Submarine-Launched Ship-To-Air Missiles

[Scott Kenny]

From "Leiser, tiefer, schneller-Innovationen im deutschen U-Boot-Bau" by Jürgen Rohweder:

Edit: I've modified the title, to include other systems, than just the Vickers SLAM, as those alrfeady were
mentioned here

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IDAS is a very interesting system. One I can see any sub stuck in shallow waters wanting!

 

[Voltzz]

Concept art of TRITON the torpedo tube launched derivative of Polyphem. While it was cancelled together with Polyphem you can still see the heavy influence the concept had on the later IDAS. Both the fibre-optic guidance and the capability against a wide range of targets (ships, helicopters and shore targets) have their origin in the Polyphem/TRIFOM

 

[publiusr]

Maybe one tube of a boomer could have a float eject…with the missile in that.

 

[NMaude]

Maybe one tube of a boomer could have a float eject…with the missile in that.

Like with the UGM-84 Harpoon?

 

[publiusr]

The float could have its own radar—-nosecone flips over as dish or something…

 

[Scott Kenny]

The float could have its own radar—-nosecone flips over as dish or something…

Balance challenges in that.

And you'd need a different launch method, the usual "cold" launch steam bubble spits a bird out of the water at a good 50fps or more.

 

[iverson]

In any case, I doubt that an SLBM would want to risk revealing its position by launching anything in response to an aircraft. Aircraft simply aren't major threats to submarines that are quiet and don't have to surface (nuclear and closed-cycle).

Systems like these might once have made some sense for conventionally powered submarines operating in shallow water. But, judging from the lack of adoption in the last 50-odd years, even that seems doubtful.

 

[uk 75]

Best defence of a submarine is to stay underwater or get there pdq.
Israel may have a special case given its operations against neighbours which might involve surfacing to land special forces.

 

[Dilandu]

In any case, I doubt that an SLBM would want to risk revealing its position by launching anything in response to an aircraft. Aircraft simply aren't major threats to submarines that are quiet and don't have to surface (nuclear and closed-cycle).

The only solution is if missile launched not from the submarine itself, but from the buoy or torpedo-like vessel. I.e. when the opponent could not be sure, where exactly submarine is, or even is it here at all (such "anti-ASW aircraft mine" could be deployed just to hamper ASW operations and create "false confirmation". The opponent would concentrate its search effort on the area, where ASW plane was downed by buoy-launched SAM - so it make sence to plant some SAM buoys as mines, to distract enemy from real submarines)

 

[iverson]

In any case, I doubt that an SLBM would want to risk revealing its position by launching anything in response to an aircraft. Aircraft simply aren't major threats to submarines that are quiet and don't have to surface (nuclear and closed-cycle).

The only solution is if missile launched not from the submarine itself, but from the buoy or torpedo-like vessel. I.e. when the opponent could not be sure, where exactly submarine is, or even is it here at all (such "anti-ASW aircraft mine" could be deployed just to hamper ASW operations and create "false confirmation". ...

I follow your reasoning. But I still doubt that the concept offers enough advantage to offset the risks of using it outside of coastal waters, where aerial detection is possible.

Launching anything, including a capsule, generates extra noise and thus extra risk. Modern submarine sonars can supposedly detect dropped tools and slightly unbalanced machinery. So even a quietly lauched capsule might be detected and allow a fix on the SSBN.

So, to justify the use of an AA weapon, the threat posed by maritime aircraft would have to outweigh the risk. Currently, it doesn't appear to. Current aircraft lack both the sensors and the weapons for attacking quiet submarines in open waters. It isn't clear that planes could even come close enough to use nuclear depth charges effectively, and they would only be used after the start of full-scale hostilities, in which case the SLBMs would probably be on their way, rendering an attack on the SSBN moot. In almost every other scenario, the SSBN can either avoid detection by aircraft togetheror quietly break a fleeting contact and slip away.

The obvious threat to an SSBN is a shadowing SSN following it from port and operating a passive sonar backed by powerful signal-processing computers. In such a case, quiet makes all the difference. The quieter boat can break contact and slip away or, in extremis, make a first-shot kill on its opponent.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In any case, I doubt that an SLBM would want to risk revealing its position by launching anything in response to an aircraft. Aircraft simply aren't major threats to submarines that are quiet and don't have to surface (nuclear and closed-cycle).

The only solution is if missile launched not from the submarine itself, but from the buoy or torpedo-like vessel. I.e. when the opponent could not be sure, where exactly submarine is, or even is it here at all (such "anti-ASW aircraft mine" could be deployed just to hamper ASW operations and create "false confirmation". ...

I follow your reasoning. But I still doubt that the concept offers enough advantage to offset the risks of using it outside of coastal waters, where aerial detection is possible.

Launching anything, including a capsule, generates extra noise and thus extra risk. Modern submarine sonars can supposedly detect dropped tools and slightly unbalanced machinery.

Not even modern sonars, we were doing that on the Ohio-class with their 1970s vintage BQQ-5. Even dropped toilet seats could be heard miles away.

So even a quietly lauched capsule might be detected and allow a fix on the SSBN.

So, to justify the use of an AA weapon, the threat posed by maritime aircraft would have to outweigh the risk. Currently, it doesn't appear to. Current aircraft lack both the sensors and the weapons for attacking quiet submarines in open waters. It isn't clear that planes could even come close enough to use nuclear depth charges effectively, and they would only be used after the start of full-scale hostilities, in which case the SLBMs would probably be on their way, rendering an attack on the SSBN moot.

Honestly, given that SSBNs are usually second-strike platforms, it's unlikely for there to be much available to hurt an SSBN after it emptied its tubes. That said, what scared boomer crews the most was a partial launch order. Because they just launched the mother of all flares and if someone was on the ball with their retargeting and launch, dropping a circle of 100kt warheads around the position of an SLBM launch is possibly able to smoke that boomer.

In almost every other scenario, the SSBN can either avoid detection by aircraft togetheror quietly break a fleeting contact and slip away.

The obvious threat to an SSBN is a shadowing SSN following it from port and operating a passive sonar backed by powerful signal-processing computers. In such a case, quiet makes all the difference. The quieter boat can break contact and slip away or, in extremis, make a first-shot kill on its opponent.

You would not believe just how quiet an Ohio class is, even when operating normally.

 

[publiusr]

Well, you want the capsule to be noisier than the sub.

Speaking of visibility

Neural wavefront shaping camera overcomes light scattering problem in optical imaging

Engineers from Rice University and the University of Maryland have created full-motion video technology that could potentially be used to make cameras that peer through fog, smoke, driving rain, murky water, skin, bone and other media that reflect scattered light and obscure objects from view.

phys.org

Defense Technical Information Center

apps.dtic.mil

I could see a sat warning a sub in advance of aviation and the sub pre-deploys the float in advance.

Several floats could also be placed in choke points in peacetime.

The ASW may be so focused on looking for a sub that it just…goes quiet.

With more sat-to-sub partnerships that are line of sight (cone) the ASW’s job gets much harder.

As for hunter killers, boomers might go from sea-floor smoker to sea-floor smoker.

I want noise to hide in.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well, you want the capsule to be noisier than the sub.

Speaking of visibility

Neural wavefront shaping camera overcomes light scattering problem in optical imaging

Engineers from Rice University and the University of Maryland have created full-motion video technology that could potentially be used to make cameras that peer through fog, smoke, driving rain, murky water, skin, bone and other media that reflect scattered light and obscure objects from view.

phys.org

Defense Technical Information Center

apps.dtic.mil

I could see a sat warning a sub in advance of aviation and the sub pre-deploys the float in advance.

Several floats could also be placed in choke points in peacetime.

The ASW may be so focused on looking for a sub that it just…goes quiet.

With more sat-to-sub partnerships that are line of sight (cone) the ASW’s job gets much harder.

As for hunter killers, boomers might go from sea-floor smoker to sea-floor smoker.

I want noise to hide in.

I think most smokers are too deep for any military sub to hang around, but I hope to be surprised. Maybe in the South China Sea? I mean, generally speaking subs don't really go a whole lot deeper than 300m/1000ft, so any smoker in water shallower than probably 600m/2000ft is likely to be too deep to provide much noise to hide a sub.

And for maintaining comms, especially with that laser, you need to be shallower. IIRC no less than 180m/600ft