The Royal Navy with CVA01

[NOMISYRRUC]

Thoughts come questions.
If CV force retained on CVA-01 and CVA-02, perhaps with a planned CVA-03....
What RAF assets were tasked with say Kola Peninsula, Murmansk et al?

What RAF assets were tasked with Coastal Command?

What was the GIUK Gap assets ?

Do you need RAF to perform these tasks or was the FAA doing them before CV force scrapped?

Another thought. Strike North lives with USN getting real support from CVA-01 and RN.

Lofoten Bastion might be more cramped but more potent a threat.
This sucks Soviet resources to deal with that threat away from elsewhere.

AEW.....this becomes Nimrod and Argus I think it was called?
Imagine all that money sunk into the UK system that never made it beyond development, put into CVA-01 aircraft.......

Air-wing: Between the RN Sea Harrier force and the Buccaneer and Phantom units assigned to SACEUR for TASMO (Tactical Air Support to Maritime Operations) as a direct replacement for the air wings previously assigned to the RN heavy carriers the aircraft, crews, maintainers etc all existed in reality. The ASW component of those air wings would have been the same Sea King Squadrons that operated from the Invincibles in reality. AEW is less certain but far from intractable, for instance helicopter AEW was studied in the UK in the mid-1960s and I'm sure given an incentive industry would have been happy to extract more life from the Gannet.

To answer some of @zen's questions and to show how large the TASMO force was.

1. What RAF assets were tasked with say Kola Peninsula, Murmansk et al?

I don't know.

2. What RAF assets were tasked with Coastal Command?

In the middle-1960s the RAF had a front-line force of 66 Shackletons in 11 squadrons. That is:

• 48 in 8 squadrons of 6 aircraft in Coastal Command.
  • 3 squadrons at Ballykelly
  • 3 squadrons at Kinloss
  • One squadron at St Mawgan plus the Maritime OTU which would be mobilised as 220 Squadron in wartime.
  • One squadron at Gibraltar
• 6 aircraft in one squadron was at Malta.
• 4 aircraft in one squadron was at Aden.
• 8 aircraft in one squadron was at Singapore.

This was reduced to 5 squadrons of Nimrods by 1975.

• 4 squadrons in 18 (Maritime) Group of RAF Strike Command.
  • 3 Squadrons at Kinloss
  • One squadron at St Mawgan plus 236 OCU which would be mobilised as 38 Squadron in wartime.
• One squadron at Malta.
• There were also detachments of Nimrods at Gibraltar and Singapore.

The Malta-based Nimrod squadron and the detachments at Singapore were disbanded as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.

45 Nimrod MR.1s survived at this point. 34 were brought up to MR.2 standard which left 11 aircraft available for other uses with what can charitably be described as "unfortunate" consequences.

3. What was the GIUK Gap assets ?

Maritime Reconnaissance

In 1965 it was the 6 Shackleton squadrons at Ballykelly and Kinloss. By 1975 it was the 3 Nimrod squadrons at Kinloss and that was the assigned force until the end of the Cold War.

Long-range maritime reconnaissance was provided by the Victor SR.2s of 543 Squadron of No. 1 (Bomber) Group of RAF Strike Command from 1969 to 1974 when the squadron disbanded. It was replaced in this role by the Vulcan B.2 (MRR)s of the newly reformed 27 Squadron until it disbanded on 31st March 1982.

Airborne Early Warning

8 Squadron re-formed at Kinloss on 1st January 1972. It was equipped with 12 Shackleton AEW.2s which were conversions of MR.2s and fitted with APS-20 radars removed from Gannet AEW.3s.

This squadron took over from 849 NAS (which had been at Lossiemouth since November 1970) provided the Gannet AEW and COD flights aboard the strike carriers. However, 849 wouldn't decommission until 15th December 1978.

The Shackletons should have been replaced by the Nimrod AEW.3. According to the Observer's Book of Aircraft 1981 this should have commenced in 1982. However, it didn't. In December 1986 the MoD announced the decision to cancel the Nimrod AEW.3 programme and to order Boeing Sentries instead for delivery in 1990.

In the meantime 8 Squadron continued to operate the Shackleton AEW.2 from Lossiemouth until 30th June 1991 when it disbanded. A new 8 Squadron reformed the next day at Waddington with the Boeing Sentries that were ordered in 1986.

Maritime Strike

The RN had five Buccaneer S.2 squadrons which in order of decommissioning were:

• 803 NAS which decommissioned on 18th December 1969.
  • It had re-commissioned at Lossiemouth on 3rd July 1967 as the Buccaneer Headquarters squadron.
  • In August 1968 a detachment of four aircraft (803 Dt4) flew out of via Nicosia, Masirah and Gan to Malaysia to join Hermes in the Indian Ocean and returned in August 1968, using air-to-air refuelling with Victor tankers of 55 Squadron, RAF. This is the operation from British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories by David Hobbs mentioned in one of my quotes from that book in Post 111.
• 801 NAS which decommissioned on 21st July 1970.
  • This was Hermes' squadron from May 1968 from May 1968 to June 1970.
  • It had re-commissioned as Buccaneer S.2 squadron in October 1965 from a nucleus of 700B Flight and was embarked on Victorious from May 1966 to June 1967 when Victorious began her ill-fated refit.
• 800 NAS which decommissioned on 23rd February 1972. This was Eagle's squadron.
• 736 NAS which decommissioned on 25th February 1972. This was the training squadron and was at Lossiemouth at the time.
• 809 NAS which decommissioned on 15th December 1978. This was Ark Royal's squadron.

They were replaced by three RAF squadrons that operated Buccaneers in the Maritime Strike role as part of the TACSMO force. Although one of them only existed for a year. They were:

• 12 Squadron re-formed at RAF Honington on 1st October 1969. It moved to Lossiemouth in 1980 where it disbanded on 1st October 1993. On the same day a new Tornado equipped No 12 took over the numberplate in the same role and is still based at Lossiemouth.
• 208 Squadron re-formed at Honington on 1st July 1974. It moved to Lossiemouth in July 1983 where it disbanded on 31st March 1994.
• 216 Squadron re-formed at Honington on 1st July 1979. It took over the aircraft that had belonged to 809 NAS. However, 216 Squadron disbanded at Lossiemouth on 4th August 1980 after just over a year's existence. (See below.) However, the squadron would re-form as a Tristar tanker-transport unit on 1st November 1984.

For completeness there were 2 Buccaneer squadrons in RAF Germany which replaced the Command's Canberra interdictors:

• No. 15 which re-formed at RAF Honington on 1st October 1970 and moved to Germany in January 1971. It converted to the Tornado GR.1 in 1983.
• The second was 16 Squadron (which had been one of the Canberra interdictor squadrons) which re-formed at RAF Laarbruch on 1st October 1972 as No. 16 (Designate) squadron and declared operational on 8th January 1973. It converted to the Tornado GR.1 in 1984.

Buccaneer crews were trained by 237 Operational Conversion Unit. According to RAFWEB.

It reformed again, this time at Honington on 1 March 1971 as the Buccaneer OCU in No 1 Group. It moved to Lossiemouth on 11 November 1984 in No 18 Group, where it disbanded on 1 October 1991, its tasking being taken over by the Buccaneer Training Flight attached to No 208 Sqn.

The OCU took over the training of RN Buccaneer crews from February 1972 (when 736 NAS decommissioned) until December 1978 (when 809 NAS decommissioned). 237 OCU was not assigned a reserve squadron number so my guess is that it would not have been mobilised in the event of war and instead would have been broken up to provide reinforcements for 12 and 216 Squadrons.

The Buccaneer was grounded for a period in 1980 due to suspected metal fatigue problems and about half were withdrawn. (Source: the Putnams book on RAF aircraft since 1918.) This resulted in the number of Buccaneer units being reduced from five to four. The short-straw was drawn by 216 Squadron which as related above disbanded on 4th August 1980 after just over a year's existence as a Maritime Strike squadron.

Fighters - Royal Navy

The RN had six fighter squadrons in the late 1960s. Which in order of decommissioning were:

• 893 NAS which decommissioned on 14th July 1970.
  • This was Hermes' squadron from May 1968 from May 1968 to July 1970.
  • It had re-commissioned as Sea Vixen FAW.2 on 4th November 1965 and was embarked on Victorious from May 1966 to June 1967 when Victorious began her ill-fated refit.
• 766 NAS which decommissioned on 10th December 1970. This was the Sea Vixen training squadron and would have decommissioned around this time anyway if all operational fighter squadrons had converted to Phantoms.
• 890 NAS which decommissioned on 6th August 1971.
  • It had been in existence since 14th August 1967 for operational trials and training. It later absorbed the aircraft of 766 NAS and was the Sea Vixen Headquarters squadron until it decommissioned.
  • It's previous incarnation had been from 1st February 1960 until 7th October 1966. It had initially been the fighter squadron aboard Hermes, but from 1963 it had usually been Ark Royal's fighter squadron until that ship paid off for its Phantomisation refit in October 1966.
• 767 NAS which decommissioned on 1st August 1972.
  • This was the Phantom squadron which had re-commissioned on 14th January 1969 from a nucleus of 700P NAS.
  • The Phantom crews of 892 NAS were trained by the RAF's Phantom OCU for the remainder of its existence.
• 899 NAS which decommissioned on 26th January 1972.
  • This was Eagle's fighter squadron.
  • It was also the last operational Sea Vixen squadron.
• 892 NAS which decommissioned on 15th December 1978. This was the only operational Phantom squadron in the RN.
  • It de-commissioned as a Sea Vixen squadron on 4th October 1968.
  • It re-commissioned as a Phantom squadron on 31st March 1969.
  • The squadron operated from Eagle for five days in September 1969, a detachment operated from USS Saratoga for seven days in September 1969 and another detachment was aboard Ark Royal for 16 days from 30th April 1970 to 15th May 1970.
  • The whole squadron finally embarked on Ark Royal as an operational unit on 14th June 1970.
  • It had been intended to form a second Phantom FG.1 squadron in the RAF with the redundant aircraft. Instead they were used to re-equip 111 Squadron and the displaced FGR.2s were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.

Fighters - RAF TASMO

According to Plan P of March 1964 RAF Fighter Command had had 88 fighters in 7 squadrons at 31st March 1964. That is:

• 28 Javelin FAW.9 in 2 squadrons of 14 that were due to disband by 30th September 1967.
• 60 Lighting F.1, F.1A and F.2 in 5 squadrons of 12. These were due to convert to the Lightning F.6 by 30th June 1967.

Some of these squadrons had an overseas reinforcement role.

The squadrons in the overseas commands brought the RAF's total to 156 aircraft in eleven squadrons. That is 60 Lightnings in five squadrons and 96 Javelin FAW.9 in six squadrons. At the time the plan was for this to reduce to 120 aircraft in 10 squadrons by 31st March 1968. Two of the squadrons would have the Lightning F.2A and the other eight would have the Lightning F.6. The long-term plan at this date was...

The present authorised purchase of Lightnings is sufficient to back this force until 1972/73. By the mid-1970s, a replacement will be required which could be either a variable geometry aircraft for joint use by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy or a derivative of the P.1154. Whichever aircraft is finally ordered this minimum force of 10 squadrons must be replaced on a one-for-one basis and the overall U.E. should thus remain as 120 aircraft.

According to the Defence Costings 1966 (WF 1/66) dated March 1966 the RAF had 140 fighters in 10 squadrons on 31st March 1966. This was made up of 56 Javelins in three squadrons and 84 Lightnings in seven squadrons. This would reduce to 120 Lightings in ten squadrons by 31st March 1969. This would transform to 120 Phantoms in 10 squadrons between 1st April 1972 and 31st March 1977.

The Aircraft Requirements section shows 38 Phantoms On Requisition and Further Requirement for 110 for a Total Requirement for 148. If the 2 YF-4Ms are added that makes a total of 150 which happens to be the number of Phantoms originally ordered for the RAF. The Aircraft Programme section shows them being delivered between April 1967 and March 1970.

The Phantoms would initially form seven ground attack squadrons with 84 aircraft which would form between April 1968 and March 1971. These squadrons would convert to the Jaguar between April 1972 and March 1976.

This is significant because March 1966 is the month after the decision to cancel CVA.01 and to phase the existing strike carriers out by 1975. Seven of the ten Phantom fighter squadrons were listed as Phantom (Fighter) and the other 3 as Phantom (Maritime) with two in Fighter Command and one in FEAF. The first Maritime squadron was to be the FEAF squadron which would form in 1972/73 and the two Fighter Command squadrons would be formed between April 1975 and March 1977. My guess is that the redundant FGR.2s would be used to form the seven terrestrial fighter squadrons and the thee maritime fighter squadrons would be formed from the survivors of the 59 FG.1s that were ordered for the RN and transferred to the RAF after Ark Royal and Eagle were paid off.

Incidentally it also says that a force of 36 Buccaneers in three squadrons of 12 would be formed between April 1974 and March 1977. Two squadrons would be in Bomber Command and the third would be in FEAF. As already explained the the RAF did form three Buccaneer squadrons for Maritime Strike operations, but not until 1979 and one of them had to be disbanded a year later due to the aircraft's metal fatigue problems.

However, it didn't happen exactly like that.

The Phantom order was cut from 209 to 170. As far as I know this was done after the Sterling Devaluation of 16th November 1967. According to Phantom A Legend in its Time by Francis K. Mason this was done because it was a fixed-price contract so presumably the Devaluation reduced the number of Phantoms that could be purchased for the fixed-price. Including prototypes the FG.1 order was cut from 59 to 52 and the FGR.2 order was cut from 150 to 118. Mason wrote that most of the 39 aircraft were cut from the FGR.2 order because some of the FG.1s were transferred from the RN to the RAF.

The number of Phantoms ordered was actually 223 (made up of 59 FG.1 and 164 FGR.2) but that's another story.

The RAF actually had ten fighter squadrons between March 1967 to May 1968 when the last Javelin squadron finally disbanded. The other nine squadrons had Lightnings and consisted of five in No. 11 (Fighter) Group of the newly formed RAF Strike Command, two in RAF Germany, one in Cyprus with NEAF and one in Singapore in FEAF.

The Sterling Devaluation also resulted in the decision to bring the East of Suez withdrawal forward from 1975 to the end of 1971. This also resulted in Eagle's Phantomization being cancelled because she'd be in service until 1972 instead of 1975 so the cost of the refit wasn't worth it. The redundant Phantom FG.1 aircraft were passed to the RAF which used them to form 43 Squadron on 1st September 1969. This brought the number of RAF fighter squadrons back up to ten and as far as I know it was the first TASMO fighter squadron.

However, the number of fighter squadrons was soon back down to nine because No. 74 Squadron disbanded in Singapore on 1st September 1971 as part of the accelerated withdrawal from East of Suez.

The Phantom FGR.2s were initially used to form five ground attack and two reconnaissance squadrons which formed between and April 1972. No. 38 (Tactical) Group of RAF Strike Command had two and one while RAF Germany had three and one. These squadrons converted to the Jaguar GR.1 between April 1974 and April 1977. This allowed six Lighting squadrons to convert to the Phantom FGR.2 between October 1974 and April 1977.

My guess is that the Phantom order hadn't been reduced from 209 to 170 in 1968 the 39 extra aircraft would have allowed the conversion of all eight Lightning squadrons to the Phantom between April 1974 and April 1977.

Back in March 1966 the plan had been for ten Phantom fighter squadrons in April 1977 made up of five in No. 11 Group, two in RAF Germany, one in NEAF and two in FEAF. The actual total was nine squadrons and as explained in the previous paragraph two of them were still equipped with Lightnings.

• There weren't any squadrons in FEAF because of the 1967 and 1968 Defence Cuts.
• There weren't any squadrons in NEAF because its fighter squadron was transferred to 11 Group on 21st January 1975 as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75
• RAF Germany had two Phantom squadrons as planned in April 1966.
• 11 Group had five Phantom squadron as planned in April 1966. It also had the two fighter squadrons that in April 1966 had been planned for FEAF, but as already explained the reduction in the Phantom order meant they were still equipped with Lightnings.

I suspect that the reason why there were nine fighter squadrons instead of ten was due to the 1970 decision to keep Ark Royal in service until the end of 1978 instead of early 1971 as had been planned in 1968 so the aircraft weren't available. According to Phantom A Legend in its Time by Francis K. Mason the RAF intended to form a second Phantom FG.1 squadron in 1979 with 892 NAS's aircraft which would have increased the total to ten fighter squadrons. However, the aircraft were used to re-equip 111 Squadron and the displaced FGR.2s were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.

This was the situation until October 1984 when 74 Squadron re-formed on the F-4J (UK). This increased the total number of fighter squadrons to ten including eight equipped with Phantoms.

The first Tornado ADV squadron was formed in April 1987 and the there were seven of them by the end of January 1990.

• Four of the eight Phantom squadrons converted between April 1987 and January 1990.
• The two Lightning squadrons converted to the type between January and April 1988.
• No. 25 Squadron which had been a Bloodhound SAM squadron from 1962 or 1963 (depending upon whether Lake or RAFWEB is correct) to 2nd July 1989 reformed as a Tornado ADV squadron on 1st January 1990.

At the end of January 1990 there were eleven fighter squadrons in the RAF. That is four Phantom squadrons and seven Tornado ADV squadrons. All the Tornado squadrons were in 11 Group. Two Phantom squadrons were in RAF Germany, one was in 11 Group and the fourth squadron was in the Falklands.

How many of the above squadrons were assigned to the TASMO Force?

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-33-Seminar-Maritime-Operations.pdf

Two according to the article that begins on Page 116 of the PDF that can be reached by clicking on the link above. That is the Phantom FG.1s of 43 Squadron from its formation in 1969 and the FGR.2s of 29 Squadron from 1980.

I expected it to be at least three. That's because the March 1966 Plan included three squadrons and also because three Maritime Strike squadrons were formed, although as already related one of them was only in existence for a year.

I also expected and at a faster rate than actually happened. I though the second squadron would have been assigned after Eagle was withdrawn and the third after Ark Royal paid off. A second squadron wasn't added after Eagle paid off. A squadron was added after Ark Royal paid off, but I was surprised that it was one of the FGR.2 squadrons and not 111 Squadron as that would have created a homogenous force.

I also thought that the Tornado ADV was built to replace the Phantom in the TASMO role. As already related seven Tornado squadrons were formed by the end of January 1991 and I expected that more than two of them would have been assigned to the TASMO force. But it seems that my expectation was wrong. Does anyone know better?

4. Do you need RAF to perform these tasks or was the FAA doing them before CV force scrapped?

No because the CV force did this before the force was scrapped.

5. Another thought. Strike North lives with USN getting real support from CVA-01 and RN.

As already explained I think it will be CVA.01, 02 and 03 or nothing with one ship in refit/reserve and two operational so the USN would receive "real support" from two CVA.01 class aircraft carriers and the RN.

6. Bastion might be more cramped but more potent a threat. This sucks Soviet resources to deal with that threat away from elsewhere.

See Point 5.

However, shouldn't that be, "This sucks more resources to deal with that threat from elsewhere," because as I understand it that was one of the objectives of Strike North.

7. AEW.....this becomes Nimrod and Argus I think it was called? Imagine all that money sunk into the UK system that never made it beyond development, put into CVA-01 aircraft.......

I think the money spent on Nimrod AEW.3 in the "real world" will be spent on building CVA.02 and CVA.03.

Or instead of that the money spent on Nimrod AEW.3 would be spent on a replacement for the Gannet. Probably the HS. Brough P.139. It would be cancelled in 1986 and the money spent on the Boeing Sentry in he "real world" would be used to buy some Grumman Hawkeyes and Greyhounds.

 

[zen]

Dear can't remember your name(dyslexia) and can't copy and past it, but it begins with an N.

Thank you for your detailed response.

You don't need to explain about 01 02 and 03. The reference to the Lofoten Bastion is that more than a USN Supercarrier and a CVL is potentially cramping the ability of said attendant forces within that Bastion.

Such that CVA-01 or 02 or 03 depending on timing, schedules etc... would either be the carrier in that location or would be in some other location.

Though thinking on it a bit depending on prevailing winds carriers would cycle along the mear wind axis for launch and recovery cycles and then turn out to transit back down wind. In turn a second CV would enter and start their launch or recovery.

The Bastion essentially provides for a defensible zone while the carrier has to steam along a fixed direction and is effectively unable to manoeuvre.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

DEFENCE (CARRIER FORCE) (Hansard, 30 July 1963)

DEFENCE (CARRIER FORCE) (Hansard, 30 July 1963)

api.parliament.uk

DEFENCE (CARRIER FORCE)
HC Deb 30 July 1963 vol 682 cc237-42237

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

With permission, Sir, I will make a statement to the House.

The Government have had the question of aircraft carriers under consideration with a view to determining the requirement for the 1970's. After full consideration it has been decided that the carrier force likely to be required during that period is three carriers.

The life of H.M.S. "Eagle" and H.M.S. "Hermes" can with refits be extended until about 1980. H.M.S. "Victorious" and H.M.S. "Ark Royal" will come to the end of their useful lives in the early 1970s. A decision has, therefore, been taken to build one carrier replacement. This ship will be of around 50,000 tons and will give us, with H.M.S. "Eagle" and "Hermes", a force of three carriers. This decision will ensure that the Fleet Air Arm can maintain its rôle at least until 1980.

I have also had under consideration an aircraft replacement for the Sea Vixen. I am now able to announce that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have reached agreement on the characteristics of a common aircraft which will replace both the Sea Vixen and the Hunter. This aircraft which will be capable of operation either from land or from carriers will greatly increase the flexibility of our use of air power and provide the opportunity for economies in its disposition.

The aircraft will be based on the Hawker P1154 and a detailed study is at this moment proceeding. As soon as this is complete I will take steps to inform hon. Members of the result.

Mr. Healey [Secretary of State for Defence 1964-70 and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1974-79]

May I say, first, how glad we are on this side of the House that the Government have accepted the arguments which we have so often put forward against building an aircraft carrier of the size of the "Forrestal" class? Can the right hon. Gentleman give any estimate of the cost of this proposed aircraft carrier?

Secondly, does his statement mean that no further aircraft carrier will be built for Britain over the next ten years?

Thirdly, will he assure the House that in deciding the procedure which he is to adopt for placing the contract for the aircraft carrier, he will bear in mind the needs of those development areas which are not benefitting from other Government shipbuilding programmes?

On the question of the new aircraft, we are delighted that, for the first time almost in post-war history, the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy have been able to agree on the characteristics of an aircraft. Would he give some idea of the number of aircraft of this type which he proposes to order and what the total cost is likely to be?

Mr Thorneycroft

The all-up cost of the aircraft carrier is about £60 million, which will be spent over eight to ten years. The hon. Member asked about other aircraft carriers. The conclusion which we have reached is that we should go for an aircraft carrier fleet of three carriers, which will be composed, at least until 1980—when the "Ark Royal" and the "Victorious" go out—of the "Hermes" and the "Eagle". Whether a replacement of the "Eagle" and the "Hermes" will be made during the 1970s is a matter which will fall to be considered at that date.

The hon. Member asked about the shipbuilding yards. Naturally, all considerations such as that which he mentioned will be borne in mind, but I emphasise that the building of a ship of this character will be of substantial benefit to the whole of the shipbuilding industry, because the orders will be placed widely.

The hon. Member asked about the aircraft. As he knows, we never mention costs or numbers, because this would disclose our plans in considerable detail to an enemy. But I agree with him that the decision on a common aircraft is a breakthrough in military operations and is much to be welcomed.

I posted the opening part of the debate to show that at mid-1963 the official plan was for a force of 3 strike carriers in the 1970s with CVA.01 replacing Ark Royal as well as Victorious.

I also posted it to show that the officially stated cost of CVA.01 in mid-1963 was £60 million. However, Emmanuel Shinwell pointed out that it was the estimated cost and the final cost could be £70 or even £80 million.

This is a link to Lord Carrington saying almost exactly the same thing to the House of Lords on the same day.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAMME (Hansard, 30 July 1963)

AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAMME (Hansard, 30 July 1963)

api.parliament.uk

 

[zen]

It would be cheaper to opt with the USN for Greyhound or the COD variant of the S3 Viking.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It would be cheaper to opt with the USN for Greyhound or the COD variant of the S3 Viking.

I agree and in comparison to the 1960s purchases of US aircraft it wouldn't be as much a drain on the Treasury's Dollar reserves due to the North Sea oil being on stream.

However, it's somewhat of an "out of the blue" suggestion. Were you writing it in reply to one of my posts?

 

[uk 75]

If the RN had pitched a two carrier solution (CVA01 and Eagle (CVA02 later) as a replacement for its early 60s big 4 (Eagle, Ark, Vic, Hermes) and got NATO support (providing one of the two Carrier Striking Groups in the Atlantic) I think they could have got a carrier force.
By including Hermes they made it easy for the Treasury and the RAF to pour scorn on the proposal and Healey agreed with them.
A two carrier force like France (Foch and Clem) would have been a coherent and affordable proposal.
Without Hermes you could buy standard USN F4s as operated by them on Coral Sea and Midway into the 80s.
Assuming CVA01 and 02 survive Nott and Trident acquisition like CS and Mid they would get F18. The Bucs could be upgraded like the A6.
A handful of E2 AEW and COD could have come from the USN via NATO.
No need for S3 as Seakings RN standard then Merlin for ASW. I am assuming RAF still get Nimrod ASW for the N Atlantic.

 

[Archibald]

While I understand Clemenceaus were too small, the real missed opportunity might have been Essex - not second hand ones, but the two crippled and rebuild and stored from 1945: CV-13 Franklin and CV-17 Bunker Hill.

How hard would it for the goddam RN to set their sights on these two hulls and rebuild them to British standards ? Can't be worse than Hermes and Victorious rebuild...

World Aircraft Carriers List: US Fleet Carriers, WWII Era

 

[uk 75]

I think that the mistake made by the RN was not recognising early enough that the largest possible aircraft carrier (Eagle/CVA01) was the only way to go in the 1960s.
There was no need for the Essex hull, Eagle was a perfectly feasible Phantom/Buc platform and CVA01 was affordable if the RN accepted not wasting money on Victorious and Hermes sooner and had moved to a two carrier force.

 

[EwenS]

While I understand Clemenceaus were too small, the real missed opportunity might have been Essex - not second hand ones, but the two crippled and rebuild and stored from 1945: CV-13 Franklin and CV-17 Bunker Hill.

How hard would it for the goddam RN to set their sights on these two hulls and rebuild them to British standards ? Can't be worse than Hermes and Victorious rebuild...

World Aircraft Carriers List: US Fleet Carriers, WWII Era

Interesting thought re CV-13 & 17. But there are I think a few limitations.

In the Essex class the hangar deck was the strength deck with everything above it being superstructure. On the one hand it simplifies reconstruction, but on the other you need to allow that superstructure to flex on such a long hull. Looking at the wartime as completed drawings there were four expansion joints fitted:-
1. Just aft of the forward lift with the H-4 catapult being just forward of it
2. Just in front of the island structure (behind the 5" mounts)
3. At the aft end of the bridge structure (forward of the 5" mounts)
4. Just aft of the after lift.

Looking at the drawings for CV-12 Hornet after her SCB-27A/SCB-125 refit the aft two expansion joints did not move. The forward pair seem to have been replaced with a single new expansion joint roughly mid-way between the two originals. The H-8 catapults then start immediately forward of that new forward expansion joint.

So, assuming that the SCB-27C conversions are the same, you are probably limited to a catapult of the length of a C-11 (as fitted to the SCB-27C conversions) which means 211ft stroke 225ft overall. Does that make enough of a difference over the 199ft BS5 to allow launching of the Buccaneer & Phantom fully loaded?

If you can't move those expansion joints in the after part of the ship then there is no possibility of placing a catapult on the port side flight deck extension as was done in Eagle & Ark Royal.

 

[Archibald]

Well considering the difference it made, between Clems & Hermes 171 & 175 ft, and the Audacious 199 ft - yes, I would glady take all those ft in length.
Although the Essex still had trouble handling vanilla Phantoms... but how about the brutish Spey-powered Rhinos ?

 

[BlackBat242]

While I understand Clemenceaus were too small, the real missed opportunity might have been Essex - not second hand ones, but the two crippled and rebuild and stored from 1945: CV-13 Franklin and CV-17 Bunker Hill.

How hard would it for the goddam RN to set their sights on these two hulls and rebuild them to British standards ? Can't be worse than Hermes and Victorious rebuild...

World Aircraft Carriers List: US Fleet Carriers, WWII Era

Interesting thought re CV-13 & 17. But there are I think a few limitations.

In the Essex class the hangar deck was the strength deck with everything above it being superstructure. On the one hand it simplifies reconstruction, but on the other you need to allow that superstructure to flex on such a long hull. Looking at the wartime as completed drawings there were four expansion joints fitted:-
1. Just aft of the forward lift with the H-4 catapult being just forward of it
2. Just in front of the island structure (behind the 5" mounts)
3. At the aft end of the bridge structure (forward of the 5" mounts)
4. Just aft of the after lift.

Looking at the drawings for CV-12 Hornet after her SCB-27A/SCB-125 refit the aft two expansion joints did not move. The forward pair seem to have been replaced with a single new expansion joint roughly mid-way between the two originals. The H-8 catapults then start immediately forward of that new forward expansion joint.

So, assuming that the SCB-27C conversions are the same, you are probably limited to a catapult of the length of a C-11 (as fitted to the SCB-27C conversions) which means 211ft stroke 225ft overall. Does that make enough of a difference over the 199ft BS5 to allow launching of the Buccaneer & Phantom fully loaded?

If you can't move those expansion joints in the after part of the ship then there is no possibility of placing a catapult on the port side flight deck extension as was done in Eagle & Ark Royal.

The C-11-1 bow catapults of the SCB-27C Essex CVAs were the same as the bow catapults installed in all 3 Midway class CVAs during their 1950s SCB-110/110A (Coral Sea) modernizations.

Coral Sea's waist (angle deck) catapult was also that size... and she carried all three, in the same length & power, until her 1989 decommissioning... making thousands of F-4 and F/A-18 launches from them!

Midway traded her C-11-1s & shorter C-11-2 (waist) for a pair of C-13-0s in her SCB-101.66 modernization and FDR did the same in her 1969-70 "Austere overhaul".

The boilers of the Essex class ships produced the same pressure & temp as those in the Midways.

 

[zen]

BS4 151ft stroke (6g)
36,000lb to 126kts
177ft stroke same load 145kts
130ft stroke same load 99kts (3.7g)
Zero WOD same load to 149kts needs 210ft stroke.

A 200ft stroke could launch a 60,000lb load to 113kts

 

[The Skipper]

The big question is, how good a carrier would have CVA-01 been ? What kind of capability ? upgraded Midway, Forrestal, Kitty Hawk or Kennedy ?

Close to French "Fosh"-class, I think.

"Foch". not "Fosh".

 

[GK Dundas]

I suspect given her size and some of her flight deck design somewhere at at first between Foch and Midway at first.
I am assuming here that during the 70s there would be fairly large overhaul. The sea darts would be deleted and the hanger deck and flight deck would be extended.
I'm of two minds on the Alaskan Highway. It might actually prove useful but if not perhaps the island would be extended.

 

[starviking]

The big question is, how good a carrier would have CVA-01 been ? What kind of capability ? upgraded Midway, Forrestal, Kitty Hawk or Kennedy ?

Close to French "Fosh"-class, I think.

"Foch". not "Fosh".

Well, the claim was that it was as capable as USS America, but on 2/3rds the displacement. If all the elements (Alaskan Highway, arrestors, catapults) work as supposed it’s doesn’t seem to be an excessively boastful comparison.

 

[uk 75]

The Royal Navy operated Ark Royal as its only fixed wing carrier from 1972 to 1979.
Had CVA01 been ordered in the early sixties as planned and entered service by 1970 the Ark could have left service in 1966 and not been refitted.
Keeping Eagle in service as well as CVA01 and two Commando carriers through the 1970s would probably have required too much manpower. The unlovely Tiger and Blake could have been scrapped in the 60s which would help somewhat.
Replacing Eagle with a second CVA would have been pretty difficult in the UK as it existed in our reality though with no Invincible to worry about it could have been done.
The other casualty would have been the numbers of hunter killer fleet nuclear submarines built in the 70s.

 

[Lascaris]

How does a pair of fixed winged carriers affect EFA by the late 1970s, early 1980s? Presumably the British will also need a replacement for the Phantoms and Buccaneers in their carrier wings. Do we see the British requirements being closer to the French ones as a result? Do we see them alternatively go for Hornet which potentially could kill Eurofighter in i5s cradle?

 

[zen]

Hornet is a good system, but lacked range/endurance for a F4 replacement. They were more effectively a Crusader/Corsair replacement in a single type thanks to the avionics.

An intriguing thought is another attempt at Anglo-French collaboration on a new aircraft.

IF we're in a world were CVA-01, CVA-02 and maybe CVA-03 exist and they cover the North Sea/GIUK Gap and assist in Strike North. Then the thinking would be to replace F4 and S2.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Please note that the below can only happen if the British economy performs as well (or better) than West Germany's from the Sandys Defence review to the end of the Cold War. That is the British economy starts to perform better than it did in the "Real World" in the late 1950s. By the middle of the 1960s is performing as well (or better) than West Germany's and continues to perform as well (or better) than West Germany's until the end of the Cold War.

I think that the largest armed forces that the UK could have supported from circa 1970 to the end of the Cold War are those that existed before the Mason Defence Review of 1974-5 with three CVA.01s instead of 3 Invincible class. Some of the money to do it would have come from the Top Brass, MoD and the British Defence Industry doing their jobs better. That is new equipment is delivered on time and at cost. However, most of it comes from the British economy performing as well as West Germany's.

In the case of the RN it would have a fleet of 5 SSBN's, 20 SSNs, 10 SS, 70-75 destroyers & frigates, 3 LPH & 3 LPD at the end of the Cold War in addition to the 3 CVA.01s.

Please note that the above can only happen if the British economy performs as well (or better) than West Germany's from the Sandys Defence review to the end of the Cold War. That is the British economy starts to perform better than it did in the "Real World" in the late 1950s. By the middle of the 1960s is performing as well (or better) than West Germany's and continues to perform as well (or better) than West Germany's until the end of the Cold War.

 

[uk 75]

While I agree that it's worth making the "real world" point about British economic weakness it was not the whole story.
The 1964 Labour government was commited to large scale expenditures in areas like health and education. It also reflected a disenchantment post Suez crisis with Britain's colonial legacies.
CVA01 and F111K go as much for political as economic reasons.
Even the Conservatives were looking to Europe for Britain's future role. The Heath government's 1970 Defence White paper did not send the RN back to Singapore and balks at keeping Eagle in service. It also confirmed the Anglo French Jaguar as the main Hunter replacement.
CVA01 could have survived if the RN had not tied its role to East of Suez and NATO had pushed harder for the UK to carry on contributing to the Striking Fleet.
But in 1962 the US was not short of carriers and Forrestals and Enterprise were bigger than anything the RN could deploy.
The Invincible ASW carriers and the T22 frigates that replace CVA01 and T82 as the RN's task force for NATO reflect the drastic growth in the Soviet nuclear submarine threat. The Soviet surface fleet grows as well but USN carriers and SSN plus RAF aircraft are seen as principal counters to these
The RN were not as effective as the RAF in lobbying for its forces. Throughout the Cold War the priorities for the UK were:

The Deterrent. RAF until 1968 then Polaris with Trident coming.

West Germany. RAF and Army forces increasingly focus on the defence of West Berlin and West Germany.

Air Defence. The Lightning and Bloodhound force then F4, Rapiers and Tornado F2.

If more money had been available these three roles would still have swallowed up resources before RN general purpose forces (carriers). The hunter killer SSN was primarily there to protect the Polaris boats.

 

[uk 75]

This thread is packed with good information and arguments about CVA01.
Like TSR2 it ought to have been possible, but many things came together to prevent it

 

[Rule of cool]

My view is if Britain can build 3 I class in the stagflation of the 70s then it can build 2 CVA01s and refit Eagle in the lower inflation environment starting in the 60s.

The long lead items for CVA01 had already been ordered when the ship was cancelled, as had the air group.

For me the tricky thing is that the Phantoms and Buccaneer S2 were in service by 1968, CVA01 won't be in service until 1973 and the Victorious and Hermes can't handle the Phantoms. This means that in in order to have 2 Phantom capable carriers in commission the Ark Royal Phantom refit will have to happen, and the Ark will serve until CVA02 enters service in 1976 (having been laid down in 1969-70 as soon as CVA01 is launched).

 

[Scott Kenny]

The big question is, how good a carrier would have CVA-01 been ? What kind of capability ? upgraded Midway, Forrestal, Kitty Hawk or Kennedy ?

My vague rememberances of "Navy matters - CVA-01" long gone early Internet website are of an absolute botched, compromised horror ship.

Any chance it could have resulted in a decent ship down the line ?

I would have aimed for "upgraded Midway" (Coral Sea, specifically). 45,000 tons light, 60ktons fully loaded.

Given that Coral Sea herself stayed in service clear through till 1990, that seems to be a sufficiently versatile hull size.

What came out of that was a ship was 53,000 tons (action condition, 54,500 tons deep) 890ft WL, 925ft OA (963ft with the bridle catcher), Hull beam 122ft, beam max 231ft, flight deck 189ft, draught 32ft.

So yes, 60,000-70,000shp machinery plant might have been nice but it was just not possible. QE2 plant was only 55,000shp per unit. So no point whinging about that. Move on.

But there is no denying the ship was to have been innovative. For example:-
Parallel deck layout that generated advantages for aircraft landing in bad weather in comparison with the then traditional angled deck.
Scissors lift (replicated in the Invincibles but with a few teething problems leading to “drunken” lift incidents)
Alaskan Highway to allow aircraft movements outboard of the island.
Access from the hangar deck to the quarterdeck to allow testing of aircraft engines without disrupting flight deck operations.
New water spray arrester gear.
There are probably others.

Is there a picture of that flight deck somewhere? I'm having a really hard time picturing it... Maybe I'm just tired (it is 0130local here...)

Is that the Spey-powered version?

If it is, my guess is that the R&D programme would have suffered from the same delays and cost escalation problems that they Spey-Phantom had. It's got the same engine so it's reasonable to expect that it would double from £25 million to £50 million.

My other guess is that the production cost would be several times the estimate too which is due to the reasons that I've already given for the Spey-Phantom, i.e. it's a non-standard aircraft, the sterling devaluation and the relatively small number of aircraft built.

Edit. No it isn't the Spey-powered version. Serves me right for not doing a quick search on the internet.

No, J75 powered and Sparrow armed, but only single seat.

Could have been Olympus for the UK, depending on balance of payments needs or on commonality of engine with other UK aircraft. There'd already been some work done on an Olympus engine swap for J75 in the UK F-105 proposal, Olympus BOl.21. Since Vulcan bombers were also using Olympus engines, I'd probably recommend the engine swap. The flip side of that is that J75s were the original engine on some 707s (but no C-135s).

 

[zen]

Therefore, they had to be loaded horizontally (rather than vertically as Sea Dart usually is) so apparatus was required to turn the vertically stored Sea Darts horizontal prior to loading, resulting in the bespoke launcher. Rebuilding the Royal Navy has diagrams of the two flight decks and it is hard to imagine how Sea Dart could be loaded vertically on the pre-December 1962 version due to the lack of hull depth under the launchers.

A bit of necromancy here but I think this bit is intriguing....

The reason the County class Destroyers weren't updated to Sea Dart is because of no side loading system and storage......and Sea Dart was designed for vertical storage.....

But had this version of Sea Dart Magazine and transport system been created With Sea Dart given the strengthening for side storage.....

It does potentially open that option up. To allow a major update of the County design.

 

[EwenS]

Is there a picture of that flight deck somewhere? I'm having a really hard time picturing it... Maybe I'm just tired (it is 0130local here...)

It wasn't a true parallel deck as the ship was too small to allow it, but is always described as such. The angle was 2.5 degrees in the design study of Nov 1962 and 3 degrees in the sketch design from July 1963 and the final design in Dec 1965. See below:-

And note The Alaskan Highway running starboard side outboard of the island, allowing aircraft with wings folded to be moved forward and aft.

The fight deck of a Nimitz class has an angle of 9 degrees.

 

[Rule of cool]

Just on the Sea Dart, I've seen people argue against it given the trajectory of carrier armament moved towards close-in self-defence. However area defence SAMs were the style of the time, USS Kitty Hawk and other US carriers were fitted with Terrier.

 

[EwenS]

Just on the Sea Dart, I've seen people argue against it given the trajectory of carrier armament moved towards close-in self-defence. However area defence SAMs were the style of the time, USS Kitty Hawk and other US carriers were fitted with Terrier.

Only Kitty Hawk, Constellation & America CVA-66 were fitted with Terrier. It was later removed from all of them.

 

[Rule of cool]

Gannet was doomed by 1976, Westland had long washed its hands of it in terms of keeping open facilities to modernise the airframe and Rolls-Royce was equally cut to shut the Mamba repair shop as quickly as possible.

I'd say this was a consequence of the decision first in 1966 to cut carrier numbers down to 2 until 1975 then the 1968 decision to have a single carrier until 1972, which was then extended by the 1970 Tory govt to the late 70s?

IIUC by about 1972 849sqn had 7 Gannet AEW and a couple of CoDs, which is certainly not enough work for Westland and RR to bother with. The RAAF had the same problem keeping it's B707 tankers in service.

However in this environment where the Government builds a pair of CVAs with service lives of 30+ years and keeps one other carrier alive through the 70s that would mean a Gannet fleet of over 20 aircraft through the 70s with no end in sight. This would impact Westland and RRs thinking on the viability of their supporting facilities etc.

 

[Rule of cool]

Only Kitty Hawk, Constellation & America CVA-66 were fitted with Terrier. It was later removed from all of them.

True, and my guess is that during the 80s the Sea Dart would be swapped out for Sea Wolf and CIWS guns, however this is well into the future and Admirals weren't thinking that in the 60s and the close-in option was the very ordinary Sea cat.

 

[uk 75]

The Royal Navy in 1982 is a very different force from that in 1962 when CVA01 is being designed. In 1962
Its only area defence missile ships the Countys are only just coming into service while only HMS Dreadnought has been built for its nuclear fleet. Its escort ships rely on guns rather than missiles.
Assuming CVA01 had been built as planned she would have been a very different ship from the well known drawings.
We can see this from Ark's appearance after her conversion. No 3D radar just a pair of bedsteads. Although fitted for Seacat mounts she never received them.
Invincible had a single radar similar to those on T82/42. I expect CVA01 would have been fitted the same.
She would not have received Seadart (the Invincibles also lost theirs). Phalanx or Goalkeeper would have been mounted as they were on the Invincibles.
Steam boilers would not have taxed the RN (other big ships like Fearless had them into the 90s)
Her airgroup would have been identical to Ark. The Gannet AEW and COD were fine for one or two ships. Her Phantoms and Buccaneers would have survived into the 1991 Gulf War. But the Cold War peace dividend would have seen her leave the fleet
If relations with France had prospered it is possible to imagine a joint UK French carrier programme

 

[CV12Hornet]

Just on the Sea Dart, I've seen people argue against it given the trajectory of carrier armament moved towards close-in self-defence. However area defence SAMs were the style of the time, USS Kitty Hawk and other US carriers were fitted with Terrier.

My personal beef against Sea Dart on CVA-01 is that it's such a penny-wise, pound foolish maneuver in true British procurement fashion. Okay, so you can't afford enough Sea Dart escorts to protect your carriers - so you drive up the cost of the carriers by fitting an area SAM system???

Seriously, look at some of the design studies during the period for CVA-01. Sea Dart adds something like 20% or more to the price tag of the ships.

Really, the RN should've invested in some Hawkeyes for CVA-01. That would lead to real cost savings by eliminating the need for the five picket Sea Dart ships they needed without an AEW aircraft better than the ancient Gannets.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It wasn't a true parallel deck as the ship was too small to allow it, but is always described as such. The angle was 2.5 degrees in the design study of Nov 1962 and 3 degrees in the sketch design from July 1963 and the final design in Dec 1965. See below:-

Thank you!

That looks a lot more conventional than I was attempting to picture based on the description.

And note The Alaskan Highway running starboard side outboard of the island, allowing aircraft with wings folded to be moved forward and aft.

I'm not sold on that idea, but then again the elevator layout is terrible.

It looks like the idea is to be able to use both elevators to feed the forward catapult.

The fight deck of a Nimitz class has an angle of 9 degrees.

Yes, and Coral Sea had a 10deg angled flight deck.

I guess carriers steam so that the flight deck has the wind straight down it when only recovering aircraft? As opposed to the pilots having a crosswind landing?

 

[Rule of cool]

My personal beef against Sea Dart on CVA-01 is that it's such a penny-wise, pound foolish maneuver in true British procurement fashion. Okay, so you can't afford enough Sea Dart escorts to protect your carriers - so you drive up the cost of the carriers by fitting an area SAM system???

Seriously, look at some of the design studies during the period for CVA-01. Sea Dart adds something like 20% or more to the price tag of the ships.

Really, the RN should've invested in some Hawkeyes for CVA-01. That would lead to real cost savings by eliminating the need for the five picket Sea Dart ships they needed without an AEW aircraft better than the ancient Gannets.

I don't disagree, I recall reading how putting Sea Dart on the carrier gets the TF the number of launchers it needs without having to buy another T82. However I'd point out that even the USN must have had similar reasoning given how their 60s carrier had Terrier, so the RN likely was not insane.

 

[CV12Hornet]

I don't disagree, I recall reading how putting Sea Dart on the carrier gets the TF the number of launchers it needs without having to buy another T82. However I'd point out that even the USN must have had similar reasoning given how their 60s carrier had Terrier, so the RN likely was not insane.

Yeah, tactically the fit makes sense. But the RN was and is not the USN and doesn't have the same financial resources. CVA-01 was, despite its size, very much a budget ship; the Kitty Hawks were not. An expensive SAM system makes more sense on the latter than the former.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Royal Navy in 1982 is a very different force from that in 1962 when CVA01 is being designed. In 1962
Its only area defence missile ships the Countys are only just coming into service while only HMS Dreadnought has been built for its nuclear fleet. Its escort ships rely on guns rather than missiles.
Assuming CVA01 had been built as planned she would have been a very different ship from the well known drawings.
We can see this from Ark's appearance after her conversion. No 3D radar just a pair of bedsteads. Although fitted for Seacat mounts she never received them.
Invincible had a single radar similar to those on T82/42. I expect CVA01 would have been fitted the same.
She would not have received Seadart (the Invincibles also lost theirs). Phalanx or Goalkeeper would have been mounted as they were on the Invincibles.
Steam boilers would not have taxed the RN (other big ships like Fearless had them into the 90s)
Her airgroup would have been identical to Ark. The Gannet AEW and COD were fine for one or two ships. Her Phantoms and Buccaneers would have survived into the 1991 Gulf War. But the Cold War peace dividend would have seen her leave the fleet
If relations with France had prospered it is possible to imagine a joint UK French carrier programme

That's the trajectory of a navy committed to decline, whereas going ahead with CVA01 is the trajectory of a navy (and Government) committed to remaining a major naval power.

This is a recurring theme in Britain from the failure at Suez, they'd like to retain power and influence around the world but lack the confidence (and possibly associated expertise) to do so. This pushed Britain down sad paths, like never updating the Lightning because its replacement was just round the corner, or the austere Ark Phantom refit because it was only going to serve until 1975.

An alternative trajectory (which of course requires political courage but not much foresight) would be to reduce ideology in defence strategy and procurement, identify opportunities where Britain can do well and pursue those with great vigour. After all it's hardly surprising that an industry constantly under unnecessary pressure from Government fails to deliver great products on time and budget. Conversely an industry that is strongly encouraged to deliver what it can without constant changing of requirements and journeys down unproductive paths should produce good results.

 

[Rule of cool]

Yeah, tactically the fit makes sense. But the RN was and is not the USN and doesn't have the same financial resources. CVA-01 was, despite its size, very much a budget ship; the Kitty Hawks were not. An expensive SAM system makes more sense on the latter than the former.

I read once that the reason 3 shafts and subsequently 53,000t was chosen was because 58,000t didn't provide any significant tactical advantage that would justify the expense of the 4th shaft it would require. The Admirals were thinking about cost, and fitting Sea Dart was one result of that thinking.

I recall reading that T82s would be needed to defend the support group of oilers etc, but they rationalised this away by planning to use Counties with Sea Slugs.

 

[CV12Hornet]

I read once that the reason 3 shafts and subsequently 53,000t was chosen was because 58,000t didn't provide any significant tactical advantage that would justify the expense of the 4th shaft it would require. The Admirals were thinking about cost, and fitting Sea Dart was one result of that thinking.

I recall reading that T82s would be needed to defend the support group of oilers etc, but they rationalised this away by planning to use Counties with Sea Slugs.

Yeah, I've only seen reference to T82s with the carriers and amphibs, not the replenishment ships.

 

[zen]

Sea Dart...
Admiralty focus was on distribution of this SAM across as much as possible. Because keeping ships close together invited the risk of a single nuclear weapon chopping the bulk of the out.
The chief problem then was affording as much as possible on as many ships as possible. But every parsimonious cut of the SAM only increased the unit costs of those remaining.
But sadly personnel numbers were also a factor so not every ship could mount every system.
This is part of the multitude of problems that beset Type 82.

Radar fit.
It's a proper open question what would happen if the RN continues with a carrier fleet in planning terms beyond the decommissioning of then current vessels through the 70's.
Would they stick with the Dutch Broomstick? After the Dutch have reneged on Sea Dart?
ASWRE would still be pushing for their preference of C-band electro-mechanical scanning piling up justifications for that.
Key being it's entirely domestic content.
The fallback would be some interim version of Type 984, NOT a repeat of the older, less capable mixture of Type 965, Type 986 and Type 987 (these latter actually minor updates of 982 and 983 respectively).
In fact it's highly possible they'd look at removing the mechanical emitter horn system and replace with electrical scan.

Lifts....
Extremely sound locations
Deck edge near the rear is very sheltered and it'd be too exposed to repeat that ahead of the island. Thus inboard is in fact even more sheltered and neither interfere with deck movements, or operations of launch and recovery.

The Alaskan Taxiway has to be seen in the context of modern (for the times) stabilisation. That would keep the deck within 1 degree if tilt. If it's too rough to maintain that, flying operations are shut down. So it's unlikely to see aircraft moved along that route outside the island.

Flight deck...
The offset recovery strip angle permits approaching aircraft to start by simply following the Carrier and lining up with its direction of travel and at a set distance angling off to line up the strip.
If anything this is a lot easier than then conventional angled decks.

 

[Rule of cool]

Radar fit.
It's a proper open question what would happen if the RN continues with a carrier fleet in planning terms beyond the decommissioning of then current vessels through the 70's.
Would they stick with the Dutch Broomstick? After the Dutch have reneged on Sea Dart?
ASWRE would still be pushing for their preference of C-band electro-mechanical scanning piling up justifications for that.
Key being it's entirely domestic content.
The fallback would be some interim version of Type 984, NOT a repeat of the older, less capable mixture of Type 965, Type 986 and Type 987 (these latter actually minor updates of 982 and 983 respectively).
In fact it's highly possible they'd look at removing the mechanical emitter horn system and replace with electrical scan.

I believe that tied to the decision to cancel CVA01 was the decision that 3D radars were not required and therefore Britain withdrew from the Anglo-Dutch 3D Type 988 project an declared the 3D Type 984 obsolete. When did the Dutch decide to go with the Terrier? Presumably it was after they got shafted by the British on the Type 988 in 1966.

IIUC the Type 988 could be fitted to the T82s whereas a developed Type 984 could not. What's more in the absence of the Type 988 the T82s needed the Type 965 search radar coupled with the Type 992 to provide target indication for Sea Dart whereas the Type 988 was a STIR radar that did both.

Given the Type 984 carriers also carried a Type 965 and the T82s needed 2 radars to run Sea Dart I'd suggest that if CVA01 was built it would be cheaper to go with the Type 988 as it would save equipping the carriers and their escorts with 2 radars each.

Failing that an updated Type 984 with solid state electronics and the mechanical servo driven feedhorns replaced by frequency changes to get the vertical scanning. I recall reading that the Type 984 had better performance than the Type 988 but was too limited by only being fitted to carriers.

 

[zen]

When did the Dutch decide to go with the Terrier? Presumably it was after they got shafted by the British on the Type 988 in 1966.

No the Dutch screwed the UK as we only 'joined' because of 'international partnerships' and a bribe to get them on our side over EEC membership.
The Dutch agreed they buy Sea Dart in return we'd buy Broomstick.
Then they reneged over costs in favour of Standard.

if CVA01 was built it would be cheaper to go with the Type 988 as it would save equipping the carriers and their escorts with 2 radars each.

It would fundamentally be cheaper to opt for funding ASWRE C-band 3D radar and distribute across as many platforms as possible.
This would cut the TIR set requirements and reduce costs for Sea Dart equipped ships.