The Royal Navy with CVA01

Apparently the British by this change as the Tartar had a reaction time of 30 seconds compared to the Sea Dart's 12 seconds.

I've not heard of the ASWRE C-band 3D radar, how far along was it?
 
The shift from East of Suez to NATO puts the RN's ASW forces centre stage. The S and T class SSNs, T22 frigates, EH101 helos, and RAF Nimrods are all made possible by abandoning fixed wing carrier aviation.
The Soviet threat is paramount, carriers contribute much less than ASW to dealing with it. The Soviet surface fleet can be dealt with by land based air and SSNs working together with the US carrier fleet.
 
I'm not sold on that idea, but then again the elevator layout is terrible.

It looks like the idea is to be able to use both elevators to feed the forward catapult.
The idea was that during continuous operations that the aircraft would land, fold their wings, taxi back towards the stern inboard of the island, then turn onto the Alaskan Highway where there are four refuelling and rearming stations, then move forward to the bow catapult, extend wings and take-off.
The plan for the air group in this scenario was to have 1/3 airborne, 1/3 on deck being replenished/at readiness and 1/3 down in the hangar for maintenance.
For maximum effort both catapults would be used to fly off 2/3rds of the air group.


1707477502708.png
 
The idea was that during continuous operations that the aircraft would land, fold their wings, taxi back towards the stern inboard of the island, then turn onto the Alaskan Highway where there are four refuelling and rearming stations, then move forward to the bow catapult, extend wings and take-off.
The plan for the air group in this scenario was to have 1/3 airborne, 1/3 on deck being replenished/at readiness and 1/3 down in the hangar for maintenance.
For maximum effort both catapults would be used to fly off 2/3rds of the air group.


View attachment 719501
If I have the runout correct on the #3 wire, the plane comes to a stop at roughly the front of the island, then needs to go aft all the way around the island to refuel and rearm.
 
The beauty of the forward lift is if on recovery an aircraft has some maintenance issue, it can turn sternwards and be over the lift quickly.
If for storage, forward to the narrow park.
If needed again, it can traverse to the Alaskan Taxiway.

Meanwhile maintained aircraft rise on the sternwards lift ready to go forward.
 
The beauty of the forward lift is if on recovery an aircraft has some maintenance issue, it can turn sternwards and be over the lift quickly.
If for storage, forward to the narrow park.
If needed again, it can traverse to the Alaskan Taxiway.

Meanwhile maintained aircraft rise on the sternwards lift ready to go forward.
Okay, I am following that part.

Still don't like the deck elevator, but that's a different discussion.
 
It wasn't a true parallel deck as the ship was too small to allow it, b


Imperial Hobby Productions on X: We close our first month of ...
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And note The Alaskan Highway running starboard side outboard of the island, allowing aircraft with wings folded to be moved forward and aft.

The fight deck of a Nimitz class has an angle of 9 degrees.


What size are you looking at the get a true parallel deck?
 
Can I ask where were the originally envisaged Ikara and Sea Cat launchers meant to be located on the CVA-01 please?

Regards
Pioneer
 

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The shift from East of Suez to NATO puts the RN's ASW forces centre stage. The S and T class SSNs, T22 frigates, EH101 helos, and RAF Nimrods are all made possible by abandoning fixed wing carrier aviation.
How? And the Invincible class is conspicuous by its absence from that sentence.
The Soviet threat is paramount, carriers contribute much less than ASW to dealing with it.
Did you mean?
. . . carriers contribute much less to ASW than to dealing with it.
Once again how?

Furthermore, the RN has 3 aircraft carriers in both timelines. It had 3 ASW carriers (the Invincible class) IOTL each with a squadron of ASW helicopters and 3 strike carriers (CVA.01 class) ITTL each with a squadron of ASW helicopters. So whatever the contribution that aircraft carriers made IOTL would have been exactly the same ITTL.
The Soviet surface fleet can be dealt with by land based air and SSNs working together with the US carrier fleet.
True. However, is land based air significantly cheaper than carrier based air, when the cost of building & operating the Invincible class is included? My conclusion is, no, it isn't.
 
My personal beef against Sea Dart on CVA-01 is that it's such a penny-wise, pound foolish maneuver in true British procurement fashion. Okay, so you can't afford enough Sea Dart escorts to protect your carriers - so you drive up the cost of the carriers by fitting an area SAM system???
The estimated costs of CVA.01 in 1966 that I've seen are between £60-70 million. How much would have been saved by deleting the Sea Dart system?

The best I can do is the difference between the costs of Types 21 and 42 as the latter was effectively the former with Sea Dart. The costs quoted in Jane's 1969-70 which were £7-8 million and £17 million respectively. Difference £9-10 million.

Therefore, was the cost of CVA.01 without Sea Dart £50-61 million?​

I think not because CVA.01 would still need a long-range air surveillance radar so it would still have the Type 965P radar that Type 42 Batch 1 had (or something better & therefore more expensive) and ADAWS (which Type 42 had & Type 21 didn't) and there is 3 years of inflation to include.
Seriously, look at some of the design studies during the period for CVA-01. Sea Dart adds something like 20% or more to the price tag of the ships.
Whoops! Scotties! I didn't see that before writing my reply.
20% of £60-70 million = £12-14 million.​

That seems too good to be true, because if it did the RN would have proposed CVA.01s "fitted for but not with" Sea Dart in the 1966 Defence Review if deleting Sea Dart saved that much.
Really, the RN should've invested in some Hawkeyes for CVA-01. That would lead to real cost savings by eliminating the need for the five picket Sea Dart ships they needed without an AEW aircraft better than the ancient Gannets.
I think some Sea Dart armed escorts would have been required if some Hawkeye's had been purchased for CVA.01.

However, building CVA.01 does mean that Shackleton MR.2s (which were older than the Gannet AEW.3s) wouldn't have been converted to AEW.2s and there's no need for the Nimrod AEW.3 to replace them. The money spent on Nimrod AEW 1977-86 would have paid for enough Hawkeye's to replace the Gannets in 849NAS and I suspect that there would have been enough change to bring the 11 Nimrod MR.1 airframes converted to AEW.3s to MR.2 standard.
 
The Royal Navy in 1982 is a very different force from that in 1962 when CVA01 is being designed. In 1962
Its only area defence missile ships the Countys are only just coming into service while only HMS Dreadnought has been built for its nuclear fleet. Its escort ships rely on guns rather than missiles.
Assuming CVA01 had been built as planned she would have been a very different ship from the well known drawings.
We can see this from Ark's appearance after her conversion. No 3D radar just a pair of bedsteads. Although fitted for Seacat mounts she never received them.
Invincible had a single radar similar to those on T82/42. I expect CVA01 would have been fitted the same.
She would not have received Seadart (the Invincibles also lost theirs). Phalanx or Goalkeeper would have been mounted as they were on the Invincibles.
Steam boilers would not have taxed the RN (other big ships like Fearless had them into the 90s)
Her airgroup would have been identical to Ark. The Gannet AEW and COD were fine for one or two ships. Her Phantoms and Buccaneers would have survived into the 1991 Gulf War. But the Cold War peace dividend would have seen her leave the fleet.
If relations with France had prospered it is possible to imagine a joint UK French carrier programme
For a change, I more or less agree with you.

The most important "less" is the sentence that I've emboldened and underlined. CVA.01 and her sisters would have been kept in service for the same length of time as the Invincible class in spite of their operating costs.

I think the CVA.01 class would have been built with Sea Dart because the Invincible class that was built instead of it had Sea Dart. It might not have been removed. As I understand it the Sea Dart was removed from the Invincible class to increase the size of the air group and to provide more magazine space for the larger air group's armament. A CVA.01 built to the OTL design had a much bigger flight deck and an air armament magazine capacity than were much larger than a modernised Invincible so the benefit of removing Sea Dart wasn't as great. Also it would be much harder (and more expensive) to extend the flight deck of a CVA.01 over the space vacated by the Sea Dart launcher than it was on an Invincible.

The RAF wouldn't have had its two Phantom maritime fighter squadrons (later replaced by 2 Tornado ADV squadrons), two Buccaneer maritime strike squadrons (later replaced by 2 Tornado IDS squadrons) and the Shackleton AEW squadron (later replaced by the Boeing Sentry). There wouldn't be a Nimrod AEW project ITTL and as I've written many times before the money spent on that would have bought more than enough Hawkeyes & Greyounds to replace the AEW & COD Gannets for 3 CVA.01s.
 
The effects of inflation in the 1970s is horrendous. But is general inflation, from the BoE data, the same as for technology businesses/products? Look at the costs of the Ikara Leander conversions.

First ship - Leander 1970-73 £7.6 million.
Fourth ship - Aurora - 1974-76 £15.6 million
Final ship - Dido - 1975-78 £23 million

And the Exocet Leanders rose from £13.8 million to £47.7million between 1973 and 1982. Those kind of price rises eventually saw the cancellation of the Seawolf conversions cancelled in the early 1980s.
No it isn't, but it's the best that I can do and does provide a rough guide.
And look at the cost of the Type 42 Batch 1s.
£17.0 million estimated cost of a Type 42 according to Jane's 1969-70.​
£23.2 million actual cost of Sheffield completed in 1975.​
£31.0 million actual cost of Birmingham completed in 1976.​
£34.6 million actual cost of Newcastle completed in 1978.​
£37.9 million actual cost of Coventry completed in 1978.​
£36.9 million actual cost of Glasgow completed in 1979.​
£40.5 million actual cost of Cardiff completed in 1979.​
However, according to the Bank of England inflation calculator, £17 million in 1969 was:
£26.1 million in 1974.​
£31.8 million in 1975.​
£36.7 million in 1976.​
£42.0 million in 1977.​
£45.2 million in 1978.​
£50.2 million in 1979.​

Sometimes, general inflation, from the BoE data, was more than inflation from technology businesses/products.
 
And look at the cost of the Type 42 Batch 1s.
£17.0 million estimated cost of a Type 42 according to Jane's 1969-70.​
£23.2 million actual cost of Sheffield completed in 1975.​
£31.0 million actual cost of Birmingham completed in 1976.​
£34.6 million actual cost of Newcastle completed in 1978.​
£37.9 million actual cost of Coventry completed in 1978.​
£36.9 million actual cost of Glasgow completed in 1979.​
£40.5 million actual cost of Cardiff completed in 1979.​
However, according to the Bank of England inflation calculator, £17 million in 1969 was:
£26.1 million in 1974.​
£31.8 million in 1975.​
£36.7 million in 1976.​
£42.0 million in 1977.​
£45.2 million in 1978.​
£50.2 million in 1979.​

Sometimes, general inflation, from the BoE data, was more than inflation from technology businesses/products.
Hang on!
As they built ships the cost of each goes down. Efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design.

Which is why it's not £50M by 1979, but £40.5M
Reverse the numbers and see what the last would cost in 1969.
 
Hang on!
As they built ships the cost of each goes down. Efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design.

Which is why it's not £50M by 1979, but £40.5M
Reverse the numbers and see what the last would cost in 1969.
Here's the link.
Do it yourself.
 
Can I ask where were the originally envisaged Ikara and Sea Cat launchers meant to be located on the CVA-01 please?
The Ikara launcher would have been on a sponson just ahead of the aft lift. In the final design this installation was replaced by a another refuelling/rearming position.

1707558247314.png

This is the magazine layout. Given this transverse section view the launcher does have the capability to fire over the deck towards the portside - though of course the island would block the arcs off the port bow.

1707558443555.jpeg
 
Hang on!
As they built ships the cost of each goes down. Efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design.

Which is why it's not £50M by 1979, but £40.5M
Reverse the numbers and see what the last would cost in 1969.
And how do you explain the first ship built by each yard costing less than the rate of inflation?
  • Sheffield (completed February 1975) the first ship built by Vickers cost £23.2 million instead of £26.1 million (inflation 1969-74).
  • Birmingham (completed December 1976) the first ship built by Cammell Laird cost £31.0 million instead of £36.7 million (inflation 1969-76).
  • Coventry (completed November 1978) the first ship built by Swan Hunter cost £37.9 million instead of £45.2 million (inflation 1969-78).
 
As we're into AH let us briefly examine an Alternative CVA-01.
The key to such is to feed in the multirole fighter-bomber prefered concept of this period. Still under the Aegis of OR.346 and AW.406.

This resolves into something like BAC (Vickers-Supermarine) Type 590.
This completely meshes with then studies on what best fits AW.406.
Namely a twin Spey VG aircraft under 50,000lb with Strike weaponry (actually the study has 48,000lb)

The lightest '60 CVA-01 was the 42,000ton comparison. Which costs the least.
This still trying to handle OR.346 and thus only 18 such aircraft. Each upto 90ft long and weighing upto 80,000lb. Needing catapults of 225ft stroke length.
Though happily it can tote some 32 Buccaneer sized aircraft.....

The '62 study shows a CVA-01 of 50,000tons and a deck limit of 60,000lb individual weight. Catapults of 200ft stroke length.

Arguably if the new carrier is being designed not for current aircraft such as Sea Vixen and Buccaneer, and not just for next aircraft F4K Phantom II. It is being designed for the aircraft after the OR.346.

Now if RN and RAF agree on Type 590, 50,000lb twin Spey (or scaled up RB.199). That lower 60,000lb individual limit gives a 20% excess for generation after OR.346. It also frees OR.346 should weight growth afflict the it's realisation.

Consequently, it is possible to compromise the carriers further if accepting the reciprocal compromise of future domestic aircraft being sourced rather than assuming USN designs as the future. Which can be constrained as fits UK needs....

Such a ship can cross deck F4, but could not F111B or later F14.
But by the late 70's the F/A-18 is coming......
 
And how do you explain the first ship built by each yard costing less than the rate of inflation?
Isn't that obvious?
Who's buying the equipment to fit into these ships and when did they buy?
 
Hang on!
As they built ships the cost of each goes down. Efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design.

Which is why it's not £50M by 1979, but £40.5M
Reverse the numbers and see what the last would cost in 1969.
The six Type 42 Batch 1s were built in 3 yards.
  • Cammell Laird built one (Birmingham) see Post 176.
  • Swan Hunter built three, which were laid down between January 1973 & April 1974, launched between June 1974 & April 1976 and completed between February 1978 & May 1979 at costs of.
    • £37.9 million Coventry (completed November 1978)
    • £34.6 million Newcastle (completed February 1978 but laid down after Coventry).
    • £36.9 million Glasgow (completed May 1979)
    • The average cost was £36.4 million. Therefore, it looks like there was no saving due to efficiencies as the yard staff repeated the same design.
    • That's less than the.
      • £42.0 million that £17 million was worth at the end of 1977.
        • And the.
      • £45.2 million that £17 million was worth at the end of 1978.
    • Though to be fair the 3 ships were built at the same time making said efficiencies impossible and Glasgow may have cost less if the fire of 23.09.76 hadn't happened.
  • Vickers built 2 Type 42 Batch 1 destroyers for the RN.
    • Sheffield as already noted in Post 176.
    • Cardiff (which was laid down 17 months after Sheffield) but due to the yards workload (Invincible, the Type 42 built for Argentina and nuclear submarines) she had to be towed to Swan Hunter, who completed her in October 1979.
    • She's the one that cost £40.5 million to build.
    • However, we can't say that she cost 80% of £17 million at 1979 prices instead of 89% of £17 million at 1974 prices (Sheffield) because efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design because here hull was built at one yard and she was fitted out by another.
 
Isn't that obvious?
It isn't obvious to me.
Who's buying the equipment to fit into these ships ...
The Ministry of Defence or the yards that built them. What is the relevance of that?
... and when did they buy?
I presume at the same time as when the 6 ships were ordered, which was between November 1968 and November 1971. What is the relevance of that?
 
Hang on!
As they built ships the cost of each goes down. Efficiencies accrue as yard staff repeat the same design.

Which is why it's not £50M by 1979, but £40.5M
Reverse the numbers and see what the last would cost in 1969.
Which is missing my point.

@EwenS wrote.
But is general inflation, from the BoE data, the same as for technology businesses/products?
What he meant, was that, the rate of inflation for military products is higher than the rate of general inflation. I was saying that it was not always the case.

These are the six Type 42 Batch 1 destroyers arranged in order of their date of completion (C.p. in the table) with their actual cost, the estimated cost of £17 million for a Type 42 in 1969 (according to Jane's 1969-70) adjusted for inflation and the actual cost as a percentage of the estimated cost in 1969 adjusted for inflation. The adjustment for inflation is at the end of the nearest calendar year and according to the Bank of England inflation calculator.

Type 42 Batch 1 costs.png

Yes, the cost of the first ship (adjusted for inflation) is more than the subsequent ships. However, that can't be for your reason because all but one of the five subsequent ships were built by different yards.

Yes, Cardiff (the other ship built by Vickers) did cost less than Sheffield (after adjusting for inflation) but as already written she doesn't count because her fitting out was done at Swan Hunter.

The three ships built by Swan Hunter were laid down over a period of 15 months, launched over a period of 22 months and completed over a period of 14 months. Their actual costs were about the same. They cost an average of 82.62% of the estimated cost of £17 million in 1969 at 1977 or 1978 prices as applicable. Cardiff's actual cost of as a percentage of the estimated cost in 1969 at 1979 prices (80.73%) was only 2% less than that.
 
The Ministry of Defence or the yards that built them. What is the relevance of that?
Dunno how they do the accounting in the UK, but things like the radars and weapons are considered Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and aren't part of the cost that the shipyard bills to Congress.

Example: an Arleigh Burke class DDG costs something like $800mil for the base hull, but all the GFE costs something like $1.5bn. Total ship cost including GFE is therefore $2.3bn, but the price Congress sees is only $800mil.


I presume at the same time as when the 6 ships were ordered, which was between November 1968 and November 1971. What is the relevance of that?
Certain items may have even been ordered before the ship was officially ordered. Long Lead Items, like reduction gears and boilers/reactors, usually gets ordered a couple of years before the ship is officially ordered and laid down.

So those items may not be included in the costs you're working with.
 
Dunno how they do the accounting in the UK, but things like the radars and weapons are considered Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and aren't part of the cost that the shipyard bills to Congress.

Example: an Arleigh Burke class DDG costs something like $800mil for the base hull, but all the GFE costs something like $1.5bn. Total ship cost including GFE is therefore $2.3bn, but the price Congress sees is only $800mil.
The RN used to do the Vote 8 cost and the total cost. Vote 8 being Vote 8 (Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, &c.) of the Navy Estimates. So the Vote 8 cost of a ship didn't include its armament because that was in Vote 9 (Naval Armaments) of the Navy Estimates.

However, that's irrelevant to the discussion I'm having with @zen, which is whether the later ships of Type 42 Batch 1 cost less (after adjusting for inflation) than the first ships of the batch and what the reason the difference (if any) may have been.

It's irrelevant because the costs I'm using for the six ships would have been calculated on the same basis. That is the cost of each and every of the six Type 42 Batch 1 ships is the Vote 8 cost or the costs of each and every of the six Type 42 ships is the total cost.
Certain items may have even been ordered before the ship was officially ordered. Long Lead Items, like reduction gears and boilers/reactors, usually gets ordered a couple of years before the ship is officially ordered and laid down.

So those items may not be included in the costs you're working with.
Again, that's irrelevant to the discussion that I'm having with @zen, because the cost of each and every Type 42 Batch 1 that I've quoted includes the cost of the long-lead items or the cost of each and every Type 41 Batch 1 that I've quoted doesn't include the long-lead items. Therefore, it doesn't explain why the cost increases were less than the general rate of inflation.
 
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Costs are complicated

For your comparison Vs inflation then I think the granularity of comparison you're after isn't really possible from that data.

e.g. you can't simply use the actuals cost in X year and deflate to the earlier estimate in Y year. The expenditure occurs across the whole build process so you need to look at expenditure in each year and then do inflation corrections. And inflation corrections based on what's actually been purchased Vs just general CPI/RPI. And then some items are ordered in quantity for multiple ships at once.
 
Interesting idea, that "alaskan highway". Any other carrier anywhere with a similar concept ? or was it just a smart but typical british excentricity ?
 
The estimated costs of CVA.01 in 1966 that I've seen are between £60-70 million. How much would have been saved by deleting the Sea Dart system?

The best I can do is the difference between the costs of Types 21 and 42 as the latter was effectively the former with Sea Dart. The costs quoted in Jane's 1969-70 which were £7-8 million and £17 million respectively. Difference £9-10 million.

Therefore, was the cost of CVA.01 without Sea Dart £50-61 million?
I think not because CVA.01 would still need a long-range air surveillance radar so it would still have the Type 965P radar that Type 42 Batch 1 had (or something better & therefore more expensive) and ADAWS (which Type 42 had & Type 21 didn't) and there is 3 years of inflation to include.
So what I was thinking of were the design studies posted here and on the following post: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...scort-cruisers-1963-to-1968.1049/#post-165711

Someone posted the following summary on another thread:

Just dug out a couple of tables from Friedman on sizes and costs:
1960 Alternatives
1-42,000 tons, 31 aircraft, 770x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, Sea Cat, £44M
2-48,000 tons, 41 aircraft, 820x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3 Tartar, £54M
48,000 tons, 43 aircraft, 820x200ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3 Tartar, £54M

50,000 tons, 44 aircraft, 860x165ft flight deck, 2 cats, 3-4 Tartar, £55M
55,000 tons, 34 aircraft, 870x200ft flight deck, 3 cats, 4 Tartar, £59M
68,000 tons, 59 aircraft (+4 ASW heli), 1004x190ft flight deck, 3 cats, 4 Tartar, £67M

1962 Alternatives
50,000 tons, 36 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 890x177ft, 2 cats (200 & 250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
52,000 tons, 39 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 900x177ft, 2 cats (200 & 225ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
53,000 tons, 40 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 920x180ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £50-60M
55,000 tons, 40 aircraft inc. heli (36 interim Vix & Bucc), 940x180ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £58-63M
58,000 tons, 46 aircraft inc. heli (48 interim Vix & Bucc), 970x190ft, 2 cats (250ft), 1 Sea Dart & 1 Ikara, £60-65M
So two things to note: first, that the cost of fitting a Sea Dart and an Ikara looks to be about the same as fitting 4 Tartar launchers and associated infrastructure. Second, that fitting Tartar directly cost at least 5 million pounds, and possibly more - the cost leap from the 42,000-ton to 48,000-ton alternatives was double the cost leap from 48,000 to 55,000 tons, with my thesis being the difference was entirely down to the SAM fits.

So basically half the cost impact I thought, but nonetheless a 10% cost jump to fit the Sea Dart launcher is significant.

I think some Sea Dart armed escorts would have been required if some Hawkeye's had been purchased for CVA.01.
Oh, absolutely, but it's the difference between needing 13 Sea Dart ships for two carriers and needing 8-10.
 
Interesting idea, that "alaskan highway". Any other carrier anywhere with a similar concept ? or was it just a smart but typical british excentricity ?
HMS Eagle R05, HMS Ark Royal R09.
Carrier Air Groups - Volume One - HMS Eagle by David Brown, Hylton Lacy 1972, has this on page 25:
When Eagle emerged from the [Devonport] Dockyard in 1964, she was virtually unrecognizable. The original island had been replaced by a longer and lighter structure with improved accommodation and a 'Flyco' (Flying Control Position) which projected more than 25 feet over the flight deck. This was necessitated by the requirement for the command to be able to to watch aircraft throughout the approach to the 8½° angled-deck. The greater angle had been created by building a considerable overhang on the port side. The starboard side had also been extended, to provide an 'Alaskan Highway' outboard of the island, this space being used for the stowage of flight deck vehicles and bulky ground equipment. Beam was now increased to over 171 feet.
Nothing quite as wide as what was proposed for CVA01 - the same moniker, though.
 

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Pioneer mentioned Seacat. Although this is mentioned in places (Jane's or Conway?) there is no sign of them anywhere else
 
Fun though the various early 60s fighter-attacker designs are to look at, especially the two versions of Vickers 583 I think AFVG is closer to what a Phantom/Buccaneer replacement could have been.
It is smaller than a UK national type because of the need to operate from French carriers. It would have allowed Hermes to double up with CVA01 while CVA02 might then have joined them around 1980. AFVG (Tornado in English and French?) could then have served into the 90s giving way to an Anglo French Rafale or a US/UK Harrier successor.
 
Isn't it interesting that we can compare the 1960 comparison study to 1962 study at certain tonnages to price.
1960 of 50,000ton @ £55M
1960 of 55,000ton @ £59M

1962 of 50,000ton @ £50-60M
1962 of 55,000ton @ £58-63M

We can also run through year inflation to see what cost rises the 42,000ton @ £44M...

Note though that the 1960 studies use Type 985 which had not yet been abandoned. Or in fact well defined though highly likely to be a four face PESA system.
 
IIUC the requirement from 1958 or so to 1964 or so was the RN needed 4.5 carriers; 2 for East of Suez, 1 for the Home Fleet/NATO, 1 in refit and .5 is the Centaur to cover gaps that arose with long refits. The plans for 3, 4 and even 5 CVA01s are to fit in with this requirement, and the F4K development was ordered in July 1964 for the RN with 140 aircraft being the requirement.

When Labour was elected in late 1964 they did a defence review that in 1965 said that Britain would remain EoS indefinitely, apparently it was electorally popular. At some point in this time-frame the number of carriers was dropped to 3.5, I think CVA01 & 02, Eagle with Hermes being the .5. Also the number of F4Ks required for the RN dropped to 110, presumably because there would only ever be 3 decks to fill.

In 1966 the requirement changed to where the EoS requirement would end in 1975. This is where the CVA01 was cancelled but Ark Royal refitted for Phantoms, and the requirement dropped to 70 then 50-55 F4Ks for Ark and Eagle.

After the November 1967 devaluation of the pound it was decided to end the EoS commitment by 1971, which I believe is where the decision to operate Ark until 1972 comes from. The Phantoms for Eagle were diverted to the RAF in 1969, before Eagle grounded which was in late 1970 or early 71. The Tory government of June 1970 reprieved the Ark until the late 70s; I don't know if that decision was before or after Eagle's grounding but certainly it was a full year after the RAF received the F4Ks destined for Eagle.

Does any of that seem drastically wrong?

When was NATO Strike Fleet Atlantic stood up, with a RN carrier being Strike Group 2? I know the Ark was the centrepiece of Strike Group 2 through the 70s, but don't know about SG2 before that.
 
The Ikara launcher would have been on a sponson just ahead of the aft lift. In the final design this installation was replaced by a another refuelling/rearming position.

View attachment 719624

This is the magazine layout. Given this transverse section view the launcher does have the capability to fire over the deck towards the portside - though of course the island would block the arcs off the port bow.

View attachment 719625
Thank you Hood, very kind of you and much appreciated.

This now gives me a much better perspective of not only the position of the Ikara launcher, but also the size/room the Ikara magazine and handling arrangement that one could say encroached upon the carrier design.

I can't help wonder if the Admiralty could have considered the RAN Ikara magazine/handling arrangement for the CVA-01? I appreciate that the RN arrangement spacifically allowed for the requirement for the Ikara missile payload to be changeable aboard ship to permit different payload combinations to be used, including the WE.177A nuclear depth bomb option. While the RAN combine the missile and payload at a shore-based ordnance facility and issuing the complete unit to a ship; repair or maintenance was only possible ashore. In the British ships, the changes made enabled a faulty torpedo on a missile in working order to be replaced, increasing the flexibility of use of very limited stocks aboard.....But I can't but think that in the case of the CVA-01, the RAN arrangement would have saved critical weight/space....


To clarify, it was only one Ikara launcher intended for instalment on the CVA-01?

Regards
Pioneer
 
Yes, just the one launcher for Ikara.

One the subject of the "Alaskan Highway", I know what it is (actually properly called the Alaska Highway these days), but why was the moniker attached to this idea? Being of Canadian-American origin it seems a rather odd choice (you'd expect the Admiralty wags to come up with something like "By-Pass"!).
 
The Royal Navy were unlucky in allowing a situation where they had four such disparate carriers by 1962.
Eagle was the best of the bunch. Ark Royal and Victorious were too tired and Hermes was too small.
I think this was down to the long life of the Seahawk and Wyvern airgroup which could operate from the four Centaurs as well as the three bigger ships.
CVA-01 should have been in service in 1961 with three sister ships in service by 1972. The famous fighter/attacker VG aircraft should have replaced Sea Vixen and Buccaneer in the early 70s.
Like the US Nimitz class the ships could still be serving into the 21st Century with new aircraft.
 
CVA-01 should have been in service in 1961 with three sister ships in service by 1972. The famous fighter/attacker VG aircraft should have replaced Sea Vixen and Buccaneer in the early 70s.
The question is how you get the Royal Navy to not only get new carriers funded in the mid-50s, but have those new carriers be full-size fleet carriers instead of the Medium Fleet Carriers actually pushed. Anything earlier runs afoul of political fights or financial realities.
 
Sadly you are quite right. The legacy carriers and cruisers were worked hard in the 50s. It took long enough to get the County class missile destroyers into service.
 
The Royal Navy were unlucky in allowing a situation where they had four such disparate carriers by 1962.
Eagle was the best of the bunch. Ark Royal and Victorious were too tired and Hermes was too small.
I think this was down to the long life of the Seahawk and Wyvern airgroup which could operate from the four Centaurs as well as the three bigger ships.
CVA-01 should have been in service in 1961 with three sister ships in service by 1972. The famous fighter/attacker VG aircraft should have replaced Sea Vixen and Buccaneer in the early 70s.
Like the US Nimitz class the ships could still be serving into the 21st Century with new aircraft.
I would not say that Victorious was too tired. It had emerged from its reconstruction in 1958 as basically a new ship - rather, it was somewhat too small and with a sub-optimal catapult configuration. Instead of two bow-mounted 145' BS-4 sets, it should have received a bow-mounted 151' BS-5 and a waist-mounted 199' BS-5A if in any way possible (at least steam should not be a problem as its new boilers provided steam at a clearly higher pressure than all the other carriers in the fleet). When it comes to Hermes, I would say that in addition to being too small, it had a sub-optimal configuration (should have had the rear lift as a deck-edge unit instead of the front lift and a similar catapult configuration as I suggested for Victorious; it also lacked a gallery deck) and was too slow and had an insufficient steam generation capability (they should have switched to the same Foster-Wheeler boilers as fitted to Victorious after her reconstruction - this should have provided roughly 90 000 shp and a clearly higher steam pressure).
 
IIUC the only other time the British Government supported new carriers in the post-war era was in 1952-53 during the Korean War, and the '1952 carrier design' was a 55,000t ship.

The British Government began long term defence planning again in 1948-49, with the assumption no war was likely for about 10 years and 1957 was the year of maximum danger. The RN had a choice between Pacific style strike warfare, and Atlantic style convoy warfare, they chose convoy warfare and put their priority on having a big fleet of escorts by converting all of those WW2 destroyers to fast ASW escorts.

If instead they had chosen the strike option competing carriers and maximising the strike fleet would have been the priority and the likes of Ark Royal would have been finished years earlier. Strike warfare would have put the RN in a better position for Korea as well as in 1957 when it was decided that Global War deterrence and Limited War was the way of the future.
 
DNC is adamant the combination of gallery deck and deck edge lifts require a waterline beam of 120ft or more.
Below that you get to compromise and choose what you value most.

Deck edge = no gallery deck = large island, but can have a taller hanger.
Gallery deck = no deck edge lifts but you get a smaller island.

On all likelihood the Medium Fleet Carrier would possess the bow 151ft stroke catapult and waist 199ft stroke catapult.
Deck strengthened for 60,000lb aircraft.
 
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