There's no evidence it cost a fortune to run; radar manning isn't all that expensive

Since the only Safeguard base stayed in service for less than a year & was closed after just 24 hours of running at full capability, we could safely assume that US military considered it of far less practical utility that Soviet FOBS missiles. The single completed base cost two billions to build, and was decided to be closed down even before it actually get fully operational (of which it operated only a DAY). With all respect, but if FOBS was a failure, then what was Safeguard? A disaster?
 
There's no evidence it cost a fortune to run; radar manning isn't all that expensive

Since the only Safeguard base stayed in service for less than a year & was closed after just 24 hours of running at full capability, we could safely assume that US military considered it of far less practical utility that Soviet FOBS missiles. The single completed base cost two billions to build, and was decided to be closed down even before it actually get fully operational (of which it operated only a DAY). With all respect, but if FOBS was a failure, then what was Safeguard? A disaster?
Translation: you have no actual data for O&S costs. So are you cool with conceding that point?

The US House of Representatives had its view on Safeguard.
Says absolutely nothing about the military utility of the system or the costs.

The crucial difference is that Safeguard could be reactivated (PAR is still operational!) whereas FOBS was *destroyed*
 
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Translation: you have no actual data for O&S costs. So are you cool with conceding that point?

Well, we have facts) Safeguard was decommissioned after less than a month without any Soviet diplomatic efforts at all)

FOBS was decommissioned only after more than ten years of service, and only because USA put diplomatic efforts into it)

Sorry, the difference is pretty much obvious)

The crucial difference is that Safeguard could be reactivated (PAR is still operational!) whereas FOBS was *destroyed*

The crucial difference is, that FOBS were decommissioned in accordance to the international treaty, while Safeguard did not bother anyone to demand it being demolished) :)

Seriously, I have nothing against patriotism, but let's be reasonable. There are no way you could prove Safeguard was better, more successful, or even cheaper than FOBS.
 
Translation: you have no actual data for O&S costs. So are you cool with conceding that point?

Well, we have facts) Safeguard was decommissioned after less than a month without any Soviet diplomatic efforts at all)

FOBS was decommissioned only after more than ten years of service, and only because USA put diplomatic efforts into it)

Sorry, the difference is pretty much obvious)

The crucial difference is that Safeguard could be reactivated (PAR is still operational!) whereas FOBS was *destroyed*

The crucial difference is, that FOBS were decommissioned in accordance to the international treaty, while Safeguard did not bother anyone to demand it being demolished) :)

Seriously, I have nothing against patriotism, but let's be reasonable. There are no way you could prove Safeguard was better, more successful, or even cheaper than FOBS.
To recapitulate: your claim was that FOBS drove US force structure, planning and procurement.
I haven't seen any evidence to suggest that's the case. And you haven't provided any.

I've shown that FOBS was not a threat to the MMI through MMIII silos.
The US built an ABM site; it was going to build that site FOBS or no FOBS.
The US built new early warning radars and a space-based constellation to detect launches; it was going to build those systems FOBS or no FOBS.

All of that EW stuff is still around. And Still being used including the allegedly expensive BMD radar.

Despite your considered view that it FOBS was some ABM-proof, bolt-from-the-blue, hard-target killer the
Russians readily consented not to mothball or restrict, or limit FOBs but to blow it up!

Like the ABM Treaty, the Russians don't bend on these matters unless it doesn't matter.
 
To recapitulate:

To recapitulate; you are claiming that ultra-expensive system that was considered worthless even before it entered service is "American success", while the relatively cheap system that served faithfully for decade is a "Russian failure".

Let's stop here. We are both clearly biased, and the tensions are rising higher and higher.
 
To recapitulate:

To recapitulate; you are claiming that ultra-expensive system that was considered worthless even before it entered service is "American success", while the relatively cheap system that served faithfully for decade is a "Russian failure".

Let's stop here. We are both clearly biased, and the tensions are rising higher and higher.

Your claim was that FOBS induced costly force structure, procurement and operational changes for the US.
Please either furnish data to support this claim since it's been shown that FOBS was not a threat to the contemporary silos
or withdraw it.

It's not a matter of bias. It's a matter of data. You've presented absolutely nothing.

Edit: I think I've read every declassified CIA report on FOBS; it's exactly the same theme: not a hard target threat, not really
able to evade planned early warning installations for the late 60's, not much complication for ABM.
 
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The physical limitations of FOBS necessarily imply a reduced payload vs a traditional ICBM. In the modern strategic environment, there is no reason to go with super high throw weights, so FOBS is fine. The US wanted something like FOBS when it rebuilt MMIII to be able to hit Iran via great circle routes that did not overfly Russia - and slashed the payload by 2/3rds in the process which was fine because arms treaties and old boosters.

I have no idea whether accuracy must be worse for aerodynamics or whatever, but with boost glide weapons, MARVs and improving INS and stellar nav (which are supposed to be accurate even while flying aerodynamically), I see no reason FOBS with a HGV warhead cannot come back in style, with even worse payload and higher costs of course.

The downsides and counters against FOBS are pretty standard, the exact cost benefit was obviously unfavorable during the Cold War, hence the Soviet retirement even though the US agreed that FOBS was OST compliant. It's not like the Yanks would have launched on warning or something. If tensions were high, the bombers might even scramble on DSS alerts.
 
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The physical limitations of FOBS necessarily imply a reduced payload vs a traditional ICBM.

Yes. That's why FOBS was viewed only as addition to existing systems. Again, the main argument was, that it was rather cheap - the basic was the existing R-36 missile with minimal changes, and if needed, arsenal of FOBS could be rapidly increased by re-using R-36 boosters (which started to get replaced by newer, more capable R-36M). It was not some kind of ultra-costly concept, like "Safeguard" was - FOBS was cheap and elegant solution on existing basic, which allowed more strategic flexibility.

I have no idea whether accuracy must be worse for aerodynamics or whatever, but with boost glide weapons, MARVs and improving INS and stellar nav (which are supposed to be accurate even while flying aerodynamically), I see no reason FOBS with a HGV warhead cannot come back in style, with even worse payload and higher costs of course.

Essentially "Avangard" have the FOBS capabilities; in could be boosted in any direction, the question is mainly how long the hypersonic glider would spend in space.
 
That's much less than that of contemporary RV.s.
US ones perhaps, not Soviet ones. Contemporary UR-100 was 1.4km IIRC.

The point is: FOBS wasn't the solution for countering the the geometric shadow and hardened target problem.
FOBS absolutely was a "solution for countering the geometric shadow...problem". It's not like this debate is hard to find, it's in one of the earliest reports on the Golden Arrow/MX efforts and in pretty much every report on the MX that followed. Here's one from 1983's "Strategic Forces Technical Assessment Review":

Development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles with hard target kill capabilities which launch from non-northerly directions, accurate fractional orbital ballistic systems, or manoeuvring reentry vehicles..."

The well-named "ICBM Basing Options: A Summary Of Major Studies To Define A Survivable Basing Concept For ICBMs", nicely summarizes this:

The chief difficulties with this intuitively attractive concept are its poor survivability against credible advances in Soviet threats and the surprising scarcity of suitable sites. The threats include SLBMs launched from the south, maneuvering reentry vehicles and attacks of the mesas, cliffs, etc., to bury the silos in debris, thereby precluding launch.
FOBS is low-beta because it's decelerating immediately prior to terminal, which allows it to drop in at higher angles.

Now it is true that FOBS was not a solution to the hardened target problem, but the only one that has claimed that is you.​

Only very accurate SLBMs or ICBMs with MaRVs could quickly service that target set.
FOBS flew a shorter path than a normal ICBM.

The Russians being chased from the open oceans into bastions meant the only fast-time threat was ICBMs with advanced MaRVs.
Time-of-flight for an SLBM from Novaya Zemlya is shorter than an ICBM, and FOBS is typically a shorter path as well.

Say FOBS achieved Trident D5 like accuracies: It's a not a fast-time threat to ICBMs and even Safeguard had no trouble knocking down FOBS.
Safeguard was incapable of knocking down FOBS. It is mentioned in pretty much every article on the topic. Here's one of the more famous, Garvin/Bethe's SciAm article.

Note the caption on page 26. You keep speaking of "fast time" and how FOBS doesn't deliver that, but in fact that was the entire point. When early warning was based on BMEWS, FOBS left almost no time to react. The real goal of FOBS is to compress the time/space of the command structure. Unless the US was willing to move to launch-on-warning, and they weren't, launching FOBS against the command structure was keeping everyone awake at night. This was the basis for much of the US's pressure to dismantle FOBS, which is very well recorded in the historical record.

But don't take my word for it, take the USAFs:


By contrast, a weapon launched into low orbital plane would ascend on a relatively flat, depressed trajectory, level off, and never rise more than 150 miles above Earth. It thus would not clear the radar horizon until it had almost reached its target. As Soviet planners saw it, US warning time would be reduced to as few as five minutes.

Even that much warning would be available only if the incoming warhead were to come in over the Arctic. The US in the early 1960s was unprepared to detect intrusion from the south. In that case, time from detection to impact could have been only a few seconds.

The idea was that effective use of FOBS might well rob the US of its capacity to carry out a launch-under-attack counterstrike which would be possible if a Soviet attack were detected soon enough.
Not mentioned in this article was the scenario that FOBS would be used without deborbit, and instead fly up from the south to a point above the PARs and then detonate at altitude. This could cause an ionization disk below them that would render the PAR blind, and last long enough in the UHF that the follow-up RVs would not be seen until they too were descending. Garvin/Bethe touches on this in the linked article, but in a different context.

Winds over target, rain over target, all sorts of things can change in that time.
As you can see in the diagram in Garvin/Bethe, on a direct-approach trajectory (as illustrated), FOBS spends less time in the atmosphere. It does a pull-down/deorbit just prior to terminal. In terms of theoretical performance, FOBS is higher.

The crucial difference is that Safeguard could be reactivated
FOBS was decommed in 1983. Safeguard was decommed in 1976 and sealed in 1977 with all the equipment removed. This is well recorded in the historical record:

The Defense Department had wanted to keep the site in a standby status after next July, with the idea that it could be reopened in an emergency. The House Appropriations Committee replied that in the ballistic missile age “the time necessary for this may simply not be available.”​

They said "no" and removed any budget needed if it was ever able to be recommissioned. The guts were carted away and scrapped. Along with MAR's guts, they did see some secondary use in radio astronomy, so not a complete loss.

I've shown that FOBS was not a threat to the MMI through MMIII silos.
Which no one argued in the first place, so... what?

Despite your considered view that it FOBS was some ABM-proof, bolt-from-the-blue, hard-target killer the
Not one person has suggested this except for you.

Your claim was that FOBS induced costly force structure, procurement and operational changes for the US.
I cannot find any such statement in any posts. The closest statement is from me, which is that the US abandoned reverse inclination basing due to FOBS and SLBM. But they never operated it. So again, you're arguing against your own claims.

But on the force structure side of things, it's trivially easy to find that Sentinel was modified with south-facing PARs specifically to counter FOBS: "A History of the Huntsville Division, 15 October 1967 - 31 December 1976". I don't know how costly that would have been, but larger than zero in any event.

FOBS was not a threat to the contemporary silos or withdraw it.
This claim was never made.

Curious: do you argue with yourself a lot?
 
A complete and utter lie. You can stop right there.

There is a little difference between "thinking about" and "adopting". If I recall correctly, one of the greatest arguments for MX was exactly its re-targeting capability, which made launch-on-warning a bit safer (since if was possible to observe the results of attack, evaluate the opponents strategy, and then order the missiles to re-target if needed).

And I should point out, that the whole idea of superhardened silos was to AVOID being forced into launch-on-warning attack.
 
A complete and utter lie. You can stop right there.

There is a little difference between "thinking about" and "adopting". If I recall correctly, one of the greatest arguments for MX was exactly its re-targeting capability, which made launch-on-warning a bit safer (since if was possible to observe the results of attack, evaluate the opponents strategy, and then order the missiles to re-target if needed).

And I should point out, that the whole idea of superhardened silos was to AVOID being forced into launch-on-warning attack.

Where do you get "thinking about?" That's total mischaracterization of the source material which
conveniently italicized it for the hard of seeing: The United States really planned to do it.

If it's in your warplan and your EW/C3I and missile are technically capable of doing it (they were)
that's called "adopting."

Now, the US wished to LUA long before it became technically possible. It has a long history going
back to Eisenhower. And RAND gets it right: it was the big revelation about US strategic planning.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB43/

Superhardening lets you hold some missiles in reserve. By the late 70's, the US was envisioning quick retarget trans-SIOP
follow-on attacks from an intercontinental reserve force. MX would have been part of that reserve.

But because MX was, practically speaking, impervious to pindown from SLBMs, the only practical counter to LUA
was eliminated. It also explains why the Air Force was always *meh* about basing modes other than silos.
 
Unless the US was willing to move to launch-on-warning, and they weren't,

A complete and utter lie. You can stop right there.


View attachment 642744
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1210/RAND_MG1210.pdf

You're own source points out that it was NOT a "lie" and in fact the make a specific attempt to point out that while the US was willing to move to a "Launch UNDER Attack" (LUA) they were NOT willing to consider "Launch On Warning" (LOW) which was what was said. In fact the same source states that official policy has been that confirmation of an attack in progress, (ie nuclear detonations) has been US policy even during the Cold War. LUA has been part of the policy but LOW never was.

Very interesting monograph though as it shows that even 'super-hardened' silos would be vulnerable and the various reasons that a US mobile system is unworkable in most cases. Not something I see brought up a lot. (It also points out that Russia is still the only nation with the plausible capability to actually attack our ICBM system in any effective manner) It also points out that 'new' (written in 2014) ICBM's will most likely still be deployed in MM3 silos due to cost issues and the lack of a viable alternative that keeps that "leg" of the triad intact.

Randy
 
Heh. Look what's sitting at Boca Chica in the latest flyover:

View attachment 642756

Planning for a mobile Falcon 9 you think? :)

Randy
Ohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohpleaseohplease........

SpaceX TELs trundling up and down the highways launching USSF Falcon's willy nilly from wherever they may be, filling the sky with Starlink-derived comsats, spysats, antisats, navsats... oh, my, yes.
 
Unless the US was willing to move to launch-on-warning, and they weren't,

A complete and utter lie. You can stop right there.


View attachment 642744
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1210/RAND_MG1210.pdf

You're own source points out that it was NOT a "lie" and in fact the make a specific attempt to point out that while the US was willing to move to a "Launch UNDER Attack" (LUA) they were NOT willing to consider "Launch On Warning" (LOW) which was what was said. In fact the same source states that official policy has been that confirmation of an attack in progress, (ie nuclear detonations) has been US policy even during the Cold War. LUA has been part of the policy but LOW never was.

Very interesting monograph though as it shows that even 'super-hardened' silos would be vulnerable and the various reasons that a US mobile system is unworkable in most cases. Not something I see brought up a lot. (It also points out that Russia is still the only nation with the plausible capability to actually attack our ICBM system in any effective manner) It also points out that 'new' (written in 2014) ICBM's will most likely still be deployed in MM3 silos due to cost issues and the lack of a viable alternative that keeps that "leg" of the triad intact.

Randy
LUA and LOW both launch the ICBMs prior to nuclear detonations. The only practical (and irrelevant for this conversation) distinction
is timescale which is strategic vs. tactical warning timelines. In fact Maury was talking about tactical warning timelines.

Either would have been sufficient and does alter the fundamental point.

In fact, ICBM (and C3I) readiness levels required for LUA would permit LOW but not the other way around.
IOW, achieving a LUA posture is far more demanding that LOW. That LUA was adopted shows intent.

So by virtue of developing the capability for and adopting LUA, the US was implicitly capable of LOW.
And I see no evidence that LOW was not adopted since it's not necessarily the case that policy decisions end up in the SIOP.

It's clear from all of the declassified documents that RAND points to that the SIOP planners
have their own views since military planning is not the province of policy hacks.

The big issue for both LOW and LUA was pindown which MX solved through hardening and thrust.
 
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The only practical (and irrelevant for this conversation) distinction

No. The difference is fundamental. Launch on warning is the idea of launching the missiles BEFORE the targets of enemy attack become clear (and thus the risk of launching countervalue counter-strike as response to counterforce attack). Launch under attacks is the idea of launching AFTER the targets of the enemy attack become clear.
 
The only practical (and irrelevant for this conversation) distinction

No. The difference is fundamental. Launch on warning is the idea of launching the missiles BEFORE the targets of enemy attack become clear (and thus the risk of launching countervalue counter-strike as response to counterforce attack). Launch under attacks is the idea of launching AFTER the targets of the enemy attack become clear

You're really talking about Launch on Attack Assessment (LOAA): a launch after determination of the intent and extent of the attack against the
CONUS, including an assessment of the degree of threat to the ICBMs.

But none of the various launch-on/under-* (aside from impact) constitute a fundamental difference for an attack on the land based deterrent.

Such an attack would be unmistakable to early warning assets which form the basis for a launch on warning.
And it's clear from the various declassified accounts that the EO/IR sats were *much* more capable than was publicly
acknowledged; SECDEF Brown talked about an exercise where he's using EO/IR sats and some fast intermediate weapons
to chase Soviet armor divisions.

So maybe precise attack characterization for LOAA is a function of horizon constrained microwave radars which is the basis for launch under attack.
You can spoof the former but it's much harder (due tor "dual phenomenology) to spoof the latter.

And all of the efforts of the late 70's and early 80's was to retarget portions of the land based deterrent dynamically
within the LUA timeline. So again, a distinction without a difference.
 
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You're really talking about Launch on Attack Assessment (LOAA): a launch after determination of the intent and extent of the attack against the
CONUS, including an assessment of the degree of threat to the ICBMs.

But none of the various launch-on/under-* (aside from impact) constitute a fundamental difference for an attack on the land based deterrent.

Such an attack would be unmistakable to early warning assets which form the basis for a launch on warning.
And it's clear from the various declassified accounts that the EO/IR sats were *much* more capable than was publicly
acknowledged; SECDEF Brown talked about an exercise where he's using EO/IR sats and some fast intermediate weapons
to chase Soviet armor divisions.

So maybe precise attack characterization for LOAA is a function of horizon constrained microwave radars which is the basis for launch under attack.
You can spoof the former but it's much harder (due tor "dual phenomenology) to spoof the latter.

And all of the efforts of the late 70's and early 80's was to retarget portions of the land based deterrent dynamically
within the LUA timeline. So again, a distinction without a difference.

No as the monograph you cited points out there IS a difference and it is a distinct one that everyone is trying to avoid specifically because of that difference. Launch On Warning is exactly that, you launch the second you "see" a threat appear and before you have a distinct determination of the possible target(s). Yes in fact our satellite based sensors are really, really good but that also made them really, really susceptible to false-alarms which is why they were never the primary means of attack warning.

Our primary means of warning has always been horizon limited radar and especially southern coverage was sparse and in-effective till the mid-90s. (Oddly enough it only got significant improvement with the addition of static radar balloons arguably emplaced to try and track drug smuggling as part of the "War on Drugs") LUA assumed that we had time for a full Attack Assessment which would include actually 'seeing' the missiles coming over the horizon with multiple radar and optical assets and enough tracking data to have a good feeling for their targets. And policy was STILL to wait until something hit and detonated before a launch order was given. Mind you if there was good data that the missile fields were in the first tier of attacks then it was likely this policy would have been set aside but at NO point was anyone willing to consider Launch On Warning. LOW as a policy means you launch the second you have some confirmation that there is an attack in coming and as such it has no "Attack Assessment" only a confirmation of launch from multiple assets. Which is why the difference between LOW and LUA is made so much of and why it is stated to be two very different situations.

LOW has always been a very dangerous and difficult option because it depends on super-accurate information and NO mistakes or misinformation. Everything from FOBS, Cruise Missiles to SLBM's has been carefully scrutinized since they have all had aspects that reduce the amount of time available to conduct an Attack Assessment and each and every time Launch On Warning has been rejected as an option because it relies too much on systems that are known to be inaccurate, fallible and to open to mistakes. Launch Under Attack is specifically what Dilandu is saying. You launch ONLY when you have assessed that there IS an attack and WHAT the targets are. Up to the 90s the 'actual' effect wouldn't have been much different as re-targeting wasn't really seen as an option because it was assumed that any attack would be an all out one on both sides and therefore there would likely be no 'follow-up' attacks and all targets were pre-planned. Counter-Force or Counter-Value didn't matter. This began to change somewhat with the adoption of the idea of a 'limited' nuclear war but didn't significantly change until after the USSR fell and the idea that a "real" limited exchange might be possible.

You are actually correct in saying that Launch On Warning is the 'easier' posture but not because Launch Under Attack is more difficult it's because it's less accurate and VERY much more subjective since rather than analyzing the attack you simply launch an all out retaliation the moment you have a warning of a launch against you. Note that you may not have anything more than some fuzzy satellite warnings and some possible inbound missile tracks but that's what makes LOW so easy and quick. LAU assumes you not only have incoming positive tracks on multiple inbounds by both radar and satellite but you also are fairly sure where each and every one is going to hit and when. And by that point at least some of your 'short' flight time incoming (such as SLBM's) will likely have hit their targets already and you will have confirmed that an attack is underway. Launch On Warning had you sending missiles off BEFORE you can confirm a general attack BECAUSE you can't wait that long for a proper assessment. It assumes that all warning systems are 100% accurate and that those missiles you see with flight times of under 15 minutes ARE there and ARE coming so you launch everything before you 'see' anything coming over the horizon.

So how many inbound tracks are needed for a LOW response? One. Just one because that one might be an EMP attack or the vanguard of one and (as you keep pointing out) you can't 'wait' for a nuclear detonation to 'confirm' the attack. Launch Under Attack means you wait and assess both the attack and it's targets and you confirm all the inbound information you can BEFORE you launch a counter-attack. That is likely going to take more than 15 minutes and is also likely to mean that at least one inbound will have reached it's target. LOW is easier and faster and has for very good reason NEVER been considered as a plausible response scenario by anyone with nuclear weapons. And because it is so vastly different than any of the plausible response scenarios is exactly why it is made to be clearly different from those more accurate and plausible responses.

Randy
 

From what I can gather from the discursive incoherency above you are describing what Garwin called Launch on Attack Assessment.
It's clear from RAND and the number of declassified docs that that's not the form of LUA the US adopted.

Maury above was talking about tactical warning timelines which he incorrectly described as launch on warning. But even so:

It's clear from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-...-warning-nuclear-strategy-its-insider-critics
that at various times the US had adopted LOW and LUA. Sorry but the declassified documents count for more than your anecdotes.

And you are technically incorrect: BMEWS and forward scatter radars had *much* higher false track rates than the early warning satellites.

There's no evidence whatsoever that early warning satellites would produce a false positive on the scale of an all out Soviet counterforce attack.

The entire point of having a lot of hardened aimpoints is that the Soviets would have to unmask to attack it. It would look like nothing else.

And The US had a fairly good idea what such an attack would look like and whence it would originate.

There's no evidence that the US would have been concerned about an attack on the deterrent on the basis of a single track.

The only form of "vanguard" attack that LUA was vulnerable to was pindown. But a pindown attack would also
look like nothing else and MX was designed explicitly to resist it. By all accounts, it was just about impervious to it.

There's no evidence that the policy you state was reflected in the SIOP.
 
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sferrin said:
Another was the "super hard silo". From what I recall they tested silos that could withstand up to 50,000 psi (today's are about 2,000 psi). There was a photo in Airforce Magazine back in the day of one of the tests. There was a huge crater in the ground and there sticking up in the middle of it was the concrete silo unscratched.
Isn't 50000 psi pretty close to having a bomb detonate right over your head?
The Floating Shell Game: Tom Clancy’s 1982 Plan to Fire Nuclear Weapons from a Hovercraft - See more at: http://news.usni.org/2013/10/02/flo...clear-weapons-hovercraft#sthash.Jv6gQF9t.dpuf
That's actually a pretty creative idea.

fightingirish said:
Alternate MX Basing Concepts Weighed
Washington—Alternate basing concepts are being considered for the USAF/Martin Marietta MX advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by high-level Pentagon officials as possible hedges to the linear grid system in the southwestern U. S. now favored by the Carter Administration.
By CLARENCE A. ROBINSON
Source: Aviation Week, October 27th, 1980, pages 19-21
Link (Login!): http://archive.aviationweek.com/issue/19801027/#!&pid=18
Actually, all silliness aside, some kind of short range hypersonic system whether ballistic, cruise, boost-glide, would actually be useful for a CVBG to use, as it'd destroy the hardest defenses, making it easier for the rest of the fighter/attack planes to get through.

Maury Markowitz said:
I've done a lot of reading on these topics over the years, my personal interest being ABMs but that often pushes over to counterforce issues. Some of the studies I've seen are truly hair-raising.

One of the earliest is the PSAC report on Nike Zeus. They note that even if the system worked perfectly, the Soviets could simply drop their warheads upwind of the cities, just out of range of the missiles. These would cause so much fallout that it would kill almost as many people as a direct attack. With a few thousand warheads, 90% of the US population would die.
From what I remember the bulk of the fallout tends to expand upwards and outwards (hot air rises) if detonated in an airburst, though precipitation would see some of that come down (this happened at Hiroshima and was called "black rain"), though I don't know to what extent.

Generally, radiation tends to be the worst and most persisting when it's detonated either sub-terranean / ground-level, or very close to the ground, as it not only digs up a rather spectacular crater, the contents of the fireball (which was the warhead) interact with the contents of the ground, and neutron-radiation ends up activating certain elements, that got displaced (amazingly the Russians actually created a lake from a nuclear blast, and if I recall the radiation levels were around 634 mSv: 20 mSv is a DHS guideline for relocating people, 50 mSv is the maximum lifetime NRC/DOE employees; 100-200 mSv depending on chronic or acute has some degree increase in cancer risks).

Forest Green said:
Wow, that's actually quite impressive.
 
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From what I remember the bulk of the fallout tends to expand upwards and outwards (hot air rises) if detonated in an airburst, though precipitation would see some of that come down (this happened at Hiroshima and was called "black rain"), though I don't know to what extent.

Generally, radiation tends to be the worst and most persisting when it's detonated either sub-terranean / ground-level, or very close to the ground, as it not only digs up a rather spectacular crater, the contents of the fireball (which was the warhead) interact with the contents of the ground, and neutron-radiation ends up activating certain elements, that got displaced (amazingly the Russians actually created a lake from a nuclear blast, and if I recall the radiation levels were around 634 mSv: 20 mSv is a DHS guideline for relocating people, 50 mSv is the maximum lifetime NRC/DOE employees; 100-200 mSv depending on chronic or acute has some degree increase in cancer risks)
I'm quite curious about this lake, but I'm a little confused about the measurement you gave. As sieverts are measurements of absorbed dosage (which is generally why radiation levels, such as background, are given in μSv/hr), it's odd to hear the level at the lake given as simply "634 mSv," since this would be like giving the speed of a car as "65 miles." If it were 634 mSv/hr this would be quite significant, but if it were the estimated dosage of a fish caught in the lake it'd be much less of an impressive measurement.

Anyways, in an attempt to stay relevant, here's a video giving a walkaround for one of the aforementioned railcars (it's about as informative as you might expect of a video of a railcar, but if you're in Ohio and up for a trip to the National Museum of the United States Air Force you can see it yourself):

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrpVr9M0O8g
 
A report by the Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress discusses submarine basing as an option for the MX missile and has a line drawing of a submarine carrying missile canisters similar to the Boeing proposal. Could the missile in the Boeing ULMS proposal be MX?

MX Missile Basing, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, September 1981
Link:http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8116.pdf
sublaunchmx-jpg.86618
 
Via Shipbucket:
1617556239934.png
Initial Draft of markings.
"Tail Code" located on the fin follows USAF conventions
The large two letters "MX" in this case are symbolic of the missiles being carried. The small two letters "AK" represent the proposed basing of Anchorage Alaska. In terms of the numbers, USAF has the first 2 as the Fiscal Year the air frame was approved with the other digits being sequential for that year.
Since the service entry was expected to be 1992, I figure an 8 year development time for the lead boat would be reasonable. In addition some Peacekeeper missiles were approved that year so it seemed a good fit. IRL for the FY 1984 budget the missiles received serial numbers in the 84-0540/0560 range. Following this range there's a jump to USAF serial numbers 84-0809/0812 (These were F117s). I feel that it's plausible the boats would be approved alongside the missiles so I decided to use the allocated (as far as I can tell) 84-0570 range for the serial numbers.
If this had gone through, the screams of the Navy would have probably been heard out past Pluto!

Also via the same Shipbucket thread:
 
The picture reminds me of a scene in the "The Hunt of Red October":
"Would you launch a SLBM horizontal?":D
Edit: I had the same comment in September 2009. o_O
It reminds me of a line from the film 'The Hunt For Red October', where Jack Ryan (Alec Baldwin) asks the Naval Academy Instructor/Consultant Skip Tyler (Jeffrey Jones) about the horizontal doors seen on the fictional Typhoon class sub "Red October":
- " Can you launch a Ballistic Missile horizontally?"
- "Sure. Why would you want to?".
:)
 
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It just dawned on me that ICBM vs FOBS is kind of "ballistics" vs "orbital mechanics"... ballistics mandates a very "pointy" trajectory with a very large vertical / altitude component. For example: 1000 miles high for a range of 12 000 km. Try flattening that and range shrinks.
Orbits can be very low (100 miles) but orbital mechanics are constraining.

Maybe the best "compromise" is indeed, something akin to the Space Shuttle Abort Once Around... one incomplte orbit. But even that takes 90 minutes.

Makes one thinks...
 
It just dawned on me that ICBM vs FOBS is kind of "ballistics" vs "orbital mechanics"... ballistics mandates a very "pointy" trajectory with a very large vertical / altitude component. For example: 1000 miles high for a range of 12 000 km. Try flattening that and range shrinks.
Orbits can be very low (100 miles) but orbital mechanics are constraining.

Maybe the best "compromise" is indeed, something akin to the Space Shuttle Abort Once Around... one incomplte orbit. But even that takes 90 minutes.

Makes one thinks...
I was always under the impression that, given the humungous multimegaton warhead, Safeguard and suchlike would probably have had substantial ASAT capability, and likewise would have had reduced but serviceable counter-FOBS capability.

Is the horizon really that much of an impediment when your FOBS is at 200km or something? That's a thousand-klick horizon at least.
 
Via Shipbucket:
View attachment 654382
Initial Draft of markings.
"Tail Code" located on the fin follows USAF conventions
The large two letters "MX" in this case are symbolic of the missiles being carried. The small two letters "AK" represent the proposed basing of Anchorage Alaska. In terms of the numbers, USAF has the first 2 as the Fiscal Year the air frame was approved with the other digits being sequential for that year.
Since the service entry was expected to be 1992, I figure an 8 year development time for the lead boat would be reasonable. In addition some Peacekeeper missiles were approved that year so it seemed a good fit. IRL for the FY 1984 budget the missiles received serial numbers in the 84-0540/0560 range. Following this range there's a jump to USAF serial numbers 84-0809/0812 (These were F117s). I feel that it's plausible the boats would be approved alongside the missiles so I decided to use the allocated (as far as I can tell) 84-0570 range for the serial numbers.
If this had gone through, the screams of the Navy would have probably been heard out past Pluto!

Also via the same Shipbucket thread:


A fleet of them in the Great Lakes..........
 
General Lemay and Powers would have had kittens... oh wait they were long gone.
 
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It just dawned on me that ICBM vs FOBS is kind of "ballistics" vs "orbital mechanics"... ballistics mandates a very "pointy" trajectory with a very large vertical / altitude component. For example: 1000 miles high for a range of 12 000 km. Try flattening that and range shrinks.
Orbits can be very low (100 miles) but orbital mechanics are constraining.
Ballistic trajectories are in fact orbits. They're just orbits that have their perigee below the surface of the planet.
 
Ballistic trajectories are in fact orbits. They're just orbits that have their perigee below the surface of the planet.
Ok, but by that definition, when I jump off my couch I'm in orbit. I'm not sure one can define anything that intersects the surface as "orbit" without making the definition useless for its intended purpose.
Via Shipbucket:
View attachment 654382
Initial Draft of markings.
If this had gone through, the screams of the Navy would have probably been heard out past Pluto!
This remains the most bizarre of the MX proposals IMHO. There's no way the DoD would allow the AF to make a submarine. Even if they managed to convince anyone that it was a requirement to have MX, they'd simply hand the program to the Navy. This was more a threat to the AF than the Soviets.

You do get some feeling for the complete loss the AF was at after Puzzle of Polaris was released when you see things like this.
 
Ok, but by that definition, when I jump off my couch I'm in orbit. I'm not sure one can define anything that intersects the surface as "orbit" without making the definition useless for its intended purpose.
It's not terribly useful for definitional purposes, but for analytical purposes it's very useful - you need to use orbital mechanics to calculate the trajectory of a ballistic weapon at any appreciable range. I'm not quite sure at what point the flat-earth approximation stops being useful, but it's certainly a lot less than ICBM range.
 
Where there ever serious plans to base ICBMs on the goddam Moon ? There are potentially immense underground cave in Oceanus Procellarum - the Marius Hills, exactly.

Well, the Project Horizon military moonbase project of 1959 was hinted to be capable of being used as IPBM (Inter-Planetary Ballistic Missiles) position. The main advantages were:

* Distance, that made any sudden strike from Earth against Moon-based IPBM's impossible; the projectiles would took days to reach the Moon.
* Camouflage, that allowed missiles to be hidden in craters and crevices - so the opponent could not easily found them (contrary to, say, orbital basing, where missiles would be constantly on plain view)
* Some hardening, due to the ability to use lunar regolith to provide additional protection for missiles (again, much more practical than hauling such protection from Earth)
* Not actually made USSR nervous - since it would took days for IPBM's from Moon to reach Earth, USSR may not fear American sudden attack - so, politically it would make both sides trust each other a bit more.

Disadvantages are obvious - enormous cost of placing and maintaining the IPBM arsenal on Moon. The IPBM booster must be big enough to allow direct Moon-Earth flight. Which means, that it would be... bigger than Apollo Lunar Module, and harder to put in place. The last problem could be solved by using moon-produced fuel - like aluminum and oxygen, extracted from regolith - but it doesn't seems that there were much thoughts about that in 1950s (as far as I could say, the idea of using Lunar soil to produce aluminum based fuel was developed in USSR in 1960s).
Yeah.

Counterintuitively, Project Horizon had the potential to be quite...stabilizing. A 5-9 day travel time meant no first strike (Even with the 50's sensors there wasn't any realistic stealth in space). Conversely, in the event of a Soviet first strike (which the U.S. considered a possibility) IPBMs on the moon would be excellent retaliatory weapons and a superb deterrent but would be useless in a sneak attack. One interesting possibility would be to restrict U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to the moon which would rob the USSR of any counterforce targets in the U.S. as well as re-assure the Russians that a US first strike was not in the cards. because of the great cost of each moon nuke the total kilotonnage would have been significantly less. Of course the Russians might set up a base on the moon too, and although they faceplanted with their moon program historically, that was a bit of a fluke. They are quite excellent at rocketry, having invented it and all.

If the Russians did that, then the invulnerability of the US nukes would be voided and both Russian and US facilities would face the same issue of a first strike from the other side that they did on Earth....with the exception that a hypothetical exchange of nukes would take place in an airless desert without an ecosystem, away from both nations population centers.

Add to this happy development the advances in space transport tech and the likelihood of civillian piggy-backing on these endeavors as they often had around military encampments historically. Given all the crazy, stupid, and horrifying proposals for atomic ordinance during the Cold War, Horizon seems almost not to fit with the rest of them, aside from maybe Orion.

Regarding in-situ fueling, until Apollo 11 they didn't know WHAT was available on the moon other than a reasonable certainty that it was not made of cheese. So that couldn't have figured into preliminary cost assessments.
 
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Counterintuitively, Project Horizon had the potential to be quite...stabilizing. A 5-9 day travel time meant no first strike (Even with the 50's sensors there wasn't any realistic stealth in space).

Agreed completely. In fact, I consider high-orbit missile platforms as near-ideal retaliation weapon with very good stabilizing factor.
 
Of course the Russians might set up a base on the moon too, and although they faceplanted with their moon program historically, that was a bit of a fluke. They are quite excellent at rocketry, having invented it and all.

Wouldn't it be more rational for USSR to have strike force on Lunar orbit?
 
Nah, nukes in HEO was inferior to nukes under the sea. Your communications can be spoofed, and this time there's no man-in-the-loop on the far end. Maintenece is a nightmare, and the enemy can just tail your birds with killsats and sink them at a stroke... if they don't jam your communications networks first.

Nukes on the moon have similar problems, with men in the loop this time, but need big boosters. Also, the bad guys can set up a camp with SRBMs or a Davy Crockett next door.

If your nukes are in LEO, it's even worse - first strike, use it or lose it.
 
Reading stuff about Minuteman WS-120A and MX basing. Pretty interesting to note that despite 30 years of intensive debates and a bazillion studies they could never beat the basic Polaris system: big solid fuel rockets in a nuclear submarine roaming the ocean depths.
 
And if I may add some controversial statements... in a sense, the USN won the "deterrent war" against the Air Force. Bombers, Skybolts and even Minuteman had survival issues when Polaris subs were (more or less) untouchable once hidden in the ocean depths.

That's paramount. But try telling that to Curtiss Lemay or Tommy Powers - they would have kittens !

Polaris and Poseidon certainly had flaws (lack of range, CEP & precision, reliability) but they were gradually corrected and by 1980 SLBMs essentially matched ICBMs - minus the land-based and silos vulnerability.

I often think that there is a reason why nowadays, 95% of the French deterrent and 100% of the British one are SLBMs. ASMP-A is like a secondary, more flexible system with a man in the loop. The British gave up that with Blue Steel retirement 50 years ago.
 

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