Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

I think the bigger question might be, does the US actually want to share Virginia Class build information at all? They might be saying, "Sure, we'll share reactor tech with you, but not how to build our state-of-the-art submarines". All the other stuff may be off the table.

Flip side of that is the availability of a shared maintenance spares depot. Although, they do already have facilities at Diego Garcia, Guam and Honolulu. Would an additional facility in South Australia (and/or Fremantle in West Australia) really be that attractive?
 
jeffb said:
I think the bigger question might be, does the US actually want to share Virginia Class build information at all? They might be saying, "Sure, we'll share reactor tech with you, but not how to build our state-of-the-art submarines". All the other stuff may be off the table.

Flip side of that is the availability of a shared maintenance spares depot. Although, they do already have facilities at Diego Garcia, Guam and Honolulu. Would an additional facility in South Australia (and/or Fremantle in West Australia) really be that attractive?
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To the first, I think that would be the biggest obstacle. Submarine technology is by far the biggest US edge at sea; I imagine they'd be reluctant to release it, even to a trusted ally like Australia.

Another maintenance depot, especially one forward in the WESTPAC region, would be huge for the US Navy. They're short of ship maintenance facilities of all stripes, and to have one added to the roster on someone else's dime... the Navy would be all over that.
 
CV12Hornet said:
To the first, I think that would be the biggest obstacle. Submarine technology is by far the biggest US edge at sea; I imagine they'd be reluctant to release it, even to a trusted ally like Australia.
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Time will tell I guess. AUKUS details released so far don't detail exactly whose reactor designs Australia might gain access to. Certainly, as it stands now and given Australia's lack of any domestic nuclear facilities or expertise, units would have to come as complete modules. That in turn suggests fairly modern, all electric designs and not steam driven prop shafts. Further, stated LOS reactor lifetimes strongly suggest S9G/PWR3.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that the deal would create "hundreds of high-skilled jobs" and "preserve security and stability around the world"
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So Boris obviously sees the deal as a boon for UK industry (but then he would say that).

Rolls-Royce PWR - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

The PWR3 was a new system "based on a US design but using UK reactor technology". The Royal Institution of Naval Architects reported that it was likely that the UK was given access to the US Navy S9G reactor design used in their Virginia-class submarines. The PWR3 was a simpler and safer design with a longer life and lower maintenance requirements than the PWR2 variants and cost roughly the same as the PWR2b. The PWR3 has 30% less parts compared to the PWR2.
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jeffb said:
I think the bigger question might be, does the US actually want to share Virginia Class build information at all? They might be saying, "Sure, we'll share reactor tech with you, but not how to build our state-of-the-art submarines". All the other stuff may be off the table.

Flip side of that is the availability of a shared maintenance spares depot. Although, they do already have facilities at Diego Garcia, Guam and Honolulu. Would an additional facility in South Australia (and/or Fremantle in West Australia) really be that attractive?
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If the US doesn't want to give out Virginia class details, I'm sure the UK will be happy to supply Astute details in their place. Though if you're willing to share reactor tech, is there really anything more sensitive?

Personally I wonder if the optimum solution wouldn't be Astute with a Virginia Payload Module :)

The USN also has contracted facilities in Singapore, but that's right on the Straits of Malacca, aka chokepoint central, especially if China were to get basing rights in, say, Myanmar. Australia OTOH, while significantly further south, doesn't have nearly the same exposure to access denial.
 
jeffb said:
GTX said:
jeffb said:

The Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 prohibits certain nuclear actions specified in s.22A unless a federal approval is obtained. It specifically prohibits nuclear power generation in s.140A (an amendment insisted upon by the Australian Democrats). The Act states that the Minister must not approve an action consisting of or involving the construction or operation of a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, or a nuclear power station, or an enrichment plant, or a reprocessing facility.
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That doesn't really change anything. If the political will is there it will happen.
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Laws typically do change things I find.

Sure, the Parliament can change laws. Changing these particular laws however would require reopening and winning the nuclear power debate in Australia.

Good luck with that.

I suppose the government could slip a special amendment to the act through with some other legislation. Not a terribly democratic approach though.
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On second thought...Australian Liberal/National Coalition (Tory/Republican) now throwing around nuclear power and SMRs as a way to rapidly bring down carbon emissions in the lead up to COP26 in Glasgow.

So you may well be right again GTX.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
 
DWG said:
Though if you're willing to share reactor tech, is there really anything more sensitive?
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There could be.....Sonar and signal processing. Now that is part of the crown jewels or should we say towers of excellence the UK has.
 
A heads up for later this week:

France's Barracuda-Suffren SSN Article: Personnel

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.
gentleseas.blogspot.com gentleseas.blogspot.com

I’d say that an SSN capability, to date only held by Great Powers, is all too expensive and difficult for Middle Power Australia.

Australia would need to build an SSN capability from scratch (ie. no SSN experience and no SSN infrastructure).

Later this week I'll present some websites on AUKUS submarine issues - just put up by Australia's Defence Department.
 
GTX said:
www.abc.net.au

US or UK submarines? Australia hired three Americans to advise them on a big decision but won't say how much they're paying them

Three senior American shipbuilding executives are being paid to advise Australia on submarines, but Defence is so far refusing to say what their work involves or how much they’re costing.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
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Well that's a bit of a stacked deck. My new prediction is a Virginia+- with UK manufactured seat cushions as a thrown bone. Although I could definitely undercut Mr Winter there. :oops:
 

Op-ed for AFR Defence special | Defence Ministers

Australians are rightly concerned about tensions in the Indo-Pacific. As we confront a more uncertain region than we have known in decades, new energy and determination is flowing through Australia’s defence ecosystem. Defence is getting on with its core business.That business is about making...
www.minister.defence.gov.au www.minister.defence.gov.au
 
Opportunistic Minnow said:
Well that's a bit of a stacked deck. My new prediction is a Virginia+- with UK manufactured seat cushions as a thrown bone. Although I could definitely undercut Mr Winter there. :oops:
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It is the most expedient, economical, and capable solution. Especially if they negotiate assistance in developing a yard to perform EDSRAs and other major service events on US submarines.
 
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NeilChapman said:


It is the most expedient, economical, and capable solution. Especially if they negotiate assistance in developing a yard to perform EDSRAs and other major service events on US submarines.
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And converts to a Block V Virginia SSGN with the addition of the Virginia VPM module and 24-28 additional Tomahawks. Although 12 Tomahawks in the Block I-IV configurations is nothing to sneeze at.


Virginia-Class-VPM.jpg
 
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Is it an affordable solution though? I have my doubts that Australia would select the VPM option or otherwise I suspect that the average Tomahawk loadout per boat will be rather meagre. A lot of blank cheques get written on this site!

I think a Virginia likely too but perhaps not with every bell and whistle Uncle Sam puts on her.
 
I'm pretty sure that Australia would be happy with the standard Virginia.

But the VPM plugin is a little or no risk future upgrade option that opens up a bunch of UUV and/or strategic strike options that they might want.
 
Opportunistic Minnow said:
Is it an affordable solution though? I have my doubts that Australia would select the VPM option or otherwise I suspect that the average Tomahawk loadout per boat will be rather meagre.
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In the current environment nothing would surprise me. We are already ramping up significant missile production plans (see here) and other programs on the Defence side. Both sides of politics are largely supportive.
 
The head of the nuclear submarine taskforce, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, told the committee that Australia intended to select a "mature design" for its nuclear submarine, to be built under the AUKUS security partnership.

"It is our intention that when we start the build program, the design will be mature and there will be a production run already in existence," Admiral Mead told the Defence estimates hearing in Canberra.

"All options are on the table, but the plan is that the design is mature at the start of the build."
www.abc.net.au

Government concedes naval ship it promised to build will now be bought from overseas

Defence admits it won't be building a ship promised to be constructed locally, as more details on Australia's nuclear submarine fleet are also revealed
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
www.afr.com

Hybrid nuclear submarine ‘unlikely’, navy chiefs say

The government says the first nuclear submarine will be delivered before 2040, as it comes under fire for building a new ship for the Pacific overseas instead of locally.
www.afr.com www.afr.com
 
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Second article paywalled, can you reproduce the paragraphs relating to an overseas build?
 
More details on Australia's intended acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines have come to light this week following a Senate Estimates hearing and an interview given to the AFR by Defence Minister Peter Dutton

Both confirmed that Australia is seeking an unchanged mature design - either the UK Astute class or the US Virginia class – but sources told the AFR that Defence is leaning towards the Virginia class.
The sources also indicated that the rear half of the submarine and the nuclear reactor would be built overseas and joined together with a locally-built front half. According to the AFR, Defence has told industry that the submarine will include about 40 percent local industry content.

Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead told a Senate Estimates hearing that British and American designers are coming to Australia next year as part of the 18-month planning and evaluation process, which VADM Mead said would report to government 'regularly' and government will then decide whether that information is made public.

VADM Mead also said that Prime Minister Scott Morrison has personally established the timeline of having the first Australian boat "in the water by 2040" but VADM Mead could not define what "in the water" means in the Prime Minister's context - whether that is an operational submarine or one prior to commissioning. The task force will identify this timeline and examine options of bringing that date forward or not over its 18-month tenure.

When asked if the RAN would lease British or American submarines to fill the capability gap as the Collins class nears the end of its life, Defence Department Secretary Greg Moriarty appeared to suggest that was not on the cards.

Nonetheless, Chief of Navy Michael Noonan agreed that hull fatigue would affect the operational capabilities of the Collins class in response to a question posed by Senator Kimberley Kitching.

"Does this mean if hull fatigue is starting to impact Collins, it reduces their operational capabilities?" Senator Kitching asked.

"That is a fair characterisation," VADM Noonan replied.

"So how does that fit with the second Life of Type Extension [LOTE]?"

"If we were to see evidence of hull fatigue at the 40 year mark, it would mean that consideration of a second LOTE would need to take that into account and might see us considering the potential life of a second LOTE – it may be less than ten years – or we may need to put operational restrictions on the submarines.

"So yes, hull fatigue will be an important factor in determining whether it is possible to extend the Collins class beyond the planned LOTE period."

The hearing also revealed that Cabinet only signed off on the AUKUS decision 'a day or two' before the public announcement on September 16, Minister Dutton spoke to his French counterpart the day before the announcement, and CDF General Angus Campbell spoke to his counterpart only after the announcement.

Both CDF or Secretary Moriarty said they had not been party to discussions on potentially expanding AUKUS to include New Zealand, Canada or Japan.

If Defence's preference for the Virginia class is correct, it would reinforce existing questions over the influence of Don Winter, a former US Navy secretary and Prime Minister Scott Morrison's personally-appointed special advisor on naval shipbuilding, as well as the government's Submarine Advisory Committee, which 'provides independent critical peer review of the current and projected submarine capability'.

The members of this committee include Jim Hughes, a former vice president of submarines at Newport News Shipbuilding (the company that constructs the Virginia class submarines for the US Navy), and Donald Kirkland, Chairman of the Board of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII - the company that owns Newport News Shipbuilding). This committee was appointed by Minister Dutton and Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price.

According to Greg Sammut, General Manager Submarines, the role of this committee in acquiring the nuclear-powered boats 'hasn't been determined yet' and he could not say when it would be determined - although the three committee members have reportedly identified 'conflicts of interest' which Sammut says will be factored into any role that committee plays in the acquisition.

"Given the role of Kirkland as chairman of HII, and that organisation's role in building the Virginia class, has that been identified as a conflict of interest?" Senator Jordon Steele-John asked.

"They continue to review the work we're doing on Collins and within their remit look at how we are winding down the Attack program," Sammut replied. "Whilst that is their remit there is no conflict of interest."

In a separate discussion of the Sovereign Shipbuilding Talent Pool (SSTP), which is a mechanism to redistribute Naval Group and Lockheed Martin workers affected by the cancellation of the Sea 1000 contract, Deputy Secretary of National Naval Shipbuilding Tony Dalton revealed that other companies' employees eligibility for the SSTP will effectively be decided on a case by case basis.

So far, over 560 eligible people have been affected by the contract cancellation and 286 have applied for assistance through the SSTP, but only 13 job offers have been made and 11 people have accepted a new job.
 
Well that cuts Astute out then, PWR2 will be long out of production by then and the last Astute will have been in the water a least a decade before the Australian build even begins.
Even the Virginia will be at the end of its build run by then. Seems odd to plan to buy a current type now for 2040 when the SSN(X) and SSN(R) will exist by that time.
Don't forget the Australian subs will be building throughout the 2040s and possibly into the early 2050s and both of these current designs will be out of build and their builders will be well into next-gen construction by then.
 
I believe that training of Ocker crews on US and UK boats based on the region while joining the next sub program would be the best fit. Train crews by placement and build up the facilities to run the vessels operated by the US and UK and get in early for vessels capable of good long service use. Why buy old tech boats?
 
Thanks aonestudio, interesting read!

aonestudio said:
When asked if the RAN would lease British or American submarines to fill the capability gap as the Collins class nears the end of its life, Defence Department Secretary Greg Moriarty appeared to suggest that was not on the cards.
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Yep, no one has any spares.

aonestudio said:
The sources also indicated that the rear half of the submarine and the nuclear reactor would be built overseas and joined together with a locally-built front half.
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This is an interesting wrinkle. I wonder if this the plan for all the boats or just the first few?
 
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It's not impossible to do it and it does mean Australia can focus on uncontroversial high end elements produced for the 'front end'.

But......it does have to fit.
But.....these days it's much more achievable.
 
It would at least save a lot of yard space and construction effort to have one large hull section with the reactor in it. Aren’t the Virginia’s constructed in sections at two different yards now? That might be why that design is preferable, plus the fact that RAN uses a US combat system already anyway.
 
Ah. So sections 4 and back would be provided (if Virginia is selected) and Aus would build 3 and forward, hypothetically.
 
I would caution readers.....and the Australian government, I guess, against taking the idea of producing "halves" as 100% literal. Part of the reason is that is not an evolution of what happens now. When we see something like this:
https://twitter.com/x/status/1300932191455649792
View: https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/status/1300932191455649792

We're seeing a LOT of both companies' work, whichever yard is doing final assembly.

As an example: all the pressure hull ring sections come from EB's Quonset Point facility regardless of "whose" module it is inside the hull. Both from a material performance and cost perspective, using a single source to produce the hull rings makes a ton of sense. But now that leads to a new question: how does that translate into Australia production? EB could ship rings to Australia to be joined and filled with hardware, this would probably be the fastest and most affordable option, but that plan may cause Australian industrial share concerns (at least among Aussie steel people). On the opposite side of the spectrum, Australia could stand up its own SSN hull ring production and not use the US-made hull rings at all, but that's probably the most expensive and slowest option.
 
If deftly executed, the nascent Australian SSN program could meet the key force capability goals set by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as provisionally approved by Australia's cabinet and endorsed by the loyal opposition Australian Labor Party.

Yet I would bet an all-expenses paid long weekend at a Hyatt resort that this initiative will go pear shaped.

There is little chance of Australian Labor Party (or UK Labour Party (thy are spelt differently!)) parliamentarians taking the risk/wearing the blame for a highly foreseeable SSN fiasco.

Therefore, in my humble opinion, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison have less than three years, to conjure up:

(a) a signed bilateral contract, blessed by all three AUKUS partners, for the UK and Australian future submarine construction programs to be seamlessly joined, with Australia and the UK jointly building (and separately operating) at least eight SSNs of the same design each - including a mix of Astute SSN and their successor class, aka SSN(R) [due to be delivered first to the UK Royal Navy (RN) in the 2040s or 2050s.]

(b) live video of an impressive looking new nuclear boat, underway in UK waters, flying the Australian ensign

(c) a UK Treasury disclosure document showing rivers of gold flowing to the UK under a line item titled “Leasing Fees for HMS Agamemnon and HMS Agincourt from the RN to the RAN”

Strangely Sobering AUKUS SSN Sermon

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.
gentleseas.blogspot.com gentleseas.blogspot.com
 
"If Boris declines to agree to an urgent loan to the RAN of Astute boats six and seven, then Australia might be just as likely to abolish its submarine service (as Denmark did) to punish the RAN (and avoid a Collins SSK sinking after 32 years in service), than to press on to create a viable SSN force prior to the 2040s.

Somebody pass me the popcorn, this saga is 'must-sea' viewing."

- wow this is good. Pass the popcorn indeed.
 
Moose said:
Australia could stand up its own SSN hull ring production and not use the US-made hull rings at all, but that's probably the most expensive and slowest option.
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This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean. But certainly all of the internals from the reactor compartment back would have to be made in the US, possibly this is the 'half' they're referring to.
 
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jeffb said:
Moose said:
Australia could stand up its own SSN hull ring production and not use the US-made hull rings at all, but that's probably the most expensive and slowest option.
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This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean. But certainly all of the internals from the reactor compartment back would have to be made in the US, possibly this is the 'half' they're referring to.
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If they're keen on translating the 774 (or Astute) hull into their micro-alloy steel they're definitely signing up to spend some money, but it's money well spent to end up with the product they want. But these are the sorts of details which can A) dramatically effect the shape of a program and B) dramatically effect the cost of a program.

I want to be clear that I'm definitely not suggesting they couldn't or shouldn't, I just don't want people to get the wrong idea when they're seeing talk of "building half" a boat. Whatever the overall workshare, and even if the Aussies go out of their way to avoid as much powertrain work as possible, there's going to have to be a real thorough and well-thought-out teaming arrangement between the US and AU yards to make such a program work.
 
jeffb said:
This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean.
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But surely a Virginia or Astute is capable of a much deeper diving depth - at least 200-250ft+ (that we know of based on vague public figures) than the Collins regardless of local conditions.
The Collins used a high-tensile micro-alloy steel, developed by the Swedes and further improved by BHP. It is lighter and easier to weld than HY-80 or HY-100, but was it really selected because Australia demanded such a steel or simply because SSAB couldn't produce HY-80 or HY-100 steels (presumably through lack of need given Sweden's particular submarine parameters for the shallower Baltic)?

Presumably the Virginia uses HY-100 and they would have to certify that whatever Australian steel is produced matches the quality EB are currently casting. And you probably wouldn't want to mix rings of different material on the same submarine.
If a British option was chosen you'd have to ask whether we have enough capacity to make sufficient steel for 8 Aussie SSNs alongside the needs of SSN(R) and the last two Dreadnoughts. We seem to have problems even keeping the foundry going.... more orders would help I guess.
As an aside its interesting that HMS Dreadnought suffered from micro-cracking in her British-built half, it was said not to be too serious but she was withdrawn from service while she was still young. Perhaps an admission that all wasn't well with her steel or perhaps her join proved weaker than expected (there was a slight mismatch in diameters by nature of design).
Assembling or building the same sub across two continents should be doable these days but getting the steel quality right might take some effort.

Moose said:
I just don't want people to get the wrong idea when they're seeing talk of "building half" a boat. Whatever the overall workshare, and even if the Aussies go out of their way to avoid as much powertrain work as possible, there's going to have to be a real thorough and well-thought-out teaming arrangement between the US and AU yards to make such a program work.
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Indeed, it was always obvious the powerplant sections would have to come from the parent company.
I'd be weary of any political talk at this stage, its waaaay too early in the process and politicians know as much about submarines, naval matters and industry as I know about K-Pop.
 
jeffb said:
This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean. But certainly all of the internals from the reactor compartment back would have to be made in the US, possibly this is the 'half' they're referring to.
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Please elaborate.
 

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