If an aircraft carrier had been assigned to Force Z, what would have happened in history?

The R class battleships are used to "beef up" the escorts of the Alexandria to Malta convoys that sailed between March and August 1942.
  • MW.10 in March. However, in common with the "real world" all the ships that got through to Malta were sunk after arrival.
  • Operation Vigorous in June reaches Malta and Vian's force also escorts Harpoon the westbound convoy to Malta after it had passed the Sicilian Narrows.
  • The dummy convoy in August that acted as a diversion for Operation Pedestal IOTL is a proper convoy ITTL which fights it's way to Malta and escorts the survivors of Pedestal to Malta after they have passed through the Sicilian Narrows.
Is that plausible?
I might come back to the IO part of your post, but to me the Med part doesn’t work.

Firstly, re Vigorous, adding 1-3 R class to the escort would have made no difference to the outcome.

The real problem this convoy had was that the escort ran low on ammunition. Vian had warned about this on the evening of the 14th while the Italian fleet was still en route to the area. By the time all the reversals of course had happened during 15th they were down to one third of ammo outfit.

The AA on even those 3 old Battleships was not enough to make a difference. Maybe their presence attracts more attention away from Harpoon. But more ships putting a barrage over the convoy is not getting it to Malta.

As for the dummy convoy in Aug becoming a real one, you ignore the changed situation on the ground in North Africa.

Vigorous sailed at the same time the Gazala battles were being fought. That meant the convoy was able to obtain some limited air cover from British forward airfields. Bombers were sent to attack German airfields around Derna to assist its passage.

By Aug the front line is at El Alamein. The German aircraft are now at least 250 miles further forward. The convoy is exposed to enemy air attack virtually from the moment it leaves Port Said. Add to that, IIRC the Med Fleet by then was not sufficiently strong to provide such a huge escort. Vigorous had borrowed 2 cruisers and about 7 destroyers from the IO. Then figure losses and damages and the IO itself being scaled back.
 
Part of Post 13 again.
If they're still operational when British naval forces were evacuated from Singapore there are three alternatives.
  1. They're sent to Java and are sunk in a "Battle of the Java Sea on Steroids" in which the ABDA force was reinforced by Prince of Wales & Repulse and the Japanese were reinforced by Mutsu & Nagato.
  2. They're send to Ceylon and reinforce "Force A" of the Eastern Fleet.
  3. They're sent to Perth and find their to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of Coral Sea.
This is inspired by Post 38 and is a combination of Options 2 and 3.

ABDAs ships are withdrawn at the end of January/beginning of February 1942.

Houston, Perth & the American destroyers are sent to Perth. They find their way to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Houston & Perth serve in the Guadalcanal Campaign.

Prince of Wales & Repulse plus the British & Dutch cruisers & destroyers are sent to Ceylon and the R class battleships are sent to Alexandria to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet. Not having the R class means Somerville doesn't have to divide his ships into a slow force & a fast force so the aircraft carriers and the capital ships Prince of Wales, Repulse & Warspite have a much thicker screen of cruisers and destroyers ITTL than the aircraft carriers and Warspite had IOTL.

The R class battleships are used to "beef up" the escorts of the Alexandria to Malta convoys that sailed between March and August 1942.
  • MW.10 in March. However, in common with the "real world" all the ships that got through to Malta were sunk after arrival.
  • Operation Vigorous in June reaches Malta and Vian's force also escorts Harpoon the westbound convoy to Malta after it had passed the Sicilian Narrows.
  • The dummy convoy in August that acted as a diversion for Operation Pedestal IOTL is a proper convoy ITTL which fights it's way to Malta and escorts the survivors of Pedestal to Malta after they have passed through the Sicilian Narrows.
Is that plausible?
It's very realistic compared to what I envisioned.
 
If they're still operational when British naval forces were evacuated from Singapore there are three alternatives.
  1. They're sent to Java and are sunk in a "Battle of the Java Sea on Steroids" in which the ABDA force was reinforced by Prince of Wales & Repulse and the Japanese were reinforced by Mutsu & Nagato.
  2. They're send to Ceylon and reinforce "Force A" of the Eastern Fleet.
  3. They're sent to Darwin Perth and find their to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of Coral Sea.
No.3 - that would be interesting, indeed. Although the age of carriers started right there, battleships and battlecruisers were not a big part of the naval action there. Same at Midway, now imagine if they find their way to round 3 - Guadalcanal. There was one of the few battleship brawls of WWII, between US "treaty battleships" (the ones before the Iowas, USS Washington and another one, from memory) and Japanese BB. Imagine if PoW found itself in that bloody night brawl. Repulse too, but there is a real risk the latter pulls a Hood, same flaws, old BC used as a modern fast BB except with the wrong armor...

USS South Dakota was the other - she mainly functioned as a damage sponge to distract the Japanese from Washington, who did most of the damage.

When SD went back to Pearl for repair, her crew blabbed about their part in the battle, and completely left Washington out of their recountings - so the American public viewed SD as the heroes and Wash as "so what was she doing during that battle?".
 
If they're still operational when British naval forces were evacuated from Singapore there are three alternatives.
  1. They're sent to Java and are sunk in a "Battle of the Java Sea on Steroids" in which the ABDA force was reinforced by Prince of Wales & Repulse and the Japanese were reinforced by Mutsu & Nagato.
  2. They're send to Ceylon and reinforce "Force A" of the Eastern Fleet.
  3. They're sent to Darwin Perth and find their to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of Coral Sea.
No.3 - that would be interesting, indeed. Although the age of carriers started right there, battleships and battlecruisers were not a big part of the naval action there. Same at Midway, now imagine if they find their way to round 3 - Guadalcanal. There was one of the few battleship brawls of WWII, between US "treaty battleships" (the ones before the Iowas, USS Washington and another one, from memory) and Japanese BB. Imagine if PoW found itself in that bloody night brawl. Repulse too, but there is a real risk the latter pulls a Hood, same flaws, old BC used as a modern fast BB except with the wrong armor...
USS South Dakota was the other - she mainly functioned as a damage sponge to distract the Japanese from Washington, who did most of the damage.

When SD went back to Pearl for repair, her crew blabbed about their part in the battle, and completely left Washington out of their recountings - so the American public viewed SD as the heroes and Wash as "so what was she doing during that battle?".
I though the problems with the anti-aircraft that contributed to the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse would have been cured by May 1942 and the extra firepower they provided might have prevented the loss of Lexington and that Yorktown might have been damaged less badly.

I wasn't going to suggest that the British capital ships take part in Midway, the Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz. but I was going to suggest that they be used to back up the American cruisers and destroyers in the surface actions around Guadalcanal.

The RN's night fighting doctrine (which as far as I know was as good if not better than the IJN's) might be as important as the main armament of the two ships. Plus my understanding is that both ships had better radar than the American ships that fought in the night battles of 1942 and that their crews knew how to use it. However, as a note of caution the RAN ships that took part in the Battle of Savo Island were trained in the RN's night fighting doctrine, (as far as I know) had better radar than the American cruisers and their crews knew how to use it, but the Japanese still won and in a spectacular fashion at that.

Plus knowing that two British capital ships were in the vicinity of Guadalcanal might make the Japanese decide that it was too risky to send reinforcements to Guadalcanal and bombard Henderson Field or "if they were going to do it - they'd have to do it properly" and send capital ships of their own in sooner.
 
IMOHO, the Repulse and POW, should never have been sent alone, they SHOULD have joined a combined fleet instead. Much more effective and survivable. Logic was however, just not present at the time. Nothing new under the sun however.

When you fail to prepare etc.
 
Part of Post 13 again.
If they're still operational when British naval forces were evacuated from Singapore there are three alternatives.
  1. They're sent to Java and are sunk in a "Battle of the Java Sea on Steroids" in which the ABDA force was reinforced by Prince of Wales & Repulse and the Japanese were reinforced by Mutsu & Nagato.
  2. They're send to Ceylon and reinforce "Force A" of the Eastern Fleet.
  3. They're sent to Perth and find their to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of Coral Sea.
This is inspired by Post 38 and is a combination of Options 2 and 3.

ABDAs ships are withdrawn at the end of January/beginning of February 1942.

Houston, Perth & the American destroyers are sent to Perth. They find their way to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Houston & Perth serve in the Guadalcanal Campaign.

Prince of Wales & Repulse plus the British & Dutch cruisers & destroyers are sent to Ceylon and the R class battleships are sent to Alexandria to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet. Not having the R class means Somerville doesn't have to divide his ships into a slow force & a fast force so the aircraft carriers and the capital ships Prince of Wales, Repulse & Warspite have a much thicker screen of cruisers and destroyers ITTL than the aircraft carriers and Warspite had IOTL.

The R class battleships are used to "beef up" the escorts of the Alexandria to Malta convoys that sailed between March and August 1942.
  • MW.10 in March. However, in common with the "real world" all the ships that got through to Malta were sunk after arrival.
  • Operation Vigorous in June reaches Malta and Vian's force also escorts Harpoon the westbound convoy to Malta after it had passed the Sicilian Narrows.
  • The dummy convoy in August that acted as a diversion for Operation Pedestal IOTL is a proper convoy ITTL which fights it's way to Malta and escorts the survivors of Pedestal to Malta after they have passed through the Sicilian Narrows.
Is that plausible?
It's very realistic compared to what I envisioned.
Thank you.

The R class battleships weren't fast enough to operate with Force "A" of the Eastern Fleet but they might have been fast enough to escort a convoy of fast merchantmen.

Their AA armaments would have helped the escort fend of the Luftwaffe & Regia Aeronautica and I thought they'd deter the Italian battlefleet because as far as I know the Regia Navale's standing orders forbade it from attacking unless it was in overwhelming force.

Another thing that I didn't mention is that as far as I know the American victory at Midway allowed the British to weaken the Eastern Fleet which is why Indomitable was able to take part in Operation Pedestal. Therefore, "in this version of history" the Admiralty may decide that it can transfer Prince of Wales, Repulse, Exeter, Electra, Encounter and Jupiter from the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean Fleet to reinforce the escort of the Alexandria to Malta convoy that compliments the Pedestal convoy.
 
IMOHO, the Repulse and POW, should never have been sent alone, they SHOULD have joined a combined fleet instead. Much more effective and survivable. Logic was however, just not present at the time. Nothing new under the sun however.

When you fail to prepare etc.
As far as I know No. 1

The Admiralty wanted to assemble the Eastern Fleet at Ceylon and not send it to Singapore until it had become a combined fleet and it was Churchill that had Prince of Wales and Repulse sent to Singapore.

As far as I know No. 2

Churchill got his way because Pound didn't do as good a job at standing up to him on behalf of the Royal Navy as Alanbrooke did on behalf of the British Army.

Roskill in "British Naval Policy Between The Wars" suggested that Chatfield should have been brought back as First Sea Lord when Backhouse resigned and been kept-in-office until 1943 which was when Pound resigned and replaced by Cunningham. If I remember correctly Roskill claimed that Chatfield was in excellent health at the time and added that he lived to be 90. However, Roskill was wrong because according to Chatfield's Wikipedia entry he died in 1967 aged 94!
 
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I have zero skin in the 'who to blame game'. Whoever did it screwed up badly which cost service people their lives and lost assets which were needed at the time.
 
Boyd in "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" looks at the Pound v Churchill situation and writes:-

" The degree to which Churchill overrode professional advice from Pound, or directly intervened in operational matters, thus circumventing Pound's authority, has also proved controversial, with Roskill, as official historian, especially critical both of Churchill's interference and Pound's reluctance or inability to confront him. It is not hard to find examples of Churchill intervening in the operational chain of command directly or indirectly. It is rather harder to find examples where such interventions either cut across Admiralty intent or produced outcomes the Admiralty did not want. Brodhurst [author of the only full biography of Pound] also argues that Pound was good at handling Churchill. He deliberately avoided the type of head-on collision, implicit in the "standing up to Churchill" sought by Roskill, in favour of wearing the prime minister down with reasoned argument, which was invariably successful. The case above all others which is quoted to illustrate Churchill riding roughshod over Pound's advice is the deployment of Force Z in late 1941. As this book will demonstrate, the reality of the positions taken in this debate is almost the opposite of historical consensus."

Boyd also note the Brodhurst investigated the position re Pound's health, including consulting modern medical opinion "and doubts health and fatigue were major factors before 1943".
 
Part of Post 13 again.
If they're still operational when British naval forces were evacuated from Singapore there are three alternatives.
  1. They're sent to Java and are sunk in a "Battle of the Java Sea on Steroids" in which the ABDA force was reinforced by Prince of Wales & Repulse and the Japanese were reinforced by Mutsu & Nagato.
  2. They're sent to Ceylon and reinforce "Force A" of the Eastern Fleet.
  3. They're sent to Perth and find their to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of Coral Sea.
This is inspired by Post 38 and is a combination of Options 2 and 3.

ABDAs ships are withdrawn at the end of January/beginning of February 1942.

Houston, Perth & the American destroyers are sent to Perth. They find their way to Sydney in time to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Houston & Perth serve in the Guadalcanal Campaign.

Prince of Wales & Repulse plus the British & Dutch cruisers & destroyers are sent to Ceylon and the R class battleships are sent to Alexandria to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet. Not having the R class means Somerville doesn't have to divide his ships into a slow force & a fast force so the aircraft carriers and the capital ships Prince of Wales, Repulse & Warspite have a much thicker screen of cruisers and destroyers ITTL than the aircraft carriers and Warspite had IOTL.

The R class battleships are used to "beef up" the escorts of the Alexandria to Malta convoys that sailed between March and August 1942.
  • MW.10 in March. However, in common with the "real world" all the ships that got through to Malta were sunk after arrival.
  • Operation Vigorous in June reaches Malta and Vian's force also escorts Harpoon the westbound convoy to Malta after it had passed the Sicilian Narrows.
  • The dummy convoy in August that acted as a diversion for Operation Pedestal IOTL is a proper convoy ITTL which fights it's way to Malta and escorts the survivors of Pedestal to Malta after they have passed through the Sicilian Narrows.
Is that plausible?
The British & Dutch ABDA ships were the cruisers Exeter, De Ruyter & Java, the British destroyers Electra, Encounter & Jupiter and the Dutch destroyers Banckert, Evertsen, Kortanaer, Piet Hein, Van Ghent, Van Ness & Witte de With.

The force available to Somerville at the end of March 1942 in the "Real World" was 3 aircraft carriers (Formidable, Hermes & Indomitable), 5 battleships (Warspite & 4 R class), 7 cruisers, 16 destroyers and 7 submarines.

Not allowing for refits & repairs the force available to Somerville at the end of March in "This Version of History" were 3 aircraft carriers, 3 capital ships (Prince of Wales, Repulse & Warspite), 10 cruisers, 26 destroyers and 7 submarines.

That's only going to give the Kido Butai more targets to sink if the Japanese locate the Eastern Fleet and it's possible that (in common with Hermes, Cornwall & Dorsetshire & the two destroyers) some of the extra ships would be caught & sunk if any were detached from the Fleet. However, it makes things more interesting if the Anglo-Dutch force finds the Japanese first and is able to attack at night.

Another factor is that Phillips would have been in command instead of Somerville. Would he have used the available force differently from Somerville?

Though what I want to happen is roughly what happened in the "Real World" with the same losses. This would allow for as many as 3 extra cruisers and 10 extra destroyers to be taken from the Eastern Fleet to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet for Operation Vigorous and the August convoy that compliments Operation Pedestal.
 
Time to look beyond the numbers of ships and their suitability to the Med.

The Vigorous convoy consisted of 11 merchantmen, 2 rescue ships and a dummy battleship (Centurion).

Its escort consisted of 8 cruisers (4 Didos, Arethusa, the AA cruiser Coventry and 2 Towns), 14 fleet destroyers (7 J/K/N, 2 Tribals, 2 P class with AA main armament, & 6 A-I class), 9 Hunt class destroyers plus 4 Flower class corvettes & 2 Bangor class minesweepers. Total 40 ships.

Of those the 2 Town class cruisers and 3 N class & 1 P class destroyers had come from the IO. The cruisers were not available to your IO fleet commander at the end of March but the destroyers were. Note the decision to sent the two available modern ships as opposed to all the old cruisers.

Looking at the ships available in the IO at the end of March the majority of the cruisers and destroyers were very poorly armed against aircraft attack. The IO was bottom of the list for things like additional 20mm. The Dutch are going to want to retain their ships in the IO to face their real enemy the Japanese. So unless the Cornwall, Dorsetshire & Exeter survive your new scenario, I see very little worthwhile sending to the Med to augment the escort of the Vigorous convoy. Emerald, Enterprise, Dragon & Caledon are little more than sitting ducks in a high air threat environment. By the end of 1942 all 4 had been withdrawn for refits that included substantial upgrading of their AA armament.

In fact the best ship to send would be the van Heemskerk with its 4" HA main armament. Yet come June 1942 she was retained in the IO with Birmingham & Newcastle sent to the Med.
 
Link to Post 51 - Time to look beyond the numbers of ships and their suitability to the Med.
I didn't read the above until today because you're on my ignore list.

I was expecting it to be a critique on the suitability of the R class battleships for Mediterranean operations due to their speed & condition of their machinery and also on the suitability of the Dutch ships on account of their AA armaments. However, in the case of the Dutch ships it seems that they weren't as bad as I expected as the limited information that I have is that they're about the same as contemporary British ships.

I disagree about the Dutch refusing to send any ships to reinforce the June and August Malta convoys. However, there is a possibility that they'll be evacuated to Australia instead of Ceylon. This is because Tromp (van Heemskerk's sister ship) was sent to Australia and spent the rest of the war fighting with the RAN & USN.

I agree that it's possible that Exeter would have been sunk with Cornwall & Dorsetshire.

Do you have any information on the dummy convoy that was run from Alexandria in August 1942 as a diversion for Operation Pedestal?

I think this comes from the British Official History of the War Against Japan. It is Appendix 9 "Naval Forces Taking Part in Operations of Ceylon 29th March-10th April, 1942" on Pages 448 & 449.

CVs: Hermes, Formidable & Indomitable.​
BBs: Ramilies, Revenge, Resolution, Royal Sovereign & Warspite​
CAs: Cornwall & Dorsetshire​
CLs: Caledon, Dragon, Emerald & Enterprise and the AA Cruiser Heemskerk (RNLN).​
DDs: Arrow, Decoy, Fortune, Foxhound, Griffin, Hotspur, Issac Sweers (RNLN), Napier, Nestor, Norman, Paladin, Panther, Scout & Vampire (RAN).​

The 14 destroyers consisted of: 6 A to I type, one Dutch Gerard Callenburgh class, 3 N class, 2 P class, one R&S class and one V&W class. I don't know what their status was in June 1942 or August 1942 or if any ships that had been sent to the Eastern Fleet to bolster its destroyer force.

The Naval-History.net page on the Malta Convoys the force assigned to Operation Vigorous includes some familiar names. Viz.
The convoy, entitled ME 11, sailed in three sections, 11A from Haifa AJAX, CITY OF EDINBURGH, CITY OF LINCOLN, CITY OF PRETORIA and ELIZABETH BAKKE escorted by the destroyers HOTSPUR, INCONSTANT, NAPIER, NESTOR, NIZAM and NORMAN, from Alexandria 11B comprised the tankers BULKOIL and POTARO escorted by the destroyers FORTUNE, PAKENHAM and PALADIN while Port Said sailed 11C AAGTEKIRK, BHUTAN, CITY OF CALCUTTA and REMBRANDT.
And.
The escorting forces were the cruisers ARETHUSA, BIRMINGHAM, CLEOPATRA, DIDO, EURYALUS, HERMIONE and NEWCASTLE, destroyers HURWORTH and TETCOTT of the AA capable Hunt class and the fleet destroyers GRIFFIN, HASTY, HERO, JAVELIN, JERVIS, KELVIN, SIKH and ZULU few of which had any great AA capability. Additionally there sailed the corvettes DELPHINIUM, ERICA, PRIMULA and SNAPDRAGON and minesweepers BOSTON and SEAHAM. The miscellaneous collection was completed by four MTBs, the rescue ships ANTWERP and MALINES and the disarmed battleship, CENTURION. The rationale for her inclusion was that a) she was crudely disguised as a unit of the KING GEORGE V class b) her pre W War I armour might afford her a better chance of survival than a merchant ship c) she carried 2000 tons of supplies, d) she was available and expendable. The combined convoy was intended for a mean speed of thirteen knots, an optimistic estimate as became clear quite early in the operation.
I counted 7 out of 14 destroyers that were in the Eastern Fleet from the end of March to the beginning of April 1942.

In spite of me disagreeing about the RNLN ships I find it puzzling that Heemskerk and Issac Sweers (which had six 4" AA guns in 3 twin mountings) didn't take part. However, I do count no less than 4 Dido class light cruisers while Arethusa, Birmingham and Newcastle were each armed with eight 4" AA in four twin mountings.
 
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@EwanS this the next paragraph from the Naval History net page about Operation Vigorous.
MW 11C was sailed ahead of the other two sections, on 11.6, and ordered to go as far east as Tobruk before turning back to join the other two sections. The plan was that this sortie, ostensibly to supply Tobruk, would lure the Italian fleet out of its bases, expose it to attack and drain its fuel supplies; the ruse did not succeed. Escorted by the AA cruiser COVENTRY and the destroyers AIREDALE, ALDENHAM, BEAUFORT, CROOME, DULVERTON, ERIDGE and HURWORTH joined by EXMOOR off Alexandria, the convoy had just turned to return to the rendezvous on the evening of 12.6 when it was attacked by dive bombers. CITY OF CALCUTTA was damaged and had to be sent in to Tobruk with CROOME and EXMOOR. The remaining ships returned eastward and made the junction with the balance of the convoy on 13.6 when the Hunt class destroyers were sent back to Alexandria to fuel.
I count one AA Cruiser and 8 Hunt class escort destroyers. It's possible that Heemskerk (and Issac Sweers) weren't sent to escort the convoy because it was thought that it had enough AA capable ships. As far as I can remember it wasn't the air threat that made Harwood order the convoy to turn back it was the surface threat.
 
The RN's night fighting doctrine (which as far as I know was as good if not better than the IJN's) might be as important as the main armament of the two ships. Plus my understanding is that both ships had better radar than the American ships that fought in the night battles of 1942 and that their crews knew how to use it. However, as a note of caution the RAN ships that took part in the Battle of Savo Island were trained in the RN's night fighting doctrine, (as far as I know) had better radar than the American cruisers and their crews knew how to use it, but the Japanese still won and in a spectacular fashion at that.

Plus knowing that two British capital ships were in the vicinity of Guadalcanal might make the Japanese decide that it was too risky to send reinforcements to Guadalcanal and bombard Henderson Field or "if they were going to do it - they'd have to do it properly" and send capital ships of their own in sooner.
The problem with everyone's radar at Guadalcanal was that the state-of-the-art in August 1942 meant that even the RAN's radar couldn't pick out the IJN ships from the background of the islands they were passing near on their approach, nor after the shooting started.
 
The RN's night fighting doctrine (which as far as I know was as good if not better than the IJN's) might be as important as the main armament of the two ships. Plus my understanding is that both ships had better radar than the American ships that fought in the night battles of 1942 and that their crews knew how to use it. However, as a note of caution the RAN ships that took part in the Battle of Savo Island were trained in the RN's night fighting doctrine, (as far as I know) had better radar than the American cruisers and their crews knew how to use it, but the Japanese still won and in a spectacular fashion at that.

Plus knowing that two British capital ships were in the vicinity of Guadalcanal might make the Japanese decide that it was too risky to send reinforcements to Guadalcanal and bombard Henderson Field or "if they were going to do it - they'd have to do it properly" and send capital ships of their own in sooner.
The problem with everyone's radar at Guadalcanal was that the state-of-the-art in August 1942 meant that even the RAN's radar couldn't pick out the IJN ships from the background of the islands they were passing near on their approach, nor after the shooting started.
Fair enough. In that case do you think Houston and Perth would only have been additional targets for Mikawa's cruisers?
 
The RN's night fighting doctrine (which as far as I know was as good if not better than the IJN's) might be as important as the main armament of the two ships. Plus my understanding is that both ships had better radar than the American ships that fought in the night battles of 1942 and that their crews knew how to use it. However, as a note of caution the RAN ships that took part in the Battle of Savo Island were trained in the RN's night fighting doctrine, (as far as I know) had better radar than the American cruisers and their crews knew how to use it, but the Japanese still won and in a spectacular fashion at that.

Plus knowing that two British capital ships were in the vicinity of Guadalcanal might make the Japanese decide that it was too risky to send reinforcements to Guadalcanal and bombard Henderson Field or "if they were going to do it - they'd have to do it properly" and send capital ships of their own in sooner.
The problem with everyone's radar at Guadalcanal was that the state-of-the-art in August 1942 meant that even the RAN's radar couldn't pick out the IJN ships from the background of the islands they were passing near on their approach, nor after the shooting started.
Fair enough. In that case do you think Houston and Perth would only have been additional targets for Mikawa's cruisers?
The key would be if one, say Perth, had been stationed closer to the area where the IJN group entered the sound, and could provide radioed warning before the Japanese could launch their torpedoes (USS Blue DD-387 was supposed to be performing that task, but its lookouts failed to spot the IJN ships*).

Also, Houston's skipper would NOT have frozen like Chicago's captain did... and therefore the northern group would have received detailed radio reports while the IJN cruisers were still engaged with the southern group and have been ready, rather than completely surprised as they were historically - thanks to their considering the "fireworks show" as being of no importance due to no radio report being received from Chicago.



* In the moonlight, lookouts on the IJN ships could clearly see Blue approaching, then reversing course less than 2 kilometers from them and sailing away from their line-of-advance, they even saw a sailor on the stern light a cigarette - but the moonlight did not illuminate the IJN ships, and they blended into the island behind.
 
You could also say what-if the Northumberland-class heavy cruisers hadn't been cancelled and the RN had two additional 8in cruisers in the Far East?
That would have resulted in 20,000 tons being deducted from the British Commonwealth's light cruiser tonnage quota in the First London Naval Treaty. So it's probable that 3 Leanders or 2 Towns aren't built. Therefore, Northumberland & Surrey would have had to take the place of those ships and wouldn't be in the Far East.
 
What about if Glorious had not been sunk and Indomitable still doesn't run aground? Wouldn't an extra carrier change the calculus?
Part of Post 6.
It has been proved that Indomitable couldn't have reached Singapore in time to accompany Force Z if she hadn't run aground.
Glorious (and/or Courageous) not being sunk could change the calculus considerably between June 1940 and December 1941. It depends upon what's done with her (or them).
In July 1940 Courageous goes to the Home Fleet and Glorious is sent to the Mediterranean Fleet.

Glorious is sunk during the Battle of Crete, but in the meantime more damage is done to the Italian Fleet at Taranto while Illustrious is less badly damaged of Malta in January 1941 and Formidable less badly damaged off Crete. Both ships return to service sooner. One and possibly both is ready in time to accompany Force Z. (It's possible that Southampton might not have been sunk off Malta in January 1941 and that some of the 3 cruisers & 6 destroyers lost during the Battle of Crete survive due to the extra air cover provided.)

Having Courageous in the Home Fleet ship might result in the Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Scheer, Hipper and Prinz Eugen having much shorter careers. E.g. she makes the first air attack on Bismarck instead of Victorious and because she had 3-4 times as many Swordfish embarked was able to slow the German ship down sufficiently for King George V, Prince of Wales and possibly Repulse to sink her soon afterwards. Prinz Eugen might still be with Bismarck and in that case is sunk with her.

The sinking of Bismarck and completion of Victorious allows Courageous to be transferred to Alexandria to replace her sister and Formidable. She would provide the Mediterranean Fleet with A/S cover as well as fighter cover which might prevent the loss of Barham.

This is somewhat convoluted. According to Roskill, Queen Elisabeth and Valiant should have been escorting a convoy when the Italian human torpedoes sank them but according him they had to be left at Alexandria for want to destroyers to screen them. However, the air cover provided by Glorious and then Courageous meant the Mediterranean Fleet lost fewer destroyers so enough were available to screen the two battleships and they weren't sunk at Alexandria. Queen Elisabeth, Valiant and if she survived Barham are sent to join Warspite at Ceylon where they form the First Battle Squadron within the Eastern Fleet. (The Second Battle Squadron was in the Home Fleet and the 4 R class were the Third Battle Squadron.)
 
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The Opening Post.
While I was reading about a report abou Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse, I suddenly wondered what history would have been like if HMS Indomitable had been assigned to the Force Z without any damage, or if the Implacable Class Aircraft Carrier had been built earlier than the original history and assigned to the Force Z.

What do you think about it?
Post 6.
Well, the site owner (Called Dae-Sa) I referred to must have encountered some wrong information. The site operator said HMS Indomitable's failure to join Force Z was due to rocks in the West Indies.

Anyway, the latter premise was that I asked because of the alternative history that I personally thought of.
It has been proved that Indomitable couldn't have reached Singapore in time to accompany Force Z if she hadn't run aground.
However, Indomitable (and Formidable, Implacable, Indefatigable, & Victorious) could have been completed sooner.

I've been watching many of Dr Alexander Clarke's videos recently and he says they could and should have been built in about 36 months. (I'm not including Illustrious because she was completed about 36 months after being laid down).

He blames Churchill (when he became First Lord of the Admiralty in the Autumn of 1939) for suspending them when he gave priority to building convoy escorts and suspending construction of fleet units like the armoured carriers to do it. Furthermore, he claims that not stopping the construction of the aircraft carriers was something that aught to have been done without the benefit of hindsight.

I think Churchill's decision was the lesser of evils. Furthermore, a year later the RN needed every convoy escort it could get. However, he's a professional naval historian with a PHD in war studies and I'm not. So I'll go with what he says.

Having Formidable & Victorious completed in the summer of 1940 and Indomitable at the end of 1940 would have made a lot of difference with or without the losses of Courageous & Glorious. E.g. Formidable with Illustrious & Glorious at Taranto & off Malta in January 1941 and Indomitable & Victorious helping Courageous find & destroy Hipper, Scheer & The Twins in the Winter of 1940-41 and finally Indomitable with Courageous & Victorious with a full-strength air group in the Bismarck Chase.

Even if the only change is that Indomitable is completed a few months earlier she would be able to reach Singapore in time to sail with Force Z. That is as long as she doesn't hit a rock that puts her out of action for a few months in which case we're back to square one.
 
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It didn't delay her "months". It only delayed her 21 days.


Nov 2: 18.00 Arrived Jamaica. Ran on reef entering harbour.
Nov 3: 02.30 Got off reef. Clocks 6 hours back on B.S.T.
Nov 4: [Sailed] For Norfolk. V.A Max speed during passage 16 knots due to drainage.
Nov 8: Arrived off Norfolk during forenoon. Cold day.
Nov 9 – 10: At Norfolk Naval Air Station. Eight leaves.
Nov 19: In [Elizabeth] river. Marsh fires caused bad visibility, returned to berth in the
evening.
Nov 20: [sailed] For Jamaica
Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting
trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
 
This is for the benefit of everyone else as @NOMISYRRUC has me on ignore at the present time (see post #52)!;)

This is the second time in recent months that I have seen Dr Clarke’s video referred to with his assertion that Churchill suspended all the carriers when he became First Lord of the Admiralty on 3 Sept 1939. Anyone got a link to it as I haven’t been able to find it? I would love to know the basis for that assertion as in all my researches on the class and British warship building around that time I have found NO evidence for it. In fact there seems to be plenty of evidence to the contrary.

The Illustrious/Implacable classes were subject to delay almost from the very start. Much of their armour, and that for the Fiji class cruisers, had to be ordered from Czechoslovakia due to a lack of capacity at the time in the British armour industry, with priority going to the battleships. Deliveries from there continued right up to August 1939, but not everything ordered was delivered. And with that armour being structural on the carriers most of it had to be in place before launch.

Circa three years build time seems to me to be a reasonable length of time for a carrier in the lead up to WW2. Ark Royal took 39, Illustrious 36, the first two Yorktowns took 39 & 46 (although Hornet only took 25), Wasp 47, while the Essex class were planned for 36. The Shokakus took 44 & 39 months. But the Admiralty were hoping for the Implacables in 32 which seems a bit optimistic.

In 1938 it was estimated that armour delays would add 9 months to the build time of Indomitable. That was why the opportunity was taken to modify her design to include as many features of the 1938 carrier (Implacable) as possible given the state of her build at that point, most notably the half hangar aft. (see Friedman, “British Carrier Aviation”). And after war started modifications began to be made to designs in the light of early war experience.

ADM 1/10112 dated 28 March 1939 noted that the Controller had reported a couple of weeks previously, that completion of the first two 1936 Programme carriers had been delayed and that the new completion dates were expected to be as follows:-

Illustrious – mid-May 1940
Victorious – mid-Sept 1940

Note that this is before either ship was launched. The Illustrious then completed to that schedule but Victorious was further delayed.

By 1939, the Admiralty was still planning its future Programmes and had agreed to order a single carrier in each of the 1939, 1940 & 1941 Programmes. It also planned in the summer of 1939 for what it would it would do in the outbreak of war in the short term, both in terms of ships it would cancel or suspend and ships which it would add to the building Programmes. (See Moore “Building for Victory”). He specifically notes that, at a meeting on 21 July 1939, in relation to these plans, “The aircraft carriers were to go on including the 1939 programme ship (INDEFATIGABLE) which had just been ordered and laid down.” (In fact at that point while Indefatigable had been ordered on 19 June 1939, she wasn’t laid down until 3 Nov 1939).

On the 4th Sept, the day after Churchill took office, that plan was implemented with modifications only to the cruiser and smaller warships. Further changes were made in Oct 1939 to the battleship programme. Moore makes no mention of any changes to the carrier programme at this time. Churchill isn't even mentioned by Moore as being involved in that process, but much rested on the Treasury and what they felt could be afforded.

In Appendix 4 Moore gives the Admiralty’s anticipated completion dates for ships of cruiser size and above at various dates (with suspensions noted where appropriate with an ‘S’). He also notes “The reality in the shipyards was not always translated into reduced expectations at the Admiralty”.



ProgrammeShipAs at 9/39As at 9/40As at 3/41As at 9/41As at 3/42As at 9/42Actual completionTotal build time (months)
1936Illustrious5/4025/5/4037
1936Victorious9/4012/405/4115/5/4148
1937Formidable10/4011/4024/11/4041
1937Indomitable4/416/4110/10/4147
1938Implacable10/41?End 194303/4412/4301/4428/8/4466
1939Indefatigable6/42SMid 194312/4312/4311/433/5/4454


There are a number of points that seem to me to refute the assertion that the carriers were all suspended when Churchill became First Lord on 3 Sept 1939.

Illustrious completed in May 1940, just as predicted in March 1939 and as predicted in Sept 1939.

Indefatigable was ordered in June 1939 and laid down in Nov 1939 after Churchill’s appointment. She was suspended in May 1940 following the crisis in France. The Admiralty ordered work on her restarted in Sept 1940 with Churchill himself noting on 15 October “press on with Indefatigable but we do not need to consider a new carrier until early next year”.

Other points of interest relating to the delays in building these ships include

The Blitz – for example Barrow where Indomitable was building, was heavily hit in April 1941 with the destruction of 25% of the housing stock. While the ship herself was not damaged there would have been disruption in the yard while workers found new homes and pushing her completion date back. She actually sailed on trials on 7 Sept 1941.

The same thing happened at the John Brown yard at Clydebank where Indefatigable was building. Again damage to the yard was light but the surrounding town became the most heavily damaged place in the country. For a couple of days after the raid only some 10% of the workforce turned up for work. By the end of the following week it was 70% and the week after 80%. And some disruption continued after that.

While Implacable building at Fairfield on the Clyde was never suspended, the yard had too much work in hand in 1940/41 to make any progress on her for 13 months between March 1940 and April 1941. To put it in context they reportedly had as much work on hand as John Brown but with half the workforce. Orders for two destroyers were moved to John Brown during this time. (Moore).

Implacable & Indefatigable were also delayed by redesign work, ever changing priorities, large amounts of repair work in the yards and by machinery defects after they left the yards on trials but before those completion dates noted.

As for Victorious I’m still puzzled by the delays to her. She was on the slips for 4 months longer than Illustrious but the same length of time as Indomitable which required all those design modifications while under construction. She then took an extra 7 months to complete, some two months more than even Indomitable. I’m not clear how badly she would have been affected by armour delays.
 
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It didn't delay her "months". It only delayed her 21 days.


Nov 2: 18.00 Arrived Jamaica. Ran on reef entering harbour.
Nov 3: 02.30 Got off reef. Clocks 6 hours back on B.S.T.
Nov 4: [Sailed] For Norfolk. V.A Max speed during passage 16 knots due to drainage.
Nov 8: Arrived off Norfolk during forenoon. Cold day.
Nov 9 – 10: At Norfolk Naval Air Station. Eight leaves.
Nov 19: In [Elizabeth] river. Marsh fires caused bad visibility, returned to berth in the
evening.
Nov 20: [sailed] For Jamaica
Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting
trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Wrong months. Wrong reef.

I was writing about her taking a few months less than 41 to build, but she might hit another reef that puts her out of action for long enough to still miss sailing with Force Z.

Ark Royal and Illustrious classes.png

Dates are from Conway's 1922-46. If they're wrong, blame the printers, not me.
 
What I wrote about Indomitable not being able to reach Singapore in time to join Force Z if she hadn't hit the reef may be wrong.

I did these calculations using Sea-Distances.org. for Kingston, Jamaica to Singapore.
Way #1
Distance 10,840 nautical miles VIA Suez Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 03 hours​
Way #2
Distance 11,089 nautical miles VIA Panama Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 19 hours​
Way #3
Distance 11,860 nautical miles VIA Cape of Good Hope​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 32 days 23 hours​
Way #4
Distance 15,753 nautical miles VIA Strait of Magellan​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 18 hours​
Way #5
Distance 15,817 nautical miles VIA Cape Horn​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 22 hours​

The Suez Canal route is out because that will mean sailing through the Mediterranean. However, the Panama Canal route gets Indomitable to Singapore on 5th December 1941 if she sailed on 2nd November. (Does crossing the International Date Line add or deduct one day.) The Cape of Good Hope route allows it to arrive on 7th December 1941 if she sails on 2nd November.

A higher average speed improves the feasibility. E.g. 20 knots via the Panama Canal is 23 days 2 hours and via Cape Horn is 24 days 17 hours.
 
What I wrote about Indomitable not being able to reach Singapore in time to join Force Z if she hadn't hit the reef may be wrong.

I did these calculations using Sea-Distances.org. for Kingston, Jamaica to Singapore.
Way #1
Distance 10,840 nautical miles VIA Suez Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 03 hours​
Way #2
Distance 11,089 nautical miles VIA Panama Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 19 hours​
Way #3
Distance 11,860 nautical miles VIA Cape of Good Hope​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 32 days 23 hours​
Way #4
Distance 15,753 nautical miles VIA Strait of Magellan​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 18 hours​
Way #5
Distance 15,817 nautical miles VIA Cape Horn​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 22 hours​

The Suez Canal route is out because that will mean sailing through the Mediterranean. However, the Panama Canal route gets Indomitable to Singapore on 5th December 1941 if she sailed on 2nd November. (Does crossing the International Date Line add or deduct one day.) The Cape of Good Hope route allows it to arrive on 7th December 1941 if she sails on 2nd November.
Considering the situation of the Royal Navy at the time (the Royal Navy was reluctant to use the Suez Canal because of Regia Marina) and the HMS indomitable range of navigation (https://www.armouredcarriers.com/technicaldata), Way#3), it seems the most reasonable route.

*I deleted the previous one because I kept writing strange things due to a smartphone error.
 
What I wrote about Indomitable not being able to reach Singapore in time to join Force Z if she hadn't hit the reef may be wrong.

I did these calculations using Sea-Distances.org. for Kingston, Jamaica to Singapore.
Way #1
Distance 10,840 nautical miles VIA Suez Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 03 hours​
Way #2
Distance 11,089 nautical miles VIA Panama Canal​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 30 days 19 hours​
Way #3
Distance 11,860 nautical miles VIA Cape of Good Hope​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 32 days 23 hours​
Way #4
Distance 15,753 nautical miles VIA Strait of Magellan​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 18 hours​
Way #5
Distance 15,817 nautical miles VIA Cape Horn​
Vessel speed 15 knots​
Time 43 days 22 hours​

The Suez Canal route is out because that will mean sailing through the Mediterranean. However, the Panama Canal route gets Indomitable to Singapore on 5th December 1941 if she sailed on 2nd November. (Does crossing the International Date Line add or deduct one day.) The Cape of Good Hope route allows it to arrive on 7th December 1941 if she sails on 2nd November.
Considering the situation of the Royal Navy at the time (the Royal Navy was reluctant to use the Suez Canal because of Regia Marina) and the HMS indomitable range of navigation (https://www.armouredcarriers.com/technicaldata), Way#3), it seems the most reasonable route.

*I deleted the previous one because I kept writing strange things due to a smartphone error.
Armoured Carriers says 6,900miles (5,996 nautical miles) @ 20kts.
  • Honolulu, Hawaii is 5,282 nautical miles from Kingston, Jamaica. (Sea-Distances.org didn't do Pearl Harbour) which can be reached in 11 days 00 hours at 20 knots.
  • Honolulu is 5,877 nautical miles from Singapore, which can be reached in 12 days 06 hours at 20 knots.
  • That's 23 days 06 hours (plus the time needed to refuel at Pearl Harbour) which if Indomitable leaves Kingston on 2nd November 1941 gets her to Singapore before the end of November 1941.
The Cape of Good Hope route's length was much closer to the Panama Canal route's than I expected. If the Cape route is used it will be possible to refuel at Freetown, Sierra Leone, Simonstown, South Africa, and Trincomalee, Ceylon if necessary. I've not done the calculations, but it looks like there's more than enough time to reach Singapore before Force Z sails with one or two refuelling stops, provided she's able to steam at 20 knots and provided she leaves Kingston on 2nd November 1941.
 
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That's assuming that the RN, for some unknown reason, decides to delete the entire work-up & training period for the brand new carrier that was the whole reason she went to Bermuda in the first place!

Lets look at that:

Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Nov 30: Sent for week to H.M.S BUZZARD. Palisadoes. F.A.A aerodrome.
Above: Kingston harbour, Jamaica. Below: two views of Kingston, Jamaica
Dec 6: Ship back in harbour. Returned to ship.
Dec 6 -12: Leave in Kingston.
Dec 13: [sailed] For Trinidad.
Dec 15: Sighted Trinidad. Lay off Port of Spain.
Dec 16: Submarine scare - F.A.A Cadets [Fleet Air Arm Observers from H.M.S.
GOSHAWK, R.N. Ait Station Piarco] come to sea with us. Bad show. Two landing crashes.
Dec 17: 23.00 To sea for Cape Town.

Even after Japan attacks UK possessions in the far east, they still kept her in the Caribbean for 10 more days to finish up training etc!

That week of 30 Nov to 6 Dec was the aircrew carrier qualification & flight deck crew final training period, without which things would have been a lot dicier (and more landing/flight deck accidents and losses) than the RN was willing to accept - even in wartime.

Then the RN felt the crew needed leave prior to heading east.

Now some of this might be the need to wait for the ship's full warload of materials and weapons, which had NOT been planned to arrive quite this early, but in the "no reef collision" scenario, there would have still been no reason for those materials to have arrived early.
 
That's assuming that the RN, for some unknown reason, decides to delete the entire work-up & training period for the brand new carrier that was the whole reason she went to Bermuda in the first place!

Lets look at that:

Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Nov 30: Sent for week to H.M.S BUZZARD. Palisadoes. F.A.A aerodrome.
Dec 6: Ship back in harbour. Returned to ship.
Dec 6 -12: Leave in Kingston.
Dec 13: [sailed] For Trinidad.
Dec 15: Sighted Trinidad. Lay off Port of Spain.
Dec 16: Submarine scare - F.A.A Cadets [Fleet Air Arm Observers from H.M.S.
GOSHAWK, R.N. Ait Station Piarco] come to sea with us. Bad show. Two landing crashes.
Dec 17: 23.00 To sea for Cape Town.

Even after Japan attacks UK possessions in the far east, they still kept her in the Caribbean for 10 more days to finish up training etc!


That week of 30 Nov to 6 Dec was the aircrew carrier qualification & flight deck crew final training period, without which things would have been a lot dicier (and more landing/flight deck accidents and losses) than the RN was willing to accept - even in wartime.

Then the RN felt the crew needed leave prior to heading east.

Now some of this might be the need to wait for the ship's full warload of materials and weapons, which had NOT been planned to arrive quite this early, but in the "no reef collision" scenario, there would have still been no reason for those materials to have arrived early, so the wait would still be there.

For her to sail straight for Singapore on 2 Nov would have required a completely different training and deployment plan to be in place from the beginning of October at the latest.
 
That's assuming that the RN, for some unknown reason, decides to delete the entire work-up & training period for the brand new carrier that was the whole reason she went to Bermuda in the first place!

Lets look at that:

Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Nov 30: Sent for week to H.M.S BUZZARD. Palisadoes. F.A.A aerodrome.
Dec 6: Ship back in harbour. Returned to ship.
Dec 6 -12: Leave in Kingston.
Dec 13: [sailed] For Trinidad.
Dec 15: Sighted Trinidad. Lay off Port of Spain.
Dec 16: Submarine scare - F.A.A Cadets [Fleet Air Arm Observers from H.M.S.
GOSHAWK, R.N. Ait Station Piarco] come to sea with us. Bad show. Two landing crashes.
Dec 17: 23.00 To sea for Cape Town.

Even after Japan attacks UK possessions in the far east, they still kept her in the Caribbean for 10 more days to finish up training etc!


That week of 30 Nov to 6 Dec was the aircrew carrier qualification & flight deck crew final training period, without which things would have been a lot dicier (and more landing/flight deck accidents and losses) than the RN was willing to accept - even in wartime.

Then the RN felt the crew needed leave prior to heading east.

Now some of this might be the need to wait for the ship's full warload of materials and weapons, which had NOT been planned to arrive quite this early, but in the "no reef collision" scenario, there would have still been no reason for those materials to have arrived early, so the wait would still be there.

For her to sail straight for Singapore on 2 Nov would have required a completely different training and deployment plan to be in place from the beginning of October at the latest.

That's assuming that the RN, for some unknown reason, decides to delete the entire work-up & training period for the brand new carrier that was the whole reason she went to Bermuda in the first place!

Lets look at that:

Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Nov 30: Sent for week to H.M.S BUZZARD. Palisadoes. F.A.A aerodrome.
Dec 6: Ship back in harbour. Returned to ship.
Dec 6 -12: Leave in Kingston.
Dec 13: [sailed] For Trinidad.
Dec 15: Sighted Trinidad. Lay off Port of Spain.
Dec 16: Submarine scare - F.A.A Cadets [Fleet Air Arm Observers from H.M.S.
GOSHAWK, R.N. Ait Station Piarco] come to sea with us. Bad show. Two landing crashes.
Dec 17: 23.00 To sea for Cape Town.

Even after Japan attacks UK possessions in the far east, they still kept her in the Caribbean for 10 more days to finish up training etc!


That week of 30 Nov to 6 Dec was the aircrew carrier qualification & flight deck crew final training period, without which things would have been a lot dicier (and more landing/flight deck accidents and losses) than the RN was willing to accept - even in wartime.

Then the RN felt the crew needed leave prior to heading east.

Now some of this might be the need to wait for the ship's full warload of materials and weapons, which had NOT been planned to arrive quite this early, but in the "no reef collision" scenario, there would have still been no reason for those materials to have arrived early, so the wait would still be there.

For her to sail straight for Singapore on 2 Nov would have required a completely different training and deployment plan to be in place from the beginning of October at the latest.
Thank you for good information!

Anyway, what do you think would have happened if HMS Indomitable had somehow joined Force Z at Simonstown Naval Base and then went to Singapore?
 
That's assuming that the RN, for some unknown reason, decides to delete the entire work-up & training period for the brand new carrier that was the whole reason she went to Bermuda in the first place!

Lets look at that:

Nov 24 - 28: Lying off Jamaica. Kingston harbour. Out all week off Kingston fighting trials.
Nov 29: Back in harbour
Nov 30: Sent for week to H.M.S BUZZARD. Palisadoes. F.A.A aerodrome.
Above: Kingston harbour, Jamaica. Below: two views of Kingston, Jamaica
Dec 6: Ship back in harbour. Returned to ship.
Dec 6 -12: Leave in Kingston.
Dec 13: [sailed] For Trinidad.
Dec 15: Sighted Trinidad. Lay off Port of Spain.
Dec 16: Submarine scare - F.A.A Cadets [Fleet Air Arm Observers from H.M.S.
GOSHAWK, R.N. Ait Station Piarco] come to sea with us. Bad show. Two landing crashes.
Dec 17: 23.00 To sea for Cape Town.

Even after Japan attacks UK possessions in the far east, they still kept her in the Caribbean for 10 more days to finish up training etc!


That week of 30 Nov to 6 Dec was the aircrew carrier qualification & flight deck crew final training period, without which things would have been a lot dicier (and more landing/flight deck accidents and losses) than the RN was willing to accept - even in wartime.

Then the RN felt the crew needed leave prior to heading east.

Now some of this might be the need to wait for the ship's full warload of materials and weapons, which had NOT been planned to arrive quite this early, but in the "no reef collision" scenario, there would have still been no reason for those materials to have arrived early.
You miss the point. All I was saying was that there's time to get there before Force Z sailed if the grounding hadn't happened. That being said I take your point.
 
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