M60 Main Battle Tank Evaluated and Tested by West Germany, circa 1964

[Christopher Wang]

The following was originally posted on the War Thunder Forums by DMYEugen on June 26, 2022 ( https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/557699-m60-an-alternate-future/ ):

After its entrance into NATO, West Germany was allowed to rearm itself and build up a tank force. This tank force initially consisted on cheaply acquired M47s and M48s, the latter of which would see many upgrades. While these tanks were all well and good, they were ultimately stop-gap vehicles acquired for self-defense while a domestic design was being developed. This domestic design would be eventually come to be the Leopard 1 series of vehicles. Of course, before being accepted into service, the Leopard 1 needed to undergo a number of tests. One of these tests was comparative trials against a number of other vehicles including two 105mm armed M48A3s and one standard M60.

The M60 would be purchased from the US and given German markings as well as, potentially, a basic German paint job. The M60 was chosen as a competitor for a few reasons, one of which being the fact that the M60 was essentially just a fancy M48. A lot of the parts from an M48 could be used on a M60 and German crews already knew how to use an M48. Overall, the M60 was considered to be a more economical alternative to the Leopard 1. Trials commenced in 1964 and, while the 105mm armed M48A3s and M60 were considered to be perfectly serviceable vehicles, the pre-series Leopard 1 was simply considered to be better.



This wouldn't be the last time the German M60 was used, however, as, after the Leopard 1 had entered service, it was seen again alongside a M48A2C and an early production Leopard 1A3. Whether it was again being used in comparative trials or was simply brought out for a photo is ultimately unknown.

Left to Right: M60, M48, and Leopard 1

The M60 remains in German hands to this day and rests peacefully at the Munster Tank Museum, although it has been painted to look like a US M60.


Source:
Marx, Stefan. Der Kampfpanzer m 48 in der Bundeswehr. Tankograd Publishing. pp. 64–66.

 

[datafuser]

From "Assessment of the Weapons and Tactics used in the October 1973 Middle East War" by the Institute for Defense Analyses in October 1974.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-480-3-1-4.pdf

 

[Bruno Anthony]

The following was originally posted on the War Thunder Forums by DMYEugen on June 26, 2022 ( https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/557699-m60-an-alternate-future/ ):

After its entrance into NATO, West Germany was allowed to rearm itself and build up a tank force. This tank force initially consisted on cheaply acquired M47s and M48s, the latter of which would see many upgrades. While these tanks were all well and good, they were ultimately stop-gap vehicles acquired for self-defense while a domestic design was being developed. This domestic design would be eventually come to be the Leopard 1 series of vehicles. Of course, before being accepted into service, the Leopard 1 needed to undergo a number of tests. One of these tests was comparative trials against a number of other vehicles including two 105mm armed M48A3s and one standard M60.

The M60 would be purchased from the US and given German markings as well as, potentially, a basic German paint job. The M60 was chosen as a competitor for a few reasons, one of which being the fact that the M60 was essentially just a fancy M48. A lot of the parts from an M48 could be used on a M60 and German crews already knew how to use an M48. Overall, the M60 was considered to be a more economical alternative to the Leopard 1. Trials commenced in 1964 and, while the 105mm armed M48A3s and M60 were considered to be perfectly serviceable vehicles, the pre-series Leopard 1 was simply considered to be better.
View attachment 695642
View attachment 695643

This wouldn't be the last time the German M60 was used, however, as, after the Leopard 1 had entered service, it was seen again alongside a M48A2C and an early production Leopard 1A3. Whether it was again being used in comparative trials or was simply brought out for a photo is ultimately unknown.
View attachment 695644
Left to Right: M60, M48, and Leopard 1

The M60 remains in German hands to this day and rests peacefully at the Munster Tank Museum, although it has been painted to look like a US M60.
View attachment 695646

Source:
Marx, Stefan. Der Kampfpanzer m 48 in der Bundeswehr. Tankograd Publishing. pp. 64–66.

The following was originally posted on the War Thunder Forums by DMYEugen on June 26, 2022 ( https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/557699-m60-an-alternate-future/ ):

After its entrance into NATO, West Germany was allowed to rearm itself and build up a tank force. This tank force initially consisted on cheaply acquired M47s and M48s, the latter of which would see many upgrades. While these tanks were all well and good, they were ultimately stop-gap vehicles acquired for self-defense while a domestic design was being developed. This domestic design would be eventually come to be the Leopard 1 series of vehicles. Of course, before being accepted into service, the Leopard 1 needed to undergo a number of tests. One of these tests was comparative trials against a number of other vehicles including two 105mm armed M48A3s and one standard M60.

The M60 would be purchased from the US and given German markings as well as, potentially, a basic German paint job. The M60 was chosen as a competitor for a few reasons, one of which being the fact that the M60 was essentially just a fancy M48. A lot of the parts from an M48 could be used on a M60 and German crews already knew how to use an M48. Overall, the M60 was considered to be a more economical alternative to the Leopard 1. Trials commenced in 1964 and, while the 105mm armed M48A3s and M60 were considered to be perfectly serviceable vehicles, the pre-series Leopard 1 was simply considered to be better.
View attachment 695642
View attachment 695643

This wouldn't be the last time the German M60 was used, however, as, after the Leopard 1 had entered service, it was seen again alongside a M48A2C and an early production Leopard 1A3. Whether it was again being used in comparative trials or was simply brought out for a photo is ultimately unknown.
View attachment 695644
Left to Right: M60, M48, and Leopard 1

The M60 remains in German hands to this day and rests peacefully at the Munster Tank Museum, although it has been painted to look like a US M60.
View attachment 695646

Source:
Marx, Stefan. Der Kampfpanzer m 48 in der Bundeswehr. Tankograd Publishing. pp. 64–66.

So they rated it behind the Leopard 1 in what ways?

 

[uk 75]

M60 did serve with the Austrians, Italians and Spanish but only because they were made available from US Army stocks.
Leopard 1 on the other hand was ordered by Belgium and Italy and then by Denmark, Norway and Canada.
However, Leopard 1 has not seen combat yet so its shortcomings compared with M60 have not been tested on the battlefield.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Leopard 1 saw combat in Bosnia and Kosovo.

 

[Arjen]

Indeed. With dire results for the opposition.

 

[Apophenia]

Leopard 1 saw combat in Bosnia and Kosovo.

And, to stretch the point, in Afghanistan - the Canadian Army's Leopard C2A1 MEXAS.

 

[uk 75]

Sorry I meant against other tanks. Bosnia and Afghanistan were more fire support for infantry.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Indeed. With dire results for the opposition.

Two platoons of Leopard 1s destroyed an anti-tank gun/missile battery during an ambush and routed a platoon of T-55A, so yes, actually. Something like 100 or so Serbian militiamen were liquidated despite having every advantage at the start over the UN peacekeepers.

Sorry I meant against other tanks. Bosnia and Afghanistan were more fire support for infantry.

The only time Western tanks have been battle tested against comparable armor was probably 1973 tbh. The CIA's conclusion was apparently that T-62 is better than M60 for (redacted) reasons, but Israeli tankers are lot better than US Army tankers so they didn't seem to suffer for it. Everything afterwards amounted to target practice.

Leopard 1 probably doesn't have any noticeable shortcomings compared to M48A5 unless it's been poorly stored, or there are some dark secrets like the hulls or turrets have bad welds, neither of which seems too terribly likely.

Then again the Leopard 2s in Syria have popped like T-64s at times so who knows.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

I don't really quite get the analysis that the T-62 is notably better than the M60. The biggest advantage of the T-62 is that it is smaller but the M60 is still well shaped for ballistic protection and both are going to be equally vulnerable to HEAT projectiles. M60 has better optics for the crew and isn't as cramped. All else being equal the 115mm smoothbore is going to be more powerful than the 105mm but the 105mm has a significantly better rate of fire and starting with the M728 105mm APDS should be able to defeat a T-62 at typical combat ranges.

 

[Elan Vital]

For some insight on why the M60 may have done poorly in competition against the Leopard 1, the Aussies made the following arguments:

Wayback Machine

Serious deficiencies were noted in the fighting arrangements for the crew commander on the M60. These deficiencies were attributed to the complex machine-gun cupola and a number of poor target-acquisition arrangements. The evaluation team considered that the Leopard tank was superior to the M60 in terms of strategic movement. Because the most effective method of movement in Australia was by rail, the size of the M60 precluded its carriage on the eastern coast railway network. As a result, if the M60 was chosen, tank-training activities would be effectively confined to the Puckapunyal area in Victoria. In contrast, the Leopard tank was portable over most Australian mainline railways and was thus more strategically versatile.

In addition, although the Leopard tank carried less armour, it was lighter, faster and more agile. The German tank could probably survive better on the modern battlefield since it presented a ‘smaller target for a shorter time’. The evaluation team also believed that the M60 did ‘not represent a significant improvement over the [mobility] characteristics of the Centurion [tank]’. A further consideration was that, although the M60 weighed 8 tons more than the Leopard vehicle, the former’s extra armour [weight] was spread over a greater surface area. Thus, the evaluators concluded that the ‘the degree of armoured protection provided by the M60 is only marginally greater than that provided by the Leopard’. In respect to issues of mechanical reliability and ease of technical maintenance, both tanks were considered to be a great improvement on the Centurion. However, the Army’s Director of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (DEME) expressed a strong preference for the Leopard. He noted that the latter vehicle, being a more recently designed vehicle ... has advanced maintenance engineering features when compared with the M60A1’.

A factor that told heavily against the M60 was the fact that there was no armoured recovery vehicle based on the former’s chassis design. The US Army used the M88 ARV, which operated on an entirely different chassis and had no commonality with M60. The introduction of even a few vehicles of this type into the Australian Army would place a considerable burden on the logistic system. The Army did not consider that the M88 had the full range of capabilities that the Armoured Regiment required. Indeed, the evaluation team suggested that the Army would have to give serious thought to three options: retain the Centurion ARV in service; develop a local ARV based on the M60; or purchase the Leopard ARV for use with the American tank. In contrast to these problems with the M60 ARV, the Leopard ARV (an example of which had taken part in the trials), was not only based on the gun tank’s chassis but was ‘highly regarded, both as a recovery vehicle and for its usefulness in tank maintenance’.



The primary advantages of the M60 at the time were lower costs, better acquisition logistics and a guarantee the tank will be in production beyond 1974, while the Leopard 1 was then expected to be out of production by 1974. And probably the guarantee an advanced fire control system would be fielded on the M60 while such a system was still only in testing in some countries for the Leopard. These last 2 points quickly changed and the introduction of the M60A3 was delayed by two years.

 

[Rickshaw]

M60 did serve with the Austrians, Italians and Spanish but only because they were made available from US Army stocks.
Leopard 1 on the other hand was ordered by Belgium and Italy and then by Denmark, Norway and Canada.
However, Leopard 1 has not seen combat yet so its shortcomings compared with M60 have not been tested on the battlefield.

You left out Australia as a user of the Leopard 1, we purchased over 100 new and about 50 second-hand from Canada. We also tested the M60 way back in 1970 or so. We were interested in purchasing it but the US Army was busy re-equipping with it and so could not guarantee supply of the same tranche for us, so we went with the Leopard 1 instead.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I don't really quite get the analysis that the T-62 is notably better than the M60.

The exact reasoning is redacted. It probably has to do with the fact that T-62 is shorter, thus harder to detect at range, has a hypervelocity long rod that defeats M60 and M60A1 out to any range, and is better protected against contemporary ammunition.

The size difference between T-62 and M60 is actually very important because M60 is a massive tank:

Tank battles are not decided by who can wail out the most rounds, the M728/L52 APDS was not in existence at the time of the analysis (nor even the war, as M728 was only serially issued beginning in 1974), and T-62 isn't very cramped (its interior is in line with other European norms; M60 is merely massive, again); so I don't know what those have to do with it.

The analysis was explicitly done in the aftermath of the 1973 war and pre-war simulations by the US Army (presumably) where T-62 was judged as the superior weapon. Given the influence of Johnson's Criteria on contemporary night imaging systems and Soviet expertise in imaging infrared capability, the T-62 would have been both a better day and night fighter. T-62 would see the M60 first, because the M60 is tall. It would hit the M60 first, because its shells have a longer battlesight range. It would penetrate the M60, because it hit first, and its shells over matched the M60A1's armor.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf70t8ehyNM

All else being equal the T-62 is the superior tank. The CIA did not change its opinion regarding this because it considered Arab and Egyptian tankers to be of poor quality relative to the Israelis. Evidently, that was a correct assumption, because the Israelis suffered fewer losses of tanks and had higher numbers of kills, with the majority of their kills against Egyptian armor coming from direct fire tank guns, while the majority of Israeli losses were from Egyptian anti-tank missile teams.

Tanks are ultimately only as good as their crews, even if some tanks are simply better than others. 1973 tells us that M60 is a bit tall and a bit too big and somewhat weakly armored, but can still be effective when crewed with well trained troops. It also tells us that a war involving modern mechanized armies of the late Cold War, at their fullest heights, would be approximately 2-3x as lethal as WW2.

 

[Rickshaw]

M60s were notorious in 1973 because of losses to hydraulic fires in Israeli service. Their traverse and elevation systems used flammable hydraulic oil and that had to replaced after the Yom Kippur war.

 

[MadRat]

I thought Israeli losses were to missiles, but survived many tank shots.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Does anyone know of a comparison test of the armour between the M60 andChieftain tanks?

 

[Elan Vital]

Does anyone know of a comparison test of the armour between the M60 andChieftain tanks?

Unfortunaly not, there is just a btvt article on Soviet armor measurements of Chieftain and a M60A1 and they compared them to the T-64, but IIRC they did not do live fire testing so the expected performance of their ammo is entirely calculated and theoretical (and besides they didn't really do proper estimates of ranges at which Soviet ammo pens for M60A1).

We can only infer from the measurements that:

- M60A1 should have slightly better side protection against KE in some places (mostly lower front hull sides and turret sides) due to the thinner armor of the Chieftain in these areas (even accounting for the cast vs rolled steel difference), but the side skirts on Chieftain offer better protection against shaped charges on the lower hull sides at high angles.

- M60A1 has better mine protection due to thicker and better shaped armor

- M60A1 might have slightly better frontal protection in a very small frontal arc, especially on the turret, but Chieftain's upper hull might be better due to a harder steel and better slope (even with reduced thickness), while Chieftain's turret provides a wider protected arc (as much as 25-30° either side vs 10-15° against 100mm ammo and better).

- M60A1's lower front hull is better armored (slightly useful against 100mm AP)

- Chieftain has a better protected turret ring mechanism and somewhat fewer weakened zones on the turret (no cupola).

- M60A1 overall is better protected for the mass since it provides comparable protection in most places (better in some, worse in some) in spite of being a bigger vehicle than Chieftain. This seems to be mostly down to the very mass-inefficient Chieftain's running gear and powertrain.

 

[uk 75]

Kat Tsun massive apologies to Denmark. I found the story you mention here.

Operation Amanda - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I visited Copenhagen and Aalborg a number of times between 2017 and 2019 and was impressed by the number of fit young people proud to visit a zoo in uniform.
A real change from the old Cold War Denmark.

 

[Arjen]

Another clash, also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where an attempt to ambush a combined Danish/Swedish force (seven Danish Leopard 1, one Swedish PBV302) went sour for the ambushers:

Operation Bøllebank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A NATO airstrike was requested by Danish commanders, but denied. Danish Leopards returned fire when shells started falling around them.
In 2006, Canadian Leopard C2 tanks were involved in combat near Panjwaii, Afghanistan:

Battle of Panjwaii - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Christopher Wang]

If West Germany had adopted the M60 instead of the Leopard 1, would other historical users of the Leopard 1 (e.g. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Ukraine, etc.) adopt the M60 instead?

 

[Rickshaw]

Australia adopted the Leopard 1 because when it's competition was held, the M60 won but was rejected because the US could not supply sufficient vehicles to provide all of the required numbers to supply all of the Australian Army's needs. With the liklihood that we would end up with different vehicles which might have different controls the Army opted for the Leopard 1. rather than face different training requirements. The problem was that the US Army was re-equipping with the M60 and there was a likelihood of successor vehicles being different and so we decided that it was important. Coupled with newly elected Australian Government intent on being somewhat divorced from the US after the experience of the Vietnam War, meant that the Leopard 1 got the gig.

 

[GK Dundas]

I thought Israeli losses were to missiles, but survived many tank shots.

No, most of the tank losses on both sides w Iere found to to have caused by kinetic energy kill vehicles ( Tank rounds sabot) As opposed to chemical energy warheads (heat ).
A US Army research team were on the ground at the various battle site usually with a few hours after the engagements ending.
It was their observations that in the early part of campaign the most of the sagger kill were due to poor Israeli tactics, tanks operating without infantry screens and so forth.
One scene that that struck me was the description of a Israeli tank practically buried under sagger guidance wires and unexploded missiles. And still moving and capable of fighting.
The cure for for ATGW teams is quite simple , awareness of your surroundings, infantry screens and liberal use of your coax.

Btw . The Sovs took the words of their own people on the ground and their Arab allies Most of whom really hadn't seen the action or drew erroneous conclusions from poorly gathered data and worse analysis . As a result the Russians went one way and Western tank development went another.

 

[sp_mm]

Australia adopted the Leopard 1 because when it's competition was held, the M60 won but was rejected because the US could not supply sufficient vehicles to provide all of the required numbers to supply all of the Australian Army's needs. With the liklihood that we would end up with different vehicles which might have different controls the Army opted for the Leopard 1. rather than face different training requirements. The problem was that the US Army was re-equipping with the M60 and there was a likelihood of successor vehicles being different and so we decided that it was important. Coupled with newly elected Australian Government intent on being somewhat divorced from the US after the experience of the Vietnam War, meant that the Leopard 1 got the gig.

That was not the case. An article in the Australian Army Journal, Volume IIII, Number I covers the evaluation of both tanks, the M60 lost pretty much in every evaluated aspect:

Meanwhile, a military team carried out evaluations of the two contending tank types, Leopard and M60, in the period between June 1972 and April 1973. The Military Board considered the evaluation team’s report at three separate meetings during August 1973 and the results of its deliberations were set forth in Military Board Minute No. 392/1973 of 30 August 1973. The evaluation team considered the main armament systems of the two vehicles to be excellent, although better fire control systems were required on both tanks in order to use their guns to full potential. Serious deficiencies were noted in the fighting arrangements for the crew commander on the M60. These deficiencies were attributed to the complex machine-gun cupola and a number of poor target-acquisition arrangements.
The evaluation team considered that the Leopard tank was superior to the M60 in terms of strategic movement. Because the most effective method of movement in Australia was by rail, the size of the M60 precluded its carriage on the eastern coast railway network. As a result, if the M60 was chosen, tank-training activities would be eff ectively confi ned to the Puckapunyal area in Victoria. In contrast, the Leopard tank was portable over most Australian mainline railways and was thus more strategically versatile.

In addition, although the Leopard tank carried less armour, it was lighter, faster and more agile. The German tank could probably survive better on the modern battlefield since it presented a ‘smaller target for a shorter time’. The evaluation team also believed that the M60 did ‘not represent a significant improvement over the [mobility] characteristics of the Centurion [tank]’. A further consideration was that, although the M60 weighed 8 tons more than the Leopard vehicle, the former’s extra armour was spread over a greater surface area. Thus, the evaluators concluded that the ‘the degree of armoured protection provided by the M60 is only marginally greater than that provided by the Leopard’

In respect to issues of mechanical reliability and ease of technical maintenance, both tanks were considered to be a great improvement on the Centurion. However, the Army’s Director of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (DEME ) expressed a strong preference for the Leopard. He noted that the latter vehicle, ‘eing a more recently designed vehicle … has advanced maintenance engineering features when compared with the M60A1’. A factor that told heavily against the M60 was the fact that there was no armoured recovery vehicle based on the former’s chassis design.

[...]
Although no firm cost estimates could be given, available estimates, based on the cost of the purchase of 100 gun tanks, suggested a unit cost of $A336 000 for the M60 and $A593 000 for the Leopard. The Military Board concluded that, while the M60 represented a great improvement on the Centurion, on balance, ‘the Leopard is the medium tank which best suits the operational and training needs of the Australian Army’ In terms of a phased purchase, the Military Board strongly recommended that the Leopard tanks be bought in a single purchase, thereby averting the risk that the tank might be out of production when the second phase became necessary. The Army’s final evaluation report was completed in June 1973
and copies were passed to the Department of Defence in September of that year.

The evaluation report recommended the Leopard 1 due to it being more survivable, more mobile, easier to maintain and coming with a proper ARV (the M88 was considered deficient). It also proved to be more reliable according to an Australian website:

Speculation was rife during 1974, waiting for the Government's decision as to which tank would be purchased. It was commonly thought that the M60A1 would be the winner, based on cost grounds, but the decision was made in favour of Leopard, and for once the Army and its soldiers were pleased with the choice of their government. The main deciding factors in favour of Leopard were its higher reliability and ease of maintenance and repair; the weight of the Leopard, which was some 10 tonnes less than M60A1, and would make transport by road and rail somewhat easier; and its underwater fording capability

However the price difference lead to an updated report from the Military Board lead to a second revision of MES 9, recommending the M60A1 over the Leopard 1. The Australian Army contested these updates, pointing to performance difference and other unaccounted factors in the Military Board's revised recommendation (including the projected cease of production of new M60 tanks in 1979, delivery schedule and the upgrade costs from M60A1 to M60A3). DFDC also suggested purchasing a reduced number of tanks (87) to further reduce, costs, which the Australian Army considered an horrible suggestion:

A mixture of types of medium tanks within a single unit is entirely unacceptable from the point of view of the conduct of operations, although such a mixture might be acceptable across a range of armoured units in a large army.

After that, several different options (regarding suppliers, potential for improving M88 ARVs, numbers of purchased tanks) were discussed, with at some time the Australian Army siding with earlier Military Board reports (stopping the competition and just buy the M60A1 in order to keep numbers high) and at others insisting on buying the Leopard 1 tank as it had performed better during trials. In the end, the Leopard AS1 was purchased at nearly twice the cost of M60A1/M60A3 due to its better performance in trials & evaluation.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I don't really quite get the analysis that the T-62 is notably better than the M60.

The exact reasoning is redacted. It probably has to do with the fact that T-62 is shorter, thus harder to detect at range, has a hypervelocity long rod that defeats M60 and M60A1 out to any range, and is better protected against contemporary ammunition.

The size difference between T-62 and M60 is actually very important because M60 is a massive tank:

Tank battles are not decided by who can wail out the most rounds, the M728/L52 APDS was not in existence at the time of the analysis (nor even the war, as M728 was only serially issued beginning in 1974), and T-62 isn't very cramped (its interior is in line with other European norms; M60 is merely massive, again); so I don't know what those have to do with it.

The analysis was explicitly done in the aftermath of the 1973 war and pre-war simulations by the US Army (presumably) where T-62 was judged as the superior weapon. Given the influence of Johnson's Criteria on contemporary night imaging systems and Soviet expertise in imaging infrared capability, the T-62 would have been both a better day and night fighter. T-62 would see the M60 first, because the M60 is tall. It would hit the M60 first, because its shells have a longer battlesight range. It would penetrate the M60, because it hit first, and its shells over matched the M60A1's armor.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf70t8ehyNM

All else being equal the T-62 is the superior tank. The CIA did not change its opinion regarding this because it considered Arab and Egyptian tankers to be of poor quality relative to the Israelis. Evidently, that was a correct assumption, because the Israelis suffered fewer losses of tanks and had higher numbers of kills, with the majority of their kills against Egyptian armor coming from direct fire tank guns, while the majority of Israeli losses were from Egyptian anti-tank missile teams.

Tanks are ultimately only as good as their crews, even if some tanks are simply better than others. 1973 tells us that M60 is a bit tall and a bit too big and somewhat weakly armored, but can still be effective when crewed with well trained troops. It also tells us that a war involving modern mechanized armies of the late Cold War, at their fullest heights, would be approximately 2-3x as lethal as WW2.

All that may be, but once the US Army got their hands on some actual T-62's for testing, and the Israelis had fought against them in combat, it became apparent that the T-62 was actually inferior to the T-55.

The gun was a HUGE problem on it. The T-62 could only load at a fixed angle of elevation due to how tight the design was. This slowed the ROF to 2 to 3 rounds a minute for an average crew.

The shell ejection port on the back of the turret generally failed to work as advertised resulting in spent casings ricocheting around the inside of the tank.

The driver couldn't operate open hatch in combat because an interlock on his hatch prevented the turret from rotating to prevent decapitation if he had his head out of the hatch.

Turret rotation was slow. The drive train was unreliable and prone to breakdown. The suspension was such that at high speeds throwing a track in a turn was likely.

The gunsight was a stada type that meant beyond about 1000 yards / meters hitting a target was a matter of gunner skill not fire control.

A good indication of how bad the T-62 really was is that many nations using older Soviet armor chose to upgrade their T-55's with Western systems and drive trains while not doing the same to their T-62's.

 

[Kat Tsun]

The assessment of T-62 as a "generally good tank" didn't change after the U.S. got their hands on it.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA392790.pdf

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001066239.pdf

AMSAA received several T-62s as a result of the 1973 war from Israel. It analyzed these tanks and modeled them in computer simulation, which concluded that despite ergonomic disadvantages, the T-62 was superior to the M60 tank. Marginally, but still superior. Quite a problem if the enemy has three to four times as many of these marginally superior tanks to your marginally inferior tank.

Whatever the tankers thought is different I suppose, and what the conclusions were based on the ergonomics of the vehicle were different than the statistical conclusions (bad ergonomics makes for a good tank?), but the issues you mention were not so much to impede the T-62's capability to destroy other armor. The T-62 would be the better tank for a major ground war on par with WW2. The U.S. didn't believe it possessed a tank superior to T-62 until M60A3.

Also you don't need to range a shot with the T-62 out to 1,400 meters. That is the approximate battlesight for the 3BM6, since it is a fairly fast flying HV round. I don't know where you got the idea that it's inaccurate outside 1,000 meters. The actual cutoff would be past battlesight range:

The change of a hit for the 3BM6 at 1,500 meters is around 50%. This is approximately battlesight, maybe a bit less, like 1,200 meters. The chance of a hit at 1,000 meters is almost unity. The T-62 suffers at ranges excess of 2,000 meters, which are almost unheard of in Europe anyway and therefore irrelevant. They mattered in 1973 because it was a desert war, but would be absolutely unimportant in West Germany, or even East Germany or Poland, where the lines of sight were around 1,500 meters most of the time.

The U.S. considered the base model T-62s recovered by Israel to be superior to the M60A1, thus ergonomic concerns did not matter. If the T-62 was "bad", then the M60A1 was "worse", plainly speaking, and this is reflected in one-on-one computer modeling, real life tank trials by OPFOR, and AMSAA large-scale statistical analysis...

Also that's an absolutely nuclear take in that last line. I could get into it, but I'll just tell you that Cuba recently upgraded their T-62 fleet with digital fire control systems as late as a decade ago, Russia has modernized much of the T-62 fleet in the post-Cold War era it's using in a current European War, Algeria upgraded their T-62s with Berezhok turrets, and anyone who didn't do this stuff is because they simply didn't have T-62s.

The actual reason the tank was not exported as much as the T-55 is because a lot of people simply didn't think it was worth the money. Which is kind of a duh moment. It looks like a T-55 with hydrocephaly and tinpot dictators are more sensitive to appearances than practical elements of fightability. T-62 got burned bad mostly by not looking noticeably different from a T-55. Plenty of big men around the world make decisions on armaments procurement based solely on appearances, just look at the USN's 774-class lack of a hydrodynamic sail and the US Congress's demand that US warships have more "visible" armaments back in the 1970's.

It's especially interesting because you say the T-62 was "inferior to" the T-55.

Yet even the United States, the Soviet Union's greatest imperial competitor, conceded that the T-55 was superior to the M48 and the T-62 over twice better. I wonder how the U.S. Army, which had actual T-62s and T-55s to look at, could be so bamboozled to think it was better than a T-55?. Perhaps they were lucky for getting the only dozen or so T-62s that worked ever made out of tens of thousands? Who knows! It's almost as if you made it up based on somewhat arbitrary circumstances and an odd bias, rather than anything relating to statistical modeling or realistic, contemporary threat projections.

...but then you're the guy saying that T-62 was never modernized when all five or so operators of the tank extensively modernized them.

I don't think you know much about this subject to be honest, since you seem to be conflating ergonomic and human factors with fightability, when these are very different, and often mutually exclusive, elements. The detriments you list are mostly ergonomic in nature. They seem to be results of getting a highly, highly fightable tank, rather than actually detrimental elements. The export concerns you mention are either lies or actually irrelevant, because only Egypt, North Korea, Algeria, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union operate extensive quantities of the tank and engaged in major upgrade programs. All of the operators of T-62 to include Syria, Libya, Irak, and Angola had undergone major, major overhauls, to include new fire control systems, guns, and armor packages, as well as engines and turrets in some cases.

Everyone else who operates the tank operated them in double digit quantities, were war captures, or have dissolved entirely as state entities. Comparatively these same entities operated triple or quadruple digit numbers of of T-55s. T-62 was typically just seen as "warmed over T-55" rather than "revolutionary 2nd generation main battle tank".

Actual U.S. Army and CIA understanding of the T-62 can be best summarized as "it's an M60A1 but better in most ways, annoying in others".

For that matter, T-62M is essentially M60A3 "but better" in many of the same ways, and in ways that -A3 didn't bother with. About the only thing T-62M lacks is the thermal sight of the -A3TTS model, but it has improved armor comparable to the Super 60's, so it's a bit of a mixed bag. Presumably it would have received Agava-type thermal imagers in the 1990's or 2000's had the USSR not voted to dissolve itself.

 

[Rickshaw]

Australia adopted the Leopard 1 because when it's competition was held, the M60 won but was rejected because the US could not supply sufficient vehicles to provide all of the required numbers to supply all of the Australian Army's needs. With the liklihood that we would end up with different vehicles which might have different controls the Army opted for the Leopard 1. rather than face different training requirements. The problem was that the US Army was re-equipping with the M60 and there was a likelihood of successor vehicles being different and so we decided that it was important. Coupled with newly elected Australian Government intent on being somewhat divorced from the US after the experience of the Vietnam War, meant that the Leopard 1 got the gig.

That was not the case. An article in the Australian Army Journal, Volume IIII, Number I covers the evaluation of both tanks, the M60 lost pretty much in every evaluated aspect:

Meanwhile, a military team carried out evaluations of the two contending tank types, Leopard and M60, in the period between June 1972 and April 1973. The Military Board considered the evaluation team’s report at three separate meetings during August 1973 and the results of its deliberations were set forth in Military Board Minute No. 392/1973 of 30 August 1973. The evaluation team considered the main armament systems of the two vehicles to be excellent, although better fire control systems were required on both tanks in order to use their guns to full potential. Serious deficiencies were noted in the fighting arrangements for the crew commander on the M60. These deficiencies were attributed to the complex machine-gun cupola and a number of poor target-acquisition arrangements.
The evaluation team considered that the Leopard tank was superior to the M60 in terms of strategic movement. Because the most effective method of movement in Australia was by rail, the size of the M60 precluded its carriage on the eastern coast railway network. As a result, if the M60 was chosen, tank-training activities would be eff ectively confi ned to the Puckapunyal area in Victoria. In contrast, the Leopard tank was portable over most Australian mainline railways and was thus more strategically versatile.

In addition, although the Leopard tank carried less armour, it was lighter, faster and more agile. The German tank could probably survive better on the modern battlefield since it presented a ‘smaller target for a shorter time’. The evaluation team also believed that the M60 did ‘not represent a significant improvement over the [mobility] characteristics of the Centurion [tank]’. A further consideration was that, although the M60 weighed 8 tons more than the Leopard vehicle, the former’s extra armour was spread over a greater surface area. Thus, the evaluators concluded that the ‘the degree of armoured protection provided by the M60 is only marginally greater than that provided by the Leopard’

In respect to issues of mechanical reliability and ease of technical maintenance, both tanks were considered to be a great improvement on the Centurion. However, the Army’s Director of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (DEME ) expressed a strong preference for the Leopard. He noted that the latter vehicle, ‘eing a more recently designed vehicle … has advanced maintenance engineering features when compared with the M60A1’. A factor that told heavily against the M60 was the fact that there was no armoured recovery vehicle based on the former’s chassis design.

[...]
Although no firm cost estimates could be given, available estimates, based on the cost of the purchase of 100 gun tanks, suggested a unit cost of $A336 000 for the M60 and $A593 000 for the Leopard. The Military Board concluded that, while the M60 represented a great improvement on the Centurion, on balance, ‘the Leopard is the medium tank which best suits the operational and training needs of the Australian Army’ In terms of a phased purchase, the Military Board strongly recommended that the Leopard tanks be bought in a single purchase, thereby averting the risk that the tank might be out of production when the second phase became necessary. The Army’s final evaluation report was completed in June 1973
and copies were passed to the Department of Defence in September of that year.

The evaluation report recommended the Leopard 1 due to it being more survivable, more mobile, easier to maintain and coming with a proper ARV (the M88 was considered deficient). It also proved to be more reliable according to an Australian website:

Speculation was rife during 1974, waiting for the Government's decision as to which tank would be purchased. It was commonly thought that the M60A1 would be the winner, based on cost grounds, but the decision was made in favour of Leopard, and for once the Army and its soldiers were pleased with the choice of their government. The main deciding factors in favour of Leopard were its higher reliability and ease of maintenance and repair; the weight of the Leopard, which was some 10 tonnes less than M60A1, and would make transport by road and rail somewhat easier; and its underwater fording capability

However the price difference lead to an updated report from the Military Board lead to a second revision of MES 9, recommending the M60A1 over the Leopard 1. The Australian Army contested these updates, pointing to performance difference and other unaccounted factors in the Military Board's revised recommendation (including the projected cease of production of new M60 tanks in 1979, delivery schedule and the upgrade costs from M60A1 to M60A3). DFDC also suggested purchasing a reduced number of tanks (87) to further reduce, costs, which the Australian Army considered an horrible suggestion:

A mixture of types of medium tanks within a single unit is entirely unacceptable from the point of view of the conduct of operations, although such a mixture might be acceptable across a range of armoured units in a large army.

After that, several different options (regarding suppliers, potential for improving M88 ARVs, numbers of purchased tanks) were discussed, with at some time the Australian Army siding with earlier Military Board reports (stopping the competition and just buy the M60A1 in order to keep numbers high) and at others insisting on buying the Leopard 1 tank as it had performed better during trials. In the end, the Leopard AS1 was purchased at nearly twice the cost of M60A1/M60A3 due to its better performance in trials & evaluation.

Interesting. I spoke at length with a researcher that evaluated the purchase of the Leopard. His conclusions were as I said, the M60 won but the Leopard was chosen because the US could not guarantee that there would sufficient numbers available for the Australian Army's purchase and there was a danger that we could end up with differing vehicles with differing controls. The Australian Army therefore recommended the Leopard rather than the M60.

 

[Christopher Wang]

During the 1970s, Australia and Canada also evaluated and tested the M60 as a possible replacement for their Centurion tanks. In both cases, the M60 competed and lost against the Leopard 1 which was adopted by both Australia and Canada (Maas, 2016).

Reference:
Maas, Frank. (2016). "From a Beetle to a Porsche": The Purchase of the Leopard C1 Tank for the Canadian Army. Canadian Military Journal, 16(4), 16-27. Retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no4/PDF/CMJ164Ep16.pdf

 

[Elan Vital]

The big factors that probably played even more in favor of the Leopard 1 was that contrary to initial plans, production continued beyond 1975 and an advanced fire control system (SABCA AVLS) was added in production the same year, while the M60A3 was delayed by 2 years to 1978. For decisions made in 1974-76 that made the choice of the vehicle with a mature FCS obvious.

By the way, I can't express enough how impressed I am that the Belgians fielded such a capable FCS so early.

 

[GK Dundas]

Given how political Canada procurement has become it should come as no surprise that the only reason we replaced the Centurion at all was put down to a private conversation between Pierre Trudeau and the then German Chancellor Schmidt .
Something to the effect of "No tanks , no trade ".

 

[GTX]

Given how political Canada procurement has become it should come as no surprise that the only reason we replaced the Centurion at all was put down to a private conversation between Pierre Trudeau and the then German Chancellor Schmidt .
Something to the effect of "No tanks , no trade ".

Have you got any evidence to base your claims upon?

The following paints a different picture:

From Centurion to Leopard 1A2 by Frank Maas | Canadian Military History

Canada’s Main Battle Tank (MBT) for most of the Cold War was the venerable Centurion. This British tank debuted in the final days of the Second World War, and its excellent performance in the Korean…

canadianmilitaryhistory.ca

 

[GK Dundas]

Economic pressures by the Europeans I believe is the quote mentioned in the article above . The Prime Minister's and Chancellor's walk in the woods during that conference has become lore and legend to the RCAC.
Shortly after that the Government announcement concerning new Tanks popped up.
This would eventually lead to the C1 purchase and Cougar bit of mixed blessing perhaps but both purchases kept the Canadian Army in the armour business til the end of the Cold War.

 

[GTX]

Economic pressures by the Europeans I believe is the quote mentioned in the article above .

Where in said article? The only comment that comes close is "The Trudeau government was adamant that the Centurion would be replaced by a lighter, air-transportable vehicle... but pressure by European allies over the summer of 1975 convinced Trudeau to relent and allow the army to keep MBTs in Europe." That does not imply economic pressure but could just as easily refer to 'military/strategic' pressure of wanting to maintain military forces including Canadian armour.

The Prime Minister's and Chancellor's walk in the woods during that conference has become lore and legend to the RCAC.

As for lore and legend...well that's probably kept to the fantasy world.

 

[danger71ad]

Two platoons of Leopard 1s destroyed an anti-tank gun/missile battery during an ambush and routed a platoon of T-55A, so yes, actually. Something like 100 or so Serbian militiamen were liquidated despite having every advantage at the start over the UN peacekeepers.



The only time Western tanks have been battle tested against comparable armor was probably 1973 tbh. The CIA's conclusion was apparently that T-62 is better than M60 for (redacted) reasons, but Israeli tankers are lot better than US Army tankers so they didn't seem to suffer for it. Everything afterwards amounted to target practice.

Leopard 1 probably doesn't have any noticeable shortcomings compared to M48A5 unless it's been poorly stored, or there are some dark secrets like the hulls or turrets have bad welds, neither of which seems too terribly likely.

Then again the Leopard 2s in Syria have popped like T-64s at times so who knows.

I don't know that Israeli tankers are a lot better than US Army tankers. They have more combat experience, but anytime American Tankers were called on, they delivered.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Israeli tankers are a lot better than US Army tankers

Grade A horseshit that got swallowed whole by even USArmy officials. I have some docs from USAHEC that claimed they fired more in training than US tankers. I guess that was supposed to be the big difference.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Grade A horseshit that got swallowed whole by even USArmy officials. I have some docs from USAHEC that claimed they fired more in training than US tankers. I guess that was supposed to be the big difference.

Does mean they have more practice, and proper prior practice prevents piss poor performance.

So if the training situations closely resembled combat situations I'd believe the Israeli tankers were better than US tankers.

 

[Ozair]

A factor that told heavily against the M60 was the fact that there was no armoured recovery vehicle based on the former’s chassis design. The US Army used the M88 ARV, which operated on an entirely different chassis and had no commonality with M60. The introduction of even a few vehicles of this type into the Australian Army would place a considerable burden on the logistic system.

This is quite amusing in hindsight. 40 years later the Australian Army ordered the M1A1 with the M88ARV... Have done the same with the M1A2

Army will receive up to 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, 29 M1150 assault breacher vehicles, 17 M1074 joint assault bridge vehicles and an additional six M88A2 armoured recovery vehicles.

https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-01-12/enhancing-adfs-armoured-combat-capability

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Does mean they have more practice, and proper prior practice prevents piss poor performance.

So if the training situations closely resembled combat situations I'd believe the Israeli tankers were better than US tankers.

And, it's a major reason Russian tankers are not so good. Training by rote and fixed, mostly classroom, instruction with crews that are not particularly motivated doesn't get you ace crews.

 

[GTX]

This is quite amusing in hindsight. 40 years later the Australian Army ordered the M1A1 with the M88ARV... Have done the same with the M1A2

https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-01-12/enhancing-adfs-armoured-combat-capability

Technically there was the RV90 ARV based upon the Abrams but it never went into production with the M88 favoured instead: