Raytheon Coyote interceptors

Isn't it simpler to use something akin to APKWS?

Does APKWS have the kinematics to engage a manouevring target? It's basically a straight-line weapon with course-correction, rather than a dogfight weapon.

I thought that thing got cancelled. (2.75" LG rocket.) :confused:
There was a laser-guided Zuni (5" rocket) as well but no idea if it ever went into production.

The original APKWS was cancelled, but 70mm APKWS II is fielded and operational in fairly large numbers (tens of thousands of rounds procured).

That's great to hear. When I read it was cancelled (must have been an old article talking about the first phase) it blew my mind that they'd cancel a mod that was so simple with so much bang for the buck.
 
That's great to hear. When I read it was cancelled (must have been an old article talking about the first phase) it blew my mind that they'd cancel a mod that was so simple with so much bang for the buck.

Turns out the original Raytheon version didn't work very well. The new version seems much better.

There are a couple others out there as well. DAGR is a Hellfire-compatible system (4 DAGR for one Hellfire). LOGIR has imaging IR instead of semi-active laser homing, ideal for engaging small boat swarms.
 
Those will be handy for shooting down the likes of Shaheed drones.
Think these are for ground attacks (there was video of one firing 2 rockets at a Russian position in a tree break recently, alomg with danger close video from Ukrainian's who were 50 yards away from impact. The unit seem does not have a laser or E/O turret to guide the rockets, relying on designation from another source. This is quite different from the Vampire version that has the launcher and E/O turret mounted onboard.
 
Think these are for ground attacks (there was video of one firing 2 rockets at a Russian position in a tree break recently, alomg with danger close video from Ukrainian's who were 50 yards away from impact. The unit seem does not have a laser or E/O turret to guide the rockets, relying on designation from another source. This is quite different from the Vampire version that has the launcher and E/O turret mounted onboard.
.yes familiar w that scene and had pointed out is another thread how these things were provided for for AD and were instead apparently being used for ground atk.
 
.yes familiar w that scene and had pointed out is another thread how these things were provided for for AD and were instead apparently being used for ground atk.
Different vehicles. The Vampire were on commercial pickups. This is something else, its using the same rocket pod but mounted on a HMMVW.
 
Different vehicles. The Vampire were on commercial pickups. This is something else, its using the same rocket pod but mounted on a HMMVW.
Needs to be pointed out that that type of HMMVW?

The bed is basically within commercial pickup truck dimensions with all the same hook up points in roughly the same area and the like.

Basically since the Vampire rig can fit in multiple different models of full size pickups it be able to fit in a HMMVW no issue.

So you cannot use the vehicle it mount on to tell you if its the same or not.

Especially since going by L3harris site you can remove the E/O turret for use as a dumb rocket slinger...
 
Different vehicles. The Vampire were on commercial pickups. This is something else, its using the same rocket pod but mounted on a HMMVW.

Vampire, and all it controversy has been in the press for sometime but the above is the only and recent press of the ground attack. This new Ukr capability never made the regular defense press nor ADefense's media website.
 
Raytheon Co., El Segundo, California, was awarded a $196,719,957 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for Coyote Interceptors. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Dulles, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2027. Fiscal 2024 aircraft procurement, Army funds in the amount of $196,719,957 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-24-C-0018).

This contract award on September 26th doesn't specify whether these are for block II or block III interceptors, which are entirely different interceptors. The award is almost certainly not for block I.

In a contracting notice earlier this year, the Army stated their intention to procure 6,000 block II interceptors and 700 block III interceptors.


Block II interceptors are jet-powered proximity fuse kinetic interceptors, while block III interceptors are reusable interceptors with short loiter times and a non-kinetic (EW, HPM, etc.) effector and reusability.

I wasn't able to find a credible source for the cost of a block II interceptor, but I've seen estimates of $100k - $150k per interceptor. This makes a block II interceptor slightly cheaper than a Stinger.

Assuming the $196M buy is for the block II interceptors, this contract would purchase 1300 - 2000 block II interceptors.

$100k per interceptor to take out a $5k or $10k drone isn't scalable or sustainable. I hope the army can get this cost per kill down with systems like the block III interceptor and other non-kinetic effectors.
 
$100k per interceptor to take out a $5k or $10k drone isn't scalable or sustainable. I hope the army can get this cost per kill down with systems like the block III interceptor and other non-kinetic effectors.

Why would the Army require a 555+ top speed, 15 km range, networked weapon against a $5 K or $10K drone? The Army has 30 mm guns, EW, other non-kinetic options and Block 1 interceptors (that it is refurbishing and life-extending) for that purpose. Not to mention that we've pushed out quite a bit of lower cost CsUAS gear into CENTCOM that doesn't cost that much per kill. That said, there are higher end small and larger (Group 3-4) UAS that cannot be dealt with without requiring greater stand off range, speed and higher altitude coverage. The Coyote block II+ is optimized to defeat those.

A DJI Mavic or an FPV drone is not exactly the requirements driver for something like the block 2 Coyote.

Block II interceptors are jet-powered proximity fuse kinetic interceptors, while block III interceptors are reusable interceptors with short loiter times and a non-kinetic (EW, HPM, etc.) effector and reusability.
I have seen no reference of the Block 3 having a EW warhead. It is known to have a HPM warhead. Do you have a source for that more traditional EW payload?
 

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Why would the Army require a 555+ top speed, 15 km range, networked weapon against a $5 K or $10K drone? The Army has 30 mm guns, EW, other non-kinetic options and Block 1 interceptors (that it is refurbishing and life-extending) for that purpose. Not to mention that we've pushed out quite a bit of lower cost CsUAS gear into CENTCOM that doesn't cost that much per kill. That said, there are higher end small and larger (Group 3-4) UAS that cannot be dealt with without requiring greater stand off range, speed and higher altitude coverage. The Coyote block II+ is optimized to defeat those.

A DJI Mavic or an FPV drone is not exactly the requirements driver for something like the block 2 Coyote.
It's a matter of range and stopping the attack further out is my guess.
 
It's a matter of range and stopping the attack further out is my guess.
Yes but think larger Group 2 and Group 3 drones and not quadcopters or cheap FPV drones. Of course tactically you will use the solution that makes the best sense, and not necessarily the one that is the lowest cost. But my point was related to what led the Army to ask for a much faster, longer ranged, more precise, and networked weapon which is responsible for the cost increase. The next gen CUAS weapon will be even faster than the block 2+ Coyote and is chasing a higher performing Group 3/4 UAS threat. There are other things addressing the smaller, and cheaper UAS threat (kinetic) with many more available should the Army wish to add to its arsenal.
 

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Yes but think larger Group 2 and Group 3 drones and not quadcopters or cheap FPV drones. Of course tactically you will use the solution that makes the best sense, and not necessarily the one that is the lowest cost. But my point was related to what led the Army to ask for a much faster, longer ranged, more precise, and networked weapon which is responsible for the cost increase. The next gen CUAS weapon will be even faster than the block 2+ Coyote and is chasing a higher performing Group 3/4 UAS threat. There are other things addressing the smaller, and cheaper UAS threat (kinetic) with many more available should the Army wish to add to its arsenal.
It's a case of how many drones are coming your way TBH. Autocannons and laser are okay if there's only a few, but if there are 100+ you don't really want to wait until the last 2km to start engaging. HPM is great unless the enemy has some kind of counter. The other problem is that even if you successfully shoot down all the drones, if they got within 2km they may have spotted several artillery pieces, counter battery radars and other expensive stuff (like your autocannon, laser and HPM system) that can then be shelled.
 
It's a case of how many drones are coming your way TBH. Autocannons and laser are okay if there's only a few, but if there are 100+ you don't really want to wait until the last 2km to start engaging. HPM is great unless the enemy has some kind of counter. The other problem is that even if you successfully shoot down all the drones, if they got within 2km they may have spotted several artillery pieces, counter battery radars and other expensive stuff (like your autocannon, laser and HPM system) that can then be shelled.
If you desire to kinetically engage and shoot down small Group 1 drones at 10-15 km then you should be looking to pay a cost exchange ratio of 10-100 to one. Its that simple. 2-5 km slant range makes it a little cheaper but still looking at 5-10 x the cost of the lower end G1 UAS's. Trying to detect and track something that small (most CsUAS sensors with tactical vehicle SwaPc optimization have tracking ranges of 2-5 km against those threats) and then engage it at SO distances is a foolish proposition.

Luckily, the Army and the DOD at large is focusing on much shorter ranged, lower cost kinetic solutions against that threat which allows you to affordably field mass which is what is required since these systems have proliferated beyond just one off systems. You are better off defeating these at range via non kinetic means. Like having a HPM effector with long loiter time (LM Morfius) etc. That's the only way to build up inventory to keep pace with the scale that the threat will proliferate at. You can't "Coyote" your way to solving the Group 1 defeat mission.

HPM is great unless the enemy has some kind of counter.

In that case, can you provide some examples of a HPM and HEL negating Group 1 UAS and what performance specifications it possesses? And how much of the HPM and HEL effect is it able to negate? and how it does it..and what type of HPM and HEL systems has it been demonstrated against?

There is no such thing as free lunch as the saying goes. You are talking about small Group 1 systems in the 1-6 lb class. There are limits to the sort of protection you can add to them before they become tactically useless.
 
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A Coyote 2 allegedly costs $100k (around 5x a Group 1 UAS - $20k) and has a 10-15km range plus the versatility to tackle larger drones. Will HPM work against fibre optic cable drones?

But yeah, APKWS is probably better for a ranged hard kill against Group 1 stuff, if range is essential. I get my UAS groupings confused. Against a Shahed ($290k) it makes sense.
 
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A Coyote 2 allegedly costs $100k (around 5x a Group 1 UAS - $20k) and has a 10-15km range plus the versatility to tackle larger drones. Will HPM work against fibre optic cable drones?
Tactical Group 1 UAS systems can cost anywhere from $500 to $25K and beyond (US systems cost between $25K and $100K). You can even have a thermal imager equipped G1 UAS that costs less than $5K.

Why will HPM not work on fibre optic cable drones? HPM is penetrating and going after all electronic components not focusing on RF communication channels used to control drone.
 
Tactical Group 1 UAS systems can cost anywhere from $500 to $25K and beyond (US systems cost between $25K and $100K). You can even have a thermal imager equipped G1 UAS that costs less than $5K.

Why will HPM not work on fibre optic cable drones? HPM is penetrating and going after all electronic components not focusing on RF communication channels used to control drone.
What do you think are the most promising systems for defeating group 1 UAS right now?
 
What do you think are the most promising systems for defeating group 1 UAS right now?
It has to be layered. That said, if you follow Ukraine-Russia, by far the most number of low end Group 1 drones have been downed by EW. More so than by any other means. There's a reason Russia is now trying to use fibre optic cable drones and both sides are playing the cat-mouse game of operating in EMS that negates fielded jammers.. A smart layered Counter small UAS system would layer software defined EW jamming, stand off kinetic interceptors, directed energy and point defense gun based systems against this threat. This is the basic architecture of the FADC2 powered LIDS system the Army has built up. You mix smart EW with HPM and HEL layers and you basically significantly mitigate a huge swath of the low-mid end Group 1 and 2 systems. Your kinetic options then are more cost effective since they only have to defeat 1 out of 4-5 threats encountered..Of course stitching all of these systems is easier said than done.
FS-LIDS.png
 
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$100k per interceptor to take out a $5k or $10k drone isn't scalable or sustainable. I hope the army can get this cost per kill down with systems like the block III interceptor and other non-kinetic effectors.
You're looking at the wrong thing to compare costs.

How much did what you are defending cost? How much damage will the loss of that power substation cost? How much will losing that factory cost, just to replace it?
 
You're looking at the wrong thing to compare costs.

How much did what you are defending cost? How much damage will the loss of that power substation cost? How much will losing that factory cost, just to replace it?
This oft repeated mantra is the wrong way to think about the economics of war. Yes, if you currently have a $100k missile defending a $1M installation, and an inbound $10k drone is about to kill your installation, then the economical thing to do is to expend your $100k missile and save your $1M installation.

However, at that point you have already lost the economic/logistic/industrial fight. Your opponent can produce 10 drones for the cost of every one of your missiles. If we imagine two combatants with similar economies, both able to spend the same amount of money on the war, then the combatant able to spend 10% what their opponent spends on a given effect will be able to bring 10x of that effect to bear.

Funds are finite. Even the United State could not afford to defend against thousand dollar drones with million dollar missiles. At some point the money runs out. The cost exchange ratio matters.
 
You're looking at the wrong thing to compare costs.

How much did what you are defending cost? How much damage will the loss of that power substation cost? How much will losing that factory cost, just to replace it?
And what happens when your EW and CUAS vehicles get hit by artillery near the front? How much does that cost?
 
And what happens when your EW and CUAS vehicles get hit by artillery near the front? How much does that cost?
Bout as much as letting your Arty, tocs and troops get drone unmolested if not less.

Its a web like deal that needs to be balance on all sides since each part supports the other and without one...

Well the others become useless.

We very much reaching the point where the troops need counter UAV gear to do their jobs.

Which allows the Armor to do theirs, the Artillery theirs, then Air power and so on.

All thats worthless without troops to take and hold ground which they cant without taking insane casualties from drones.

So there is a major need to do something to lessen that through or we may as well get use to throwing generations away for a few miles of ground.
 
It has to be layered. That said, if you follow Ukraine-Russia, by far the most number of low end Group 1 drones have been downed by EW. More so than by any other means.
But if you're reliant on jamming the datalinks, what happens if the other side decides to go full Terminator and just let their drones do their own targeting....
 
Bout as much as letting your Arty, tocs and troops get drone unmolested if not less.

Its a web like deal that needs to be balance on all sides since each part supports the other and without one...

Well the others become useless.

We very much reaching the point where the troops need counter UAV gear to do their jobs.

Which allows the Armor to do theirs, the Artillery theirs, then Air power and so on.

All thats worthless without troops to take and hold ground which they cant without taking insane casualties from drones.

So there is a major need to do something to lessen that through or we may as well get use to throwing generations away for a few miles of ground.
I think it won't be long before troops are replaced with robots at this rate TBH.
 
I think it won't be long before troops are replaced with robots at this rate TBH.
Doubtful, AI getting good but baring a major break though it still too dumb and predictable for uses as a soldier

Do see a use for the first man in slash pack mule in a squad or platoon under someone immediate control.

But it be a hot minute til we have AI good enough to do a quarter of the things a trooper does in the field.

That is if we solve the other major issue.

How do you power them for say a 12 to 72 hour active period? Batteries may havd come a long way but they still got an equally long ways to go to do that.
 
Doubtful, AI getting good but baring a major break though it still too dumb and predictable for uses as a soldier

Do see a use for the first man in slash pack mule in a squad or platoon under someone immediate control.
Now there's an idea, FPS warfare.
But it be a hot minute til we have AI good enough to do a quarter of the things a trooper does in the field.

That is if we solve the other major issue.

How do you power them for say a 12 to 72 hour active period? Batteries may havd come a long way but they still got an equally long ways to go to do that.
Give them a supply of spare batteries and a generator for charging, just as you would give soldiers food and drink, which you now no longer need.
 
I have seen no reference of the Block 3 having a EW warhead. It is known to have a HPM warhead. Do you have a source for that more traditional EW payload?
I had to go check to make sure I wasn't hallucinating. Let me amend my statement:

Coyote Block 3 has a "non-kinetic effector" that I assume means EW, but isn't necessarily EW. In Raytheon's test, the block 3 round was fired using a block 2 system. It went on to defeat a complicated swarm of 10 drones with a "non-kinetic effector," was recovered, refurbished, and reused during the same test event.

If true, this is a significant capability. I also can't imagine what other kind of effector could defeat a drone swarm other than an electromagnetic effector of some sort.

Multiple outlets reported on this, citing Raytheon.

One outlet was kind enough to link to the Raytheon press release from July 19, 2021, which mysteriously has been deleted from Raytheon's website.

Fortunately the Wayback machine had archived this page.

I'll archive this Raytheon press release here as well:

Non-kinetic Coyote aces US Army test​

YUMA PROVING GROUND, Ariz., (July 21, 2021) — Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a Raytheon Technologies business, successfully defeated a swarm of drones with its reusable Coyote® Block 3 non-kinetic effector during a U.S. Army test. The demonstration moves the variant closer to deployment.

Derived from the expendable Coyote loitering munition, the Block 3 utilizes a non-kinetic warhead to neutralize enemy drones, reducing potential collateral damage. Unlike its expendable counterpart, the non-kinetic variant can be recovered, refurbished and reused without leaving the battlefield.
“This test demonstrates the effectiveness of Coyote to counter complex, unmanned aircraft systems,” said Tom Laliberty, vice president of Land Warfare & Air Defense at Raytheon Missiles & Defense. “As a non-kinetic variant, we’re offering an effective weapon against the threat and value to the Army in the form of an affordable, reusable asset.”
During the test, the Coyote engaged and defeated a swarm of 10 drones that differed in size, complexity, maneuverability and range. It achieved several significant firsts:
• Air-to-air non-kinetic defeats;
• Survivability, recovery, refurbishment and reuse during the same test event;
• Successful launch from the Coyote Block 2 system;
• Extended range engagements, communication and KuRFS radar track.
For questions or to schedule an interview, please contact:
Carolyn Beaudry
rmdpr@rtx.com
 
This oft repeated mantra is the wrong way to think about the economics of war. Yes, if you currently have a $100k missile defending a $1M installation, and an inbound $10k drone is about to kill your installation, then the economical thing to do is to expend your $100k missile and save your $1M installation.

However, at that point you have already lost the economic/logistic/industrial fight. Your opponent can produce 10 drones for the cost of every one of your missiles. If we imagine two combatants with similar economies, both able to spend the same amount of money on the war, then the combatant able to spend 10% what their opponent spends on a given effect will be able to bring 10x of that effect to bear.

Funds are finite. Even the United State could not afford to defend against thousand dollar drones with million dollar missiles. At some point the money runs out. The cost exchange ratio matters.
That applies when the opposing economies are roughly equal.

What is the GDP of Russia, compared to that of Ukraine? What is the GDP of China compared to the US?

Also, remember that when in wars, governments issue lots and lots of debt to pay for the crash production of, well, everything,
 
That applies when the opposing economies are roughly equal.

What is the GDP of Russia, compared to that of Ukraine? What is the GDP of China compared to the US?

Also, remember that when in wars, governments issue lots and lots of debt to pay for the crash production of, well, everything,
What is the opportunity cost of every dollar you spend on defense?

That dollar could have been spent on something else within defense, like another weapon system. Alternatively, it could have been spent on non-defense, or it could have just not been taxed in the first place.

There is ALWAYS value in achieving a given effect for less money. This is especially true for the United States who now faces her greatest geopolitical threat *ever* in the PRC, a nation that can vastly outproduce the united states in virtually every defense article.

I am making a very reasonable argument that any defense economist would agree with: for a given capability, spending less money is better than spending more money.

A more specific argument: the US would run out of certain precision munitions within weeks during a peer conflict. The US could not even reload her VLS cells twice with current stockpiles.

The negation of the argument would be "it's good to spend as much money as possible to achieve a certain effect." that argument is obviously false.
 
What is the opportunity cost of every dollar you spend on defense?

That dollar could have been spent on something else within defense, like another weapon system. Alternatively, it could have been spent on non-defense, or it could have just not been taxed in the first place.

There is ALWAYS value in achieving a given effect for less money. This is especially true for the United States who now faces her greatest geopolitical threat *ever* in the PRC, a nation that can vastly outproduce the united states in virtually every defense article.

I am making a very reasonable argument that any defense economist would agree with: for a given capability, spending less money is better than spending more money.

A more specific argument: the US would run out of certain precision munitions within weeks during a peer conflict. The US could not even reload her VLS cells twice with current stockpiles.

The negation of the argument would be "it's good to spend as much money as possible to achieve a certain effect." that argument is obviously false.
The statement is that it is possible and normal to spend as much money as required to achieve a certain effect.

Trying to stop $10k FPV drones is a bit of a challenge.
 
That dollar could have been spent on something else within defense, like another weapon system. Alternatively, it could have been spent on non-defense, or it could have just not been taxed in the first place...

You re-gain the cost-balance by introducing effective non kinetic defeat systems like EW, HPM, and Lasers and by introducing other passive defense measures (C-ISR, deception, C-PNT etc). The Raytheon press-release states that Raytheon demo'd the ability to employ, recover, and reuse (same test event) the Coyote 3NK to defeat multiple Group 1 and 2 threats per mission. So now, you are buying a $250K interceptor that can possibly defeat dozens of Group 1 / 2 drones over its lifetime. This is the reason why they've basically stopped producing the Coyote block 1 or rather why the US Army has not asked for a Block 3 with a kinetic payload.

Defense (as in the mission of defending against missiles, drones etc) in many ways will remain a costly proposition which is why you focus investments to buy you enough to preserve your offensive capability and apply those effects on your adversary that have favorable economics like most offensive capability.
 
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