Leaked documents expose top secret Israeli drone

[IantheThinker]

See my pm today. A field unit would need only that kind of robots to keep the RCS within operational constraints.

tbh were are they getting the funding from lowkey

 

[quellish]

tbh were are they getting the funding from lowkey

Loki?

 

[Forest Green]

The TVA will have something to say about that.

 

[Josh_TN]

NGADs new tag line: “burdened with glorious purpose”

I’d buy that patch…

 

[Big_Zukini]

A chamber is for near-field measurements. An outdoor range is for far field measurements. And a dynamic range is outdoor and measures targets that are moving or otherwise active, most commonly flying (and is also a far field range).

Near field measurements are different from far field measurements. They see different things. Near field measurements can be useful for small-scale models, but have serious shortcomings for full sized objects. To some extent near field measurements of a full sized object can be used to predict or estimate far field measurements - if you have really good models that are based on far field measurement data, which.... you would need an outdoor range to have in the first place.

Chambers have some advantages. It may be easier to make them "quiet" (depending on how quiet you need). They may also be cheaper (depending on how quiet you need).

Of course today the role of the chamber can be replaced by software, at least doing the development of an aircraft. The outdoor far field range though, can't. You need that full scale far field data to build and have confidence in your software, and you need to measure the full scale, operational aircraft.

So the chamber, at least for development, is probably the MOST disposable part of the process.

Outdoor RCS ranges don't have a "secrecy" disadvantage. Most RCS ranges have figured out how to hide what they are testing and how. There isn't much point in trying to hide the whole facility.

Unless COUNTRY X. which "hides" its RCS range in the middle of a city surrounded by WiFi and cell towers. Go them! I'm sure.... their.... measurements..... are very.... accurate.

Is an RCS range something that is more on the permanent side or can a rudimentary range be constructed for a brief test?

Israel has a large test range called Shdema in the Negev desert typically used for missile tests.
Alternatively, I'm guessing Israel might be okay with the US gathering info on whatever stealth project it tests every once in a while.

There have been few "news reports" of israeli "stealth" drones.

For example this one from a few years ago about the "secretive" "stealth" drone the Israelis were calling "Spork":

That article doesn't even mention the word "stealth".

 

[Big_Zukini]

Work done on RA-01 section and another drone section built near it.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1906623614192873885

View: https://x.com/benreuter_IMINT/status/1906623614192873885?t=xMVG_x2pNyZfHn7faK4tlQ&s=19

 

[Q-nimbus]

I believe the RA-01 isn’t an Israeli drone; it’s an American drone operated by the Israeli’s. It’s American brother is based at Tonopah. It must have been operational for quite some time and I’m baffled it still hasn’t been photographed yet,

 

[VishnuOsiris]

I believe the RA-01 isn’t an Israeli drone; it’s an American drone operated by the Israeli’s.

How so?

 

[capitan r8]

RQ-180?

 

[VishnuOsiris]

RQ-180?

I don't know, sir. The AF P-ISR platform intended for the IndoPacific? Seems like a risk to give to the Israelis. Especially when they already have the F-35. This is in regard to the military-superiority/balance of power in the ME.

 

[EmoBirb]

I believe the RA-01 isn’t an Israeli drone; it’s an American drone operated by the Israeli’s. It’s American brother is based at Tonopah. It must have been operational for quite some time and I’m baffled it still hasn’t been photographed yet,

It really wouldn't make much sense for the US handing out/stationing their drones there, in harms way so to speak, when they can conduct intelligence gathering with other platforms or with that platform from more advantageous places and then share the gathered intelligence with Israel.

 

[Q-nimbus]

It really wouldn't make much sense for the US handing out/stationing their drones there, in harms way so to speak, when they can conduct intelligence gathering with other platforms or with that platform from more advantageous places and then share the gathered intelligence with Israel.

Because Israel hasn’t got the capability to develop stealth aircraft. Quellish first pointed that out, and I followed that up as much as possible, and it appears he’s right.

They might have been allowed to use the radar test sites of the Americans, but then they’d still have to develop stealth technology more or less from scratch. I also believe that if the Americans would share their most sensitive technology with an ally, it would be Israel. In fact, they may have been quite happy to do so, just so Israel can test them out in the field, and in return for the intelligence a platform like this gathers.

Also, like I’ve said many times, I believe a successor for the RQ-170 has been flying around for quite some time for different reasons:

- there a LOT of UAV infrastructure has been built at Tonopah.
- the RQ-170 is quite basic and seems it was hastily put together.
- we’ve seen quite a few pictures of the RQ-170 which are clearly flight tests. While they could be for the RQ-170 itself, I don’t think it’s likely that tests to improve the RQ-170 are done out in the open. It would give foreign intelligence agents a good idea of what’s coming up and develop counter measures. If I were to guess it’d say they are flight tests for new airframes.
- the RQ-170 technology is in the hands of Iran, China and very likely Russia. They’ll surely figured out a way to detect RQ-170’s once they got hold of the crashed airframe in Iran.
- it would make sense to continuously develop and improve your stealth drones. Stealth and drone technology developments are FAST. Once a platform is flying it’s technology is already outdated so it would make sense to keep on developing.

Of course, no definitive proof, but a lot of things seem to point towards my conclusion: a successor of the RQ-170 is and has been flying around for quite some time.

Also, the US government seems to have gotten a lot better at hiding stuff; both the actual airframes, and the paper trails involved with operating classified airframes.

 

[EmoBirb]

Because Israel hasn’t got the capability to develop stealth aircraft. Quellish first pointed that out, and I followed that up as much as possible, and it appears he’s right.

Building a stealth fighter is difficult, building a stealthy UAV is a mere matter of being willing to spend money on it.

For one there are literal "start ups" like Kratos or Anduril developing UAVs with low observability. Then you can look at countries like Turkey developing and testing drones like the Anka-3 and whatever they called that thing with the canards, I can't be bothered to look that weird name up tbh.

Israel has plenty of money, in fact they receive annual blank checks from the US in a sense. They have a prolific UAV sector and they have a flourishing tech sector as well.

I truly don't see any reason why they couldn't be able to develop a stealthy surveillance drone. Especially when, as you said, something like the RQ-170 can be just thrown together. Something Iran literally did after that btw.

So while it's probably no GJ-11, S-70 or MQ-28 I can definitely imagine that they figured out how to make a MALE UAV with reduced signature. Even more so with assistance from US contractors.

On the other hand, as I already said, the idea of the US stationing their own advanced drones there or giving them to Israel makes less sense by comparison. The US has for one other ways to collect intelligence in the region, but if they were to repeat the same mistake they made with the RQ-170, they can station it in a country that is closer to Iran and wouldn't be blown up by ballistic missiles upon any real provocation, without days long telegraphing and warnings in advance of course.

Meaning, there are only downsides to that scenario. Which makes it not plausible for the US to station an advanced surveillance asset in a country with a huge target on their forehead that's in a geographically less than ideal situation for such operations.

On the other hand Israel has all the means and reasons to develop such a drone and that development would most likely have been in the works for years. Especially as it would most likely be peanuts for them and would keep their own aerospace sector busy.

 

[Big_Zukini]

Israel has plenty of money, in fact they receive annual blank checks from the US in a sense.

Way to take out any nuance and make it a mid 2000's reddit argument. Israel doesn't have "plenty of money". It has enough to develop something like a stealth drone, but it's not the US or EU swimming in money. With 5% defense expenditure in peacetime and often double that in war time, it certainly doesn't have resources to be throwing around.
Subsidies to LM and Raytheon are not a blank check either.

Because Israel hasn’t got the capability to develop stealth aircraft.

Conjecture. As raised by EmoBirb, Israel's defense industry has already surpassed years and even decades ago what some developing stealth aircraft are only doing now.
Israeli industries are taking part in the manufacture of F-35 parts including IAI manufacturing its wings, and there are products that are classified as LO, such as Rafael's Ice Breaker cruise missile.

Stealth tech in itself is not exclusive to any nation. Nor is its manufacture. The sole basis laid here for Israel not developing a stealth aircraft on its own is that no far field RCS measurement facility has been spotted.
That's pretty weak evidence though. There are multiple other options Israel has including improved computer models, testing in the US, covered facilities, test flights against its own ground based and airborne radars, and so on.

I remember back during my service, someone presented a project they did working for IAI, where they've done RCS tests with airborne radars.

The only hard block to Israel developing its own aircraft of any class is propulsion. That's what killed the Lavi.

But a smaller or lighter platform (compared to fighter aircraft) like that could do with COTS/non-restricted MOTS propulsion that Israeli industries and IAF units are well positioned to maintain, inside of an LO platform designed by the big defense industries, with avionics also provided by them.

There may also be a misunderstanding of the design considerations of the RA-01. Is it supposed to be a high end solution, or a rudimentary design that would be reasonably attritable in terms of both cost and an enemy's ability to reverse engineer it?

 

[quellish]

Stealth tech in itself is not exclusive to any nation. Nor is its manufacture. The sole basis laid here for Israel not developing a stealth aircraft on its own is that no far field RCS measurement facility has been spotted.
That's pretty weak evidence though. There are multiple other options Israel has including improved computer models, testing in the US, covered facilities, test flights against its own ground based and airborne radars, and so on.

Yeah, someone could build a big RC plane out of fiberglass and plastic and call it "LO" and most of the internet would believe it. Doesn't make it true though.

Someone could use pirated RCS modeling software or write their own to calculate RCS based on a model, but they would have no way to validate their design without a far field range. But they could call it "LO" and yes, most of the internet would believe it.

And someone could even put an outdoor RCS range in the middle of a city full of EM interference, and the internet believes their "LO" technology has advanced beyond the bronze age.

At the end of the day, to design and build an aircraft that has militarily relevant levels of signature reduction you need a sensitive far field outdoor RCS range. This is just physics. These ranges can't be "covered" and have distinct signatures that can be located with even low resolution satellite imagery and other means.

 

[Big_Zukini]

Yeah, someone could build a big RC plane out of fiberglass and plastic and call it "LO" and most of the internet would believe it. Doesn't make it true though.

Except it's not the "internet" or amateurs building RC planes in their garage or speculating on a design.
It's an actual plane, whose ability to fly covert missions over Iran is referenced in that leak (everyone will judge by themselves if that leak is true), which in itself requires stealth characteristics.
Are you speculating on the feasibility of one development stage of a product that already exists and is likely operational?

At the end of the day, to design and build an aircraft that has militarily relevant levels of signature reduction you need a sensitive far field outdoor RCS range. This is just physics. These ranges can't be "covered" and have distinct signatures that can be located with even low resolution satellite imagery and other means.

What makes you certain that:

1. It's impossible to test abroad.
2. Far Field cannot be extrapolated from Near Field.
3. The target must be static.
4. The measurement device must be static.

 

[quellish]

It's an actual plane, whose ability to fly covert missions over Iran is referenced in that leak (everyone will judge by themselves if that leak is true), which in itself requires stealth characteristics.

That conducting surveillance over Iran "requires stealth characteristics" (and specifically RF stealth) is your assumption, not fact. Non-stealth US aircraft surveil Iran on a regular basis.

What makes you certain that:
[*]It's impossible to test abroad.

Not in the US due to that whole legal thing with export regulations, etc. And there are not many places where Israel could test in secret abroad.

[*]Far Field cannot be extrapolated from Near Field.

There are methods to "extrapolate" a far field measurement from a near field measurement. These are problematic as they are unreliable, inaccurate, error prone, and scale poorly as the target RCS lowers. And some of these methods require a far field range to create the data necessary to create the "extrapolation" method (transform).

Any engineer that seriously considers using measurements created by transforming near field data for the design of a low observable aircraft should be drug tested and polygraphed.

There is also the problem that to use a near field range for development you have to arrive at a configuration, build a model, etc. which is expensive and slows the process down.

[*]The target must be static.

Well if the target is already flying there isn't much point - you have already designed your supposedly "LO" aircraft with none of the tools or data necessary to do so. Surprise! Your dynamic test shows it's not "LO" at all!

[*]The measurement device must be static.

An air-to-air dynamic RCS measurement is not practical for a number of reasons. You would not get valid data.

 

[Big_Zukini]

That conducting surveillance over Iran "requires stealth characteristics" (and specifically RF stealth) is your assumption, not fact. Non-stealth US aircraft surveil Iran on a regular basis.

Perhaps. But that includes non-covert surveillance, and it's geographically limited.
Given Iran's air defense and air surveillance capabilities, a non-stealth design could not be depended upon to conduct surveillance in a covert manner.

Not in the US due to that whole legal thing with export regulations, etc. And there are not many places where Israel could test in secret abroad.

What export regulations? You don't need to export the software, nor the materials. Only the data itself. Why would that be export-restricted?

There is also the problem that to use a near field range for development you have to arrive at a configuration, build a model, etc. which is expensive and slows the process down.

Not an issue. It's flying already, after all. The resources were spent, and it's likely such projects were ongoing for a very long time now.

Well if the target is already flying there isn't much point - you have already designed your supposedly "LO" aircraft with none of the tools or data necessary to do so. Surprise! Your dynamic test shows it's not "LO" at all!

But you said earlier that software can approximate RCS to the point where an outdoor range is only for validation. So it wouldn't be "with none of the tools".


And such range should not be a problem for Israel, right?
It has the space, it has the instruments, it has the requirement, and it can assure secrecy.
Since shortly after its foundation, Israeli defense companies used test ranges in the Negev for a lot of different purposes. I'm sure the necessary infrastructure can/could be built there.

 

[quellish]

What export regulations? You don't need to export the software, nor the materials. Only the data itself. Why would that be export-restricted?

ITAR/EAR, USML, etc. Technical data is export controlled.

Not an issue. It's flying already, after all. The resources were spent, and it's likely such projects were ongoing for a very long time now.

That's the point. It makes no sense to measure the RCS only after it's flying. Measuring the RCS is primarily a part of the development process. You come up with a configuration, measure and iterate.

But you said earlier that software can approximate RCS to the point where an outdoor range is only for validation. So it wouldn't be "with none of the tools".

You need a far field range to validate the software itself. The software produces a given result for a 1m sphere - does that match what was measured on the range? The software produces a result for a complex shape like an aircraft - does that match what was measured on the range? The data collected from the range validates and refines the software model.

The software, once it is at the point that it closely matches what is measured on a range, is used to calculate the RCS of different configurations. Once the candidate configurations are narrowed down they are tested on a range using physical models. Again, this is all part of the development process.

And such range should not be a problem for Israel, right?
It has the space, it has the instruments, it has the requirement, and it can assure secrecy.
Since shortly after its foundation, Israeli defense companies used test ranges in the Negev for a lot of different purposes. I'm sure the necessary infrastructure can/could be built there.

Israel is certainly capable of building a range. But a far field range is pretty much impossible to hide and there is no evidence that Israel has one at all, much less one able to measure low observable targets.

 

[Big_Zukini]

That's the point. It makes no sense to measure the RCS only after it's flying. Measuring the RCS is primarily a part of the development process. You come up with a configuration, measure and iterate.

I was talking about back when it was in development. I remind that you originally replied to my comment where I said there is no evidence that Israel cannot develop and deploy LO aircraft.

Kinda pointless argument IMO, as it was already constructed, is flying, and that capability was rumored many years ago.

 

[quellish]

I was talking about back when it was in development. I remind that you originally replied to my comment where I said there is no evidence that Israel cannot develop and deploy LO aircraft.

OK, you said there is no evidence that they *cannot* develop and deploy LO aircraft.
They don't have a far field measurement range capable of measuring LO objects. That would be evidence that they cannot develop and deploy LO aircraft.

Kinda pointless argument IMO, as it was already constructed, is flying, and that capability was rumored many years ago.

Sure, there is a UAV, designated by NPIC/NGA/ZIMA/whatever as RA-01. They do not describe it as a low observable aircraft. There is no evidence to support that it is low observable, and there is no evidence that Israel has the capability to develop and operational low observable aircraft (lack of a far field RCS range).

So not really pointless.

 

[VishnuOsiris]

Yeah, someone could build a big RC plane out of fiberglass and plastic and call it "LO" and most of the internet would believe it. Doesn't make it true though.

Sure, there is a UAV, designated by NPIC/NGA/ZIMA/whatever as RA-01. They do not describe it as a low observable aircraft. There is no evidence to support that it is low observable, and there is no evidence that Israel has the capability to develop and operational low observable aircraft (lack of a far field RCS range).

The Turkish Anka-3 being developed as an "LO" platform comes to mind as something that may fit the ME-definition of "LO." More or less a conventional aircraft with a tail-less design [AFAIK, relatively speaking]. Maybe the RA-01 is otherwise a somewhat less-detectable at-range UAV compared to the Eitan or what have you, which is good enough to spot targets for their ALBMs.

 

[SOC]

And someone could even put an outdoor RCS range in the middle of a city full of EM interference, and the internet believes their "LO" technology has advanced beyond the bronze age.

At the end of the day, to design and build an aircraft that has militarily relevant levels of signature reduction you need a sensitive far field outdoor RCS range. This is just physics. These ranges can't be "covered" and have distinct signatures that can be located with even low resolution satellite imagery and other means.

To be fair the Beijing complex hasn't been used for RCS testing for decades now, the far field range near Dingxin is pretty isolated. Gaobeidian, though... And somebody else doesn't exactly have ranges in logical places either.

Back to the matter at hand, I've looked around Israel for a while and haven't yet located something that could be a far field RCS range. Warton had a range of about 270 m from sensors to target, if that's the starting point for a far field range it is possible that such a complex could be a bit easier to miss. The big ones like RATSCAT or Gaobeidian though, those aren't going to be hard to notice.

 

[Big_Zukini]

OK, you said there is no evidence that they *cannot* develop and deploy LO aircraft.
They don't have a far field measurement range capable of measuring LO objects. That would be evidence that they cannot develop and deploy LO aircraft.

Israel not having such field is an unfounded guess.
Not having such field does not equate to inability to develop LO aircraft. It complicates things but it can be substituted.
And just because none uploaded footage to the internet, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

As I mentioned several times before, Israel's 3 largest defense companies specialize in aerospace, and have large test ranges primarily in Israel's southern desert region, as well as multiple large bases where setting up a range would be feasible.

So saying it can develop LO munitions but not LO aircraft is a serious leap.

There is no evidence to support that it is low observable

It is described as tasked with covert surveillance. While possible with non-LO, it would then likely be covert by chance, not by design.
Covert surveillance would require RF LO as well as reduced acoustic and thermal signature.

The Turkish Anka-3 being developed as an "LO" platform comes to mind as something that may fit the ME-definition of "LO." More or less a conventional aircraft with a tail-less design [AFAIK, relatively speaking]. Maybe the RA-01 is otherwise a somewhat less-detectable at-range UAV compared to the Eitan or what have you, which is good enough to spot targets for their ALBMs.

And Turkey does not have a far field range as far as I'm aware.

 

[SOC]

Want to search for a far-field RCS range in Israel? Use Israel's own mapping website: https://www.govmap.gov.il/?c=167916.7,520327.1&z=6&b=1&sb=24 Those coords are centred on the "stealth" drone base. Leave it in Hebrew and you can click the bar at bottom centre and move back and forth through a few years of imagery. Sensitive facilities are blurred out, making them easier to identify.

 

[quellish]

Israel not having such field is an unfounded guess.

Again, there is no evidence they do have a range. That is not an "unfounded guess". If you have evidence a far field range exists in Israel, please share it to support your thesis.

Not having such field does not equate to inability to develop LO aircraft. It complicates things but it can be substituted.

Yes, it does.

As I mentioned several times before, Israel's 3 largest defense companies specialize in aerospace, and have large test ranges primarily in Israel's southern desert region, as well as multiple large bases where setting up a range would be feasible.

Great. Point out the location of the RCS range. I have access to very large amounts of satellite and other imagery along with the capability to search it. Nothing remotely like an RCS range in Israel yet.

So saying it can develop LO munitions but not LO aircraft is a serious leap.

I have never made that statement.

It is described as tasked with covert surveillance. While possible with non-LO, it would then likely be covert by chance, not by design.

Covert surveillance UAV that does not have RF signature reduction measures:
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...ke-uav-crashed-in-pakistan.13468/#post-133248

Covert surveillance would require RF LO as well as reduced acoustic and thermal signature.

Again, this is an assumption, not fact.

And Turkey does not have a far field range as far as I'm aware.

They have more than one, one of which is fairly new and started operating in the last few months.
https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/tai-to-set-up-major-radar-cross-section-testing-facilityThere have been a number of papers published by Turkish groups regarding far field measurements that illustrate their far field ranges.

 

[quellish]

Want to search for a far-field RCS range in Israel? Use Israel's own mapping website: https://www.govmap.gov.il/?c=167916.7,520327.1&z=6&b=1&sb=24 Those coords are centred on the "stealth" drone base. Leave it in Hebrew and you can click the bar at bottom centre and move back and forth through a few years of imagery. Sensitive facilities are blurred out, making them easier to identify.

You can also do this with USGS imagery of the US. There are a number of places where there are "unavailable" imagery tiles which highlight sensitive areas.

 

[SOC]

They have more than one, one of which is fairly new and started operating in the last few months.
https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/tai-to-set-up-major-radar-cross-section-testing-facilityThere have been a number of papers published by Turkish groups regarding far field measurements that illustrate their far field ranges.

This is interesting: https://www.anews.com.tr/gallery/tu...blish-worlds-5th-largest-rcs-testing-facility and https://turdef.com/article/turkish-aerospace-invests-in-radar-cross-test-bed If we assume (dangerous, I know) that the building shown in the graphics there is anything close to an official rendering, then that would imply that the new site isn't a far field range. But rather, is the new building at TAI here: https://maps.app.goo.gl/JvSnmYtMy3LAcVqk7 Complete in the second half of 2024 and off-nadir imagery shows the front of the building matches the graphic. And here we specifically see mention of a near field range: https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/co...oss-section-for-national-combat-aircraft-3843

 

[Big_Zukini]

I have never made that statement.

How did Rafael test the Ice/Sea Breaker cruise missile, described as "Very Low Observable"?

Rafael very clearly can design an LO munition, but apparently a drone is pushing the limit.

 

[Q-nimbus]

Another thing that severely limits Israel’s developing capability is it’s small size; it’s ‘just’ twice the size of the Nevada Test and Training Range. There aren’t that many isolated places in Israel, and it’s surrounded by countries that can spy on them by just flying up to the border and look in.

 

[Big_Zukini]

Another thing that severely limits Israel’s developing capability is it’s small size; it’s ‘just’ twice the size of the Nevada Test and Training Rangs. There aren’t that many isolated places in Israel, and it’s surrounded by countries that can spy on them by just flying up to the border and look in.

The Negev can provide sufficient coverage and development opportunity for anything that stays on or close to the ground.
The KMG nuclear facility in the Negev is about 30-40km from Jordan to the east and 50-60km from Egypt to the west. That is considered sufficiently protected both physically and visually.
Very long range systems like ballistic missiles and ABM are tested from Palmachim out to sea or from a naval platform like the LORA was. High tier BMD Arrow 3 was tested in Alaska.

Testing a secret aircraft would certainly be more challenging, but I wouldn't say it's not doable.

Also helps that good relations with Egypt and Jordan enable them and Israel to schedule tests outside reconnaissance activities' timeframes.

 

[raptor82]

Maybe not directly related, but......

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology Cerberus UCAV study (2008-2009):


https://www.dror-aero.com/ac/ucav2.htm

 

[quellish]

Anyone who has even a basic, non-internet forum knowledge of LO principals converges on configurations similar to this as a 4-spike flyable aircraft.

 

[Big_Zukini]

While reading about the 90's era Israeli Moab missile, a modified hybrid of Python and Derby for Boost Phase Intercept, I stumbled across an article that mentions a carrier drone HA-01.
The work was done jointly with the US, so possibly an American designation. The RA-01 name is also an American designation.

These are possibly related designs.

https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=85793

 

[VishnuOsiris]

https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=85793

The sources told "Globes" that the size of the joint allocation by Israel and the US for the Moav project at the risk mitigation level amounted to $40 million for three years. The US bore 75% of the financial burden.

According to "Defense News," the project is based on a Moav-type air-to-air missile, which homes to its target using infrared sensors. The missile will be carried by a large drone, the HA-01, which will cruise at high altitude and be launched at a ballistic missile in the ascent phase. The ballistic missile will be destroyed, according to the plan, shortly after launch.

 

[UpForce]

What follows is something I wrote before searching this site for HA-10. Very stupid of me. There's a whole discussion about it here:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/israeli-boost-phase-intercept-system-ibis-ha-10.7015/
Anyway, previously in my universe:

Tried a very rudimentary search and came up with this:

In the late 1990s the Israelis began promoting the Moab system, in which unmanned aerial vehicles counter ballistic missiles during their boost phase. This effort involved using UAVs armed with Python 4 air-to-air missiles. Planners argued that an ability to operate at high altitudes and loiter for days virtually immune from attack by either surface-to-air missiles or fighters made them especially useful for engaging theater ballistic missiles soon after launch. Analysts found that high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs could complement terminal missile defense systems cost-effectively. They began developing the HA-10, a stealthy, long-endurance unmanned vehicle, but never built it, concluding that since American support for such a venture was unlikely, the required financing for the project would not be forthcoming. Zach Rosenberg reported 28 November 2012 that the Israeli military was developing a large, classified unmanned air vehicle (UAV) with features consistent with stealthy aircraft designs.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/uav.htm
Apart from the aforementioned article by Rosenberg, I don't know what Globalsecurity's sources are. In an ICAS presentation from 2004 ("History of UAV Development in IAI and Road Ahead", S. Tsach et.al.) a "HA-10" is mentioned and described briefly but the illustration (while stealthy) looks nothing like the minimalist planform sighted over Greece during the ongoing war.

Within the framework of the advanced design activity, we examined a number of additional high altitude advanced configurations: e.g. HA10 configuration whose configuration is shown in Figure 10. The HA-10 configuration was proven in wind tunnel tests to have an aerodynamic efficiency (L/D) greater than 33.0.

https://www.icas.org/icas_archive/ICAS2004/PAPERS/519.PDF


Also (Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 2002 - 2003):

Missile Defense

Five years ago the Israelis began promoting the Moab system, in which unmanned aerial vehicles counter ballistic missiles during their boost phase. This effort involved using UAVs armed with Python 4 air-to-air missiles. Planners argued that an ability to operate at high altitudes and loiter for days virtually immune from attack by either surface-to-air missiles or fighters made them especially useful for engaging theater ballistic missiles soon after launch.

Analysts found that high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs could complement terminal missile defense systems cost-effectively. They began developing the HA–10, a stealthy, long-endurance unmanned vehicle, but never built it, concluding that since American support for such a venture was unlikely, the required financing for the project would not be forthcoming.

One American defense official expressed the reluctance to support the project in the following words: “Targeting a fast-moving missile could be extremely difficult, especially if the UAV is going to see it and then catch it in the first minute or so of its flight.” According to critics, communications among vehicles and command and control centers would not be fast enough to make launch decisions on time. The United States has concluded that using UAVs for boost-phase intercept may prove to be too great a technical and financial challenge.

Israel later used UAVs to destroy launch vehicles on the ground, specifically in hunting down Scud missiles. For its part, America has explored incorporating them into missile defense for warhead detection and monitoring. These vehicles may employ infrared sensor and data collection systems, hoping to track missiles during their midcourse flight.

The verdict on using UAVs for theater missile defense is still moot. In the meantime, the Israelis appear willing to pursue the matter, in the hope that additional research and development will someday provide the knowledge that will make them effective antiballistic missile weapons.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA483682.pdf

 

[quellish]

What follows is something I wrote before searching this site for HA-10. Very stupid of me. There's a whole discussion about it here:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/israeli-boost-phase-intercept-system-ibis-ha-10.7015/
Anyway, previously in my universe:

Tried a very rudimentary search and came up with this:



https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/uav.htm
Apart from the aforementioned article by Rosenberg, I don't know what Globalsecurity's sources are. In an ICAS presentation from 2004 ("History of UAV Development in IAI and Road Ahead", S. Tsach et.al.) a "HA-10" is mentioned and described briefly but the illustration (while stealthy) looks nothing like the minimalist planform sighted over Greece during the ongoing war.

The Leading Systems W570 was intended to perform a boost phase intercept mission at about the same point in history, and there is an Israeli connection there. You can draw your own conclusions about that.

As far as RA-01, again this appears to be a designation that is internal to NIMA. The designation derives from where photo interpreters first saw it. NPIC used similar designations during the Cold War (RAM-K, etc). It is not a “real” designation.

 

[Forest Green]

The Leading Sydtems W570

?

 

[Aeroweanie]

Abe Karem's company Leading Systems went bankrupt and got bought by General Atomics. GA developed the Amber into the Gnat and Predator. Then, Karem founded Frontier Systems, which eventually got bought by Boeing. Now, he runs Karem Aircraft. Here are pictures of (all pictures from Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets 1995-96):
Frontier Systems Arrow

Frontier Systems Shadow

Frontier Systems W570A

 

[quellish]

To summarize what we know so far...


On October 18 2024 classified NGA documents were leaked to a Telegram channel. Within a day the press published a number of stories about the documents (such as https://www.axios.com/2024/10/19/israel-iran-attack-telegram-leaked-intelligence). The documents were assessments of Israeli activities preparing to strike Iran. The assessments were based on overhead imagery.

The documents allegedly included two paragraphs related to this discussion:

The IAF continued to conduct covert UAV flight activity at Ramon Airfield from 15 through 16 October. The IAF opened the RA-01 operations hangar screen and the gate to the RA-01 operations area, indicating an RA-01 airframe was transiting to or from the operations area at 1731Z 15 October. On 16 October, NGA observed personnel and ground equipment arrive within the RA-01 operations area, indicating pre or post-flight activity occurred.

And later, in an unrelated section:

The IAF continued covert UAV operations on 16 October: Israel's covert UAVs enable long-range, covert surveillance in iran and throughout the region.

On October 19th a Twitter user posted:

Why isn't aircraft & military twitter lit about Israeli RA-01 stealth ISR platform we now know for sure of ?
Also, not much into Israeli stuff but this their home ? (built around the time first reports of Israeli stealthy long range ISR platform came out in the early 2010s)

https://twitter.com/x/status/1847767114071101807

View: https://x.com/PutinIsAVirus/status/1847767114071101807?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1847767114071101807%7Ctwgr%5E09b49f2027e755cf285fbe743ebbe23e405381c5%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.secretprojects.co.uk%2Fthreads%2Fleaked-documents-expose-top-secret-israeli-drone.44594%2F


He included a Google Earth screenshot of Ramon Airfield (30.781786, 34.672105)

This post is quite a leap from the actual documents. The documents do not describe "RA-01" as a "stealth" or low observable aircraft. Only that it was being operated at Ramon Airfield.

Separately the document described "covert UAV operations" and that "Israel's covert UAVs enable long-range, covert surveillance in iran and throughout the region.". This was not in relation to "RA-01"

The "RA-01" designator is almost certainly an internal NGA designation. NGA spotted a new aircraft, at Ramon Airfield ("RA") and it was the first new aircraft they spotted first there. This is consistent with historical internal designation systems used by NGA and predecessors.

The idea that "RA-01" is a stealth aircraft comes purely from this Twitter poster's imagination, and is either assumption or hyperbole.

On or about October 29 2024 video of a flying wing aircraft over Lebanon was published in various places. The video is very low quality.

The "aviation press" connected this to the "RA-01"

https://theaviationist.com/2024/10/29/mysterious-drone-video/
The only connection here though seems to be temporal. "RA-01" was in the news a few weeks before, so.... here it is, obviously!

All of these assumptions and leaps of logic have no real basis in facts. There are no real connections between these different incidents yet. It's speculation on top of fantasy.

Maybe the "RA-01" is actually the "TR-3" !