The Royal Navy with CVA01

[NOMISYRRUC]

She would have been paid off in 1972 even if the grounding hadn't happened.

Ah yes, I see why (explained earlier in the thread): it hadn't been Phantomized unlike Ark Royal, and now it was too late, so it had to go. Facepalm.

This is the last paragraph of the quote in Post 80.

We considered whether we could continue H.M.S. "Eagle" as well. But she would need a very expensive refit to fly Phantoms. Equally significant would be the demands on the Navy's manpower, which would have meant unacceptable penalties. H.M.S. "Hermes", the third fixed-wing aircraft carrier, is to be converted to the commando ship rôle to replace H.M.S. "Bulwark". "Ark Royal" will be available most of the time, and when she is in dock her aircraft will normally be available to operate from shore bases.

The conversion of Hermes into a commando carrier took 2 years (1971-73) and cost £25 million.

By the late 1960s, fully Phantomizing Eagle was estimated to cost no more than £5 million and take 6 months.

I've written before that the projected Phantomiszation of Eagle would probably have taken longer than estimated and cost more than estimated had it been carried out. However, I do think it could have been done 1971-73 instead of converting Hermes to a commando carrier and keeping Albion in service.

 

[zen]

Beyond the obvious Political exaggeration to cover the real financial reasons for not upgrading Eagle.
There may be an element of truth if that upgrade was to include more substantial capabilities.
Elements of CVA-01 were used in Ark Royal's modernisation and it's possible the final upgrade for Eagle would use even more such elements.
Plus CVA-01 bits had been ordered and were effectively already paid for. To get the same for Eagle would substantially increase costs.

 

[Archibald]

Wait a minute... converting a medium size carrier to helicopters cost 25 millions pounds.
Yet converting a big carrier to Phantoms cost 1/5th of that ?
And I thought that choppers were gentler than Phantoms, when landing on ships...
I readily agree that Phantomizing Eagle would have been more pertinent than Hermes CC conversion.
What was wrong with Albion and Bulwark CC, they needed Hermes in the same role ? and where is the fourth horseman / musketeer - Centaur - when you need it ?
This leans more credence to my hypothesis that a better management of the Centaur fleet could have spared the RN a lot of pain and suffering in the 1970's...
And while we are at it, they should have converted goddam Victorious into a CC, instead of scrapping it for a minor fire. Considering the amount of money they sunk into that floating black hole of a ship... it was kind of scandalous.

I keep refining that post-RN carrier fleet TL of mine...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Wait a minute... converting a medium size carrier to helicopters cost 25 millions pounds.
Yet converting a big carrier to Phantoms cost 1/5th of that ?

The £25 million for Hermes is from memory. I might be wrong.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

and where is the fourth horseman / musketeer - Centaur - when you need it ?

She was paid off as a strike carrier in December 1965 and was then used as an accommodation ship for aircraft carrier refits at Portsmouth, Devonport and then back to Portsmouth. On 24th April 1970 she was towed from Portsmouth to Devonport to await disposal. On 4th September 1972 she left Devonport for Cairn Ryan, where she arrived on the 8th for breaking up.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What was wrong with Albion and Bulwark CC, they needed Hermes in the same role?

One of the Hansard quotes that I've posted said that Hermes was to replace Bulwark, but in the event she replaced Albion.

Albion was paid off in March 1973 which was nearly six months before Hermes re-commissioned. On 22nd October 1973 she was purchased by Wilson Watson Engineering of Middlesbrough which intended to convert the ship into a heavy lift crane with a capacity of 2,600 tons for use in support of North Sea oil installations. This scheme fell through and the ship towed to Faslane for breaking up on 16th November 1973.

Having written that I think the 1960s Royal Navy wanted a third commando carrier. Can anyone confirm that? Plus can anyone confirm that consideration was given to completing Leviathan which had been laid up since 1946 as a commando carrier? Plus the Colossus class light fleet carriers Glory, Ocean, Theseus and Vengeance weren't scrapped until 1961-62 and were theoretically available for conversion during the period that Albion and Bulwark were converted to aircraft carriers. Does anyone know if the RN looked into the feasibility of converting one of them? After all Ocean and Theseus were used as makeshift commando carriers in the Suez War.

 

[EwenS]

Plus can anyone confirm that consideration was given to completing Leviathan which had been laid up since 1946 as a commando carrier? Plus the Colossus class light fleet carriers Glory, Ocean, Theseus and Vengeance weren't scrapped until 1961-62 and were theoretically available for conversion during the period that Albion and Bulwark were converted to aircraft carriers. Does anyone know if the RN looked into the feasibility of converting one of them? After all Ocean and Theseus were used as makeshift commando carriers in the Suez War.

I laid out the position of the Colossus/Majestics, including Leviathan, on another thread last Sunday. Post #41 here

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/larger-british-light-fleet-carriers.39265/page-2#post-531625

Their fate had been sealed back in 1955/56.

 

[EwenS]

Wait a minute... converting a medium size carrier to helicopters cost 25 millions pounds.
Yet converting a big carrier to Phantoms cost 1/5th of that ?
And I thought that choppers were gentler than Phantoms, when landing on ships...

A lot of work was involved in that change of role that affected the whole ship.
1. Removal of steam catapults and all the associated machinery and steam pipe work.
2. Removal of arrester gear, projector landing sights etc
3. Removal of the Type 984 radar and CDS.
4. Fitting new Type 965 radar and associated mast.
5. Refitting the ADR to act as an amphibious operations room.
6. Refitting bomb rooms to take ammunition for the Commandos and their supporting artillery.
7. Modifying the accomodation for the embarked Commando Unit.

Then in 1977 she was further modified to have a computer aided Anti-Submarine information system incorporated into her Operations Room, stowage for AS weapons including conventional and nuclear depth charges as well as homing torpedoes and sonobuoys.

 

[uk 75]

Desmond Wettern Decline of British Seapower has yearly coverage of the RN.
My copy is boxed somewhere but I recall he mentions proposals to convert both Centaur and Leviathan into Commando Ships. But I dont think either got very far. A bit like the planned conversion of HMS Lion to a helicopter cruiser which was dropped.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

So I'll agree that for 175 RAF and 140 FAA F4 it would've made sense to license production for Spey F4.

For what its worth the JASDF bought 154 Phantoms (140 F-4EJ and 14 RF-4EJ) which included 138 F-4EJs that were built under licence by Mitsubishi which is about 80% of the 170 Phantoms that the UK purchased.

 

[Archibald]

1. Removal of steam catapults and all the associated machinery and steam pipe work.
2. Removal of arrester gear, projector landing sights etc

Sigh. France didn't bothered with that post-1964 with the Arromanches, for its last decade of life. Even with the Aquilons (= Sea Venoms) gone it kept its catapults for Breguet Alizés and Fouga Zephyrs. Etendard IV and Crusaders were not the one and only naval fixed wing assets... training and ASW also had them. And there Arromanches catapults were good enough.

And you can guess where this is going... imagine if Hermes in the Falklands had catapults for Gannet AEW 3... there go that AEW problem that cost the RN so much. Whatever the limits and obsolescence of the AEW Gannet, they EXISTED. An obsolete raid warning capability is still better than a non-existing one - Sheffield, cough, Antelope, Glamorgan, Atlantic Conveyor, Sir Tristam & Galahad...

 

[EwenS]

Sigh. And imagine the cost of maintaining all that kit in operating condition for an additional 12 years through the cash strapped 1970s, that would never even be intended to be used with Ark in service with her Phantoms (which were too powerful for the arrester gear if not also the catapults), Buccaneers and AEW Gannets, for an eventuality that no one ever thought would happen.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Having written that I think the 1960s Royal Navy wanted a third commando carrier. Can anyone confirm that?

Quote from Page 60 of Rebuilding the Royal Navy by D.K Brown and George Moore.

At the time [April 1964] there were long-term plans to build three commando ships to replace and enhance the capacity currently provided by the converted aircraft carriers Albion and Bulwark.

The long-term plan to build ships to replace Albion and Bulwark wasn't abandoned until 1975.

This is an extract from National Archives File CAB 129/181/c21 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, dated 25th February 1975.

a. The Amphibious Force. At present our amphibious capability consists of a Royal Marines brigade headquarters, four commando groups, a logistic regiment and Army support units, two squadrons of Royal Navy support helicopters, two commando ships (HMS Hermes and HMS Bulwark), two assault ships, (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid), and afloat support. HMS Bulwark will be paid off in 1976, earlier than previously planned, and her Wessex helicopter squadron will be disbanded. HMS Hermes will be declared to NATO as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier but will retain a secondary role as a commando ship. HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid will remain in service as previously planned throughout the 1980s, but only one ship will be kept at immediate operational readiness, the second being in care and maintenance or refit. Plans to order two purpose-built amphibious ships have been abandoned and detailed studies of alternative means of movement in the longer term are in hand.

The penultimate sentence of the above paragraph.

HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid will remain in service as previously planned throughout the 1980s, but only one ship will be kept at immediate operational readiness, the second being in care and maintenance or refit.

The short-straw was drawn by Intrepid and she paid off in 1976.

Fearless had been used for the sea training of officers from the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth since 1972 when it replaced the Dartmouth Training Squadron/17th Frigate Squadron. Intrepid would take over when Fearless was refitting.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Wait a minute... converting a medium size carrier to helicopters cost 25 millions pounds.
Yet converting a big carrier to Phantoms cost 1/5th of that ?

The £25 million for Hermes is from memory. I might be wrong.

My memory was correct. The entry on Hermes in Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82 (Internet Archive copy) says that the cost of her commando carrier conversion was £25 million. It also says that her 1964-66 refit cost £10 million.

 

[Hood]

Having CVA-01 still doesn't really address the manpower shortages the FAA faced.
809 NAS with the Buccaneer and 849 NAS with the AEW Gannets had to be cut to save manpower as it was. At best there would be one carrier air group rotating between CVA-01 and 02 (or Antique Royal) as they went in and out of refit. Running on a two-carrier fleet would be expensive and would need investment in aircrew training and equipment.

Gannet was doomed by 1976, Westland had long washed its hands of it in terms of keeping open facilities to modernise the airframe and Rolls-Royce was equally cut to shut the Mamba repair shop as quickly as possible. Given the 1976 decisions on shore-based MPA and AEW provided by the RAF it's equally possible the CVAs would not have had an integral AEW capability by 1979.
Everyone trots out the "buy E-2s" dream but that seems even less likely on costs and manpower, certainly pre-Falkands. Maybe Sea King AEW may have happened sooner (Westland had studied it since 1969) but its a big maybe.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I have had a complete reversal of opinion on this topic. The actual additional resources required to provide a three-ship/two-airwing CVA fleet should have been both achievable and manageable within the context of the time. To take things in turn:

Air-wing: Between the RN Sea Harrier force and the Buccaneer and Phantom units assigned to SACEUR for TASMO (Tactical Air Support to Maritime Operations) as a direct replacement for the air wings previously assigned to the RN heavy carriers the aircraft, crews, maintainers etc all existed in reality. The ASW component of those air wings would have been the same Sea King Squadrons that operated from the Invincibles in reality. AEW is less certain but far from intractable, for instance helicopter AEW was studied in the UK in the mid-1960s and I'm sure given an incentive industry would have been happy to extract more life from the Gannet.

Capital Cost: Escorts were built anyway, the RN escort force would not necessarily have had to have been radically different, especially if we assume that the CVA programme is retained whilst the EoS mission is dropped. Money, not as much as CVA01 would have required (thanks @NOMISYRRUC for your analysis above), was spent building the three Invincible class ships anyway, the escort cruiser would have to be a sacrifice. The actual capital cost of buying the ships, when amortised even over a 15 year period, would likely not have required an unreasonable spending increase compared to what happened historically.

Personnel: CVA01 war complement was approximately 3,000 whilst that for the Invincible's was approximately 1,000. At most, for crew, an uplift of 6,000 personnel would be required over the historical number. Vote A in 1988 was 69,100 so the total Vote A uplift would be less than 10% on even the 1988 number, which itself was much reduced from the 1970s. A good portion of those would have come from a reduced size RAF (approximately four fast jet squadrons less based on that service not providing the TASMO mission, due to the retention of the carriers). Retention and recruitment would have been easier as well, CVA01 was a spacious, fully air conditioned ship designed to the latest habitability standards rather than a modernised WW2 design and inspiring people to join an FAA with a future rather than an execution date should have been a happier experience.

Considered in the round, rather than in isolation, it feels as if a massive loss in national military capability was endured in order to save very little resource in relative terms.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 96.

For what it's worth that's roughly what I think, but better expressed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Personnel: CVA01 war complement was approximately 3,000 whilst that for the Invincible's was approximately 1,000. At most, for crew, an uplift of 6,000 personnel would be required over the historical number. Vote A in 1988 was 69,100 so the total Vote A uplift would be less than 10% on even the 1988 number, which itself was much reduced from the 1970s. A good portion of those would have come from a reduced size RAF (approximately four fast jet squadrons less based on that service not providing the TASMO mission, due to the retention of the carriers). Retention and recruitment would have been easier as well, CVA01 was a spacious, fully air conditioned ship designed to the latest habitability standards rather than a modernised WW2 design and inspiring people to join an FAA with a future rather than an execution date should have been a happier experience.

I've been thinking about the personnel implications.

According to my reference books the crew of a CVA.01 was anywhere between 2,720 and 3,230 as follows:

• 2,720 according to Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1995.
• 2,750 to 3,200 according to Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990 by Leo Marriott.
• 3,230 according to Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present An Illustrated Encyclopedia by Roger Chesneau.

Freidman's British Carrier Aviation and Brown & Moore in Rebuilding the Royal Navy don't say what the crew of CVA.01 would have been.

Ark Royal had a crew of 2,640 in 1971 according to Marriott and contemporary editions of Jane's Fighting Ships. At that time Ark Royal was operating 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 4 Gannets and 8 helicopters. CVA.01 is usually quoted with an air group of 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 Gannets (which would probably be replaced by Hawkeyes) and a squadron of helicopters. However, I suspect that the peacetime air group would be the same size as Ark Royal's and that in wartime the operational squadrons would be brought up to strength by breaking up the training squadrons.

Therefore, I'm inclined to think that the peacetime compliment of a CVA.01 would be 2,700.

The Invincible class had a complement of 1,200 made up of 1,000 ship's company and 200 air group according to Paul Beaver in Modern Combat Ships 2: Invincible class.

That's a difference of between the the two classes of 1,500 per ship.

I believe that 2 Invincibles were in commission while the third was in refit/reserve and that had 3 CVA.01s been built they would have been operated in the same fashion. That means 3,000 extra sailors have to be found. However, as you wrote...

A good portion of those would have come from a reduced size RAF (approximately four fast jet squadrons less based on that service not providing the TASMO mission, due to the retention of the carriers).

However, it sounds too good to be true.

 

[zen]

Obviously source of personnel is Albion and Bulwark. Tigers too.

Could collapse Commando Carrier concept and force CVA-01 to perform that mission.
Golf Bag concept, only 40 years earlier.

 

[Hood]

JFC Fuller has some interesting points and its possibly not the doom and gloom (although when we look at the cuts circa 76-82 its hard to imagine any sunny uplands).

Ian Sturton's article in Warship 2014 lists the final war complement as 300 officers, 730 senior ratings (CPOs and POs) and 1,950 junior ratings. This totals 2,980.
The max accommodation with full air conditioning (but not to Persian Gulf standards) was far higher though with space for 320 officers, 410 CPOs, 420 POs and 2,080 junior ratings = 3,230

In the Commando role she could lift 50 officers, 900 other ranks plus the helicopter group of 25 pilots and 150 ratings.


The need for ASW helicopters would be slightly less - 5 per ship so more than enough Sea Kings would be available even allowing for Hermes becoming a totally rotary-wing ASW carrier.

Capital cost is high though when you consider each one costs 50-70% more than the Invincible-class and two would be needed in reality unless post 1980 you just have a single carrier. So two carriers for the price of 4-5x Invincibles? Probably not a bad trade off given the capability gains but its certainly not cheap and that extra £200-300 million has to come from elsewhere in the building programme.

 

[zen]

Thoughts come questions.
If CV force retained on CVA-01 and CVA-02, perhaps with a planned CVA-03....
What RAF assets were tasked with say Kola Peninsula, Murmansk et al?

What RAF assets were tasked with Coastal Command?

What was the GIUK Gap assets ?

Do you need RAF to perform these tasks or was the FAA doing them before CV force scrapped?

Another thought. Strike North lives with USN getting real support from CVA-01 and RN.

Lofoten Bastion might be more cramped but more potent a threat.
This sucks Soviet resources to deal with that threat away from elsewhere.

AEW.....this becomes Nimrod and Argus I think it was called?
Imagine all that money sunk into the UK system that never made it beyond development, put into CVA-01 aircraft.......

 

[Archibald]

Obviously source of personnel is Albion and Bulwark. Tigers too.

Could collapse Commando Carrier concept and force CVA-01 to perform that mission.
Golf Bag concept, only 40 years earlier.

Depends from the escort cruiser no ? That is, Invincible started as early as 1962, rather than a decade later. But could Escort cruisers and CVAs being afforded in parallel ?

 

[zen]

Obviously source of personnel is Albion and Bulwark. Tigers too.

Could collapse Commando Carrier concept and force CVA-01 to perform that mission.
Golf Bag concept, only 40 years earlier.

Depends from the escort cruiser no ? That is, Invincible started as early as 1962, rather than a decade later. But could Escort cruisers and CVAs being afforded in parallel ?

Probably not and really no need.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Could collapse Commando Carrier concept and force CVA-01 to perform that mission.
Golf Bag concept, only 40 years earlier.

CVA-01 certainly had the capability to do that, see p41 Warship 2014.

 

[BlackBat242]

The time & cost estimates for Eagle were for around 1966 or so... as all that was needed was the improved arresting gear, the water-cooled jet blast deflectors behind the already-installed catapults, and the various support equipment for maintaining the aircraft themselves.

If the Phantomization was delayed, of course inflation would have made the cost go up... and more assorted repair work would have been needed, adding both cost and time.

The claims I have seen about Eagle's Phantomization being "costly" all seem to have been from the general 1968-70 period.



At the time Eagle came out of her 1959-64 modernization the plan was for 20 years operation... to 1984.

Since Ark, with much less systems overhaul work and in much worse condition, made it to 1978, 1984 should have been feasible for Eagle.

 

[Archibald]

At the time Eagle came out of her 1959-64 modernization the plan was for 20 years operation... to 1984.

Since Ark, with much less systems overhaul work and in much worse condition, made it to 1978, 1984 should have been feasible for Eagle.

My reaction:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmPhaG1ud38

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Could earlier awareness of the Soviet Bastion Strategy, and hence the potential for an earlier 1980s Maritime Strategy be a good way of justifying a NATO role for CVA-01, even if the withdrawal from East of Suez takes place?.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

JFC Fuller has some interesting points and its possibly not the doom and gloom (although when we look at the cuts circa 76-82 its hard to imagine any sunny uplands).

• Ian Sturton's article in Warship 2014 lists the final war complement as 300 officers, 730 senior ratings (CPOs and POs) and 1,950 junior ratings. This totals 2,980.
• The max accommodation with full air conditioning (but not to Persian Gulf standards) was far higher though with space for 320 officers, 410 CPOs, 420 POs and 2,080 junior ratings = 3,230
• In the Commando role she could lift 50 officers, 900 other ranks plus the helicopter group of 25 pilots and 150 ratings.

The need for ASW helicopters would be slightly less - 5 per ship so more than enough Sea Kings would be available even allowing for Hermes becoming a totally rotary-wing ASW carrier.

Capital cost is high though when you consider each one costs 50-70% more than the Invincible-class and two would be needed in reality unless post 1980 you just have a single carrier. So two carriers for the price of 4-5x Invincibles? Probably not a bad trade off given the capability gains but its certainly not cheap and that extra £200-300 million has to come from elsewhere in the building programme.

Did Sturton say what would the corresponding final war air group would have been?

The maximum accommodation of 3,230 from Ian Sturton's article matches the 3,230 that Chesneau quoted.

This is the relevant section from Post 98.

According to my reference books the crew of a CVA.01 was anywhere between 2,720 and 3,230 as follows:

• 2,720 according to Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1995.
• 2,750 to 3,200 according to Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990 by Leo Marriott.
• 3,230 according to Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present An Illustrated Encyclopedia by Roger Chesneau.

Freidman's British Carrier Aviation and Brown & Moore in Rebuilding the Royal Navy don't say what the crew of CVA.01 would have been.

Does anyone know how how the various estimates of the ship's crew would were spread across it's departments? Specifically, how many men were required run the ship and how many were required to run the air group?

This is because my guess is that the different sources quote crews of different sizes because they would be carrying air groups of different sizes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Capital Cost: Escorts were built anyway, the RN escort force would not necessarily have had to have been radically different, especially if we assume that the CVA programme is retained whilst the EoS mission is dropped. Money, not as much as CVA01 would have required (thanks @NOMISYRRUC for your analysis above), was spent building the three Invincible class ships anyway, the escort cruiser would have to be a sacrifice. The actual capital cost of buying the ships, when amortised even over a 15 year period, would likely not have required an unreasonable spending increase compared to what happened historically.

My calculations should be regarded as an extremely rough guide because I didn't know that the various cost estimates included, i.e. they might not have included the same "stuff" and as @EwanS wrote in Post 48 general inflation (from the BoE data) is not the same as for technology businesses/products.

 

[Hood]

Did Sturton say what would the corresponding final war air group would have been? Hobbs

I am at work so away from my library, so will have to check details later, but I think Sturton's air group tallies with the usual published sources - 18 F-4K, 18, Buccaneer, 4 AEW (Gannet), 5 ASW and 2 SAR helicopters with two thirds in the hangar and deck parking for two thirds allowing a surge capacity of 48 F-4K and Buccaneers.

Does anyone know how how the various estimates of the ship's crew would were spread across it's departments? Specifically, how many men were required run the ship and how many were required to run the air group?

Sadly Sturton doesn't provide a breakdown of the crew and how many were part of the air group. Maybe the original documents don't break it down either, I guess for the designers' the different space requirements for berths for officers, CPOs, POs and ratings were all they were interested in.

12 extra F-4Ks or Buccs aboard in wartime needs 24 aircrew and assuming they are all officers, those 20 spare officer bunks don't quite fill the need... of course we can't be sure the quoted war complement includes the aircrew for an additional third of an air group or not...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Did Sturton say what would the corresponding final war air group would have been? Hobbs

I am at work so away from my library, so will have to check details later, but I think Sturton's air group tallies with the usual published sources - 18 F-4K, 18, Buccaneer, 4 AEW (Gannet), 5 ASW and 2 SAR helicopters with two thirds in the hangar and deck parking for two thirds allowing a surge capacity of 48 F-4K and Buccaneers.

Does anyone know how how the various estimates of the ship's crew would were spread across it's departments? Specifically, how many men were required run the ship and how many were required to run the air group?

Sadly Sturton doesn't provide a breakdown of the crew and how many were part of the air group. Maybe the original documents don't break it down either, I guess for the designers' the different space requirements for berths for officers, CPOs, POs and ratings were all they were interested in.

12 extra F-4Ks or Buccs aboard in wartime needs 24 aircrew and assuming they are all officers, those 20 spare officer bunks don't quite fill the need... of course we can't be sure the quoted war complement includes the aircrew for an additional third of an air group or not...

As already noted Chesneau quotes a crew of 3,230. He also quotes a similar air group to Sturton, i.e., 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 5 ASW Sea Kings, "with, presumably, an additional SAR flight." for a total of 45 plus the SAR flight.

Cheseau and Sturton's figure of 3,230 matches the Technical Details section for CVA.01 in British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories by David Hobbs (Scribd's copy) which says it had a compliment of 3,230. The Aircraft Operating Data section says.

Aircraft: 47 designed, with capability to embark 15 more for surge operations.

Earlier in the chapter he wrote...

The philosophy behind the design and the planned air group of thirty-six strike fighters, four AEW aircraft, six antisubmarine helicopters and two SAR helicopters was that about two-thirds of the air group could be stowed in the hangar and about two-thirds could be parked on deck. This left a ‘spare third’ that could be filled by a squadron deployed to reinforce the carrier, as 803 (Buccaneer) NAS demonstrated on Hermes in the Indian Ocean in 1968. The RN also hoped that it might prove possible to embark RAF squadrons to provide a surge reinforcement capability, especially in the Far East, and successively proposed joint forces of Hawker P.1154, Buccaneer and Phantom aircraft. All were rejected by the RAF, which refused to see any requirement for its aircraft to operate at sea.

The sum of thirty-six strike fighters, four AEW aircraft, six anti-submarine helicopters and two SAR helicopters is 48 aircraft not 47.

If I remember correctly the RN thought that three ASW helicopters were needed to keep one on patrol at all times and that's why its helicopter anti-submarine squadrons usually had multiples of three aircraft. Therefore, that's why I think Hobbs is correct and that the ship's normal air group would have been 48 aircraft, i.e., 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 AEW Gannets, 6 ASW Sea Kings and 2 SAR helicopters.

Therefore (based on the information received so far) my conclusions are:

1. The figure of 3,230 quoted by Chesneau and Hobbs as the ship's complement and by Sturton as the maximum accommodation is the ship's complement with the "surged" air group of 62 aircraft embarked.
2. The Final War Complement of 2,980 quoted by Sturton is the ships complement with an air group of 47-48 aircraft depending upon the number of Sea King ASW helicopters carried.

 

[zen]

The Tactical Air Unit was defined as 32 Fighters, 64 Strike/Attack, and 8 AEW. This divided between 2 CVA-01 Type carriers.
Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR.
54 in total per CV.

Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR.
38 in total

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Obviously source of personnel is Albion and Bulwark. Tigers too.

That only takes us up to 1981, viz.

• Albion paid off in 1973
• Bulwark paid off in 1976. She returned to service in 1979 (as an anti-submarine rather than a commando carrier) for what was intended to be five years, but she was actually paid off in 1981.
• Tiger paid off in 1978.
• Blake paid off in 1979.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Tactical Air Unit was defined as 32 Fighters, 64 Strike/Attack, and 8 AEW. This divided between 2 CVA-01 Type carriers.
Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR.
54 in total per CV.

Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total.

I'm having one a "blond moment" because I don't know what that's meant to prove.

Is, "Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR. 54 in total per CV," what you think the "surged" air group would have been?

Is, "Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total," what you think the ship's normal air group would have been? Are you sure that your source said 14 Strike/Attack aircraft? That's 4 aircraft fewer than the normally quoted figure of 18.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

JFC Fuller has some interesting points and its possibly not the doom and gloom (although when we look at the cuts circa 76-82 its hard to imagine any sunny uplands).

• Ian Sturton's article in Warship 2014 lists the final war complement as 300 officers, 730 senior ratings (CPOs and POs) and 1,950 junior ratings. This totals 2,980.
• The max accommodation with full air conditioning (but not to Persian Gulf standards) was far higher though with space for 320 officers, 410 CPOs, 420 POs and 2,080 junior ratings = 3,230

In the Commando role she could lift 50 officers, 900 other ranks plus the helicopter group of 25 pilots and 150 ratings.

Sadly Sturton doesn't provide a breakdown of the crew and how many were part of the air group. Maybe the original documents don't break it down either, I guess for the designers' the different space requirements for berths for officers, CPOs, POs and ratings were all they were interested in.

12 extra F-4Ks or Buccs aboard in wartime needs 24 aircrew and assuming they are all officers, those 20 spare officer bunks don't quite fill the need... of course we can't be sure the quoted war complement includes the aircrew for an additional third of an air group or not...

For what it's worth Appendix 1 "Invincible Class Specifications on Page 94 of Modern Combat Ships 2: "Invincible" class by Paul Beaver says that the Complement (Ship's Company) was 131 officers and 869 ratings and the Complement (air group) was 65 officers and 135 ratings.

• That's a total of 196 officers and 1,004 ratings = 1,200 (1,000 ship's company and 200 air group) or put another way:
• 65% of the Officers, 37% of the ratings and 40% of the Total Complement of a CVA.01 with its Final War Complement.

As far as I know the Invincible had:

• the same sensors as CVA.01. That is except the Invincible class had a Type 1022 radar and CVA.01 was intended to have a Type 988. But on the other hand we've concluded that CVA.01 would probably have been fitted with a Type 965 or Type 1022.
• the same fixed armament as CVA.01 - i.e. Sea Dart because the Ikara system had been deleted from CVA.01 before the ship was cancelled.
• the same Command, Control and Communications (C3) facilities as CVA.01 or at least a more modern version of what was intended for CVA.01.
• it's ADAWS 6 system was an updated version of the ADAWS 3 intended for CVA.01.

Furthermore, the main differences between two the ships were:

• The machinery. CVA.01 had three steam turbines driving three shafts. Invincible had four gas turbines driving two shafts.
• CVA.01 had two steam catapults, Invincible didn't.
• CVA.01 had arrester gear. Invincible didn't.

As far as I know CVA.01's machinery required a bigger crew than Invincible's due the former having one shaft more than the latter and steam turbines requiring more personnel than gas turbines. CVA.01 would have needed men to operate the steam catapults and arrester gear while Invincible wouldn't because she didn't have them. CVA.01 would have also needed more ancillary staff like caterers to support them.

So I'll hazard a guess that the various complements that are quoted for CVA.01 include a ship's company of around 1,500 and the rest is the air group.

 

[zen]

The Tactical Air Unit was defined as 32 Fighters, 64 Strike/Attack, and 8 AEW. This divided between 2 CVA-01 Type carriers.
Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR.
54 in total per CV.

Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total.

I'm having one a "blond moment" because I don't know what that's meant to prove.

Is, "Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR. 54 in total per CV," what you think the "surged" air group would have been?

Is, "Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total," what you think the ship's normal air group would have been? Are you sure that your source said 14 Strike/Attack aircraft? That's 4 aircraft fewer than the normally quoted figure of 18.

So my numbers are from Norman Friedman's book on RN Carrier aviation and reflect the debate on aircraft numbers.
My understanding is these differ due to different missions.
The TAU is the most stressing case for CVA-01, which as a pair had to support land forces fighting a conventional war.
While the standalone figures are obviously for one CVA-01 operating at a more normal level.

18 Fighter is based on standing CAP for 4 hours.

As to 14 Strike, I think this was closer to Eagle and Ark Royal.

Arguably they'd cut the normal figures to 12 of each to save money.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Tactical Air Unit was defined as 32 Fighters, 64 Strike/Attack, and 8 AEW. This divided between 2 CVA-01 Type carriers.
Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR.
54 in total per CV.

Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total.

I'm having one a "blond moment" because I don't know what that's meant to prove.

Is, "Making a carrier aircraft requirement for 16 Fighters, 32 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR. 54 in total per CV," what you think the "surged" air group would have been?

Is, "Normal stand alone requirements were 18 Fighters, 14 Strike/Attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR - 38 in total," what you think the ship's normal air group would have been? Are you sure that your source said 14 Strike/Attack aircraft? That's 4 aircraft fewer than the normally quoted figure of 18.

So my numbers are from Norman Friedman's book on RN Carrier aviation and reflect the debate on aircraft numbers.
My understanding is these differ due to different missions.
The TAU is the most stressing case for CVA-01, which as a pair had to support land forces fighting a conventional war.
While the standalone figures are obviously for one CVA-01 operating at a more normal level.

18 Fighter is based on standing CAP for 4 hours.

As to 14 Strike, I think this was closer to Eagle and Ark Royal.

Arguably they'd cut the normal figures to 12 of each to save money.

Is that the four paragraphs starting towards the bottom of Page 340 and ending on Page 341?

• I can see where the 32 fighters and 64 strike/attack aircraft come from.
• However, I don't see figures quoted for the number of AEW and SAR aircraft although RN aircraft carriers of the 1960s did normally carry 4 AEW and 2 SAR aircraft. I don't see any mention of the stand alone requirement of 18 fighters,
• I don't see any mention of a stand alone requirement for 18 fighters, 14 strike/attack, 4 AEW and 2 SAR for a total of 38 aircraft either.

The fourth paragraph in the second column on Page 342 says that the planned air group was 30 strike fighters, 3 AEW aircraft, 2 SAR helicopters and 5 ASW helicopters, which makes a total of 40 aircraft. Friedman doesn't give a date for this and the first date that I can find before that paragraph is May 1962.

The antepenultimate paragraph on Page 343 says that in mid-1963 the air group was the same except for 4 rather than 3 AEW. The air group was ultimately to be OR.346 fighter/attackers. In the interim, the ship would support 18 Buccaneers and 18 Phantoms, plus four AEW and helicopters. Within two years the interim air group had changed to 24 Buccaneers and 12 Phantoms. He also wrote that the Ikara had been deleted on the theory that escorts would probably be effective and that the carrier's own helicopters constituted sufficient back-up.

Table 16-6: CVA.01 on Page 344, which the author says was the design in its final form has a air group of 47 aircraft that comprised 36 Buccaneer/F4, 4 Gannet, 2 Whirlwind and 5 Wessex in that order.

However, I think it would be 48 or 49 aircraft because I think it would carry 6 ASW helicopters and possibly a third SAR helicopter.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The antepenultimate paragraph on Page 343 says that in mid-1963 the air group was the same except for 4 rather than 3 AEW. The air group was ultimately to be OR.346 fighter/attackers. In the interim, the ship would support 18 Buccaneers and 18 Phantoms, plus four AEW and helicopters. Within two years the interim air group had changed to 24 Buccaneers and 12 Phantoms. He also wrote that the Ikara had been deleted on the theory that escorts would probably be effective and that the carrier's own helicopters constituted sufficient back-up.

That's interesting because the 52 F-4K that were built (out of 59 ordered) were enough to support 2 squadrons of 12 for Ark Royal and Eagle.

Which means that there's no need to buy additional Phantoms to support two operational and one training squadrons for an eventual force of 3 CVA.01 type carriers (2 operational and one in refit/reserve) that I envisage.

This is based on CVA.01 being built between the late 1960s and mid 1970s. Some of the money would come from not giving Ark Royal its 1967-70 Phantomisation refit and Hermes its 1971-73 conversion into a commando carrier. CVA.02 and CVA.03 would be built between 1973 and 1985 instead of the Invincible class. CVA.02 would replace Hermes and CVA.03 Eagle.

The money spent on the construction of the Invincible class might not be enough to pay for 2 CVA.01s. However, if HMG decides to maintain a force of 3 strike carriers indefinitely there's no requirement for the 12 Shackelton AEW.2 operated by 8 Squadron RAF to fill the gap left by the Gannets of 849 NAS (because there's no gap to fill). Therefore, there's no need for the Nimrod AEW and the Billion Pounds spent on that in the "real world" can be spent on competing CVA.02 and CVA.03.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

12 extra F-4Ks or Buccs aboard in wartime needs 24 aircrew and assuming they are all officers, those 20 spare officer bunks don't quite fill the need... of course we can't be sure the quoted war complement includes the aircrew for an additional third of an air group or not...

Eagle's 1967-68 Commissioning Book, which I divided from https://faaa.org.uk/Library/ says that 800 NAS had 14 aircraft, 30 aircrew officers, 4 engineer officers and 238 ratings which equals 272 or about 20 people per aircraft.

If that's the same for the other types of aircraft the squadrons my estimate is that CVA.01 with an air group of 48 made up of 18 Phantoms, 18 Buccaneers, 4 Gannets, 6 Sea King ASW helicopters and 2 SAR helicopters would require 960 personnel. That would increase to 1,200 with a surge air group of 60 aircraft made up of 24 Phantoms, 24 Buccaneers, 4 Gannets, 6 Sea King ASW helicopters and 2 SAR helicopters.

However, that doesn't include aviation personnel that are "off the books" of the squadrons and instead are part of the ship's company. This would chiefly be the Air Department, Air Engineering Department and Weapons Supply Party, which I've taken from the list of ship's departments from the Eagle's 1970-72 Commissioning book, which I also downloaded from https://faaa.org.uk/Library/.

For the record the contents listed the ship's departments as:

Seaman​

Communications​

Weapons Electrical​

Supply and Secretariat​

NBCD Party​

Divers​

Church​

Maren​

Air Engineering​

Air​

800 NAS​

826 NAS​

849 NAS `D' Flight​

899 NAS​

SAR​

Fleet Chiefs​

Medical​

Dental​

Weapons Supply​

Laundry​

Meteorological​

Education​

Royal Marines (i.e. the ship's band)​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Arguably they'd cut the normal figures to 12 of each to save money.

For what it's worth that's what I think.

I'm working on the assumption that two ships would be in commission with the third in refit/reserve and two air groups would be maintained as this is what happened with the Invincible class after it was decided to cancel the sale of HMS Invincible to Australia.

Each of the air groups would have 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 4 AEW aircraft, one COD aircraft, 7 Sea Kings for ASW and 2 SAR helicopters. That's a total of 40 aircraft which was Ark Royal's air group 1970-78 according to this website:

HMS Ark Royal R 09 Audacious class aircraft carrier Royal Navy

r-09 hms ark royal aircraft carrier royal navy

www.seaforces.org

There would also be 736 NAS and 767 NAS operating as the Buccaneer and Phantom training squadrons respectively, the shore based element of 849 NAS (the AEW and COD unit) and the "real world's" Sea King training squadron. These would form an ad hoc air group for the third CVA.01 on the rare occasions when all three ships were in commission and in wartime their aircraft and personnel would be used to bring the squadrons in aboard the two operational aircraft carriers to their full strength.

It would be easier to recruit and retain the personnel required for those groups as well as being cheaper. If my estimates in Post 119 are correct this air group requires 800 personnel, which is 160 less than my estimate of 96 for CVA.01 with an air group of 48 aircraft.

However, the downside of this is that a lot of poorly informed politicians, journalists and enthusiasts (which would have included my teenage self) would have seen a 53,000 ton ship operating the same number of aircraft as the much smaller Ark Royal and Eagle and then made the usual ill-informed criticism that British warships were under-armed in comparison to foreign warships of similar size.