Lockheed CL-1200 / X-27 Lancer

[Archibald]

Good old Prince Bernhard would have accepted any backhanders. Not sure they would have helped the MiG people.

Oh make no mistakes, old Brezhnev really loved corrupt deals, backhands, backshiches, etc. Plus Mikoyan's brother had been a good friend of Stalin in Politburo (Artem and Anastas)

 

[Pioneer]

1974
April Lockheed submits an unsolicited CL-1200 proposal to the Netherlands. Their (baffled) answer "by this point, even the Soviet tried their chance, sending us a bid for Mig-25"

Sorry to detract from principle CL-1200 Lancer subject, but I'm just wondering if it could have been the MiG-23 Flogger which may have been offered to the Netherlands, as the MiG-23 was/is a seemingly more sensible multi-role fighter option compared to the much more expensive and specialised interceptor role of the MiG-25 Foxbat.


Regards
Pioneer

 

[TomS]

1974
April Lockheed submits an unsolicited CL-1200 proposal to the Netherlands. Their (baffled) answer "by this point, even the Soviet tried their chance, sending us a bid for Mig-25"

Sorry to detract from principle CL-1200 Lancet subject, but I'm just wondering if it could have been the MiG-23 Flogger which may have been offered to the Netherlands, as the MiG-23 was/is a seemingly more sensible multi-role fighter option compared to the much more expensive and specialised interceptor role of the MiG-25 Foxbat.

It was a joke! Since everyone seemed to be making an offer to the Netherlands, why not the Soviets too?

 

[Pioneer]

1974
April Lockheed submits an unsolicited CL-1200 proposal to the Netherlands. Their (baffled) answer "by this point, even the Soviet tried their chance, sending us a bid for Mig-25"

Sorry to detract from principle CL-1200 Lancet subject, but I'm just wondering if it could have been the MiG-23 Flogger which may have been offered to the Netherlands, as the MiG-23 was/is a seemingly more sensible multi-role fighter option compared to the much more expensive and specialised interceptor role of the MiG-25 Foxbat.

It was a joke! Since everyone seemed to be making an offer to the Netherlands, why not the Soviets too?

:-[ :-X

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Michel Van]

Some background story about Netherlands and Lockheed Scandal

Already in 1950s was Lockheed paying bribery to the state Air-line KLM for buying Lockheed Airliner.

Then Lockheed sell F-104 to Netherlands Air-force in 1960 (instead of Mirage III)
and prince Bernhard van Lippe-Biesterfeld got little gift from Lockheed: $1.1 million bribe !

Around 1968 Lockheed pay again to prince Bernhard, money for favor to order Lockheed Orion P-3
Also the state Air-line KLM boss got also payment by Lockheed
That Orion P-3 Deal struggle to 1974 were prince Bernhard ask around $4 to $6 MILLION in size of order.
Lockheed was baffled about huge sum, that later prince Bernhard relativized to $1 Million on each order of four P-3
but the Deal not went on because Netherlands had Budget problems do Oil crisis 1973
So also the CL-1200 offer by Lockheed not went on

Then in 1976 during investigation the Justice department,
discover the KLM bribery and the connection to prince Bernhard van Lippe-Biesterfeld.
The results of the government inquiry led to a constitutional crisis in which Queen Juliana,
threatened to abdicate if prince Bernhard was prosecuted !
Last one explain arrogant "I am above such things" in 1976

This is one of reason why the Netherlands chose the F-16 over Lockheed proposal CL-1200 in 1976

in 2004 after the Dead of prince a interview was publish were he Admit the bribery and his final words on the case
"I have accepted that the word Lockheed will be carved on my tombstone."

 

[LowObservable]

I recall at the time that the Prince insisted that he had used the money to support the World Wildlife Fund.

A columnist in the British magazine Private Eye remarked: "I can confirm that the Prince has a strong interest in wildlife, and he even maintains a number of delightful specimens in Paris at his own expense." ;D

 

[Arjen]

After making the queen's life miserable, she saved his skin by threatening to abdicate if he was taken to court. The man was a turd. It should have been the end of the monarchy, but wasn't.

 

[thedewline]

Kelly Johnson sent an unsolicited proposal to Secretary of Defense Packard in December 1970 with low-cost Italian-built CL-1200s for the USAF. Packard responded warmly to it. For a few short weeks in late January 1971, it appeared that the air force might even go along, despite intense resistance from the presumably threatened F-15 SPO. Then disaster struck for Lockheed. The UK government called in receivers on Rolls-Royce over RB.211 development costs for the the L-1011, which plunged Lockheed -- already struggling to cope with the C-5A overruns -- immediately into a deep financial crisis that would ultimately lead to an extremely controversial loan guaranty from the US government to keep the company afloat. In that environment, any interest in giving Lockheed a sole-source deal to build fighters for the USAF in Italy swiftly evaporated. A year later, Johnson was left with the difficult challenge of pitching the CL-1600 -- actually, a highly modified F-104 derivative -- against the clean-sheet YF-16 and YF-17. He insisted on extending the fuselage of the CL-1600 by six feet, even though it meant his design would exceed the USAF's MTOW spec for the LIGHTWEIGHT fighter. For that and other reasons, the idea died.

 

[Pioneer]

Wow thedewline, one would think that Congress, with their steed fast 'not made here' attitude, would have loved the idea of Italian-built Lancer's.

Thanks for the insight!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[LowObservable]

It was an odd twist of events when Northrop and Lockheed, who were the export-fighter incumbents in the 1960s and had done much to prime the pump for co-development of an F-104 replacement, lost out to GD, who was not exactly known for agile fighters and had very little international experience.

But not as odd as Northrop winning the strategic bomber contest about five years later...

 

[Archibald]

Wow, so much interesting informations to digest. As I said earlier, Lockheed come only a hairbreadth from winning the second deal of the century with the CL-1200. Michel, what you say is very interesting. One can wonder, had the Netherlands fallen to the CL-1200, whether Belgium would have followed like a domino ? As NATO wanted, and has happened with the F-16 ?

Kelly Johnson sent an unsolicited proposal to Secretary of Defense Packard in December 1970 with low-cost Italian-built CL-1200s for the USAF. Packard responded warmly to it. For a few short weeks in late January 1971, it appeared that the air force might even go along, despite intense resistance from the presumably threatened F-15 SPO. Then disaster struck for Lockheed. The UK government called in receivers on Rolls-Royce over RB.211 development costs for the the L-1011, which plunged Lockheed -- already struggling to cope with the C-5A overruns -- immediately into a deep financial crisis that would ultimately lead to an extremely controversial loan guaranty from the US government to keep the company afloat. In that environment, any interest in giving Lockheed a sole-source deal to build fighters for the USAF in Italy swiftly evaporated. A year later, Johnson was left with the difficult challenge of pitching the CL-1600 -- actually, a highly modified F-104 derivative -- against the clean-sheet YF-16 and YF-17. He insisted on extending the fuselage of the CL-1600 by six feet, even though it meant his design would exceed the USAF's MTOW spec for the LIGHTWEIGHT fighter. For that and other reasons, the idea died.

curiouser and curiouser !

On December 20, 1973 Lockheed and Aeritalia got an interesting agreement over sales of G.222, F-104S... and development of the F-204, a rebranded CL-1200. In fact Lockheed come quite close to sell it to AMI and Turkey.

The italian connection is very interesting. Their love story with the F-104S was quite bizarre. They were the very last to get F-104s in 1968, put Sparrows into them, build that until 1979, then gave them a look down shoot down capability with Aspide 1A in 1986, and kept their Starfighters until 2004, long after Taiwan (1998) or turkey (1994).

 

[Archibald]

Some background story about Netherlands and Lockheed Scandal

Already in 1950s was Lockheed paying bribery to the state Air-line KLM for buying Lockheed Airliner.

Then Lockheed sell F-104 to Netherlands Air-force in 1960 (instead of Mirage III)
and prince Bernhard van Lippe-Biesterfeld got little gift from Lockheed: $1.1 million bribe !

Around 1968 Lockheed pay again to prince Bernhard, money for favor to order Lockheed Orion P-3
Also the state Air-line KLM boss got also payment by Lockheed
That Orion P-3 Deal struggle to 1974 were prince Bernhard ask around $4 to $6 MILLION in size of order.
Lockheed was baffled about huge sum, that later prince Bernhard relativized to $1 Million on each order of four P-3
but the Deal not went on because Netherlands had Budget problems do Oil crisis 1973
So also the CL-1200 offer by Lockheed not went on

Then in 1976 during investigation the Justice department,
discover the KLM bribery and the connection to prince Bernhard van Lippe-Biesterfeld.
The results of the government inquiry led to a constitutional crisis in which Queen Juliana,
threatened to abdicate if prince Bernhard was prosecuted !
Last one explain arrogant "I am above such things" in 1976

This is one of reason why the Netherlands chose the F-16 over Lockheed proposal CL-1200 in 1976

in 2004 after the Dead of prince a interview was publish were he Admit the bribery and his final words on the case
"I have accepted that the word Lockheed will be carved on my tombstone."

Good grief. By comparison, Dassault and Chirac are boy scouts. By the way, the third generation of Dassault is as corrupt as the other two. Marcel, Serge, and now Olivier. The family legacy live on...

 

[dan_inbox]

By the way, the third generation of Dassault is as corrupt as the other two. Marcel, Serge, and now Olivier.

Nitpick: when businessmen purchase politicians, it's the politicians who are corrupt, not the other way around.
...which is even more sad, of course.

 

[LowObservable]

The difference between bribery and extortion is one of perspective, and it is often easier for a bent politician or official to block one company's bid than to advance it.

 

[Adventurer104]

Were MiG giving backhanders?

Only instance I can recall of Russian aircraft being proposed to a NATO member is the Mermaid for SR(A).420 to replace the Nimrod

Chris

My foggy memory Mig-21s to be manufactured in USA with USA avionics as Aggressors?
The more gifted here can remember better than this wore out Cop!

 

[Jemiba]

My foggy memory Mig-21s to be manufactured in USA with USA avionics as Aggressors?

We had it here, I think
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1252.0.html

 

[Archibald]

I haven't seen the last post in the thread you linked... the americanized MiG.

 

[Michel Van]

Good grief. By comparison, Dassault and Chirac are boy scouts. By the way, the third generation of Dassault is as corrupt as the other two. Marcel, Serge, and now Olivier. The family legacy live on...

Tell that the Belgiums
in 1968/69 Dassault payed Belgium politicians in exchange for a "little order" of 63 Mirage 5
it was feast for the corrupt Belgium politicians in that time
like for 1968 Prime minister Paul Vanden Boeynants and later in 1970s as Minister of Defence responsible for purchase Orders.
also were part of Mirage build in Belgium in factories controlled by Socialist union/Party
Better know as the Biggest Crime Syndicate of Belgium

Oh by the Way,
Dassault anticipated Lockheed before they could give a "contribution" to corrupt Belgium politicians, otherwise we had stuck with CL-1200...

 

[Foo Fighter]

The only recall a plan to build and sell Mig 21's as a low cost fighter but that made as much sense as building a reverse engineered copy when so many Mig 21's were available for less money.

 

[hesham]

Hi,

F-104 Types - International F-104 Society

XF-104 The XF-104 was the prototype of the Starfighter powered by a General Electric J65 engine. In total two aircraft were build of which the

www.i-f-s.nl

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

A 57 brochure for the CL-1200-2 was sold on Ebay.

ORIGINAL 1971 Lockheed California Company promotional brochure for the Lockheed CL-1200-2 Lancer advanced fighter aircraft. The CL-1200-2 was derived from the CL-1200-1 which was a company designed fighter aircraft based on the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter airframe and intended for export. When the Grumman F-5 was awarded the international fighter competition contract, Lockheed upgraded the CL-1200-1 to the CL-1200-2 (sometimes referred to as the CL-1600) and which the USAF US Air Force designated the X-27. The CL-1200-2 was to be entered into the USAF's lightweight fighter aircraft competition in 1972, but when contracts where awarded to the General Dynamics YF-16 and the Northrup YF-17 no further development was undertaken by Lockheed. Brochure is 11" x 8.5" and dated March 1971 on back cover, has artists renderings of the proposed aircraft along with operating costs and other details, in very good condition, cover has some browning on edges and spine has a tiny chip and some creasing (very minimal, please see listing photographs), interior is like new. 57 pages and a very nice rare collectible of a plane that "never was".

 

[Pioneer]

I think it's important to appreciate that the X-27 wasn't so much 'experimental' as it's been perceived. For as articulated:

'In an attempt to make the Lockheed CL-1200 less threatening [to the USAF's FX/F-15 program], Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans suggested giving the design [CL-1200-2] the designation of X-27 to indicate it's "experimental" status. Experimental could not have been further from the truth.'

It's interesting to read further on in the chapter....

'The Lockheed [CL-1200-2] proposal generated an overflow of unsolicited fighter proposals. Northrop followed Lockheed on Jan 31; Boeing submitted its design in Feb, and LTV in Jun......'

(Source: James P. Stevenson, 1993. The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet )

Regards
Pioneet

 

[Archibald]

Many thanks !!

 

[blackkite]

Hi!
https://line.17qq.com/articles/dfdgdoobz.html

 

[Have Blue]

I've been reading Robert Coram's 2004 book "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War" and this excerpt from chapter 17 on the LWF appears to be a thinly-veiled reference to Kelly Johnson proposing the CL-1200 to him:

---

Another contractor sent in its top engineer, a world-famous designer who had sold an extraordinary series of aircraft to the U.S. government, to make a bid for the proposed new fighter. The engineer presented a set of generalized plans with no supporting data. The aerodynamic estimates were broad and vague. The lift versus drag curves were wildly optimistic. Boyd realized the design was not for a new aircraft but simply an upgrade of an existing airplane. The designer was giving Boyd what he thought the Air Force needed and not what Boyd wanted. The contractor apparently thought Boyd would be awed by the famous designer.

Boyd loved to tell the story of what happened. He looked at the drag curves and shook his head in apparent awe. “This is amazing,” he said. “I just can’t believe this.”

The designer smiled. His retinue of engineers smiled. The famous John Boyd, for all of his reputation from E-M, was still a fighter pilot. And fighter pilots are easy to confuse when they are out of the cockpit.

Boyd leaned over the lift and drag chart and his fingers moved to the left, beyond the edges of the chart. He looked up, wide-eyed. “I can extrapolate this thing back to where the wing has zero lift.Wow. This airplane is so good that not only does it have zero lift, it has negative drag.”

The designer no longer was smiling. Perhaps he had underestimated this Colonel Boyd. Perhaps he should have spent more time on the design. Boyd was only warming to his subject. “If this thing has negative drag, that means it has thrust without turning on the engines.” He paused as if in deep thought. “That means when it is on the ramp with all that thrust, even with the engine turned off, you got to tie the goddamn thing down or it will take off by itself.”

The designer glowered at Boyd. Who would have thought anyone would extrapolate the curves back to zero and show, using the contractor ’s own data, that the engines had thrust even before ignition?

Boyd shoved the papers across the desk. “Goddamn airplane is made out of balonium.” According to Boyd, the designer called the next day and invited him to lunch and asked him not to tell his superiors about the spurious design. “I have to tell them,” Boyd said. Then the engineer made an offer that, stripped of all the circumlocutions and delicate language, amounted to a bribe for Boyd to keep silent. “That won’t take,” Boyd responded. Then came an open threat that the designer would use his company’s considerable clout with the Department of Defense to have Boyd fired. “Take your best shot, you son of a bitch,” Boyd said.

A week later the famous designer and his company withdrew their design from consideration.

---

Granted, Coram's book seems to paint Boyd as a persecuted messiah who comes out on top in pretty much any interaction, Boyd seems prone to a great deal of hyperbole (and many anecdotes re-use set pieces of his bombastic behavior), but it's an interesting tale nonetheless.

 

[BLACK_MAMBA]

While I agree that this piece clearly tries to paint Boyd as a saint, and Johnson as a "full of himself idiot" I have always thought that Lockheed never took the LWF program seriously so an early withdrawal makes sense. I might be wrong, but when you compare the enties from Northrop, GD, Vought or even Boeing an spruced up F-104 derivative does not exactly scream "we really want to win this contract". They tried, saw it was going to require more effort than expected, and moved on with focus on other areas/contracts.

Edit: Most of Lockheeds bids to fighter programs in the late 60's & early 70's did not seem to be serious bids compared to their contenders with a heavy reliance on design concepts used in other Lockheed products used in far different roles. It was only till the ATF program that they again started to become serious contenders in the fighter business - and even then it required GD's design absorbtion into their own to become a properly viable contender.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

It is overblown in the retelling but the essentials are correct. An error was made in the lift/drag calculations by a Lockheed engineer and it was humiliating for Johnson. These things do happen sometimes, like when Yakovlev's Yak-45/47 was claimed to have a higher rate of climb than speed in level flight.

The CL-1200 was a serious design which kinda kickstarted the entire LWF prototyping requirement. It was a low-cost, low-risk design that could be put into production immediately. That wasn't what the Air Force asked for in LWF though.

When the LWF RFP was released, Ben Rich at Lockheed was very aware the CL-1200 was simply too large to meet the requirements and tried to redesign it to be more compliant, but was overruled by Johnson. Johnson wasn't sold on the "optimise for typical air combat speeds" concept and was certain CL-1200 needed Mach 2.6 capability.

CL-1200 limped on until 1975ish in partnership with Aeritalia, later known as F-204 Lancer. Then it finally died.

 

[BLACK_MAMBA]

The CL-1200 was a serious design which kinda kickstarted the entire LWF prototyping requirement. It was a low-cost, low-risk design that could be put into production immediately. That wasn't what the Air Force asked for in LWF though.

When the LWF RFP was released, Ben Rich at Lockheed was very aware the CL-1200 was simply too large to meet the requirements and tried to redesign it to be more compliant, but was overruled by Johnson. Johnson wasn't sold on the "optimise for typical air combat speeds" concept and was certain CL-1200 needed Mach 2.6 capability.

Perhaps I should have been clearer yes. There was serious work put into the CL-1200 I agree. Based on the surfaced detail I don't think that can be disputed. It was clearly an option for countries that already used or built the F-104 and would certainly have given a good performance boost, with lower attached risk & cost compared to a full-on clean sheet design.

My earlier comment was towards the LWF program specifically. Lockheed (or Johnson specifically as per your comment it seems) didn't seem keen to put in a huge effort into the LWF program bidding an existing product instead, so I don't think my evaluation is too wrong there.

As a side note, a LWF requirement optimised F-104/CL-1200 derived design would have been an interesting aircraft! Doubt it would have won, but for us avgeeks it would be an interesting one to geek about.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

As a follow-on airplane to the F-104 for our European allies, Lockheed developed a very practical and productive proposal. Use the expensive, proven components and systems from the F-104 but add a larger wing and new tail and increase the power for an all-around fighter. The new design promised to outmaneuver all other aircraft known to be flying including the MiG-21. We called the airplane the “Lancer.”

It was proposed with a choice of engines, the familiar GE model or a new advanced-technology design from Pratt & Whitney with a Mach 2.5 speed. We proposed to conduct development and initial flight tests at the Skunk Works in cooperation with the European engineers, and that production of the plane be programmed entirely in Europe. It could have meant millions of dollars saved in production costs as well as jobs for many thousands of people in the plants where they had turned out the F-104.

The international competition among manufacturers for sale of a new airplane to the NATO countries was intense. France’s Dassault proposed an advanced version of its Mirage F-1.

Two other U.S. manufacturers were after the business. McDonnell-Douglas offered a modification of its twin-engine Phantom, to be designated F-4F. Northrop proposed a totally new design, P-530 (F-5), which would not have been available until 1976. Lockheed promised the Lancer for service in 1973. By that year, no decision had yet been reached, and we still were trying to sell the Lancer overseas. The airplane was not proposed to the USAF, which was interested in developing a new aircraft.

As a sidelight on international sales of aircraft, on the very day that we started touring Europe with our proposals for the Lancer, one of our competitors set out on the same circuit to sell theirs. Months later we discovered that both of us had retained the same overseas marketing consultant. He was being paid by both sides.

The Air Force in this country was considering development of two new fighters, the F-14 and F-15.

Back in 1969, I questioned publicly whether these aircraft actually would be competitive with the best Russian fighters. Specifically, I said that I thought the cost of the proposed F-15 would be more expensive than necessary, that a smaller, less-expensive airplane could do the job, just as well.

Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, then Senator from Missouri, very much wanted that F-15 contract for his state. He called in Dan Haughton, then Lockheed board chairman, and me and announced that whether we liked it or not that contract for the F-15 would be awarded to McDonnell. Kelly Johnson was not to give any more argument. Haughton was under the gun and promised that he’d see that I didn’t. I did not promise in my own right.

We, Lockheed, had made an unsolicited proposal to the USAF for an advanced, highly-maneuverable lightweight fighter that we could have had flying within a year at absolute minimum cost. We had lined up a dozen of our vendors with whom we were then working on another project, including Pratt & Whitney for the jet engines, other suppliers for armament, gunsights, wheels, tires—the whole package. It was a darn good airplane. The X-27, later designated X-29, was basically a new airplane, but it utilized the nose design of the F-104 which by that time had fired millions of rounds of ammunition. We even proposed firing tests on the first flight to prove we had a fighting airplane.

David Packard, then Deputy Defense Secretary, was very much impressed with the proposal. But Robert Seamans, Jr., Air Force Secretary, did not like the idea of buying a fighter in that manner. He preferred the conventional method—an experimental model first, production plans later.

I disagreed with the USAF on procurement policy.

“This airplane is not so advanced that you cannot develop the ‘X,’ the experimental airplane, into a production prototype,” I argued. “I don’t want to draw a line on paper that does not consider production. Why go to double prototyping?”

We came close to receiving a contract for that airplane, but what eventually killed any prospect for our producing the lightweight fighter were the financial problems that Lockheed encountered in 1971—first, losses from several fixed-price contracts for the U.S. military, then the threatened loss of the company’s new L-1011 commercial transport program with the unexpected bankruptcy of Great Britain’s Rolls-Royce, manufacturer of the engine. The very future of Lockheed was in question, and the Air Force reasoned understandably that they should not risk awarding the contract to the company.

Our proposal did, I believe, result in the USAF’s eventual design competition for a lightweight fighter. The plane they got at least ten years later, after double prototyping by General Dynamics and at nearly three times the cost, was comparable in performance. That was the F-16.

If the military would spend one or two percent of the cost of developing an experimental airplane in planning production at the same time, it would come back in savings many, many times over.

Kelly Johnson's account.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

This is what Ben Rich said in his autobiography. I believe the maths issue was found with the CL-1200 in 1970 during submission to the IFA competition. The details don't quite match to Coram's story, but I believe this is the truth of the anecdote. Kelly Johnson doesn't mention it it his account.

During the time I spent at the main plant on the Navy sub-hunter project, Rus Daniell had to suddenly step into the breach and take over in place of Kelly, who was hospitalized with a serious abdominal infection. That brief stint running the Skunk Works for a couple of months in 1970 proved to be a personal disaster for Rus. He had signed off on a project proposal for the Air Force that included a glaring mathematical error. The Pentagon analysts who discovered the mistake couldn’t resist rubbing our noses in it, and a two-star general, who had probably waited for years to stick it to Kelly and his know-it-alls in Burbank, phoned him in his hospital room and raised hell about our sloppy work. Kelly was livid and ordered me back to the Skunk Works immediately, to take charge of the technical section. Rus Daniell had to obtain my approval on all technical matters.

Source: Ben Rich & Leo Janos, Skunk Works.

The CL-1200 was thus under several clouds.

Jay Miller quotes from Johnson diaries on Jan 12 1972:

"Reviewed our design efforts to date to obtain optimum performance of the lightweight fighter. I disagreed with Ben and others
on shortening the airplane by 6 feet, which would lead to a questionable weight saving, in my view, and very poor flight and buffet characteristics. After going over all design elements, I set a design empty weight of 13,900 pounds for the long fighter, which does have good flying characteristics and much greater ground attack potential than the one 6 feet shorter".

"We will submit the single-engine airplane with the aerodynamic configuration of the CL-1200 as our basic bid. We set a new design number for the lightweight fighter, which will be the CL-1600, to divorce it from our prior studies. I called Rus Daniell, Larry Billups, Dick Adair, Ben Rich, Jack Prosser, and Bob Murphy and told them the schedule and approach I want to take on the CL-1600. Essentially with the Feb. 18, 1972 date for turning in our proposal and following the Air Force statement that they would decide the program in about 45 days. I proposed that if we are one of the two winners, that in June we start tooling the aircraft with part of the $3 million available, and we aim for a flight date of June 1973"

Releasing the new design number, Johnson said:

"It is advisable to change the design number of our Lightweight Fighter from the CL-1200 to another serial. The reason for this is to impress the Air force with the fact this is truly a new aircraft and responsive reaction to their request for bid on the subject aircraft. We have been advised to play down the fact that our Lightweight Fighter is derived from the CL-1200, the X-27, or the F-104. In response to this suggestion, I have obtained the design number CL-1600 for our proposed aircraft. Rationale for this number has to do with our desire to avoid the 1300 and 1500 series for obvious reasons, the latter of course being conflict with the F-15."

And it seems Lockheed's proposal wasn't even considered:

"I was told that in the final meeting between Sec. Seamans, Gen. Ryan, Gen. Stewart, and others in the Pentagon, that when the choice was finally made and Lockheed's name came up, Seamans said he didn't want to hear anything about it. So it wasn't even discussed in that particular meeting."

Source: Jay Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Note that the sleight of hand with CL-1600 redesignation wasn't successful. The proposal was viewed as a warmed over CL-1200 and classed as non-responsive to the RFP, as was LTV's V-1100 design. Only GD, Boeing and Northrop proposals were evaluated.

 

[Hood]

Even the attempt to hide the CL-1200 as an experimental "X-plane" seems like sleight of hand. While it might have been an accounting trick/cover story by the USAF, or suggested by Johnson himself, it's fair to say no other manufacturer offering a private-venture would have received an X-designation so lightly (even conceding that the X-series seems to have been applied very loosely during the early 1970s). Hard not to suspect that Johnson's political clout was used to obtain the X-27 moniker.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

On March 12, 1971, Johnson wrote Brig. Gen. John Burns a letter in which he stated, "As per our discussions last week, I am submitting a specification on the X-27 aircraft. I believe it can be used for contractual purposes. This specification clearly defines the single place airplane, but has an addendum which makes the fundamental characteristics of the single-place airplane the basis for the specification on the two-place aircraft." He continued, "I believe it is necessary for us to describe it (the two-place aircraft) as we can not obtain the objectives of the research program unless we keep constantly in mind the fact that evaluation of the maneuvering flaps, for instance, will require the presence of a gunsight, etc."

Though the Air Force now had conceded Johnson the "right" to build the CL-1200/X-27, funding was not forthcoming from Congress and there was no guarantee it ever would. Somewhat surprisingly, Lockheed corporate picked this very moment to inform Johnson his Skunk Works design team, perhaps the most innovative and prestigious in the world, soon was to be disbanded unless it could be restructured to carry its own financial weight. Johnson took this revelation to the Air Force and—in a masterstroke—effectively threatened the service with the possibility of a world without its most innovative advanced design team. The ploy had an immediate effect; during April of 1971, the Air Force prepared to request official approval to proceed with the X-27. A contract was drafted and signing was declared imminent.

Jay Miller, Skunk Works.

My reading from published books and original Lockheed documentation is -

Lockheed needed flying hardware to make any progress in selling the Lancer. The X-27 designation was a 'fig leaf' to protect Lancer from the F-15 lobby.

Packard and the DOD liked Lockheed's fighter prototype idea but the USAF weren't interested in funding it. Some USAF staff balked at the notion of a single source contract, and Northrop, Boeing and Vought all somehow found out very quickly that a prototype contract was in the wind and started making their own unsolicited proposals - thus making it clear any such single source award to Lockheed without competition would be contested. Tom Jones at Northrop probably flexed his political influence. Lockheed was in financial trouble. April's "preparations for contract" quickly faded away. By July, Lockheed privately conceded that the X-27 was dead in the water unless they could get Packard and the DOD to force it on the Air Force instead of the LWF requirement being formulated. Letters were sent but ignored.

The DOD instead regrouped around Packard's prototype selection plans. The Air Force came on board, making sure the LWF requirement would be definitively behind F-15 in timing (and no threat to F-15) by insisting on the F100 engine, and by making it smaller and more advanced than the off-the-shelf X-27 Lancer. Lockheed were outmaneuvered. Despite effectively kickstarting the idea, Johnson was unwilling to play by the RFP rules, and his proposal stood no chance of acceptance.

 

[F.L.]

If it can interest !

 

[F.L.]

It is interesting to note that Lockheed had considered selling CL-200 to a number of countries : Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Switzerland, Portugual, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, New Zealand, Australia, India, South Africa, Malaysia & Indonesia !

 

[GTX]

It is interesting to note that Lockheed had considered selling CL-200 to a number of countries : Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Switzerland, Portugual, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, New Zealand, Australia, India, South Africa, Malaysia & Indonesia !

I think hoped or dreamed is a better description than considered.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

If it can interest !

Well, the text and pics are in the very first post in this topic already. But thanks

 

[kaiserbill]

It is interesting to note that Lockheed had considered selling CL-200 to a number of countries : Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Switzerland, Portugual, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, New Zealand, Australia, India, South Africa, Malaysia & Indonesia !

Lockheed were delusional if they think they would get the OK to supply South Africa with the Lancer in the 1972/73 timeframe.
The US applied the voluntary arms embargo from 1964.
Whilst, amongst other things, about 15 Lockheed L100 (civvy C-130) were purchased later to augment the airforce C-130's purchased in 1963, this could be explained away as "civilian"...(wink)
A fleet of combat aircraft after 1964...no.

 

[SCAT-15F]

It is overblown in the retelling but the essentials are correct. An error was made in the lift/drag calculations by a Lockheed engineer and it was humiliating for Johnson. These things do happen sometimes, like when Yakovlev's Yak-45/47 was claimed to have a higher rate of climb than speed in level flight.

The CL-1200 was a serious design which kinda kickstarted the entire LWF prototyping requirement. It was a low-cost, low-risk design that could be put into production immediately. That wasn't what the Air Force asked for in LWF though.

When the LWF RFP was released, Ben Rich at Lockheed was very aware the CL-1200 was simply too large to meet the requirements and tried to redesign it to be more compliant, but was overruled by Johnson. Johnson wasn't sold on the "optimise for typical air combat speeds" concept and was certain CL-1200 needed Mach 2.6 capability.

CL-1200 limped on until 1975ish in partnership with Aeritalia, later known as F-204 Lancer. Then it finally died.

The mach 2.6 capability says to me that Johnson was thinking of this strictly as an interceptor. Even with the larger wing, there was no way this could match the F-15 or F-16 in a dogfight. Wing loading was still to high.

 

[uk 75]

I remember reading the article about the Lancer in the 70s and liking the appearance. I have a Philippine wooden model of it in my collection.

If it had come earlier than the 70s it might have persuaded original Starfighter operators to take it. But by 1969 West Germany had already joined the UK to build MRCA (though it then chose F4F for the fighter role). Without West Germany the next group of potential customers were the smaller NATO air forces with F104s.

Once the USAF took F16s and the USN the F18 there was no chance of these countries buying a machine not used by the US. This also applied to the Mirage F1.