MOTS Phantom for the RN?

As an aside....
Imagine for a moment that the UK had built 600 fast jet Fighter/Attack platforms as planned in '63, and achieved it by '69.

Irrespective of what that platform was, it would alter subsequent decisions and exports significantly.
 
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Which makes a total of 322.
You can add a hypothetical 175 to 200 airframes as RAF all-weather interceptors, bringing the total to about 500 in an optimistic scenario.

To get to 600, you probably need the Royal Navy to plan on putting five air wings to sea, justifying 200 aircraft for them. A slightly larger RAF short-range interdiction force gets 200. And 200 more for the high-end F(AW) requirement.
 
P1154 was the UK's attempt at a multi role combat aircraft for the 1960s and 70s.
It has all the hallmarks of UK overambition and poor decisionmaking.
VTOL seemed in 1960 to be the wave of the future (like nuclear powered ships and hovercraft). It appeared to allow survivable airstrips and simpler aircraft carriers.
It was to take another half century of progress and technology not available in 1960 to get the RAF and RN a P1154- the F35B.
Ditch the VTOL requirement and P1154 becomes a Jaguar sized aircraft with the capability of the F4.
Let us call this aircraft the P1960.
In RAF service it would replace Hunters and some Canberras.
Once a suitable radar and missile armament were available it would replace Sea Vixen on about 4 aircraft carriers and then the RAF's Lightnings.
It might have looked like AFVG if BAC had been chosen or like a smaller F4 if Hawkers had.
 
Of course a left field option might be to go the other way an try to use a pair of RB.153 variants.
Although of lower thrust, their lower weight and fuel economy might actually translate into a more RN carrier friendly version of the F4.

This sort of option was set out for the Lightning, and give the same performance but with more modern engines of easier maintain-ability.

At least one version cranked up projected thrust to over 17,000lb in reheat. Weighing in rather less than an Avon.

Blackburn P.141, cough.
 
Ditch the VTOL requirement and P1154 becomes a Jaguar sized aircraft with the capability of the F4.
I think something like that is possible.
Such my thread on the Brough Option.
 
Which is a long-winded way of saying that Ark Royal, Hermes & Eagle will have to make do with their Sea Vixens until the early 1970s when they're replaced (in that order) by CVA.01, CVA.02 and CVA.03.

For the sake of argument CVA.03 is completed in 1975 and Eagle pays off earlier in that year to provide her crew. Therefore, the British taxpayer gets 11 years of service out of the £31 million spent on her 1959-64 refit, which is three years more than they got IOTL because she was paid off early in 1972 which was eight years after her 1959-64 refit was completed.

That situation lends itself well to a Sea Vixen/Lightning/Phantom-competitor programme for the 70s - à la AFVG. The UK could avoid Spey Phantoms altogether, and possibly start an international programme.

Skyflash could be a casualty though.
 
That situation lends itself well to a Sea Vixen/Lightning/Phantom-competitor programme for the 70s - à la AFVG. The UK could avoid Spey Phantoms altogether, and possibly start an international programme.
Avoiding Spey Phantoms altogether is the objective of the thread.
 
Blackburn P.141, cough.
The following is the text of Post 39 in the thread "Getting a British Phantom" dated 31st October 2021 to which you gave "A Love".
Link to Post 39 of the thread "Getting a British Phandom".
I looked the P.141 up in my copy of Roy Boot's From Spitfire to Eurofighter. According to him (and he should know)...
In 1965, as the brainchild of Rod Melling, came the last of our attack projects, the P.141. This was offered as an alternative concept to the MRCA (later Tornado). The approach was to avoid the size and complexity incurred by having an airframe with the capability of fulfilling a number of roles by a modular approach, where role-related major components could be attached, on the assembly line, to a common core, thereby producing a smaller and cheaper product.
The next paragraph said that the characteristics of the aircraft were...
  • Two Bristol Siddeley/SNECMA M45G turbofans of 7,460lb dry thrust and 13,000lb with reheat.
  • Wing area 400sqft.
  • Span 35ft.
  • Length 56ft.
  • Basic weight 23,000lb.
  • Normal take-off weight 38,000lb.
  • Maximum speed about Mach 2.
  • Radius of action up to 1,000 miles.
  • A good short-field performance was also a feature of the design.
How do they compare to the characteristics quoted in the brochure that you mentioned?

It's in the section on possible Buccaneer successors which also includes the B.123 and P.135 which were to have had reheated Spey engines. Which suggests to me that the P.141 wasn't really a British equivalent to the Phantom. However, the brochure that you are using as your source suggests otherwise.
 
Part of Post 323.
Ditch the VTOL requirement and P1154 becomes a Jaguar sized aircraft with the capability of the F4.
This is the January 1964 version of the VTOL P.1154RN with vectored thrust Spey engines.
P.1154RN Plan - Drawing HA.00.41H Date 10.01.64.jpg
It had virtually the same length and wingspan as the F-4K Phantom but considerably less wing area - 350sqft v 530sqft.

My guess is that the CTOL version with "ordinary" non-vectored-thrust Speys (or one non-vectored-thrust BS.100) could have the main landing gear in the fuselage which would allow a narrower folded wingspan.
 
Wingloading matters for things like coefficient of lift.

So P.1154 with twin Speys vectoring thrust with PCB reheat allows a machine with a 350sqft wing area of that weight to operate safely from a carrier.

The two Speys would weigh over 8,000lb with reheat chambers like those used on the F4K.
On a P1154 the engines alone would force increases in fusilage structure adding more weight....at least 1,000lb more.

So pretty soon in redesign you'd get to needing a 500sqft wing.

This led RR to remove heavy supersonic components from the twin Spey P.1154's engines (making them more like those used in the buccaneer) and when that was discovered their bid was dropped immediately.
 
As an aside....
Imagine for a moment that the UK had built 600 fast jet Fighter/Attack platforms as planned in '63, and achieved it by '69.

Irrespective of what that platform was, it would alter subsequent decisions and exports significantly.

It's what I imagine could happen with the Lightning if it was developed into an FGA/FR instead of the Hunter conversions from 1958. Adding ~180 FGA/FR with maybe 20 2-seaters gets RAF Lightning production up to almost 500. Add in ~80 P1127 and the RAF has almost 600 fast jets in the 60s even without the TSR2 or counting the ~180 RN Buccaneer in that total.

Numbers, numbers, numbers. All my torturous reasoning is about getting those production numbers up.
 
There seems to have been a sense of unreality - on the one hand doing everything to reduce capability to reduce cost but yet underestimating that cost and ending up with fewer less-capable than planned ships at highly-inflated prices

I agree.

I can't help but think a bit of effort into simplifying the overall plan and biting the bullet that these things are required and are expensive would have got them better results from a capability and value for money perspective.
 
A brief aside on Lightning.

I think the problem with this is the running costs of a highly specialised development of a research machine.

Brakes and wheels don't just cost money. they need to be available where the aircraft is and that means stocks of them there and a logistics pipeline constantly feeding more from the factory.

The logistics is as much as maintenance time or purchase costs a significant factor.

But once you start tinkering with the design to insert longer life wheels of different form, longer life brakes, easier access etc....your designing a new plane.
 
A brief aside on Lightning.

I think the problem with this is the running costs of a highly specialised development of a research machine.

Brakes and wheels don't just cost money. they need to be available where the aircraft is and that means stocks of them there and a logistics pipeline constantly feeding more from the factory.

The logistics is as much as maintenance time or purchase costs a significant factor.

But once you start tinkering with the design to insert longer life wheels of different form, longer life brakes, easier access etc....your designing a new plane.

Sure, but the P1B was already redesigned from the P1A Mach 1.5 research aircraft to make it into an operational fighter. The P1A was designed to pull 7g and had provision for guns and needed a redesign with an inlet shock cone to go to Mach 2 anyway, so the leap wasn't too outlandish, perhaps akin to the move from F102 to F106.

In any case the Lightning, for better or worse, was the only fighter to survive the 57 DWP and produced for the RAF to the tune of ~280 units, making it the only practical candidate to reach those 450+ production numbers.

To bring this back to the OP; I think to maximise the benefit to the RAF of Lightning and P1127 production, to get the TSR2 over the line and equip the RN with Buccaneer something's got to give and that something is the RNs 60s fighter.
 
No to get MOTS F4, you really need to get CVA-01 going. Ideally by just committing to laying a new carrier down in the early 60's.
 
No to get MOTS F4, you really need to get CVA-01 going. Ideally by just committing to laying a new carrier down in the early 60's.

True, the MOTS Phantom is not practical, the Spey Phantom has to happen. I still think it's a better option than a domestic fighter, given the RAF is already taken care of.
 
As with all the 60s UK threads it comes down to trying to do too much with too little.
Mesmorised by the US, the only Western nation senior Brits respected, the UK tries to set up its own Strategic Air Command (managed to up to 1968), its own nuclear missiles (failed but we get Polaris then Trident on good terms), its own carrier fleet (collapses in 1966 and dies in 1978) and so on and so forth.
The British political and military establishment has to go through the shock of massive devaluation of the Pound and the retreat from Empire in the 60s before it starts to focus on NATO and working with European partners.
Jaguar and then MRCA only become possible once the RAF and British industry has seen for itself what a weapons system (F4) looks like as opposed to a Pilots' Prototype (Lightning and TSR2)
It is no accident that the real heir to the Hunter is the Hawk not the P1154 or Jaguar.
Single engine pilot's aeroplane with no nasty "systems" to worry about.
 
True, the MOTS Phantom is not practical, the Spey Phantom has to happen. I still think it's a better option than a domestic fighter, given the RAF is already taken care of.
Actually no.
In fact what could have happened is Sapphire F4 earlier and AS development of said or Avon F4 and RR development of.

What is needed is something better than the J79 of the time and Spey happened to be available in production and RR pitched a supersonic stressed version with the Medway reheat chamber.

But like I said the Anglo-German RB.153 is an alternative and it will fit a standard F4.

But equally the brochure Spey F4 isn't the actual Spey F4 as we've been informed on this forum.

MOTS F4 is possible.....just not the F4B.
 
As with all the 60s UK threads it comes down to trying to do too much with too little.
Mesmorised by the US, the only Western nation senior Brits respected, the UK tries to set up its own Strategic Air Command (managed to up to 1968), its own nuclear missiles (failed but we get Polaris then Trident on good terms), its own carrier fleet (collapses in 1966 and dies in 1978) and so on and so forth.
The British political and military establishment has to go through the shock of massive devaluation of the Pound and the retreat from Empire in the 60s before it starts to focus on NATO and working with European partners.
...........

There's not much wrong there, however I would argue that the British establishment didn't do themselves any favours during this process.

Weight of numbers is something that made the US and USSR superpowers, it also paid off for the French Mirage III, but Britain didn't push to maximise production numbers of its own aircraft. Rather it tried to get bespoke solutions for specific requirements that ended up in small and expensive fleets.
 
Actually no.
In fact what could have happened is Sapphire F4 earlier and AS development of said or Avon F4 and RR development of.

What is needed is something better than the J79 of the time and Spey happened to be available in production and RR pitched a supersonic stressed version with the Medway reheat chamber.

But like I said the Anglo-German RB.153 is an alternative and it will fit a standard F4.

But equally the brochure Spey F4 isn't the actual Spey F4 as we've been informed on this forum.

MOTS F4 is possible.....just not the F4B.

Are you referring to the Rolls-Royce/MAN Turbo RB.153 with 6,850 pounds dry thrust? That's a touch over half the thrust of a Spey or J79, a long way from where it needs to be for the Phantom.

IIUC from the technical discussion earlier in this thread that not even an F4J with the extended nose oleo and drooping airlerons are suitable for the BS151' bow catapults of the Eagle and Ark; particularly in 'coffin corner' of bombers inbound with an unserviceable BS5A cat, low wind, dirty-bottom-slow in hot weather.
 
Are you referring to the Rolls-Royce/MAN Turbo RB.153 with 6,850 pounds dry thrust? That's a touch over half the thrust of a Spey or J79, a long way from where it needs to be for the Phantom.
What matters is thrust-to-weight ratio and s.f.c
RB.153 was offered to fit in place of Avons on the Lightning.
Despite it's lower thrust figures it's effect, due to much lower engine weight and thus higher Thrust-to-weight ratio, was to deliver the same performance in the airframe and improved endurance.

Variants of the RB.153 were offered, notably at the time a reheated thrust of 11,750lb but later offerings reached 17,000lb.
 
For what they're worth these are the notes about the cost of the Spey-Phantom. They were handwritten many years ago from books about the Phantom that I found at Northallerton and York libraries. There are three pages and unfortunately I didn't write down the name & author of the book on two out of the three pages and I didn't write the page references for any of them. So they can't be checked.

Don't panic, I trust you!

Sifting through the info you've provided its sort of possible to filter out the 'more real' from the 'less than real' numbers. For example, ~400 units are all well and good but at most the RN needed 4 embarked sqns, a HQ sqn and trials flight and the RAF ostensibly needed to match the proposed P1154 buy of ~168 to replace the Hunter fleet. This means that 140 RN and 182 RAF is a 'real' number while 400 is not.

Similarly, the pre 'project' development cost estimate of 25m became 45m after 11 months of actual 'project' work, yet HMG kept on with the project. I'd point out that not all cost escalations are equal, cost escalations in USD are more consequential than those in Sterling and presumably the money spent on developing the afterburning Spey improved the breed overall, which may have paid off elsewhere.
 
What matters is thrust-to-weight ratio and s.f.c
RB.153 was offered to fit in place of Avons on the Lightning.
Despite it's lower thrust figures it's effect, due to much lower engine weight and thus higher Thrust-to-weight ratio, was to deliver the same performance in the airframe and improved endurance.

Variants of the RB.153 were offered, notably at the time a reheated thrust of 11,750lb but later offerings reached 17,000lb.

Is that realistic for the timeframe?

The fully developed and in production Spey entered service on the Trident and BAC111 in April 1964. Whereas the RB.154 was first run in January 1963, it would need some years' worth of development before entering production, let alone to a point where it could offer 17,000lbs thrust wet.
 
However you cut it once MDAP dries up the UK is left trying to develop a whole range of new equipment from Chieftain tanks to CVA01 in the late 50s and early 60s.
Fortunately the crazier stuff (SR177, Avro 730, Blue Streak even Blue Water) gets canned but money is still wasted.
Lightning in its fighter role is one of the better buys. For all its faults it can do the job even into the 80s in some cases.
Hunters did not need replacing as quickly as feared. In the Close Air Support role they could count on Lightnings to cover them if needed.
TSR2 suffers from confusion as to its specification. A supersonic Canberra/Valiant replacement to carry mainly nuclear free fall bombs is a very narrow requirement with no export prospects. That the US does the same thing with F111 and gets Australia to buy it is the same bad luck as the 707 making Comet 4 obsolete and VC10 too expensive.
Buccaneer should have been the Canberra replacement. Except in the early 60s it did not seem to offer much better capabilities.
If you look forward from 1960 rather than back to 1960 the UK seems to have cutting edge programmes.
TSR2 has the potential not just to replace Canberra but some of the V bombers too.
P1154 offers Phantomlike capabilities from unprepared strips..
AW681 is a fast jet powered lifter able to get into the front line.

It is only with hindsight in 1966 that these seem like follies and the US alternatives have to be grabbed. Unlike Australia we cannot afford F111s so the Buccaneer and Vulcan have to make do for an extra decade.

No amount of hindsight tinkering can dodge these bullets.
 
What matters is thrust-to-weight ratio and s.f.c
RB.153 was offered to fit in place of Avons on the Lightning.
Despite it's lower thrust figures it's effect, due to much lower engine weight and thus higher Thrust-to-weight ratio, was to deliver the same performance in the airframe and improved endurance.

Variants of the RB.153 were offered, notably at the time a reheated thrust of 11,750lb but later offerings reached 17,000lb.

But that would entail a lot of rebalancing of the aircraft, and who knows how successful, or costly that would be.
 
Imagine for a moment that the UK had built 600 fast jet Fighter/Attack platforms as planned in '63, and achieved it by '69.

Irrespective of what that platform was, it would alter subsequent decisions and exports significantly.
Agreed, getting a run of 600 airframes of a single type would have greatly helped the UK.



There's not much wrong there, however I would argue that the British establishment didn't do themselves any favours during this process.

Weight of numbers is something that made the US and USSR superpowers, it also paid off for the French Mirage III, but Britain didn't push to maximise production numbers of its own aircraft. Rather it tried to get bespoke solutions for specific requirements that ended up in small and expensive fleets.
Exactly.

The perfect bespoke solution is the enemy of something that can do multiple jobs almost as well for a lot less money because it's got a production run of 10x the bespoke solution.

And the perfect bespoke solution wasn't just a military problem, it also hit the civil aviation side.



But that would entail a lot of rebalancing of the aircraft, and who knows how successful, or costly that would be.
Worse, that's weight coming out of the tail, which makes the aircraft nose-heavy and not want to leave the ground!
 
But that would entail a lot of rebalancing of the aircraft, and who knows how successful, or costly that would be.
Yes this is likely the major problem here.
Most designs using this engine place it right aft in the airframe. Bar some of the VTOL options.
 
No to get MOTS F4, you really need to get CVA-01 going. Ideally by just committing to laying a new carrier down in the early 60's.
FWIW I agree and @uk 75 beat us too it in Post 255.
Let us assume CVA01 gets ordered in 1963 rather than kicked down the road to 1966.. She enters service in 1970 with an F4B and Buccaneer air group.
 
Agreed, getting a run of 600 airframes of a single type would have greatly helped the UK.




Exactly.

The perfect bespoke solution is the enemy of something that can do multiple jobs almost as well for a lot less money because it's got a production run of 10x the bespoke solution.

And the perfect bespoke solution wasn't just a military problem, it also hit the civil aviation side.




Worse, that's weight coming out of the tail, which makes the aircraft nose-heavy and not want to leave the ground!
Could they have done an "F-20" and shoved the engine further out the back? Or, would that mean in the aircraft behind in the take off queue?
 
Part of Post 344.
Don't panic, I trust you!
Thank you.

Something that I didn't put into Post 320 was.
[The] USA offered [an] offset package for [the] Phantom purchase, but HMG did not entertain [the] offer, but later negotiated some offset for F111K.
As far as I know there was no offset package on the C-130K, or the order for 15 CH-47A Chinooks that was cancelled or the planned purchase of C-5A Galaxies that was cancelled before any aircraft were ordered.

I did read elsewhere that the US Government offered to buy some VC.10s for the USAF and here or on Alternatehistory.com that the Spey-Corsair II was part of an offset deal and so was the Saudi arms deal of the 1960s, although the latter is disputed.

Another thing that I didn't include in earlier posts is that either the Key Publishing book on British Phantoms or the Ian Allan book on RAF Phantoms says that 40-45% of the content of the Spey-Phantom was British. I think it said 45% of the F-4K and 43% of the F-4M because I haven't checked. What 40-45% it didn't say, it could be the percentage of the value (which would be of the most use to us), the weight or the structure including engines and avionics.

If the above is true HMG not negotiating the maximum "buy back" for Phantom (MOTS or Spey) and the other American aircraft purchased in the 1960s was a huge mistake. It's also something that's easy to correct in alternative history, because it doesn't involve spending more money or using industrial resources that the UK may or may not have had.

However, it feels too good to be true. Did the USG compensate HMG for buying American in ways other than an offset package?

EDIT: 16.01.25.

It was the Key Publishing book on British Phantoms which said that 40-45% of the Spey Phantom was British built, but as this quote from Page 16 says I got the proportions for each version wrong.
Whilst based on the F-4K, the RAF’s F-4M lacked the naval-variant’s lengthened oleo, catapult hooks, slatted tailplane, aileron droop and hinged radar (only the nose-cone was hinged).
The Phantom was to be designated the FGR.2 in RAF service – referring to the aircraft’s role as an air-defence fighter, ground attack strike aircraft and tactical reconnaissance machine. Although it generally only needed to fulfil one of these functions at any given time the F-4M’s diverse capabilities required a more sophisticated equipment fit than its Naval cousin. An Inertial Navigation & Attack System (INAS) was produced by Ferranti and based upon the unit the RAF had specified for the ill-fated TSR-2. This operated alongside an AD470 HF radio that allowed over-the-horizon communication on low-level sorties and an EMI-designed reconnaissance pod – the latter housing up to five optical film cameras, infra-red linescan and sideways-looking airborne radar. It also had mapping and moving target indication capabilities.
Other changes included the addition of anti-skid brakes, provision for a centre-line mounted SUU-23 gun pod and a complete revision of avionics. Combined, these changes meant that 45% of F-4Ms were produced in the UK, compared to 40% of the Navy's F-4K.
And on Page 14 it says.
The cost and time savings compared to designing and creating aircraft from scratch was considered worthwhile but the loss of British jobs and export potential would be immense. To placate the ailing aviation industry the government negotiated for British companies to produce up to 40% of each Phantom under licence. In practice this mostly meant producing small items but the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) at Warton, Lancashire was awarded the contract for producing the F-4 rear fuselages (normally built for McDonnell Douglas by Fairchild), Shorts at Belfast manufactured the outer wing sections and Ferranti licence-produced the AN/AWG-10 radar.
So does that mean 40% of the airframe and avionics?

And on Page 15 it says.
All of the work took so much money and time that the supposedly cheap ‘off-the-shelf’ order turned into a protracted and expensive procurement. Whilst a laudable policy, the outcome of ‘anglicising’ the Phantom was an aircraft some three times the flyaway the price of the US Navy’s F-4J and – as time would tell – having a poorer performance in most areas.
Which is what Derek Wood said in the quotes from "Project Cancelled" in Post 353.

The next paragraph on Page 15 says,
The F-4M airframes destined for the RAF did not need such modifications. In fact the RAF would have been content with a standard F-4 and even viewed the change to Spey engines as completely unnecessary. As they correctly surmised, the changes consumed up valuable time and money that could have been used to finance extra aircraft.
Except, the same book says it had even more modifications than the F-4K and 45% of it was British instead of 40% for the F-4K. See the quote from Page 14.
 
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As to what the Spey-Phantom actually cost, I thought Derek Wood said it was five times the estimates. Fortunately, I checked, because it wasn't. The following is from Pages 207 and 208 of "Project Cancelled".
From start to finish the P.1154 programme was a story of delay, ministerial interference and indecision. Three years of valuable time and £21 million had been wasted. Even the procurement of the Phantom was bungled. By insisting on British equipment and Spey engines a non-standard variant emerged. Will all the alterations demanded, the serious problems that subsequently beset the the supersonic Spey and the modifications necessary to cope with structural fatigue, the Phantoms cost well over £3 million each - three times the original estimates. In addition, it has not been possible for Britain to buy more Spey-Phantoms as the version has not been adopted by other nations and is out of production. The 1154 would undoubtedly have had its problems, not least of which would have concerned hot air re-ingestion and ground erosion with PCB operating. Much remained to be learned about V/STOL before 1127 was evolved into the operational Harrier, but the lessons could well have been incorporated in the supersonic aircraft.
If a standard off-the-shelf American Phantom had been purchased with General Electric engines, the large money savings made would have provided sufficient funds for a development batch of the 1150 or the 1154. Either of these types could have progressed in step with the Harrier and by now a supersonic V/STOL strike-fighter would be in service and paying big dividends in the export market. On balance the 1150 would have been the best solution as it retained major items from 1127 including the Pegasus engine. It's design was "state-of-the-art" and its supersonic dash speed of Mach 1.2/1.3 would have been quite sufficient for both the RAF and Royal Navy needs through the late 1960s and 70s. The 1150 or 1154 would be the idea aircraft for the Invincible class light aircraft carriers.
The effect of either on the Falklands Campaign would have been even more marked that the great achievements of the Sea Harrier.
And on Page 239 in the first paragraph of Scenario: 1964 he wrote.
Once again we enter the realms of what might have been. Ignoring the prophets of doom and the left-wingers would want to turn aircraft works into jam factories, the Cabined thrashes out a workable policy. A team goes to Washington determined on maximum "buy back" for any orders placed. McDonnell Phantoms for the RAF and the Royal Navy are ordered as standard, off the line, with General Electric and not Rolls-Royce engines. This cuts the ultimate bill by two thirds and allows re-ordering to take place at a later date. In return, the US Government agrees to collaborate on financing supersonic V/STOL development in the United Kingdom and to the purchase of an agreed list of electronic and other equipment
Presumably, he didn't know that the MOTS Phantom couldn't operate from any of the RN's existing aircraft carriers.

It would be interesting to know if his "well over £3 million each" and "more than three times the original estimates" includes a proportion of the R&D cost. Assuming that it did the 170 Spey-Phantoms purchased IOTL cost more than £510 million and 170 MOTS Phantoms would have cost £170 million. That saves at least £340 million, but as we don't know how much more than £340 million the "at least" was, lets use the more than "at least" to buy as many of the 53 cancelled Phantoms as it will buy.

In Wood's scenario the P.1127 Harrier & TSR.2 are still built while HS.681 is cancelled and replaced by a licence-built Hercules with improved STOL performance and RR Tyne engines that sounds a lot like the BAC.222. The money saved by buying MOTS instead of Spey Phantoms pays for the continue development of the P.1154 which is used by the FAA, RAF, USN and USMC.

In my scenario there isn't a P.1154 in the first place and the money saved on buying MOTS-Phantoms is used to buy three CVA.01s.
 
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What matters is thrust-to-weight ratio and s.f.c
RB.153 was offered to fit in place of Avons on the Lightning.
Despite it's lower thrust figures it's effect, due to much lower engine weight and thus higher Thrust-to-weight ratio, was to deliver the same performance in the airframe and improved endurance.

Variants of the RB.153 were offered, notably at the time a reheated thrust of 11,750lb but later offerings reached 17,000lb.
What we do not know which would be nice is if there were other downstream benefits to RB.153 being introduced. It sounds like it resembles more an F404 leaky turbojet than another Spey.
 
Wingloading matters for things like coefficient of lift.

So P.1154 with twin Speys vectoring thrust with PCB reheat allows a machine with a 350sqft wing area of that weight to operate safely from a carrier.

The two Speys would weigh over 8,000lb with reheat chambers like those used on the F4K.
On a P1154 the engines alone would force increases in fuselage structure adding more weight....at least 1,000lb more.

So pretty soon in redesign you'd get to needing a 500sqft wing.

This led RR to remove heavy supersonic components from the twin Spey P.1154's engines (making them more like those used in the buccaneer) and when that was discovered their bid was dropped immediately.
Understood. In part, because you said so when I suggested this in other threads. That's why I noted that the Phantom's wing area was more than 50% larger than the P.1154RN's.

However, the P.1154RN didn't use the vectored thrust because it was to be a CATOBAR rather than a V/STOL aircraft. So how does that allow an a machine with a 350sqft wing area to operate safely from an aircraft carrier. What don't I know and/or am wrong about? I'm not being funny-peculiar, I want to be better informed.

In my non-engineer's mind having a conventional layout with reheated engines would have been simpler, lighter and more aerodynamic than having vectored engines and PCB. I appear to be wrong.

Would it help that my P.1154RN is a CTOL aircraft designed around two conventional Speys from the start?

I presume that having vectored-thrust engines is why the wings are mounted at the top of the fuselage and an ALT-P.1154 that was designed as a CTOL/CATOBAR aircraft from the start may have hand them mounted at the middle or the bottom of the fuselage. Are my presumptions correct?
 
However, the P.1154RN didn't use the vectored thrust because it was to be a CATOBAR rather than a V/STOL aircraft. So how does that allow an a machine with a 350sqft wing area to operate safely from an aircraft carrier. What don't I know and/or am wrong about? I'm not being funny-peculiar, I want to be better informed.
How? Good question!!!
It's likely the sweep angle being less contributes to better lift at lower speeds. But it trades off at high speeds.
In my non-engineer's mind having a conventional layout with reheated engines would have been simpler, lighter and more aerodynamic than having vectored engines and PCB. I appear to be wrong.
The further from the lifting structure, the more 'structure' needed to carry the weight. The wing is holding the fusilage up and the attachment zone happens to where the four poster engine provides lift in jetborn flight.
Would it help that my P.1154RN is a CTOL aircraft designed around two conventional Speys from the start?
Yes.
But temptations lurk in this. See above on the wing.
I presume that having vectored-thrust engines is why the wings are mounted at the top of the fuselage and an ALT-P.1154 that was designed as a CTOL/CATOBAR aircraft from the start may have hand them mounted at the middle or the bottom of the fuselage. Are my presumptions correct?
It's all a trade off on wing location, certainly for V/STOL using the Pegasus, a high wing solved a lot.

Mid-to-high wings make loading weapons easier and assure stores clearances for things like recovery.

Brough's next generation designs used high wings.
 
No amount of hindsight tinkering can dodge these bullets.

That's because you're not trying hard enough. ;)

However you cut it once MDAP dries up the UK is left trying to develop a whole range of new equipment from Chieftain tanks to CVA01 in the late 50s and early 60s.
Fortunately the crazier stuff (SR177, Avro 730, Blue Streak even Blue Water) gets canned but money is still wasted.
Lightning in its fighter role is one of the better buys. For all its faults it can do the job even into the 80s in some cases.
Hunters did not need replacing as quickly as feared. In the Close Air Support role they could count on Lightnings to cover them if needed.
TSR2 suffers from confusion as to its specification. A supersonic Canberra/Valiant replacement to carry mainly nuclear free fall bombs is a very narrow requirement with no export prospects. That the US does the same thing with F111 and gets Australia to buy it is the same bad luck as the 707 making Comet 4 obsolete and VC10 too expensive.
Buccaneer should have been the Canberra replacement. Except in the early 60s it did not seem to offer much better capabilities.
If you look forward from 1960 rather than back to 1960 the UK seems to have cutting edge programmes.
TSR2 has the potential not just to replace Canberra but some of the V bombers too.
P1154 offers Phantomlike capabilities from unprepared strips..
AW681 is a fast jet powered lifter able to get into the front line.

It is only with hindsight in 1966 that these seem like follies and the US alternatives have to be grabbed. Unlike Australia we cannot afford F111s so the Buccaneer and Vulcan have to make do for an extra decade.

In all seriousness some of these problems are self-inflicted.

Even with the 57 DWP the RAF was moving toward greater individual aircraft capability, Valiants replaced Canberra in the tactical NATO roles and more sophisticated Canberra B(I) 6 & 8 and B.15 & 16 displaced many of the fighter-bomber sqns in RAFG, AFME and FEAF. This trend was reversed due to Sandys incorrect dogma when the Hunter conversions were undertaken, giving the RAF as less capable aircraft because if it's interim nature, instead of giving the RAF an advanced fighter-bomber it gave the RAF an obsolescent one because it was cheap and didn't need to last. The rest of the 60s and half of the 70s was spent expensively trying to rectify thsi mistake, when it could have been avoided in the first place.

The Lightning was the only aircraft of the 60s that could have reached 500 units in production, not backing it to the hilt was a mistake. EEs 1958 development proposals could have kept the RAF and industry on the continuous improvement path rather than stagnation.

The VC10 is another example of a questionable decision that slowed Britain down. In this instance not to do the full 28' stretch and condemn the Super to worse operating economics than the B707, when the alternative was for the biggest long range airliner in the world with better operating economics than the B707.

None of this makes Britain the equal of the USA or USSR, but certainly makes it the equal of France.
 
Part of Post 311.

For what they're worth these are the notes about the cost of the Spey-Phantom. They were handwritten many years ago from books about the Phantom that I found at Northallerton and York libraries. There are three pages and unfortunately I didn't write down the name & author of the book on two out of the three pages and I didn't write the page references for any of them. So they can't be checked.

The First Page Of Handwritten Notes
  • In 1963 the estimated cost of P.1154 was £750 million including several hundred aircraft at £1.5 million each.
  • In February 1964 the estimated R&D cost of the Spey-Phantom was £25.3 million (£12.4 million for the engines). This had risen to £45.5 million (£28.7 million for the engines) in May 1965 and the bill was eventually £100 million.
  • On 28.02.66 February 1966 Dennis Healey put the cost of F-4K/M at £300 million of which £160 million was to be paid by April 1970.
  • However, on 04.04.66 the costs of American aircraft to be paid over a 10 year period were.
    • £590 million F-4K/M
    • £280 million F-111K
    • £210 million C-130K
  • In mid-1966 the unit costs were.
    • £1.15 million F-4K
    • £1.20 million F-4M
    • £9.00 million C-130K
    • The Phantom costs were on an order for 210 aircraft.
  • In June 1967 the cost of F-111K had gone up to £336 million and 50 TSR.2s would cost £610 million.
  • In May 1968 the unit costs were
    • £1.4 million F-4K
    • £1.5 million F-4M
    • Including the development cost about £2 million per aircraft for 170 aircraft. The F-4 programme was not a financial success and wasn't in service any earlier than P.1154 would have been. Invalidating major reasons for procurement.
The Second Page Page Of Handwritten Notes - Which May Be From A Different Book
  • 52 F-4K (including 2 YF-4K) for RN to Ark Royal & Eagle. When Eagle's conversion was cancelled 20 went straight to the RAF. Eagle's Phantomisation would have cost £5 million. Eagle was to get the second F-4K squadron.​
  • F-4M cost twice as much as F-4D, but no one knew this in 1964. Development of F-4M [yes F-4M] cost £100 million. The RAF didn't need the extra power of the Spey. By 1968 F-4Ms were costing £2 million per copy.
The Third Page Of Handwritten Notes.
This Time I Wrote That They Were From Phantom by Frances K. Mason
  • 59 F-4K ordered (including 2 YF-4K) and reduced to 52 because it was a fixed price contract.
  • 150 F-4M (including 2 YF-4M) and reduced to 118 because it was a fixed price contract and the transfer of RN F-4Ks to the RAF.
  • When the RN phased out 892NAS it was thought that a second RAF F-4K squadron would be formed. In the event No. 111 converted to the F-4K and the redundant F-4Ms were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.
These notes are where my oft stated R&D cost for the Spey-Phantom of £100 million comes from.

Does this mean that the F4M received extra development on top of that received for the F4K? Or does it mean that as the RAF moved into the project and the RN's share declined the 100m became the RAFs problem not the RNs?

I wonder if it would be possible to calculate the entire programme cost of ~180 Lightning fighter-bombers for the RAF and 110 F4Ks for the RN? I'm certain it would be vastly cheaper, although the RN would be in for a financial flogging.
 
@NOMISYRRUC
Is it clear when those costs are listed then what they actually are? My understanding was one driver was trying to minimise dollar costs. So whilst it may be "three times the cost" in dollars compared to a standard US aircraft from the line, then the 40% expenditure in pounds for UK work has quite a large impact on "cost to UK government"
 
Does this mean that the F4M received extra development on top of that received for the F4K?
The F-4M did receive extra development on top of that received by the F-4K, but not because of what you were quoting. It's because of these paragraphs from Post 352.
Whilst based on the F-4K, the RAF’s F-4M lacked the naval-variant’s lengthened oleo, catapult hooks, slatted tailplane, aileron droop and hinged radar (only the nose-cone was hinged).
The Phantom was to be designated the FGR.2 in RAF service – referring to the aircraft’s role as an air-defence fighter, ground attack strike aircraft and tactical reconnaissance machine. Although it generally only needed to fulfil one of these functions at any given time the F-4M’s diverse capabilities required a more sophisticated equipment fit than its Naval cousin. An Inertial Navigation & Attack System (INAS) was produced by Ferranti and based upon the unit the RAF had specified for the ill-fated TSR-2. This operated alongside an AD470 HF radio that allowed over-the-horizon communication on low-level sorties and an EMI-designed reconnaissance pod – the latter housing up to five optical film cameras, infra-red linescan and sideways-looking airborne radar. It also had mapping and moving target indication capabilities.
Other changes included the addition of anti-skid brakes, provision for a centre-line mounted SUU-23 gun pod and a complete revision of avionics. Combined, these changes meant that 45% of F-4Ms were produced in the UK, compared to 40% of the Navy's F-4K.
How much did that cost and whether it's included in the £100 million. I haven't the foggiest.

Or does it mean that as the RAF moved into the project and the RN's share declined the 100m became the RAFs problem not the RNs?
That sentence doesn't make sense. Do you mean?
Or does that mean that as the RAF moved into the project the RN's share of the £100 million R&D cost declined and became the RAF's problem and not the RN's?
If you do. No.

I wonder if it would be possible to calculate the entire programme cost of ~180 Lightning fighter-bombers for the RAF and 110 F4Ks for the RN? I'm certain it would be vastly cheaper, although the RN would be in for a financial flogging.
It says on Page 255 of the Putnams on English Electric aircraft that the 14 Lightings sold to Kuwait in December 1966 cost £20 million and the total value of Lightning exports to about £85 million. Saudi Arabia bought 40 new and 7 second hand Lightnings which added to the 14 that were sold to Kuwait makes a total of 61.
  • £20 million ÷ 14 = £1.4 million.
    • And.
  • £85 million ÷ 61 = £1.4 million.
    • Both are rounded to the nearest hundred thousand Pounds.
    • In fact there's only £35,128 difference between the two calculations - £1,428,571 v £1,393,443.
  • £1.4 million x 180 Lightning fighter-bombers for the RAF = £252 million.
    • I presume that's in addition to the 258 production Lightning fighters and trainers built for the RAF IOTL.
  • £3.0 million x 110 F-4Ks for the FAA = £330 million.
    • That's based on Derek Wood's cost of well over £3 million each for a Spey-Phantom (regardless of whether it was a F-4K or a F-4M) which may or may not include a proportion of the R&D cost.
  • £252 million + £330 million = £582 million.
Using Derek Wood's figure of £3 million a copy 170 F-4Ks cost £510 million, which would have paid for 510 MOTS Phantoms and my estimate of £582 million for 180 fighter-bomber Lightnings and 110 F-4Ks would have paid for 582 MOTS Phantoms.

So no it wouldn't have been vastly cheaper. It would help if Wood and the other source had said how much more than £3 million a Spey-Phantom cost.
 
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