon Government to power in 1971 when they chose to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact, I find it very unusual that they would be still attempting, according to you, to gain nuclear weapons 8 years later.
The Australian effort to gain nuclear weapons began in 1945, as part of the British Government's decision making to try and decentralise in the face of possible atomic annilation. Part of the plan was to move its own nuclear industries to the "periphery" of the Empire - Canada, Australia, Southern Africa. The Snowy Mountains Hydro Scheme and the establishment of the Australian National University were the two most visible signs, along with the acquisition of Canberra bombers in the late 1940s. Then there were the nuclear tests. Canada defected/was lured away by the Americans who wanted them to be more closely aligned with their nuclear efforts, early on. The Australians' nuclear dreams were never realised though, as a succession of British decisions to try and gain access to American nuclear technology were first thwarted and then succeeded. The Americans specifically made it a pre-condition that Canberra be denied access to their technology because of the fears (well founded as it later was known after the Petovs' Affair) of Soviet espionage downunder.
Spark said:Interesting, Not sure about V-Bomber production, A Commonwealth deterrent based on Blue Streak LRBM was being planned, mooted middle fifties, the Australian sites were Singapore, British North Borneo and the “outback”, from memory about twenty rounds in Hard Emplacements “silos”.
The V-bombers dual purpose function was as a conventional weapon and the Vulcan was offered as a part of the TSR2 package, until Mountbatten killed it.
Why was the UK given details plans and specification s of the USA H-bombs? this agreement stopped the Commonwealth based Joint Deterrent
rickshaw said:Actually there were early on plans for a Joint Commonwealth deterrent force, as part of the effort to decentralise the Empire/Commonwealth's nuclear industries and retaliation, as I pointed out several posts ago. This is detailed in Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb by Wayne Reynolds. While it concentrates primarily on the early period (1942-1959) of Australia's efforts to gain access to British nuclear technology, it does mention several times in passing one of the reasons why the RAF was keen for the RAAF to gain access to Canberras. Richard Broinowski on this webpage, takes the story up and provides more detail about the later period. Further research found this pdf on Blue Streak, which confirms Spark's contention that Australia was interested beyond being merely a testing range for the weapon. Although, I have to ask what was the point in acquiring a 2,300 nm range IRBM. Even from Darwin, it would only be able to reach as far as the southern tip of Indochina. While Australia's major fear at the time was Indonesian aggression, initially Canberra, then later TSR2 and finally F-111 addressed that, more than adequately addressed that problem (coupled with RAF plans during Konfrontasi to commit most of the V-Bomber force in a conventional role, if that war had gone "hot") IMO.
alertken said:Sources are: M.Gowing: Independence and Deterrence(Vols.1/2), Macmillan, 1974; S.R.Twigge, Early Development of GW in UK, Harwood, 1993; C.N.Hill, A Vertical Empire, Imperial C.Press,2001; L.Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, Palgrave,2001; R.Bud/P.Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, Harwood,1999.
1. Oz nukes. Canberra licence for GAF was 1949: it could not carry 62ins. dia/10 ton Blue Danube. UK began light Red Beard in 1952 (deployed, 9/60, Canberra B.15, 11/61)
2. UK IRBMs. Truman and Attlee made an atomic inter-operation Agreement 8/12/50, largely to cover SAC B-29 deployment to Marham - PRC had invaded Korea 25/11/50. On 1/3/54 US tested an MT warhead light enough for IRBM/ICBM use; funding to develop Atlas was released 14/1/55, Thor and Jupiter, 8/11/55. UK/US Agreements on data "exchange" and on Co-operation in Use of Atomic Energy (short of warhead/re-entry vehicle design) were 12/6/54, 30/7/54 and 15/6/55. UK had abandoned V2-derived work ("Hammer") in 1947; RAE resurrected it early 1954 and first drew on EE(GW) for IRBM schemes. On 25/7/54 USSR demanded that NATO withdraw from FRG; Churchill's Cabinet of 26/7/54 initiated Green Grass (to be Yellow Sun/Orange Herald MT warhead), Mk.2 Victor/Vulcan, Avro 730 (as recce) and Blue Streak: Sir Ralph Sorley (he of 8x.303MG for Hurri/Spit), DH Props. MD had persuaded MoS that he would pursue the IRBM with alacrity, whereas EE's George Nelson was evidently pre-occupied with Canberra production and P.1 development. Agreements in 1958 gave UK more Atlas/Thor Intellectual Property and Light Orange Herald for Blue Streak and Red Snow warhead for Yellow Sun Mk.2 and Blue Steel. ATLAS was operational 31/10/59, Thor was dual-manned in UK 6/60, Jupiter in Italy, 6/61. In 4/60 Sorley's assertions had become tarnished, prospect of 1966 deployment was dim, cost opaque, so Blue Streak was chopped. Ministers would not have been impressed by talk of turning up the wick on the RR derivation of Rocketdyne's motor, to leap from unattained 1,500nm to puff of 3 times that.
SLL: EE's efforts were reduced from July,1954 to vague research: there may be no meaningful studies to be unearthed. A.R.Adams, Good Company, BAC, 1976 has,P.107: Red Dean AAM: "After Vickers had built up a team 800 strong...it was cancelled in 1957 (sic:1956)". A mere then-paper AAM had 800 people: how many, then, for a "real" IRBM project, yet, not a word on such things in this authorised industrial biography.