Replacement of Challenger 2 with Leopard 2

Dear all,

I may be wrong but reading this thread it seems that the serving/ex-military people want the tank and want it very well protected and tracked, as in its current or future upgraded Challenger 2/3 form, while those without this military experience (but clearly well read) advocate less protection, therefore more speed, and in some cases wheels only.

In the military I believe that the term 'fad' would be used to describe that new fashion that some clever, usually young, person has dreamed up; and like the 'emperor's new clothes' they will not all work or pass the test of battle. This cheaper medium weight poorly protected vehicle fad, replacing expensive heavy armour, in a near-peer or peer conflict is just that, a fad, that will cost lives if we do not bin it soonest.

However a medium weight wheeled or tracked deployable Brigade for those non-peer or stabilisation conflicts, or even in a holding action, this light armour/excellent mobility idea makes an awful amount of sense. The French have proved this in Mali. It is deployable, if need be by air, very mobile and has good firepower; in full agreement with this. Although I doubt the UK military has the money or forethought to bring into service all the variants from recce, wheeled/tracked light tank, AIFV, APC and support vehicles etc, etc on a single wheeled or tracked platform that would be required to make this work.

However using this type of Medium Brigade to replace the well protected, well armed but perhaps less mobile Battle Tank is not the correct road when engaging a peer or near-peer enemy also equipped with Battle Tanks; as I said previously we can not see the future and the next war will not be like the one we have prepared for! Therefore we need to have all the tools in the tool box for whatever the military future intends to throw at us! So heavy armoured, medium weight and some lighter units if we are to be ready for all events. But if we have to cut our cloth accordingly then heavy armour can deal with most situations; we just need to plan how we can get it there!

There are many historical examples of where the thin armour = speed idea has failed; from the Battlecruisers at Jutland to the US medium and British cruiser tanks from the Western Desert to Germany 1945. I have just finished reading a book called Spearhead by Adam Makos which is about the US 3rd Armoured Division in Germany in 1944/45; and in particular the crew of a single M-26 Pershing heavy tank which was involved in the duel with a German Panther tank close to Cologne Cathedral. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/cologne-cathedral-tank-duel.html

But my point is not about the well armoured M-26 but about the rest of their unit in various versions of the poorly armoured M4 Sherman medium tank. The book is full of graphic descriptions of the Shermans losing that gun/armour battle and the effect on the crews prior to battle, all knowing that each engagement would lead to the loss of tanks and more importantly their crews, and during the battles; it is very moving and actually rather harrowing at times. I recommend it wholeheartedly.

In recent history there have been several examples of single Challenger 2/M1 Abrams tanks taking numerous ATGW/RPG hits and surviving; a wheeled battle tank/assault gun, even with active defensive systems, could never survive this. In fact as an ex-infantryman with experience of FV432/Saxon and Warrior I have always thought that the infantry should have similar heavy protection to the tank to get the infantry to that debus area in one piece, at the end of the day the infantry must get boots on the ground, so that they can clear and defeat the enemy.

So we learn through tank history that heavy armour works and now we want to bin it; yea gads I could scream!

While not relevant to this thread it is noteworthy that the UK choose Boxer to be the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV) APC because, having left the program earlier, we then rejoined because of its, yes wait for it, heavier armour than its competitors. Yet another lesson re-learnt through conflict (Afghanistan/Iraq); armour matters and it needs to match or over match the threat. If we have to move to more exotic armour materials, to bring down weight, then so be it.

So to be prepared to fight that peer or near-peer enemy you need the battle tank (and of course all the other toys) to ensure that your troops go into battle with confidence that their vehicle will kill the enemy and protect the crew to its best ability. A crew lacking confidence in their vehicles protection, like UK and US tankers advancing from Normandy to Germany, will be hesitant, less aggressive and will suffer morale issues. We may however need to look at the issue of top protection due to top attack ATGMs and loitering UAVs in the future.

Despite all this debate I know the UK army well, we will get a Challenger 3 and an upgraded Warrior CSP in the Mechanised Brigade(s) and Ajax/Boxer in the medium Brigade(s) (the word change is not well recognised at high levels); however with funding issues we are not likely to do either very well!

There is so much more that could be said on this matter but I will leave it at that. I will also not comment on the current Ajax (tracked) and wheeled Boxer MIV mixture in the UK planned Strike Bdes; there has been enough said on this already. I will also not harp on about the various vehicle active defensive systems out there; they work and can improve survivability of what they are fitted to - all types from light to heavy.

If you disagree with me please feel free to reply; very much enjoying the debate.

Regards, Vikingtank. PS; Pro-tank lobby man those barricades!
 
Last edited:

Not wanting to get the pro-mbt-advocates on the barricades but maybe a solution like Option D (at the end of the article) could be rather suitable for most of today's expectable scenarios.
Option D could well have it's uses in some scenarios, but I don't think it would be able to truly substitute for a real tank. Also, you would need to keep the Treasury's fingers off the project, otherwise you would probably end up (at best!) with a disaster like the Type 16 Maneuver Combat Vehicle which the JGSDF has been saddled with.
 

Not wanting to get the pro-mbt-advocates on the barricades but maybe a solution like Option D (at the end of the article) could be rather suitable for most of today's expectable scenarios.
Option D could well have it's uses in some scenarios, but I don't think it would be able to truly substitute for a real tank. Also, you would need to keep the Treasury's fingers off the project, otherwise you would probably end up (at best!) with a disaster like the Type 16 Maneuver Combat Vehicle which the JGSDF has been saddled with.
Hi Basil, Yes Option D would make a great wheeled tank for said wheeled medium Brigades. Shows that everyday is a learning day as I was unaware of the Type 16 having issues; thanks. Note to self; stop reading articles by the pro-lightweight mafia, ho, ho............. Vikingtank.
 
What the hell is near peer anyways.

The tank has been a huge failure on the defense in the modern era: almost no value has been extracted out of such equipment once air superiority is lost, which normally happens against stronger opposition.

The tank today is more like amphibious assault ships, in that it is useful when you have obvious superiority to enable offensive action, while the offensive action is of large enough scale to warrant specialized equipment. With modern long range precision strike and low cost air attack, an mechanized attack across unfavorable terrain (some of which is almost certain to exist in a campaign) is bound to be extremely expensive if advantage in other domains have not been secured and tanks are inefficient in winning other domains compared to direct investment (using tanks as bait to win air/artillery superiority is a bad idea).

In the context of expeditionary defense, the opponent simply will not (logically) attack if they could not secure superiority in air/long range strike and risk terrible defeat, which upon securing renders tanks moot. By improving capabilities in contesting the air one can deter aggression. On the practical level, heavy forces have some of the worst strategic mobility and can not contest an attempt at surprise "take and hold" at distant locals before the result is all but decided anyways, while lighter/air forces could.

The seriously threatened weak powers have shown their hand in any case: the way to deter aggressor is to have ever escalating levels of firepower to be delivered in minutes: Force protection is impossible, the only hope is to inflict serious damage in return. Effective missiles with ideally nuclear warheads beats infinite number of tanks at deterrence.

There is also a matter of war aims. A wealthy state aggressor normally would not tolerate a end state of "holding the territory but not air superiority" while getting negative economic value from territory that has all but been bombarded to the stone age.

It is a "defensive" participant that best tolerates prolonged combat under enemy air superiority that can render all economic activity and resupply impossible. It is when fighting against such opponents that close combat to dig out the enemy out of hostile populations is necessary and where tanks have shown its greatest value in modern conflict.
----------
Back to the technical side:
Heavy armored vehicles must first defeat infantry teams, the smallest unit of combatant, before other considerations. If random two man teams could defeat tanks semi-reliably, all the supposed other capabilities would be irrelevant.

The missile problem isn't one where you throw an APS and consider it done: that is like throwing a few bofors on a ship and consider the air defense problem done. The vehicle ought to allocate most mass and cost budget at comprehensively defeating this most common, evolving threat, with other consideration a distant second. Going all in on this means serious changes: reduction in traditional weapon capability (large gun and ammo a good thing to cut to save volume), cut crew count for ultracompact armor box, change in armor allocation (top armor more important than side and perhaps the front!?), operating logic (high performance systems in compact volume for depot level maintenance as opposed to field), and so on. (translation: get Carmel instead?) Personally I think a C-RAM capable vehicle variant will be necessary for protected maneuver: long distance defenses increases individual and formation ability to defeat attack: will be critical to maneuver under hostile networked munition swarms, which may be accessible "soon" to weak and non-state actors.

An infantry missile immune vehicle would have immense value in conflicts like the Syrian war, where thousands of tanks was lost to infantry weapons. Many formations were cut off for years with many overrun leading to large losses in manpower and equipment because no vehicle could break blockades: attempts at doing so without the strength to secure flanks resulted in videos of formations wiped and the survivors retreating on foot. The need for protection in other conflicts lead to things like Namer, Amarta platform, and GCV.

It is impossible to have defensive superiority against a equal weight and technological class opponent: one can at best get a small advantage in engagement range/effectiveness with optimized design, while in most cases a focus on firepower is cheaper, lighter and just as effective in head on combat. It is in combat against lighter platforms where defensive capability provides the greatest value in enabling freedom of maneuver. Defeating the mass limited infantry weapon category is probably the most practical goal for armor.

-------
As for assault gun: a vehicle with gun optimized for HESH ammo and "totally to slow for Cavalry" mobility....hmmm
 
Last edited:
The tank has been a huge failure on the defense in the modern era: almost no value has been extracted out of such equipment once air superiority is lost, which normally happens against stronger opposition.
Hmmm. Ever heard about Golan on October 6, 1973 ?
The view here is that 105 or so Centurions saved the nation. Without air superiority for the first days.
 
The tank has been a huge failure on the defense in the modern era: almost no value has been extracted out of such equipment once air superiority is lost, which normally happens against stronger opposition.
Hmmm. Ever heard about Golan on October 6, 1973 ?
The view here is that 105 or so Centurions saved the nation. Without air superiority for the first days.
Were Israeli tank forces subject to sustained and effective air attacks?
 
For those who know tanks are obsolete and have decided that a two man crew of a light vehicle with weak protection is adequate I say this, Who are the people with the greatest current experience of operating in a disparate conflict/combat scenario? The answer has to be the Israeli army. What are they fielding? Most recently developments of the early Merkava variants adapted as APC's. They have consistently used older tanks as APC variants because of their greater protection for decades and yet those who have never served or tried to do the job try to insist that there is no need. Tell me something else. When your kids and grandkids go off in one of your wheeled and lightly armed/armoured taxi's with a reduced crew to save a few bob, are you going to sleep easy? Whenever you come up with another witty way to sound clever, think of YOUR family members serving in them.

Having said that the ability to act according to the threat currently faced is going to increase in importance and some regiments will need to be able to field vehicles better suited to protecting refugee's from local bandits or rebels but increasingly, as the Russians have found, sophisticated weapons are available. They after all are developing another heavy infantry carrier in the shape of the new T-15. I wonder WHY?
 
Reading this thread again I am reminded of the Inter War period when the British Army experimented with an all arms force and went on to send an Expeditionary Force to France in 1939 which was completely motorised (unlike the Germans) but equipped mainly with lightly armed and armoured tanks. On the one occasion when the Brits had adequately armoured Matildas, Rommel had to use the famous 88mm AA gun to crack them.
This lesson and the fate of "Tommy Cooker" Shermans in France in 1944 led to Centurion, Chieftain and Challenger..
As someone fortunate enough to have only been a pen pusher, I think those lessons are worth remembering.
 
Were Israeli tank forces subject to sustained and effective air attacks?
Israeli forces were subject to air attack, definitely yes.
Effective, I don't think so.

In case people misconstrue and go off tangents: My point was that when facing a massive 1,500 tanks attack by Syria, what saved Israel was tanks. AFAIK nothing else could have done it, especially since air superiority was not ours for the first few days. (ZSU-27-4 and SAM-6, -7)

Separately:
the opponent simply will not (logically) attack if they could not secure superiority in air/long range strike
IMO this sentence is balloney. Without going back to Rommel and the DAK, Egypt and Syria did in 73. Saddam did when attacking Iran in 78. Etc...
 
They are fielding an additional type which is an 8X8, are they removing the heavy APC/IFV from service? No. It might be worth taking note of the experts who happen to be the Israeli army. Thank you for playing, out.
 
Someone should tell all the world's militaries that they're spending money on developing huge failures, I'm sure they'll be interested in being shown wrong.
 
This lesson and the fate of "Tommy Cooker" Shermans in France in 1944 led to Centurion, Chieftain and Challenger..
As someone fortunate enough to have only been a pen pusher, I think those lessons are worth remembering.
The lesson of WWII is the side with heavier the tank loses? It happened in battle of france, it happened in barbarossa, it happened to german as its tanks grew heavier. :)

Ok, the correlation and causation thing aside, the lesson of wwII is that trying attempts at outmatching a symmetrical opponent's firepower by armor is a expensive thing and can only work for short amount of time or with superior amount of resources hoping for opponents mess up their procurement planning and technical information gathering. The entire family of big cats would have been for naught against well timed firepower upgrades: we know that a HV 90mm or even 105mm could have gone in the Sherman after all. Firepower upgrades are cheap and easy relative to armor and armor is not the path to winning the symmetrical conflict.

In the conflict one can see armor's greatest value is in asymmetric contests: the increase in WWII armor have forced anti-tank weapons to shift from the portable, stealthy anti-tank rifle to massive anti-tank guns in the 75~90mm that is also impossible to hide while firing or be manhandled. This imposed costs to defending forces faster than the costs of uparmoring tank: instead of being safe with AT-rifles or light AT guns that costs like <1/10 of a light tank that it can defeat, now self propelled tank destroyer that costs perhaps 5/10 of the attacker tank is now needed to provide the same protection. Towed guns were so marginal against heavy armor that the US disbanded towed AT TD formations. Note the ability to neutralize area weapons like machineguns and most artillery means infantry losses can drop by half by means of armored halftracks, so even a bit of armor helps a real amount.

All the crying over poor protection of the Sherman forgets that tanker casualties are more like 1% of the infantry, totaling 1500 death. If a heavier tank is chosen instead, more infantry would have gone unsupported resulting in greater casualties.

The other take home lesson is that the single most important factor, by a huge margin, in tank combat is detecting the opponent first, and then targeting/firing first. This is true even if one side lacks firepower to penetrate the front armor of the other side, as the tanks are mobile weapons and detecting the opponent first means a chance to reposition or use some other tactic to defeat the opponent. Some weakness in the panther sighting system is blamed for worst exchange ratio against Sherman in actual combat despite its armor: doesn't help in fast draw engagement with side armor exposed anyway.

In case people misconstrue and go off tangents: My point was that when facing a massive 1,500 tanks attack by Syria, what saved Israel was tanks. AFAIK nothing else could have done it, especially since air superiority was not ours for the first few days. (ZSU-27-4 and SAM-6, -7)
Nothing else within the Israeli force structure in 1973, a year that is about twice closer to wwii than 2021. In the nearly fifty years since, communication, sensors and computing technology have improved more than the fokker triplane compared to saturn V or the internal combustion engine over horses.

The response to 73 wasn't just symmetrical overmatch, but the Pereh, which served decades without effective counter measures by opponents, either tactically, technically or operationally and pretty much a turkey shoot would have happened if opponents tried to ram tanks into Israel, not that was needed since bekka valley. 1973 was a transitional war where surface to air missiles are in used, but air to ground guided missiles weren't thus the balance in combat power tilts one side.

1500 tanks today? Nuclear option aside, just handing out missiles to untrained protestors did about just that. Infantry anti-tank ranges have gone from 4m(hand charges), 400m (RPG), 4000m (ATGM) to 40000m (loitering munition). Aircraft anti-tank have gone from the likes of 0.1 tank kills per sortie in pre-PGM days to expecting 10+ kills in target rich environments. After all, we see the same force with 1500 tanks stuck unable to do nothing anything about another force whose primary piece of mobile protected firepower is mild steel welded to trucks until a injection of modern airpower. Troop carriers with better tech and training could wipe heavy armor anyways, just ask Saddam.

Even in 1973, a sizable force of skilled operators with TOW or Spigot, plus general artillery and infantry superiority, could have done it, after all the Sagger knocked out 800 vehicles in that war despite its many limitations.

the opponent simply will not (logically) attack if they could not secure superiority in air/long range strike
IMO this sentence is balloney. Without going back to Rommel and the DAK, Egypt and Syria did in 73. Saddam did when attacking Iran in 78. Etc...
All those attacks that are under taken without air/long range superiority did not translate into out right victory at all. This is unlikely the conflicts where the attacker has secured those domains and can convert such leverage into clean victory. This is especially true now that long range attack is more powerful than ever. This translates back to war aims: when does the state aggressor want to start a land war with only air parity, as it means all the soft and expensive civilian infrastructure would be wrecked even in "victory": it is hard for the aggressor to justify a war barring truly insane ideology.

It is a real problem that just because it isn't logical to attack doesn't mean there'd be no attack because humans organizations are not always 'logical', just ask how Japan declared war on a opponent with x10 the war making potential. Not much you can do to deter them, but having flexible weapons that can counter all opponent moves in time, space and domain helps. The air force can fight another air force, navy or land forces, while self deploy in theater. The tank force simply can not.

-------------------------------------------
Most recently developments of the early Merkava variants adapted as APC's....

....They after all are developing another heavy infantry carrier in the shape of the new T-15. I wonder WHY?
Someone should tell all the world's militaries that they're spending money on developing huge failures, I'm sure they'll be interested in being shown wrong.
A heavy APC is a better investment than heavy tank: it protects more men.

The point isn't that armor isn't useful, it works great especially against older generation of weapons. It is great in driving into Gaza and bulldozing some offender's house or patrolling the afgan countryside. Given that those events actually happened, it is a provably useful capability.

What those conflict involves is very tightly constrained level of controlled violence against very poor opponents. This is the inverse of "high intensity self defense" that have no upper bound in allowed level of firepower against opponents that have enough money to buy enough missiles.

The MBT has both average protection and poor firepower and awful costs in a modern systems warfare context: the armor configuration does not protect it against PGM much more than medium weights, and the weapon is optimized for short range and penny pinching ammo costs, not performance as even an ATV can match the lethality....
----
Of course, in some sense militaries are not really spending real money on the tank force like it is still the decisive arm. The thing about T-14 isn't that it is new, but that it probably could have been built 30 years ago with enough priority and money. The arms race of tank performance have just terminated on a whimper as marginal value drops. The low storage costs, where you can throw one in a bog or desert and get it to use again decades later, means they will be around for a while.
 
Last edited:
For those who know tanks are obsolete and have decided that a two man crew of a light vehicle with weak protection is adequate I say this, Who are the people with the greatest current experience of operating in a disparate conflict/combat scenario? The answer has to be the Israeli army. What are they fielding? Most recently developments of the early Merkava variants adapted as APC's. They have consistently used older tanks as APC variants because of their greater protection for decades and yet those who have never served or tried to do the job try to insist that there is no need. Tell me something else. When your kids and grandkids go off in one of your wheeled and lightly armed/armoured taxi's with a reduced crew to save a few bob, are you going to sleep easy? Whenever you come up with another witty way to sound clever, think of YOUR family members serving in them.

Having said that the ability to act according to the threat currently faced is going to increase in importance and some regiments will need to be able to field vehicles better suited to protecting refugee's from local bandits or rebels but increasingly, as the Russians have found, sophisticated weapons are available. They after all are developing another heavy infantry carrier in the shape of the new T-15. I wonder WHY?
Spot on analysis. Of course, technology has made leaps and bounds since then, yet the core issue should be protection of the soldier, rather than cost. A tank can be replaced, and some money lost now, will be made up for later. But a soldier can never be replaced. That would be the logical way to reason it, but, as ever, money is ruling people's minds.

This is heavily intertwined with the "are tanks obsolete" argument. The simple way to put it is: would you rather charge in front of a machine gun by yourself, or behind a big armoured box with a big gun? Any logical person would choose the latter.

It's the way that tanks are used that is obsolete, not the vehicle itself. Whether we like it or not, there will always be a tank, it is the way that a nation uses it that should change.

Not wanting to be the person to ruin the discussion but, I believe it's best that this threads remains to discussing the Challenger 2, rather than ranting about whether tanks are obsolete or not. That should be left to another thread.
 
Reading this thread again I am reminded of the Inter War period when the British Army experimented with an all arms force and went on to send an Expeditionary Force to France in 1939 which was completely motorised (unlike the Germans) but equipped mainly with lightly armed and armoured tanks. On the one occasion when the Brits had adequately armoured Matildas, Rommel had to use the famous 88mm AA gun to crack them.
This lesson and the fate of "Tommy Cooker" Shermans in France in 1944 led to Centurion, Chieftain and Challenger..
As someone fortunate enough to have only been a pen pusher, I think those lessons are worth remembering.
British Early War Tanks were not materially worse then their German counterparts. The BEF had Matildas, A9, A10 and A13 Cruiser tanks, all of which armour and armament comparable or superior to the early models of the Panzer III that were available to in 1940, and which was available in considerably smaller numbers than the Panzer IIs that made up the majority of Wermacht's tanks.

The BEF were defeated on the strategic level when German troops reached the Channel coast, not because of insufficient equipment. It was a small force consisting no more than 10% of the entire of the Allied Forces on the Western Front and would not have decided the course of events on its own.
 
They are fielding an additional type which is an 8X8, are they removing the heavy APC/IFV from service? No. It might be worth taking note of the experts who happen to be the Israeli army. Thank you for playing, out.
Namer production was stopped well short of the original goal; Merkava is on life-support.
The 8x8 is pretty much their only armored vehicle in serial production.

IOW, given a budget, this is the vehicle the experts pursued rather than resuming Namer production or tank production.
 
Last edited:
the opponent simply will not (logically) attack if they could not secure superiority in air/long range strike
IMO this sentence is balloney. Without going back to Rommel and the DAK, Egypt and Syria did in 73. Saddam did when attacking Iran in 78. Etc...
(....) when does the state aggressor want to start a land war with only air parity, as it means all the soft and expensive civilian infrastructure would be wrecked even in "victory": it is hard for the aggressor to justify a war barring truly insane ideology.
A "truly insane ideology" is a good description, but --reality check-- this what we have as neighbors in the Middle East.
In fact, this is the kind of neighbors many countries have to contend with, and will have to for the foreseeable future, at least until Islamist régimes all over the world are eradicated. Which won't happen tomorrow.

As for the point about damage to civilian infrastructure, they turn it around: for them it is a goal of war to maximize it, even on their side, since they know that Western democracies won't be able to stomach it. The Western Press making a specialty of helping them as much as they can. Maybe someday the Press could stop wallowing in this gutter and deliberately helping terrorists, but this too won't happen tomorrow.
 
Please, back to the original topic, which was and still is the replacement of the Challenger
by Leopards. General discussions about the worth of tanks today, or operational scenarios
may be appropriate for the Military section (if not digressing into politics), but not here.
 
At one time, during the previous decade, they were seriously considering replacing the Challenger 2 with the Future Protected Vehicle. A bullet dodged, perhaps. Part of the MOD's 'Capability Visions' program, the video below was produced in order to give an idea of what it might look like as well as how it was intended to function. For some reason, the video was released with no soundtrack.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFbbc00jnbQ

Ultimately, BAE Systems, the primary contractor on the FPV project, created a family of vehicle and robot designs to support the primary FPV (see thread).
 
Last edited:
I think the above, FCS and other concepts of this category dies not because long range precision fire doesn't work, but it doesn't care what hull you put it on. You'd think the'd have learnt by IT-1. Since the capabilities do not exactly overlap, these new concepts can not replace the old either.
 
That article was followed up by "Challenger 2 - The Right tank for the British Army?" which has already been posted in this thread earlier, and is well worth a read.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom