ORCA Missile System / Project Sunrise - Containerized Seafloor-based ICBM

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Just posted by the San Diego Air & Space Museum (SDASM) Archives on Flickr, a 1962 General Dynamics Astronautics film detailing the ORCA Weapons System / Project Sunrise, a containerized / encapsulated ocean floor-based ballistic missile (ICBM). The only mention of the concept I was able to find on the forum was by Michel Van in the MX (Peacekeeper) Deployment Concepts topic (link).


Hosting and narrating the film is Mortimer Rosenbaum, described as a Vice President of Research, Development and Engineering at General Dynamics (GD).

 
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I wonder if, in today's hyper-PC climate, anybody would have the spine to name a nuclear missile system "Project Sunrise". B)
 
ORCA was an excellent concept. The folks at General Dynamics never lacked foresight and creativity. Would Crimea be an issue today, with 1,360 of these 200kT sentinels, parked a few miles away at the bottom of the Aegean Sea?

Unfortunately (with the exception of the UK) NATO seldom shared our bold vision, and France even pulled out of NATO in 1966, to pursue its "independent" nuclear agenda.
 
sferrin said:
I wonder if, in today's hyper-PC climate, anybody would have the spine to name a nuclear missile system "Project Sunrise". B)

Yes times have changed. Now you can barely mention 'nuclear' anything and people go crazy as in even talk about replacing a 40 year old ICBM :eek:

Ya gotta love three guys in suits at the beach looking like Michael Douglas from 'Falling Down'. Not making fun these men were great minds and engineers that each in their way protected this nation for 70+ years on the 'intellectual' side of the Cold War.
 
This system would have been non-mobile and to my opinion much harder to guard,
than land based missile silos. Disguising the deployment of those weapons would
probably have been hard to conseal, too. Fishery in the deployment areas, for example
would have to be strictly forbidden, giving even more clues to their locations and every
vessel using sonar would have to regarded as a potential threat ...
No wonder, that this concept wasn't adopted, I think.
 
circle-5 said:
ORCA was an excellent concept. The folks at General Dynamics never lacked foresight and creativity. Would Crimea be an issue today, with 1,360 of these 200kT sentinels, parked a few miles away at the bottom of the Aegean Sea?

Unfortunately (with the exception of the UK) NATO seldom shared our bold vision, and France even pulled out of NATO in 1966, to pursue its "independent" nuclear agenda.
It's not clear whose "our vision" it is, but the link made with Crimea is ludicrous - to say the least. One also fails to see why France is mentionned here, except because of their usual francophobia. France did not withdraw from NATO in 1966, but only from the integrated military structure. France remained a State party to the Washington treaty, which, BTW does NOT even mention the integrated military structure. And yes, the deterrent was and remains independent. You like or not.
 
Jemiba said:
This system would have been non-mobile and to my opinion much harder to guard,
than land based missile silos. Disguising the deployment of those weapons would
probably have been hard to conseal, too. Fishery in the deployment areas, for example
would have to be strictly forbidden, giving even more clues to their locations and every
vessel using sonar would have to regarded as a potential threat ...
No wonder, that this concept wasn't adopted, I think.

When the MX basing issue came up, ORCA was given another look and found lacking on the grounds of security, operability and arms control. The arms control objection was because emplacement of WMDs on the seabed was prohibited by treaty in 1971; this wouldn't have been an issue before then. The security and operability objections were rather stronger - the missiles could be located readily by an active sonar search, and the missiles' serviceability couldn't be verified without giving away their location.

On the other hand, it was felt to have excellent endurance, minimal public interface and environmental impact, and be fairly cheap to implement.
 
RLBH said:
The security and operability objections were rather stronger - the missiles could be located readily by an active sonar search, and the missiles' serviceability couldn't be verified without giving away their location.

On the other hand, it was felt to have excellent endurance, minimal public interface and environmental impact, and be fairly cheap to implement.

+1 for desiring not to have the CONUS serve as an RV sink. Surely the above security and operability issues would be mitigated by basing ORCA in some of the larger
US (natural or artificial) lakes (the Rush-Bagot treaty notwithstanding).
 
Reminds me of the 70's children's TV series The Doombolt Chase, which I have vague memories of watching, where Doombolt is a seabed emplaced weapon, and the plot relates to someone subverting its control channels.
 
I always viewed seafloor missiles as kind of idea that looks promising at first glance, but didn't hold water (despite being water-tight; sorry for the pun) after close examination. Too many contradictions and weak points.

Firstly, such weapon would need to be fully automated. I.e. it would have no two-man rule, no human input at all during launch. I.e. the ability to launch strategic weapon would be completely given to machine - and if machine would made a mistake or suffer a malfunction, there would be no one to stop it from launching an attack. Sure, it's almost improbable... but you never could be completely sure that no fool would accidentally put a wrong tape into capsule computer.

Secondly, such weapon would be extremely dependent on communication channels. Communication with submerged submarines are still a big problem. And seafloor missile capsule would not even be able to rise for communication. Basically the ability to issue a launch order would depend on just a few low-frequency systems. And if the opposing side disable them by sudden strike or find the way to hamper with their transmissions (which is hard, but not impossible), all seafloor missiles would instantly became useless.

Thirdly... the opposing side, yes. While finding seafloor capsules could be problematic, it clearly would not be impossible. What would be impossible is to prevent the opponent from tampering with capsules as soon as it would found one. Security devices and booby traps could be circumvented. So at very least the opponent would get a working sample of strategic missile, nuclear warheads, underwater communication receiver, ect. At worst - the opponent may gain enough knowledge to efficiently seek for other seafloor capsules (and either plant bombs/jammers on them, or just knock them out).

Also, I'm not sure what would prevent someone from claiming such seafloor capsule as salvage - after all, it's in international waters and owner did not admit where exactly it was placed. So...
 
1962 General Dynamics Astronautics film detailing the ORCA Weapons System / Project Sunrise
BASING MODES SHOWN IN THE VIDEO.

MODEL
MINUTE: 00:02:00 TRUCK - TRAILER
CONCEPT ART
MINUTE: 00:02:56 TRUCK - TRAILER
MINUTE: 00:03:02 BULLDOZER - TRAILER
MINUTE: 00:03:11 MISSILE CONTAINER
MINUTE: 00:03:18 AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED
MINUTE: 00:03:12 SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
MINUTE: 00:10:42 UNDERWATER MISSILE CONTAINER
 
I always viewed seafloor missiles as kind of idea that looks promising at first glance, but didn't hold water (despite being water-tight; sorry for the pun) after close examination. Too many contradictions and weak points.

Firstly, such weapon would need to be fully automated. I.e. it would have no two-man rule, no human input at all during launch. I.e. the ability to launch strategic weapon would be completely given to machine - and if machine would made a mistake or suffer a malfunction, there would be no one to stop it from launching an attack. Sure, it's almost improbable... but you never could be completely sure that no fool would accidentally put a wrong tape into capsule computer.
Not significantly different from an SSBN in practice. Two-man-rule applies at the missile control center, not at the tube. Unless for some reason you need to open up the tube, of course.

Though I do remember the missile techs keeping me awake for a week or so while chasing down a fault on one tube. Finally resorted to swapping individual cards (like graphics cards) in the box and I heard a cry of victory. The next day, as they were writing up the report for the failed card, the dude pulled up the last saved report of that type and discovered that it was exactly the same card by serial number in the saved file. I heard his profanity 50+ feet away, around 3 corners!


Secondly, such weapon would be extremely dependent on communication channels. Communication with submerged submarines are still a big problem. And seafloor missile capsule would not even be able to rise for communication. Basically the ability to issue a launch order would depend on just a few low-frequency systems. And if the opposing side disable them by sudden strike or find the way to hamper with their transmissions (which is hard, but not impossible), all seafloor missiles would instantly became useless.
Direct submerged cables would be my expectation on how they'd be dealt with.



Thirdly... the opposing side, yes. While finding seafloor capsules could be problematic, it clearly would not be impossible. What would be impossible is to prevent the opponent from tampering with capsules as soon as it would found one. Security devices and booby traps could be circumvented. So at very least the opponent would get a working sample of strategic missile, nuclear warheads, underwater communication receiver, ect. At worst - the opponent may gain enough knowledge to efficiently seek for other seafloor capsules (and either plant bombs/jammers on them, or just knock them out).
The US would probably have to base them in the Great Lakes (Lake Michigan is purely US waters), Great Salt Lake in Utah, Lake Champlain in New York/Vermont, Lake Pend O'Reille and/or Lake Coeur d'Alene in Idaho, or perhaps the Puget Sound in Washington state.

Also, I'm not sure what would prevent someone from claiming such seafloor capsule as salvage - after all, it's in international waters and owner did not admit where exactly it was placed. So...
Exactly.
 
Not significantly different from an SSBN in practice. Two-man-rule applies at the missile control center, not at the tube. Unless for some reason you need to open up the tube, of course.
There is a BIG difference between tube being inserted in manned submarine, and tube being stationed unmanned somewhere on seafloor, though.

Though I do remember the missile techs keeping me awake for a week or so while chasing down a fault on one tube. Finally resorted to swapping individual cards (like graphics cards) in the box and I heard a cry of victory. The next day, as they were writing up the report for the failed card, the dude pulled up the last saved report of that type and discovered that it was exactly the same card by serial number in the saved file. I heard his profanity 50+ feet away, around 3 corners!
;)

Direct submerged cables would be my expectation on how they'd be dealt with.
Those cables would kinda defeat the whole idea, since they could be easily tracked & their installation would require major, hard-to-stay-unnoticed efforts.

The US would probably have to base them in the Great Lakes (Lake Michigan is purely US waters), Great Salt Lake in Utah, Lake Champlain in New York/Vermont, Lake Pend O'Reille and/or Lake Coeur d'Alene in Idaho, or perhaps the Puget Sound in Washington state.
Not exactly much more advantageous than silo-based missiles... merely better camouflaged.
 
There is a BIG difference between tube being inserted in manned submarine, and tube being stationed unmanned somewhere on seafloor, though.
Not fundamentally different from something like Minuteman: the missiles are remote from the launch control centre with no people on site.
Those cables would kinda defeat the whole idea, since they could be easily tracked & their installation would require major, hard-to-stay-unnoticed efforts.
As, indeed, would the containerised missiles. You're not emplacing them particularly covertly.
Not exactly much more advantageous than silo-based missiles... merely better camouflaged.
When you get down to it, they're just silo-based missiles in concept. The silos are harder to interfere with, but also harder to protect, since in both cases you need a submarine or a diving vessel.
 
Not fundamentally different from something like Minuteman: the missiles are remote from the launch control centre with no people on site.
But they are under much more reliable control system, with larger number of specific operations needed to be performed & crew ablity to abort any suspicious activity anytime. It won't be possible with the underwater capsule somewhere in ocean, where just one misapplied command would be enough.

As, indeed, would the containerised missiles. You're not emplacing them particularly covertly.
The missile capsules at least in theory could be placed covertly by using specialized ships/submarines and avoiding observation. Long cables - not so.
 
It won't be possible with the underwater capsule somewhere in ocean, where just one misapplied command would be enough.
You do something like the Minuteman system - redundant cables and multiple control centres, with a control system such that no one command can launch a missile.
The missile capsules at least in theory could be placed covertly by using specialized ships/submarines and avoiding observation. Long cables - not so.
I'm very doubtful that you could lay the necessary moorings and hook up a missile capsule covertly.

I suppose you could try to do an acoustic system, or something using VLF radio, which might eliminate the need for cables. But I'm not sure either could be done with sufficient surety.
 
I suppose you could try to do an acoustic system, or something using VLF radio, which might eliminate the need for cables. But I'm not sure either could be done with sufficient surety.
All VLF signals did for us was tell us to come to Periscope depth and check our messages.

There's reasons I don't want to go into why VLF-only launch commands are a bad idea.
 
Dense water, dense munitions—hood for neutrino comm?
Neutrinos just don't interact with detectors often enough. Another study lasted 4-5 years and only had ~150 times their detectors went off.

This version used a very intense emitter and was getting data rates of less than 6 bits per minute.

That the Minerva detector weighs several tonnes doesn't matter to an 8-22kton submarine. But the data rate just sucks. It'd take 4-5 minutes to send a 3-letter (24 bit) signal.

Using Tom Clancy's example of how ELF radio works, you send a set of a bunch of different 3-letter code groups that you then translate into a message readable by humans, and each code group is a separate word. An hour-long transmission with this Minerva unit would give you 12 code-groups. Basically just enough to say "[ship name] you have radio traffic to receive, come to periscope depth before [time]."
 
Leaving nuclear missiles unattended in the middle of the ocean is obviously a stupid idea.

Edit: Also, it's pretty arrogant of them to suggest putting 1400 nuclear missiles in the Aegean Sea less than a month after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which only ended after Kennedy agreed to withdrawal US missiles from Turkey
 
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Edit: Also, it's pretty arrogant of them to suggest putting 1400 nuclear missiles in the Aegean Sea less than a month after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which only ended after Kennedy agreed to withdrawal US missiles from Turkey
Ironically, those Jupiter IRBMs were already scheduled to be removed. The US didn't lose anything.
 
Ironically, those Jupiter IRBMs were already scheduled to be removed. The US didn't lose anything.
To be honest, USSR did not knew that, and at very least the whole crisis efficiently discouraged BOTH sides from attempt to play "let's put the missiles right into enemy backyard, what could possibly gone wrong?" game ever again.
 
With enough ICBMs, the Russians no longer needed the missiles in Cuba. It would only have been a short episode anyway and basically only served as a provocation. At least the Jupiter in Turkey were not replaced by successors. So the Russians also achieved their goal.
 
The withdrawal of USAF PGM-19 Jupiter units from Turkey and Italy had been agreed by the spring 1962 NATO ministerial meeting, alrezdy before the Cuban missile crisis. It was an orphan system the US Army had had to transfer to USAF, which did not want it. Only 100 missiles and equipment for 4 batteries had been manufactured, which was paltry under American Cold-war standards. It was obvious to any Soviet intelligence analysis that Jupiter was already on its way out and would be replaced by Polaris SSBNs allocated to SHAPE.
And that there would no successor system was also also perfectly clear by the end of 1962.
Withdrawing Jupiter was just a face-saving gesture president Kennedy made to Khrushchev. It did not change anything in the global nuclear balance nor improve the USSR strategic position. Khrushchev's ennemies in the Kremlin knew that and ousted him less than two years later to embark on a fully different strategic rebalancing act.
 
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One possibly practical place to put underwater nuclear missiles: the Great Lakes. They would avoid the massive security risks that would come from leaving them in the middle of the ocean while still offering a deterrent that would be very difficult to destroy.
 
One possibly practical place to put underwater nuclear missiles: the Great Lakes. They would avoid the massive security risks that would come from leaving them in the middle of the ocean while still offering a deterrent that would be very difficult to destroy.
And a few other super-deep lakes across the northern US. Lakes Coeur d'Alene and Pend O'Reille in Idaho, Great Salt Lake in Utah, Lake Champlain...
 
About 120 feet...

About 460 feet

About an inch deep...


About 60 feet.

If you want *deep* lakes in the CONUS, your options are few. Crater Lake in Oregon is more than 1900 feet deep, but logistics would be entertaining. Lake Mead can be pretty deep in places, when drought isn't screwing with it. But it and Crater are small.
You don't need anything that deep; water is a very effective energy absorber.
 
And shockwave transmitter.
Ask the now-unemployed battleship architects for their torpedo defence system design data? It's not like an underwater missile silo would be working within the displacement limits of the Washington Naval treaty.
 
About 120 feet...
Lake Coeur d'Alene is 190ft deep max.


About 460 feet
Pend O'Reille maxes out at 1100ft deep in the Navy base where they test scale models of subs and ships.


About an inch deep...
Okay, I did goof on that one, Salt Lake averages about 16ft deep and maxes out at about 30ft deep


About 60 feet.
Lake Champlain maxes out at 400ft.


If you want *deep* lakes in the CONUS, your options are few. Crater Lake in Oregon is more than 1900 feet deep, but logistics would be entertaining.
"Entertaining" for values of "fuck that". I've stood on the crater rim and looked past my toes at the blue, blue waters of Crater Lake a thousand feet below.

It's something over 1000ft from the crater rim down to the water. You'd have to blast a road into the cliffside or build the world's most absurd helicopter to lift things into the caldera. And remember, you're doing this at ~8000ft elevation, so your engines and rotors are going to be hating life. I'm talking something like the Mil V-12, but made with CH-53E or CH-54B running gear.



Lake Mead can be pretty deep in places, when drought isn't screwing with it. But it and Crater are small.
Lake Mead at least has roads going to the water level. But it's a painfully small target. Not to mention that you don't want the dam blown out.

Crater Lake is only 5miles by 6 miles, so early Soviet missiles might land on the outside of the caldera. Newer missiles would almost guaranteed land inside it, though.
 
Ask the now-unemployed battleship architects for their torpedo defence system design data? It's not like an underwater missile silo would be working within the displacement limits of the Washington Naval treaty.
It's kinda unrelated things, you know. Battleship torpedo defense system is designed to limit the relatively narrow shockwave from torpedo exploding on hull, not the shockwave nuclear blast transmitting through water.
 
It's kinda unrelated things, you know. Battleship torpedo defense system is designed to limit the relatively narrow shockwave from torpedo exploding on hull, not the shockwave nuclear blast transmitting through water.
This has been tested and it's been found the blast wave of an underwater nuclear explosion doesn't get very far. What happens is it creates a bubble and for every doubling of the bubble's width it has to displace 8 times more water so it soon collapses.
 
I went with the Wikipedia numbers for average depth. Because if the deepest parts are known, they're obvious targets.
Depends on just how large the known deepest parts are, IMO.

If you've got a Crater Lake sized deep spot like Pend O'Reille, that's doable.

Thought technically I think you'd want the capsules in the ~300ft deep parts and slightly positively buoyant. ~300ft for storage, and they'd rise up to ~150ft for launch.



A chance to build something absolutely insane, that this forum would go absolutely gaga over? Yes! :D


Realistically, the Rooskies are probably gonna nuke the dam anyway. It's not like the B-21 doesn't hunger for the Three Gorges...
Yeah, all the major hydropower dams are on the list for instant sunshine.
 
Realistically, the Rooskies are probably gonna nuke the dam anyway. It's not like the B-21 doesn't hunger for the Three Gorges...
The Russians don't have enough deployed warheads to spare any on civilian infrastructure. The only thing in the Las Vegas area that is likely to be hit in a nuclear attack is Nellis AFB. Then again, Putin might explode one over The Strip to wipe out his buddies' gambling debts.
 
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