FFG(X)

[Deleted member 29851]

The original design was supposed to have 80% commonality with her European cousins. That ratio has since inverted to 20% commonality. Not sure if NAVSEA has acknowledged this, but I’m pretty sure this information comes from the GAO.

Yes, I am aware. The first mention of the word "commonality" and "Constellation" occurs in an April 2, 2024 article from USNI. It reads as follows:

> "At one point the Constellation design shared about 85 percent commonality with the original FREMM design, but the alterations have brought that commonality down to under 15 percent, a person familiar with the changes told USNI News."

https://news.usni.org/2024/04/02/constellation-frigate-delivery-delayed-3-years-says-navy

However, note this quote says nothing about an "original design," nor does it specify what "alterations" were made to the design. There are three points I want to bring up.

A) We have no idea how or when the 85% commonality number was calculated. Was it before the contract design was awarded? Was it a few months before the USNI article? We lack the context to properly evaluate this information. If this number predates the contract design award, did they factor in requirements for domestically-sourced equipment? Additionally, how is "commonality" being defined?

B) "Alterations" do not equate to "changing design requirements." Historically, when design requirements change, NAVSEA has been very public about it. See the changes from DD-21 to DD(X), canceling Zumwalt's SPY-4, cancelling AMDR X-Band for the Flight IIIs, CG(X) and the MAMJDF results, LCS Lethality and Survivability Upgrades, etc.
I can't find any reporting explicitly saying that NAVSEA changed the design requirements, no mention the GAO, CBO, or CRS reports, news articles, or interviews. Historical precedent says that if something did change, we would know.

C) There's simply no way the original requirements would allow for 85% commonality. The entire superstructure had to be rebuilt to accept SPY-6s, the powerplant was modified, the armament was completely redone, a whole bow thruster was installed, and DC standards were drastically increased. Keep in mind the European FREMMs only share 5% commonality. Also note all major components have to be domestically sourced, which means changing everything from surface search radars to door handles. There is simply no way to have 85% commonality.
It seems to me the 85% number was floated in the preliminary design stage, and as mandated design changes were made to use domestically-sourced components and increase DC standards, that number inevitably shrunk. Note none of this requires altering the design requirements. For that matter, what would they even change?

Point is, you're basing your entire argument off an 2-sentence statement from an anonymous official. The 85% number was always unrealistic, nor we don't know when those numbers were calculated, let alone how. I remain utterly unconvinced NAVSEA changed the design requirements.

 

[EmoBirb]

They are literally just under armed DDGs.

That's more or less what modern frigates are though. Large and heavy ships which are lighter on armaments than dedicated destroyers. Look towards European frigates and you'll see that they generally tend to be pretty big ships but don't pack the punch of ships of comparable or sometimes even smaller size.

Imo it's a matter of priority and doctrine. I see little reason in every ship having a quadrillion VLS with the associated cost of missiles. But indeed the Constellations are like 0.75 Burkes. But in a sense that's more or less what the Navy wanted. They just didn't plan to pay the according price, I think.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Yes, I am aware. The first mention of the word "commonality" and "Constellation" occurs in an April 2, 2024 article from USNI. It reads as follows:

> "At one point the Constellation design shared about 85 percent commonality with the original FREMM design, but the alterations have brought that commonality down to under 15 percent, a person familiar with the changes told USNI News."

https://news.usni.org/2024/04/02/constellation-frigate-delivery-delayed-3-years-says-navy

However, note this quote says nothing about an "original design," nor does it specify what "alterations" were made to the design. There are three points I want to bring up.

A) We have no idea how or when the 85% commonality number was calculated. Was it before the contract design was awarded? Was it a few months before the USNI article? We lack the context to properly evaluate this information. If this number predates the contract design award, did they factor in requirements for domestically-sourced equipment? Additionally, how is "commonality" being defined?

B) "Alterations" do not equate to "changing design requirements." Historically, when design requirements change, NAVSEA has been very public about it. See the changes from DD-21 to DD(X), canceling Zumwalt's SPY-4, cancelling AMDR X-Band for the Flight IIIs, CG(X) and the MAMJDF results, LCS Lethality and Survivability Upgrades, etc.
I can't find any reporting explicitly saying that NAVSEA changed the design requirements, no mention the GAO, CBO, or CRS reports, news articles, or interviews. Historical precedent says that if something did change, we would know.

C) There's simply no way the original requirements would allow for 85% commonality. The entire superstructure had to be rebuilt to accept SPY-6s, the powerplant was modified, the armament was completely redone, a whole bow thruster was installed, and DC standards were drastically increased. Keep in mind the European FREMMs only share 5% commonality. Also note all major components have to be domestically sourced, which means changing everything from surface search radars to door handles. There is simply no way to have 85% commonality.
It seems to me the 85% number was floated in the preliminary design stage, and as mandated design changes were made to use domestically-sourced components and increase DC standards, that number inevitably shrunk. Note none of this requires altering the design requirements. For that matter, what would they even change?

Point is, you're basing your entire argument off an 2-sentence statement from an anonymous official. The 85% number was always unrealistic, nor we don't know when those numbers were calculated, let alone how. I remain utterly unconvinced NAVSEA changed the design requirements.

Design and design requirements are different. I said they changed the design. An alteration is a change in the design.

Why is 85% commonality unrealistic for a ship that’s supposed to be an off the shelf mature design?

You’re obsessed with ‘design requirements’ no one ever said those changed. You can alter and change a design and remain within the design requirements.

A big ram pick up and an F-150 will most likely meet the same design requirements for a civilian pick up, but they are two completely different designs of pickup trucks.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

You’re obsessed with ‘design requirements’ no one ever said those changed. You can alter and change a design and remain within the design requirements.

Okay… So just to be clear, you agree the design requirements haven’t changed? If those remained stable and FMM was producing an acceptable design, why would NAVSEA have to modify the design?

They wouldn’t, unless FMM failed to produce an acceptable design. Which so far, they’ve been unable to do. The ship is 750 tons overweight and unable to meet the speed requirement. Additionally, NAVSEA does not do contractual design.

But let’s be clear, the design was always expected to change. Neither FREMM variant complies with USN survivability requirements, have commonality with the American surface fleet, nor can they take Aegis without significant modification.

So yes, I suppose NAVSEA is modifying the design by forcing compliance with the design requirements. Anything less would be gross negligence.

But they’re not going “actually we need completely different hydrodynamic performance sorry lol,” which would be irrational mismanagement. They’re changing the design by making it conform to the original requirements, which is entirely within reason. FMM just can’t deliver.

So what exactly is your issue with NAVSEA’s management of the program?

 

[joshjosh]

Not sure why anyone would believe the ships wouldn’t carry ASROC….

12 cells for ASROC leaves only 20 cells for TLAM and SAMs, luckily convoy escorts would likely rely on ESSM mostly, so that could quite easily be 48 ESSMs and a handful of SMs, and then a few TLAMs if you only have 32 cells..

TLAM isn't part of the requirements, and the TLAM computers aren't listed as part of the GFE, so we can be pretty confident that Constellation won't carry TLAM. I agree that VL-ASROC is an easier addition, and the ASW combat system is already being included.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Okay… So just to be clear, you agree the design requirements haven’t changed? If those remained stable and FMM was producing an acceptable design, why would NAVSEA have to modify the design?

They wouldn’t, unless FMM failed to produce an acceptable design. Which so far, they’ve been unable to do. The ship is 750 tons overweight and unable to meet the speed requirement. Additionally, NAVSEA does not do contractual design.

But let’s be clear, the design was always expected to change. Neither FREMM variant complies with USN survivability requirements, have commonality with the American surface fleet, nor can they take Aegis without significant modification.

So yes, I suppose NAVSEA is modifying the design by forcing compliance with the design requirements. Anything less would be gross negligence.

But they’re not going “actually we need completely different hydrodynamic performance sorry lol,” which would be irrational mismanagement. They’re changing the design by making it conform to the original requirements, which is entirely within reason. FMM just can’t deliver.

So what exactly is your issue with NAVSEA’s management of the program?

Why would they make changes? Because they’re stupid? Because they think US ships have to be bespoke?
There are all sorts of reasons they could be making the changes

 

[Scott Kenny]

Am I reading this wrong?
Whole point of Constellation was that the USN had lost all of its specialist ASW ships and that Burkes wouldn't cut it as an anti-submarine escort any more. That's why FREMM, one of the world's best ASW hulls, and CAPTAS 4, the world's best escort TA, were chosen. Or that's what I thought, anyway.
Why the faff about 'AAW frigate' and raw VLS numbers? Doesn't matter if you can survive the 20th anti-ship missile if the first torpedo sinks you, and SSKs aren't getting any less common or less capable.

How many antiship missiles does the average sub have these days? That's your first threat level.

24x missiles in an Oscar, BTW.

Your second threat level is how many missiles per day in a place like the Red Sea, times how many days you spend there.

But indeed the Constellations are like 0.75 Burkes. But in a sense that's more or less what the Navy wanted. They just didn't plan to pay the according price, I think.

I think that's exactly it.

Someone said 3/4 of a Burke and meant in capability, while everyone else like Congress thought 3/4 of a Burke in price.

 

[Ainen]

24x missiles in an Oscar, BTW.

72 in updated form.
That's too much to ask from constellation, Oskar is, old or not, a 4 times larger ship. Her missile load weights as much as carrier deckload ffs.
Furthermore, exactly because it's Oskar, if you expect her shooting at US ships, you may count on part of salvo being flashy.
Normal AD calculations won't work. You'll need a darker, 1960s vintage one.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Why would they make changes? Because they’re stupid?

Again, please provide any actual evidence to support the claim they made unnecessary changes. A vague, anonymous, one-off statement is not going to convince me NAVSEA began changing the design for the fun of it.

Again, we have no idea the context behind that statement, how the word “commonality” was being used, how it was being measured, when the 85% commonality measurement was taken, or what the “alterations” were.

It is far more likely those alterations were are describing changes required to meet the program requirements.

 

[johnpjones1775]

How many antiship missiles does the average sub have these days? That's your first threat level.

24x missiles in an Oscar, BTW.

Your second threat level is how many missiles per day in a place like the Red Sea, times how many days you spend there.





I think that's exactly it.

Someone said 3/4 of a Burke and meant in capability, while everyone else like Congress thought 3/4 of a Burke in price.

I mean yeah it is like 3/4 the cost, which still isn’t cheap lol

 

[johnpjones1775]

Again, please provide any actual evidence to support the claim they made unnecessary changes. A vague, anonymous, one-off statement is not going to convince me NAVSEA began changing the design for the fun of it.

Again, we have no idea the context behind that statement, how the word “commonality” was being used, how it was being measured, when the 85% commonality measure was taken, or what the “alterations” were.

It is far more likely those alterations were simply to meet the original program requirements.

Then they shouldn’t have asked for an off the shelf mature design, and shouldn’t have accepted an off the shelf mature design, if the design didn’t meet the design requirements, and they sure as hell shouldn’t have started building the ship before the design was finished.

 

[Reddington777]

It is far more likely those alterations were simply to meet the original program requirements.

I think even meeting the original program requirements is vague enough if you aren't totally disciplined about it.

I don't know if you're familiar with the mania some people experience with house remodeling.

You've worked 60 years of your life and saved up for your dream home. An interior designer shows you an off the shelf design that looks beautiful so you think "an off the shelf design is good enough and some minor modifications should settle my requirement". After discussing the big item changes you want to make, you're looking at 85% commonality with the off the shelf design.

But then you start getting into the weeds of hammering out the design, you start to think "hey maybe I an add a little more luxury into this than I previously thought". Nancy, your frenemy at church, gloated all about her new wine shelf she added and suddenly you also need to add a wine shelf but that means you rip out and replace a support for higher load bearing ... the list goes on and because you believe you only have one try at this, you are going to try and get everything right the very first and only time in your life so you splurge and splurge. Suddenly you've got 5% commonality, twice the amount you intended to pay in the first place, and somehow you are less happy than you were before.

I think there's a reason we can't just manage shipbuilding like we did during the WWI-II shipbuilding arms race and the reasons here aren't just "we can't build ships anymore". When 055s are being pumped out like sausages, and your procurement history for the past 20 years has had more disasters than actual products, the public demands you to not have said blunders you might naturally want to "get it right the first time". If you go down the responsible and iterative way of designing ships, you know damn well civilian leadership and the idiot public is going to question why your budget is increasing year over year and why you keep designing new classes of ships while you already have an existing class so ofcourse the only way to rectify yourself is to "get it right the first time".

The navy certainly shoulders blame for it, but the political will, expectations, demands, and that tangential but important reliance on the opinions of a largely ignorant public would preclude you from starting with a mediocre design and iterating more of it.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Then they shouldn’t have asked for an off the shelf mature design, and shouldn’t have accepted an off the shelf mature design, if the design didn’t meet the design requirements

Well then that defeats the entire purpose of FFG(X). The political environment at the time would not allow for another new hull. It seems that both NAVSEA and the design firms dramatically underestimated the amount of design work needed to meet the requirements. They did the same with Flight III.

Edit: You’re moving the goalposts. You’ve done from “NAVSEA keeps changing the design [without changing the design requirements]” to “the entire program was flawed.”

And I do think that given enough time, FMM will be able to procure a workable design, they just lack the capacity right now. The yard is currently split between 3 programs and unable to retain workers.

they sure as hell shouldn’t have started building the ship before the design was finished.

Literally every naval procurement program ever has done this. Cutting steel before the design is 100% finished has been standard practice for at least the last 3 decades, and dates back to at least DDG-51. This is not a departure from the norm.

But then you start getting into the weeds of hammering out the design, you start to think "hey maybe I an add a little more luxury into this than I previously thought". Nancy, your frenemy at church, gloated all about her new wine shelf she added and suddenly you also need to add a wine shelf but that means you rip out and replace a support for higher load bearing ... the list goes on and because you believe you only have one try at this, you are going to try and get everything right the very first and only time in your life so you splurge and splurge. Suddenly you've got 5% commonality, twice the amount you intended to pay in the first place, and somehow you are less happy than you were before.

I mean that’s great and all, but half these changes are mandated under current federal law. And you all screech about LCS having reduced survivability standards, so that wasn’t an option here (nor should it have been). And once again, all these requirements would’ve been outlined in the initial RFI in 2017. If the contractor can’t deliver, that’s their fault, not NAVSEA’s.

Does NAVSEA bear some of the blame? Absolutely, but not because they “keep changing the design” or they see unrealistic design requirements. They very much bear the blame for not checking Fincantieri’s numbers, and ensuring they were in compliance with the design requirements.

But let’s say they had done that. They caught the issues before selecting the FREMm derivative. I still can’t see it playing out any other way. FREMM was the only competitive offer, and FMM still would’ve been woefully unequipped to redesign the ship.

Now I’ll punt the question back to you: what, if any changes did NAVSEA make to the FFG-62 design requirements and/or design itself post-2017?

 

[Cordy]

Do you have any actual source for NAVSEA “continuously changing the design over 5 years?” I glanced through the March 2025 GAO report and can’t find anything suggesting that to be the case.

I think you must be in a minority of one in your interpretation of GAO report "NAVY FRIGATE Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules" Breaking News article on the report made the following comment " Auditors, who are usually mild-mannered in their criticism of their government counterparts, were unsparing in laying the blame at the Navy’s feet for tinkering with the new ship’s design too much."
“Navy decisions to substantially modify the frigate design from the parent design have caused the two to now resemble nothing more than distant cousins,” the report concludes. “Further, inadequate functional design review practices and botched metrics that the frigate program continues to rely on obscured the program’s actual design progress and contributed to prematurely starting lead ship construction before the design was sufficiently stable to support that activity.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05...n-navy-tampering-with-design-botched-metrics/

PS As recently noted by the GAO Fincantieri making claims against the Navy for the changes and modifications Navy called for, $millions, tens of $millions or hundreds of $millions? Navy refuses to disclose the amount as too embarrassing.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

“Navy decisions to substantially modify the frigate design from the parent design have caused the two to now resemble nothing more than distant cousins,”

This does not mean they are tampering with the design, or they would explicitly say so. I can as easily interpret this as the design requirements substantially modifying the FREMM hull beyond recognition. So please try again.

But even that is a stupid criticism, as FREMM-ASW and FREMM-GP only share 5% commonality.

Do you really think the Navy could’ve accepted a FREMM derivative that maintained more than passing resemblance, which is the most even the Europeans managed to achieve?

“Further, inadequate functional design review practices and botched metrics that the frigate program continues to rely on obscured the program’s actual design progress and contributed to prematurely starting lead ship construction before the design was sufficiently stable to support that activity.”

I agree with this half of the GAO’s analysis, and present no contest.

 

[timmymagic]

Type 26 will rely on the (admittedly superior) Merlin helicopter for actually killing subs.

Just to note...UK MoD has a RFP out for an ASROC type weapon carrying Stingray Mod.2. Definitely not VL-ASROC or Type 07 though as the requirements exceed anything on the market at present.

 

[Josh_TN]

I mean yeah it is like 3/4 the cost, which still isn’t cheap lol

Aren’t Burke 3s several billion?

 

[DWG]

However, note this quote says nothing about an "original design," nor does it specify what "alterations" were made to the design. There are three points I want to bring up.

A) We have no idea how or when the 85% commonality number was calculated. Was it before the contract design was awarded? Was it a few months before the USNI article? We lack the context to properly evaluate this information. If this number predates the contract design award, did they factor in requirements for domestically-sourced equipment? Additionally, how is "commonality" being defined?

Gibbs & Cox 'americanized' the FREMM for US requirements and production before contract award. I suspect the 85% figure dates from then.

But what did they judge 85% from? Line items? Price? Weight? It's a very woolly term.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

PS As recently noted by the GAO Fincantieri making claims against the Navy for the changes and modifications Navy called for, $millions, tens of $millions or hundreds of $millions? Navy refuses to disclose the amount as too embarrassing.

I wasn’t able to find anything in the Breaking Defense site suggesting this. But I have a tendency of completing missing things. Can you please point it out?

Gibbs & Cox 'americanized' the FREMM for US requirements and production before contract award. I suspect the 85% figure dates from then.

I would agree. The 85% number is completely unrealistic and sounds like something from the preliminary design.

But what did they judge 85% from? Line items? Price? Weight? It's a very woolly term.

Lord only knows. We’re basing this on an anonymous, unsourced, offhand, two sentence statement made to USNI.
We have no idea how or when these numbers were calculated. We lack the requisite context to properly evaluate the statement.
Maybe they based it off how many compartments would receive major changes. Maybe based on the number of drawings they’d changed to date. We have no idea.

 

[Cordy]

I wasn’t able to find anything in the Breaking Defense site suggesting this. But I have a tendency of completing missing things. Can you please point it out?

Not Breaking Defense, but as said the GAO, ref my post 1,226 yesterday.

The GAO June '25 Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report to Congress just out.
Contract was fixed price but Fincantieri submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design, the Navy refused to release the cost of the five requests "as not suitable for public release"

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107569.pdf p.129

 

[DWG]

The GAO June '25 Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report to Congress just out.
Contract was fixed price but Fincantieri submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design, the Navy refused to release the cost of the five requests "as not suitable for public release"

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107569.pdf p.129

"in response to a recommendation we made in our May 2024 report, the program restructured its functional design metrics to more closely align with actual designprogress. As a result, the program concluded that its functional design progress is significantly less than the 92 percent complete it reported in August 2023. As of December 2024, the program reported that the functional design was 70 percent complete, as measured with the restructured design metrics."

You have to ask what the Navy had been doing to have the 2024 completeness figure 22% less than the 2023 completeness figure? Sticking their finger in the wind? The only time I've come across a similar discrepancy our management admitted they were basically guessing.

 

[TinWing]

I think you must be in a minority of one in your interpretation of GAO report "NAVY FRIGATE Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules" Breaking News article on the report made the following comment " Auditors, who are usually mild-mannered in their criticism of their government counterparts, were unsparing in laying the blame at the Navy’s feet for tinkering with the new ship’s design too much."
“Navy decisions to substantially modify the frigate design from the parent design have caused the two to now resemble nothing more than distant cousins,” the report concludes. “Further, inadequate functional design review practices and botched metrics that the frigate program continues to rely on obscured the program’s actual design progress and contributed to prematurely starting lead ship construction before the design was sufficiently stable to support that activity.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05...n-navy-tampering-with-design-botched-metrics/

PS As recently noted by the GAO Fincantieri making claims against the Navy for the changes and modifications Navy called for, $millions, tens of $millions or hundreds of $millions? Navy refuses to disclose the amount as too embarrassing.

In defense of the Navy, we must consider the possibility that key decision makers in uniform might have been mislead by inexperienced and profoundly overconfident native born American engineers and naval architects. There was nothing wrong with the initial design changes, such a substituting bow bulwarks for an enclosed foc’sul. I suspect that the problems came from the detailed aspects of design that no working civilian American engineer has practical experience with.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Well then that defeats the entire purpose of FFG(X). The political environment at the time would not allow for another new hull. It seems that both NAVSEA and the design firms dramatically underestimated the amount of design work needed to meet the requirements. They did the same with Flight III.

Edit: You’re moving the goalposts. You’ve done from “NAVSEA keeps changing the design [without changing the design requirements]” to “the entire program was flawed.”

And I do think that given enough time, FMM will be able to procure a workable design, they just lack the capacity right now. The yard is currently split between 3 programs and unable to retain workers.


Literally every naval procurement program ever has done this. Cutting steel before the design is 100% finished has been standard practice for at least the last 3 decades, and dates back to at least DDG-51. This is not a departure from the norm.


I mean that’s great and all, but half these changes are mandated under current federal law. And you all screech about LCS having reduced survivability standards, so that wasn’t an option here (nor should it have been). And once again, all these requirements would’ve been outlined in the initial RFI in 2017. If the contractor can’t deliver, that’s their fault, not NAVSEA’s.

Does NAVSEA bear some of the blame? Absolutely, but not because they “keep changing the design” or they see unrealistic design requirements. They very much bear the blame for not checking Fincantieri’s numbers, and ensuring they were in compliance with the design requirements.

But let’s say they had done that. They caught the issues before selecting the FREMm derivative. I still can’t see it playing out any other way. FREMM was the only competitive offer, and FMM still would’ve been woefully unequipped to redesign the ship.

Now I’ll punt the question back to you: what, if any changes did NAVSEA make to the FFG-62 design requirements and/or design itself post-2017?

I’m not moving goalposts. I never once said NAVSEA changed anything.

Again, if the selected offering couldn’t meet the design requirements without massive changes, then they shouldn’t have selected the design. The political environment was against fuck ups. Their poor choices to avoid fuck ups, have led to a massive fuck up.
If this practice goes back 30 years, and we haven’t successfully started a new ship program without major issues plaguing them in the last 30 years, maybe we shouldn’t be doing the same thing we’ve been doing for the last 30 years.

Holy shit. “This is how we’ve always done it.” Is one of the most dangerous phrases there is. It justifies bad processes, bad policies, and bad decision making.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Aren’t Burke 3s several billion?

They’re like 2.5b these days. An article I shared awhile ago says the 7th Connie is expected to cost 1.7b or 1.8b (dorn remember which, not that, that’s really much of a difference)

 

[johnpjones1775]

Regardless of what anyone has to say, the ship being 3 years behind schedule shows they were not intending on many if not most of the changes or it wouldn’t be so far behind and so much over weight right now.

Report: Constellation-Class Frigate is Three Years Late, 13% Overweight

The Navy's Constellation-class frigate program continues to wrestle with an incomplete functional design, which has delayed construction on the fi...

maritime-executive.com

 

[Ozair]

They’re like 2.5b these days. An article I shared awhile ago says the 7th Connie is expected to cost 1.7b or 1.8b (dorn remember which, not that, that’s really much of a difference)

That would be an all.up cost though right. There is a lot of GFM in those costs above what the hull itself actually costs.

I thought I saw a 6 to 700 million hull cost for the FFGX but maybe that was the initial projections.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That would be an all.up cost though right. There is a lot of GFM in those costs above what the hull itself actually costs.

I thought I saw a 6 to 700 million hull cost for the FFGX but maybe that was the initial projections.

IIRC a Burke is only 1.2bn for the bare hull. It's all the systems that make them so spendy.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Again, if the selected offering couldn’t meet the design requirements without massive changes, then they shouldn’t have selected the design.

None of the designs could meet NAVSEA requirements without significant changes.

maybe we shouldn’t be doing the same thing we’ve been doing for the last 30 years.

The Constellation program has no similarities with Zumwalt, LCS, or CG(X) programs. The nature of the program is much more aligned with Burke Flight III.

The GAO June '25 Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report to Congress just out.
Contract was fixed price but Fincantieri submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design, the Navy refused to release the cost of the five requests "as not suitable for public release"

The actual text reads as follows:

> “As of November 2024, frigate program officials reported that the shipbuilder had submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment, raising the potential of unbudgeted program cost growth, depending on the outcome. Requests for equitable adjustment provide a remedy payable only when unforeseen or unintended circumstances, such as government modification of the contract, cause an increase in contract performance costs. The Navy deemed the total costs of the five requests as not suitable for public release. According to program officials these requests relate to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate's parent ship design.”

First thing to note, FFG-62 is a fixed price contract. This means NAVSEA gave FMM a fixed amount of money, and any cost overruns come out of FMM’s pocket.

Admittedly, most first R&D and first hull procurements are cost-plus contracts, where the Navy picks up the entire tab (including cost overruns). But, FMM agreed to the fixed-price contract, meaning they thought the amount of money being awarded would cover the associated costs. It’s not like they’d take a job they knew they’d lose money on. So, once again, FMM has failed to deliver their part of the contract.

But, Constellation is now three years late and counting. FMM is losing money on this, and FFG-62 design costs are only getting higher. Remember they can’t keep workers, so they have to train the original guy, then train his replacement, and they’ve brought in Gibbs & Cox for assistance.

That’s where the “the shipbuilder had submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment, raising the potential of unbudgeted program cost growth” come into play.

The verbiage “equitable adjustment” suggests they’re asking for a contract modification to get supplemental funding. Note this is different from renegotiating the entire fixed price contract. They’re asking the navy for additional funding for X reason.

Now, let’s look at why this could be. We know they had to bring Gibbs & Cox in. We know they can’t keep workers. We know they’re losing money on the contract. Any number of these things could be covered under a supplemental funding request.

Is there a possibility that NAVSEA is tinkering with FMM’s design for shits and giggles, and that’s what they want supplemental funding for? Yes, on paper.

But, and I can’t stress this enough, there has been no reporting on such actions. It hasn’t come up in GAO, CRS, or CBO reports, it hasn’t come up as the SNA conferences, it wasn’t in any of the damning USNI/TWZ articles, etc.

There is still an absence of evidence to support this claim, and it falls flat when we know FMM is having to bring in third party contractors and continually hire new workers.

This is not the smoking gun that proves NAVSEA’s mismanagement, it just further reinforces that FMM is a shit yard.

 

[johnpjones1775]

That would be an all.up cost though right. There is a lot of GFM in those costs above what the hull itself actually costs.

I thought I saw a 6 to 700 million hull cost for the FFGX but maybe that was the initial projections.

Yeah no. The SPY panels are like $100m each.
The 7th ship is expected to cost $1.7b-ish

 

[johnpjones1775]

None of the designs could meet NAVSEA requirements without significant changes.


The Constellation program has no similarities with Zumwalt, LCS, or CG(X) programs. The nature of the program is much more aligned with Burke Flight III.


The actual text reads as follows:

> “As of November 2024, frigate program officials reported that the shipbuilder had submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment, raising the potential of unbudgeted program cost growth, depending on the outcome. Requests for equitable adjustment provide a remedy payable only when unforeseen or unintended circumstances, such as government modification of the contract, cause an increase in contract performance costs. The Navy deemed the total costs of the five requests as not suitable for public release. According to program officials these requests relate to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate's parent ship design.”

First thing to note, FFG-62 is a fixed price contract. This means NAVSEA gave FMM a fixed amount of money, and any cost overruns come out of FMM’s pocket.

Admittedly, most first R&D and first hull procurements are cost-plus contracts, where the Navy picks up the entire tab (including cost overruns). But, FMM agreed to the fixed-price contract, meaning they thought the amount of money being awarded would cover the associated costs. It’s not like they’d take a job they knew they’d lose money on. So, once again, FMM has failed to deliver their part of the contract.

But, Constellation is now three years late and counting. FMM is losing money on this, and FFG-62 design costs are only getting higher. Remember they can’t keep workers, so they have to train the original guy, then train his replacement, and they’ve brought in Gibbs & Cox for assistance.

That’s where the “the shipbuilder had submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment, raising the potential of unbudgeted program cost growth” come into play.

The verbiage “equitable adjustment” suggests they’re asking for a contract modification to get supplemental funding. Note this is different from renegotiating the entire fixed price contract. They’re asking the navy for additional funding for X reason.

Now, let’s look at why this could be. We know they had to bring Gibbs & Cox in. We know they can’t keep workers. We know they’re losing money on the contract. Any number of these things could be covered under a supplemental funding request.

Is there a possibility that NAVSEA is tinkering with FMM’s design for shits and giggles, and that’s what they want supplemental funding for? Yes, on paper.

But, and I can’t stress this enough, there has been no reporting on such actions. It hasn’t come up in GAO, CRS, or CBO reports, it hasn’t come up as the SNA conferences, it wasn’t in any of the damning USNI/TWZ articles, etc.

There is still an absence of evidence to support this claim, and it falls flat when we know FMM is having to bring in third party contractors and continually hire new workers.

This is not the smoking gun that proves NAVSEA’s mismanagement, it just further reinforces that FMM is a shit yard.

Then the program requirements needed to be reassessed, because one of those requirements was be a mature off the shelf design.
What we’re getting is not a mature off the shelf design, it’s almost a completely new design.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Then the program requirements needed to be reassessed, because one of those requirements was be a mature off the shelf design.
What we’re getting is not a mature off the shelf design, it’s almost a completely new design.

And what requirement do you suggest we drop/re-evaluate?

 

[johnpjones1775]

And what requirement do you suggest we drop/re-evaluate?

Idk. I don’t exactly sit around with an exhaustive list of requirements for the FFG(X) program.

But if none of the offers met the requirements then they shouldn’t have accepted one. They should have rejected them all and started a new competition for an entirely new ship design.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yeah no. The SPY panels are like $100m each.
The 7th ship is expected to cost $1.7b-ish

The 6-700mil hull price is ex-GFE, and I'm pretty sure all the radars are GFE.

 

[H_K]

And what requirement do you suggest we drop/re-evaluate?

The main problem is NAVSEA’s inflexible design standards, which mandate everything from materials choices to plate thickness to piping to fire protection, down to the most minute detail.

I was told by a European naval architect with first hand experience with Navsea, that the result was a nightmare. He was adapting a proven, in service European landing craft for a USN program… Navsea basically required him to redesign most of the platform, and not necessarily for the better. The issue was not that the off the shelf design was inherently wrong or less safe, just that it solved for each risk area differently (eg. picking a different material, or specifying a different set of criteria for emergency genset location, or calculating hull fatigue and plate thickness using different computer tools that have slightly different results). Basically Navsea’s way was treated as gospel and they wouldn’t entertain the possibility that naval architects elsewhere might solve for the same problems differently…

This could be solved at a stroke of a pen if DoD, Congress and the Navy all agreed to waive Navsea standards and to accept foreign standards as mostly equivalent. (Perhaps not identical, not perfect in every respect, but good enough and not worth messing with)

 

[Ozair]

The 6-700mil hull price is ex-GFE, and I'm pretty sure all the radars are GFE.

That is my understanding as well. Perhaps the hull price will increase per the redesign to USN standards but I wouldn't expect it to increase more than 10-15%.

 

[Firefinder]

This could be solved at a stroke of a pen if DoD, Congress and the Navy all agreed to waive Navsea standards and to accept foreign standards as mostly equivalent. (Perhaps not identical, not perfect in every respect, but good enough and not worth messing with)

The USN tried that with the LCS program.

We still hear the reing bout their lack of survivability despite being equal to their European counterparts like the Abasol class.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

If America wants two tiers of destroyers then say so and base your second tier of the F110 or some of the Japanese Akizuki class, rather than buying a specialist ASW frigate and trying to shoehorn a destroyer into it. That sort of thing breaks programmes, as the Australians nearly found with the Hunter class.

The former is an ASW Frigate, and although the latter is called a destroyer by the Japanese, it's pretty much the equivalent of a large European ASW Frigate.

Fundamentally when it comes to the AAW combat systems of modern ASW frigates, the Constellation isn't an outlier, in some cases it could be said to be a the lower end when it comes to number of arrays and types of array. FREMM-EVO will have eight Dual-Band Kronos Arrays (four in C-Band and four in X-Band), the German F126 will have a combination of four C-Band TRS-3D arrays and four X-Band APAR Block II, Belgian-Dutch ASWF is going to have a combination of four S-Band SM400 and four X-Band APAR Block II arrays, the Spanish F110 will be using four S-Band SPY-7 arrays and four Prisma 25X arrays, and of course the Australian Hunter class has no less than twenty arrays of different frequencies (six each of CEAFAR-L and CEAFAR-S, and eight CEAMOUNT arrays). All of these ships are meant to have "lower-end" combat systems in this area, being intended to be operating alongside dedicated AAW combatants which are meant to be higher end (although being 10-20 years older than their ASW counterparts, and usually using earlier PESAs, they are actually less capable in this area).

 

[Jimmo952]

The US Navy wanted a frigate that could add value to the battle fleet as well as be capable of independent operations.

They judged the capabilities outlined in the requirements for FFGX were the minimum that would allow a frigate to operate independently and have a good chance of survival.

You can take issue with their analysis but that is what they were going for and that was their conclusion.

This means the ship is by definition multi-mission with capabilities in ASW, Anti-surface and anti-air.

It was not envisioned as a dedicated ASW frigate.

 

[H_K]

The USN tried that with the LCS program.

We still hear the reing bout their lack of survivability despite being equal to their European counterparts like the Abasol class.

Wrong example IMHO. LCS wasn’t designed to warship standards (US or European).

FREMM on the other hand was built as a high end combattant to proper naval standards (meeting both RINA standards in Italy, Bureau Veritas standards in France, and some additional custom naval standards jointly established by the French & Italian navies for this specific frigate).

To give one example, DDG-51s would likely fail the European standards due to excessive explosion risk from the closely packed MK41 VLS cells (whereas FREMM Sylver cells are separated in order to facilitate fire fighting and cooling in the event of a fire). And FFG-62 would likely fail the French Radar Cross Section and infrared signature reduction requirements designed to reduce FREMM’s susceptibility to missile seekers...

...so while Navsea's standards may be "better" in some areas (e.g. stronger hull girder strength, which should help make FFG-62 a little less broken in the event of a torpedo hit, though certainly still a mission kill and likely the end of the ship's service life), it doesn't necessarily mean that a Navsea-compliant USN combattant will be more survivable across the board, considering all possible combat scenarios.

 

[Cordy]

It was not envisioned as a dedicated ASW frigate.

Captain Kevin Smith PEO of FFG(X) at SNA 2022 emphasized it was frigate and not a destroyer and its primary role was escort / ASW.
Smith later promoted to Admiral but recently fired in May

https://news.usni.org/2025/05/27/navy-program-officer-in-charge-of-frigate-unmanned-programs-removed-from-command