FFG(X)

[Scott Kenny]

I have a couple of open questions about the FFG(X) Constellation.

VL-ASROC: I distinctly recall one of the original contracting notices stating that the FFG(X) would potentially involve a future notional vertical-launched anti-sub rocket. It did not mention Vertical Launch ASROC specifically, and the wording implied that a new weapon might be developed to replace VLA. However, now that I look back through the original notices, I can't find this anywhere. Am I hallucinating?

The original notices certainly did not mention VLA, not that I can find, but VLA started appearing later in Navy presentations. The original contracting notices only mentioned ESSM and SM-2. Is VLA confirmed now for FFG-62?

Not confirmed, but I'd be surprised that a frigate explicitly equipped with a VDS doesn't have some number of ASROCs on it. In addition to whatever helicopter and/or drone ASW they have.

The other open question relates to the Surface-to-Surface Mission Module (SSMM) armed with Longbow Hellfire. This was listed in the Government Furnished Equipment section of the original 2017 brief, but I can't find mention of it since then. Has this requirement been removed?

Haven't heard anything about that. And I personally don't like Longbow Hellfires for AShMs.

 

[johnpjones1775]

So it gets up to 32x ESSMs (and I'd actually expect ~4 cells of VL-ASROC with 16x ESSMs). Now it can protect itself, but nothing else.

A frigate needs to be able to protect other ships!



Yes, Connies are under-gunned. Under-missiled, rather. The modern threat environment has gone up to the point that an FFG needs 48-64x VLS cells, all packing SAMs, to do the job.



And then you're giving away ELINT data as to what's in any given group of ships... Which is the primary combat reason the USN wants everything on SPY6.

There's also the advantage of only needing one radar and FCS school and only one set of spare parts. Which is a significant economic and logistical advantage.

Also, I suspect that TERN or whatever develops out of TERN will have AEW radars on it.

Idk where you’re getting this idea they couldn’t protect other ships?
Even ESSM has enough range to protect other ships, particularly in convoy.

If the Connie’s had 48+ VLS it would be a good ratio for the cost and I’d be slightly more supportive of them, but that’s not the case.

Sure a single school house for a single super expensive radar does have its benefits, but we’re also seeing the downsides. Basic ships being more costly than they should be.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Idk where you’re getting this idea they couldn’t protect other ships?
Even ESSM has enough range to protect other ships, particularly in convoy.

ESSM was designed as the point defense missile system. It's not good at crossing targets.

It has a 50km range. IF you are on the threat side of a convoy, that may help. If you're on the far side of the convoy and it gets mugged by SLCMs, you're hosed.

Problem is, detection range of a supersonic target basically on the water is less than 30km. Klub missiles are doing 1km/s, ESSMs are only slightly faster at ~1.3km/s. This means that there are situations where the ESSMs are absolutely incapable of making an intercept on a missile not targeted at the launching ship. Any intercept geometry that puts the ESSM into a tail chase, you're going to lose.

Back to that "threat on far side of convoy" scenario.

Best case:
ESSM ship is ~10km off the side of the convoy. Incoming missile is detected at ~25km from the ESSM ship, ~15km from merchant target, basically in a straight line from ESSM to target to incoming. ESSM needs to fly 10km just to get to the protected ship which takes ~7sec, and in that time the incoming has closed to 8km from the target. About 4sec later, the intercept is possible. If that intercept fails, there is no chance of a second shot making an intercept.

There's intercept geometries where the defended ship is less than 8km from the radar horizon (and admittedly more than 10km from the escorting ship). You lose in that case.

Sure a single school house for a single super expensive radar does have its benefits, but we’re also seeing the downsides. Basic ships being more costly than they should be.

I didn't think I'd need to explain ESM passive detection and classification to a former Sailor. There is a very large informational difference between "I detect 3x SPY6" and "I detect 1x SPY1, 1x SPS48, and 3x SPS49."

What's that first group? Hard to say, probably 2 Burke IIIs and a Ford-class, but could also be a Burke III, a Connie, and a Ford. Could even be a trio of Burke IIIs.
What's that second group? A Tico or early Burke, a Nimitz, and a question mark.

 

[johnpjones1775]

ESSM was designed as the point defense missile system. It's not good at crossing targets.

It has a 50km range. IF you are on the threat side of a convoy, that may help. If you're on the far side of the convoy and it gets mugged by SLCMs, you're hosed.

Problem is, detection range of a supersonic target basically on the water is less than 30km. Klub missiles are doing 1km/s, ESSMs are only slightly faster at ~1.3km/s. This means that there are situations where the ESSMs are absolutely incapable of making an intercept on a missile not targeted at the launching ship. Any intercept geometry that puts the ESSM into a tail chase, you're going to lose.

Back to that "threat on far side of convoy" scenario.

Best case:
ESSM ship is ~10km off the side of the convoy. Incoming missile is detected at ~25km from the ESSM ship, ~15km from merchant target, basically in a straight line from ESSM to target to incoming. ESSM needs to fly 10km just to get to the protected ship which takes ~7sec, and in that time the incoming has closed to 8km from the target. About 4sec later, the intercept is possible. If that intercept fails, there is no chance of a second shot making an intercept.

There's intercept geometries where the defended ship is less than 8km from the radar horizon (and admittedly more than 10km from the escorting ship). You lose in that case.



I didn't think I'd need to explain ESM passive detection and classification to a former Sailor. There is a very large informational difference between "I detect 3x SPY6" and "I detect 1x SPY1, 1x SPS48, and 3x SPS49."

What's that first group? Hard to say, probably 2 Burke IIIs and a Ford-class, but could also be a Burke III, a Connie, and a Ford. Could even be a trio of Burke IIIs.
What's that second group? A Tico or early Burke, a Nimitz, and a question mark.

Convoys always have and always will have more than 1 escort, so shooting over or across those you’re escorting is pretty irrelevant.
But even on their own, LCS can still largely do it. That’s where their speed becomes a great asset allowing them to reposition ahead, behind, or to the other side of a convoy to fire.

Why the hell would the LCS be 10km away from the convoy? There’s no point. A tight formation within the convoy, and for the escorts. There’s no reason for the LCS to be more than 3km from the convoy.

In the age of satellite surveillance you’re complaining about a non-issue. Any first world military will say “I detect 3 military radar, they’re all the same, let’s confirm our suspicions and get a satellite overhead”

But even then you’re acting like there aren’t other ways to track ships, so sure if every ship is using the same radar in an absolute vacuum of a scenario you posited, sure there might be some confusion, but in real life against a peer or near peer adversary during a conflict they’ll likely know where or about where all of our ships in the active conflict zone are more or less at all times.

 

[johnpjones1775]

The biggest issue facing the USN is the fact that ‘perfect is the enemy of good enough’

People seem to think if it’s not perfect, it’s not up to standards, but our quest for perfect has screwed up our last 3 new ship building programs.
We need ships that are good enough to a job even if they’re lacking in one or two areas like ELINT.

 

[TomS]

The other open question relates to the Surface-to-Surface Mission Module (SSMM) armed with Longbow Hellfire. This was listed in the Government Furnished Equipment section of the original 2017 brief, but I can't find mention of it since then. Has this requirement been removed?

Yes, I'm fairly certain it has. Its presence in 2017 is an artifact of the switch from an LCS-derived FFG to a new hull design. The LCS-derived FFG would still have had a couple of LCS weapon module stations that could have hosted the SSMM but Constellation does not.

 

[Forest Green]

It's a big radar, so I do suspect it's got a lot of topweight.

It's getting too fat in general it seems.

Troubled Constellation Frigate Is Now At Least 759 Metric Tons Overweight

Major changes to the Constellation design from the European FREMM have already caused delays, cost growth, and questions about its future.

www.twz.com

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Just when I think this program can't get any more mismanaged.

 

[helmutkohl]

so if I understand correctly, they wanted something off the shelf to be quick and cheap, but at the same time wanted AEGIS and other US systems which seems to be where a lot of the expenses are.. in addition to changes to the hull.

Why didn't they go for another design, like one of those Japanese, Korean or even Spanish? designs that are currently using AEGIS? the Japanese and Korean ships seem more inline with US warship design philosophy?
or joining Canada with their Type 26 variant which also is planned to use AEGIS?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

so if I understand correctly, they wanted something off the shelf to be quick and cheap, but at the same time wanted AEGIS and other US systems which seems to be where a lot of the expenses are.. in addition to changes to the hull.

Why didn't they go for another design, like one of those Japanese, Korean or even Spanish? designs that are currently using AEGIS? the Japanese and Korean ships seem more inline with US warship design philosophy?
or joining Canada with their Type 26 variant which also is planned to use AEGIS?

Were any of those designs you mention significantly smaller and cheaper than the Arleigh Burke DDGs? I believe for the USN it's a problem where many of the "frigate" designs on the market are effectively not much smaller than our destroyers.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Were any of those designs you mention significantly smaller and cheaper than the Arleigh Burke DDGs? I believe for the USN it's a problem where many of the "frigate" designs on the market are effectively not much smaller than our destroyers.

I wouldn’t particularly call this class as significantly smaller or cheaper than a burke which is my whole problem with it.

As planned they’re only 1000 tons lighter than a FI burke and only a dozen or so feet shorter than FIIA&III Burkes.

They are literally just under armed DDGs. These would be T1 ships in almost any other navy if they had 64 VLS

 

[helmutkohl]

Ive heard that was the other option too.. just build more Burkes

 

[Colonial-Marine]

I wouldn’t particularly call this class as significantly smaller or cheaper than a burke which is my whole problem with it.

As planned they’re only 1000 tons lighter than a FI burke and only a dozen or so feet shorter than FIIA&III Burkes.

They are literally just under armed DDGs. These would be T1 ships in almost any other navy if they had 64 VLS

I've got to agree with you at this point. The FREMM class these were based on didn't seem like that bad of a choice among the available "off the shelf" options, but with all of the changes it's not much smaller as you said.

Ive heard that was the other option too.. just build more Burkes

They seem like good ships but there are areas where the design is dated even with the latest improvements. Really, we *should* be able to start building a successor class of DDG much sooner than current plans, while also building FFGs not all that much larger in tonnage than the old OHP class, but the state of US shipbuilding seems incredibly FUBAR and I'm not even sure how it got that way.

 

[Jimmo952]

Were any of those designs you mention significantly smaller and cheaper than the Arleigh Burke DDGs? I believe for the USN it's a problem where many of the "frigate" designs on the market are effectively not much smaller than our destroyers.

By the time they get a complete design for the Constellation, it won't be a small ship either.

 

[Jimmo952]

I wouldn’t particularly call this class as significantly smaller or cheaper than a burke which is my whole problem with it.

As planned they’re only 1000 tons lighter than a FI burke and only a dozen or so feet shorter than FIIA&III Burkes.

They are literally just under armed DDGs. These would be T1 ships in almost any other navy if they had 64 VLS

If this things survives long enough, a Block 2 will probably be built with additional VLS cells.

Some in Congress were calling for more cells in the Block 1 version.

 

[Jimmo952]

Ive heard that was the other option too.. just build more Burkes

The Navy looked at a number of options. There were several other competitive proposals offered.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

There were several other competitive proposals offered.

None of the other submissions were remotely competitive.

The LCS submissions were laughable. They may of worked for the proceeding SSC program, but were are not suited as AAW frigates.

The NSC hull can technically take SPY-6 and Mk41s, at the expansive of the entire design and SLA margin. That’s before you add electric propulsion. You’re repeating all the issues with the Perry.

The Bazan-class frigates seem viable on the surface, but the design is over 25 years old. Installing electric propulsion, completely revamping the power architecture, and upgrading the SPY-1s to SPY-6s would’ve been a major engineering challenge, and again, eaten all the design and SLA margin.

FREMM was the only submission that already had electric propulsion, and had the design margin to take SPY-6. The major downfall was the terms and conditions - has to be built at FMM.

 

[Jimmo952]

Were any of those designs you mention significantly smaller and cheaper than the Arleigh Burke DDGs? I believe for the USN it's a problem where many of the "frigate" designs on the market are effectively not much smaller than our destroyers.

The FREMM frigate chosen by the Navy probably represented the high-end of the ships submitted for consideration by industry.

Some of the proposals were not made public, particularly Huntington Ingalls which is believed to have proposed an upgunned National Security Cutter.

We do know HI applied for exemptions to one or more of the Navy's requirements.

 

[Jimmo952]

I hope the FFGX design is completed and some number of hulls are built.

The program certainly has it's issues but I think one of the reasons we are not very good at designing and building new ships is we don't do it very often.

We've lost a lot of institutional knowledge, in both industry and the Navy, since the end of the cold war.

Play it though. Build some ships. They will be useful. Rebuild the institutional knowledge of how to do that. If there are processes that are not helpful, change them.

The DDGX program is looming. There is probably a need for that lower end ship that JP Jones dreams of.

Design it and build a few. Learn. If the design is successful, build more. If not, consider it an evolutionary step and move on.

There is much to relearn. We better get on with it.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Maybe, maybe not.

How many more is the real question.
8? 16

If this things survives long enough, a Block 2 will probably be built with additional VLS cells.

Some in Congress were calling for more cells in the Block 1 version.

maybe, maybe not.

How many more? 8? 16? 24? 32?

Below 64 at the size of them is pretty undergunned imo.

 

[johnpjones1775]

I hope the FFGX design is completed and some number of hulls are built.

The program certainly has it's issues but I think one of the reasons we are not very good at designing and building new ships is we don't do it very often.

We've lost a lot of institutional knowledge, in both industry and the Navy, since the end of the cold war.

Play it though. Build some ships. They will be useful. Rebuild the institutional knowledge of how to do that. If there are processes that are not helpful, change them.

The DDGX program is looming. There is probably a need for that lower end ship that JP Jones dreams of.

Design it and build a few. Learn. If the design is successful, build more. If not, consider it an evolutionary step and move on.

There is much to relearn. We better get on with it.

Pretty sure we generally design new ships as often as most other nations.

About 15 years after ddg51 came online we began the design process for the zumwalts. A few years after that we started design work on the LCSes.
In the late 80s/90s iirc we designed a corvette for a middle eastern navy. (I’d have to do some googling to see which one and what the class was.) and then we designed the MMSC, and evolution of the freedom class. So that’s what? 4 designs since ddg51 was launched?
Other than maybe china who has been more active in designing ships?

Edit
The badr class for Saudis (ok designed earlier than I thought.)

And yeah I think we should have accepted 2 or 3 FFG projects or a heavy corvette and an FFG project and built a limited run of both. First a prototype, and if that went smoothly 2 or 3 more, and if that continues to go well then go with full runs of both. In terms of accepting multiple FFG offers yeah build one of each, which ever went smoother gets a full run, and we offer all 3 designs for foreign sales.

 

[Scott Kenny]

so if I understand correctly, they wanted something off the shelf to be quick and cheap, but at the same time wanted AEGIS and other US systems which seems to be where a lot of the expenses are.. in addition to changes to the hull.

Why didn't they go for another design, like one of those Japanese, Korean or even Spanish? designs that are currently using AEGIS? the Japanese and Korean ships seem more inline with US warship design philosophy?
or joining Canada with their Type 26 variant which also is planned to use AEGIS?

Most of the foreign ships currently using Aegis are the size of a Burke. Or bigger.

The smallest one is the Spanish F100 design, which is 5800 tons standard displacement. The replacement for that design, the F110, is 6100 tons.

They seem like good ships but there are areas where the design is dated even with the latest improvements. Really, we *should* be able to start building a successor class of DDG much sooner than current plans, while also building FFGs not all that much larger in tonnage than the old OHP class, but the state of US shipbuilding seems incredibly FUBAR and I'm not even sure how it got that way.

No, the Perrys were out of SWAP-C when they were built (just like the Ticos), you need to keep most of a thousand tons still available for upgrades at the start of a class.

We should not be dumbasses like the UKRN has been, building ships that are 2/3 the size they needed to be!

 

[johnpjones1775]

On the note if constellation size, are they small enough to access ports burkes can’t?(at least as currently planned)

 

[johnpjones1775]

Most of the foreign ships currently using Aegis are the size of a Burke. Or bigger.

The smallest one is the Spanish F100 design, which is 5800 tons standard displacement. The replacement for that design, the F110, is 6100 tons.




No, the Perrys were out of SWAP-C when they were built (just like the Ticos), you need to keep most of a thousand tons still available for upgrades at the start of a class.

We should not be dumbasses like the UKRN has been, building ships that are 2/3 the size they needed to be!

Both classes you named are smaller than the Connie’s were originally planned to be at 7300ish tons.

5800 tons is a pretty standard FFG size for the late 2000s to now.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Off the top of my head, USN surface combatant design programs going back to the late 60s:

~1968 - ~1972
DX/DXG/DXGN
Spruances, Kidd, and Virginia

~1972-1980
First Aegis Generation and Perry
Aegis DXGN, DG/Aegis, DG(N), CSGN, DDG-47, and Perry

1978-1994
Revolution at Sea
Conceptual Burke studies (1978-1982), Burke contract design (1982-1988), numerous CONFORM studies, FFX, NFR-90, Burke Flight III (1988)

1994-1998
Forward From the Sea
SC-21 COEA
Produces DD-21, CG-21, and the Arsenal Ship concepts

1998-2001
DD-21 design contract given to HII’s Gold Team, Streetfighter wargames identify need for a small littoral warship, Arsenal Ship dies

2001-2010
Zumwalt and LCS take form, Obama initiated Pivot to the Pacific. CG(X) and Zumwalt cancelled in favor of Flight IIIs

2010 - Present
Pivot to the Pacific
Burke Flight III, SSC/FFG(X), now DDG(X)

Common themes:
- All eras had programs with multi-year delays
- All eras which precluded contract designs relied very heavily on industry design
- All eras ultimately produced workable vessels

- You forgot Spruance received years of criticism for being “underarmed for its size,” too expensive, and for using gas turbines
- You forgot what an absolute clusterfuck early Aegis development was, and that only 1/4 first generation designs actually materialized, and it has to be hidden from Rickover. And even that had major issues.
- You forgot that Perry has 2% growth margin and can only has a 50 ton SLA.
- You forgot that Burke was delivered 3 years late

 

[Cordy]

The GAO June '25 Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report to Congress just out.
Constellation
Functional Design, Navy claimed 92% complete in August '23, was pure fiction, in actuality it was 70%.
Weight 759 metric tons overweight, 13% (October '24) the Navy original ship RFP only allowed for 5% weight growth throughout its life! so it will no doubt compromise the ships capabilities and make it less combat capable. Still continuing to revise the basic design documents, including the ship’s general arrangement drawings, the design drawings that all other design aspects are based on and the structural components of the ship.

Contract was fixed price but Fincantieri submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design, the Navy refused to release the cost of the five requests "as not suitable for public release"

No mention was made of progress at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Carderock in Maryland testing the propulsion and machinery control systems, mandated by Congress.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107569.pdf p.129

 

[yeetmahboi]

Connies 100% eating the hammer with this progress. How much more are they hiding?

 

[Jimmo952]

Connies 100% eating the hammer with this progress. How much more are they hiding?

Not sure what you mean.

 

[yeetmahboi]

Not sure what you mean.

Functional Design, Navy claimed 92% complete in August '23, was pure fiction, in actuality it was 70%.

Weight 759 metric tons overweight, 13% (October '24) the Navy original ship RFP only allowed for 5% weight growth throughout its life!

Contract was fixed price but Fincantieri submitted a total of five requests for equitable adjustment relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design, the Navy refused to release the cost of the five requests "as not suitable for public release"

It's JSF magnified thousandfold. I can *smell* auditors breathing up the Navy's neck for this.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Okay, serious question.
What is the Navy itself doing wrong? Other than shipyard capacity being stretched to its limits, and FMM being an awful pick to build Constellations, what can we squarely pin the blame on NAVSEA be blamed for?

The design and performance requirements were set in 2017. It’s not like the speed requirement was imposed last month. So, other than FMM under delivering, how is Navy brass that blame for this?

 

[johnpjones1775]

Okay, serious question.
What is the Navy itself doing wrong? Other than shipyard capacity being stretched to its limits, and FMM being an awful pick to build Constellations, what can we squarely pin the blame on NAVSEA be blamed for?

The design and performance requirements were set in 2017. It’s not like the speed requirement was imposed last month. So, other than FMM under delivering, how is Navy brass that blame for this?

For this specific program or historically including this program?

Zumwalts- cutting order because of production cost overruns leaving cost per round for their guns too expensive to actually use.

LCS- building and commissioning the ships before the modules were completed, and in the case of the freedoms caving to congressional demands to lower costs resulting in a shitty new combining gear.

Constellations- building before a design is finalized, asking for an off the shelf design, and then changing 80% of that design

 

[TorpedoJ]

Am I reading this wrong?
Whole point of Constellation was that the USN had lost all of its specialist ASW ships and that Burkes wouldn't cut it as an anti-submarine escort any more. That's why FREMM, one of the world's best ASW hulls, and CAPTAS 4, the world's best escort TA, were chosen. Or that's what I thought, anyway.
Why the faff about 'AAW frigate' and raw VLS numbers? Doesn't matter if you can survive the 20th anti-ship missile if the first torpedo sinks you, and SSKs aren't getting any less common or less capable.

 

[Cordy]

Okay, serious question.
What is the Navy itself doing wrong? Other than shipyard capacity being stretched to its limits, and FMM being an awful pick to build Constellations, what can we squarely pin the blame on NAVSEA be blamed for?

The design and performance requirements were set in 2017. It’s not like the speed requirement was imposed last month. So, other than FMM under delivering, how is Navy brass that blame for this?

How the Navy responsible for the disaster that is the Constellation
Navy funded five shipyards to bid for the new frigate, Navy said it had to be based on a parent design ship to speed up production, shipyards had to meet the Navy specifications in the RFP, Navy picked and funded Austal, Fincantieri, GD, HII and Lockheed to bid, Lockheed pulled out and the Navy declared Fincantieri the winner with its parent Italian FREMM frigate design with 85% remaining commonality after the necessary changes meeting the Navy specifications in the RFP.

After awarding the contact to Fincantieri NAVSEA continuously changed / modified the design over five years even though Fincantieri had met the Navy RFP so now it has less than 15% commonality with the original parent Italian FREMM. Net result after five years the design still not completed and costs keep rising and delivery continuously slipping.

The first 10 minutes or so of the Sub Brief gives you a feel for the incompetance of NAVSEA as does the GAO May '24 report
"NAVY FRIGATE Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules"

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgkX7Txgeak

 

[DWG]

For this specific program or historically including this program?

Zumwalts- cutting order because of production cost overruns leaving cost per round for their guns too expensive to actually use.

There were an awful lot of things wrong with the Zumwalts, starting with the entire CONOPs of a stealth land attack destroyer, then planning on so many new technologies being introduced in a single class (or technically two classes, but once CG(X) was cancelled it was one). The cost of the LRAP is way down in the list of issues.

 

[yeetmahboi]

Am I reading this wrong?
Whole point of Constellation was that the USN had lost all of its specialist ASW ships and that Burkes wouldn't cut it as an anti-submarine escort any more. That's why FREMM, one of the world's best ASW hulls, and CAPTAS 4, the world's best escort TA, were chosen. Or that's what I thought, anyway.
Why the faff about 'AAW frigate' and raw VLS numbers? Doesn't matter if you can survive the 20th anti-ship missile if the first torpedo sinks you, and SSKs aren't getting any less common or less capable.

Connies are less "dedicated ASW ships" and more "general utility SSCs with a pitch on ASW". They'd be tasked with handling less demanding missions to free up Burkes and DDG(X) mission rates hence why the discussion on its AAW capabilities, which, with the development in the ME region has growing to be a point of contention.

 

[joshjosh]

Am I reading this wrong?
Whole point of Constellation was that the USN had lost all of its specialist ASW ships and that Burkes wouldn't cut it as an anti-submarine escort any more. That's why FREMM, one of the world's best ASW hulls, and CAPTAS 4, the world's best escort TA, were chosen. Or that's what I thought, anyway.
Why the faff about 'AAW frigate' and raw VLS numbers? Doesn't matter if you can survive the 20th anti-ship missile if the first torpedo sinks you, and SSKs aren't getting any less common or less capable.

The Navy never described the Constellation as primarily an ASW ship. It was always more of a versatile, affordable multi-role ship. Also note that VLA was not listed in the government furnished equipment initially - only SM-2 and ESSM were listed as ammunition for the Mk 41.

The Navy is interested in the FFG(X) to provide Combatant and Fleet Commanders a uniquely suitable asset to achieve select sea control objectives and perform maritime security operations while facilitating access in all domains in support of strike group and aggregated fleet operations. In terms of the Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept, this FFG(X) small surface combatant will expand blue force sensor and weapon influence to provide increased information to the overall fleet tactical picture while challenging adversary ISR&T efforts. The purpose of this type of ship is to (1) fully support Combatant and Fleet Commanders during conflict by supplementing the fleet's undersea and surface warfare capabilities, allow for independent operations in a contested environment, extend the fleet tactical grid, and host and control unmanned systems; and (2) relieve large surface combatants from stressing routine duties during operations other than war.

This platform will employ unmanned systems to penetrate and dwell in contested environments, operating at greater risk to gain sensor and weapons advantages over the adversary. The FFG(X) will be capable of establishing a local sensor network using passive onboard sensors, embarked aircraft and elevated/tethered systems and unmanned vehicles to gather information and then act as a gateway to the fleet tactical grid using resilient communications systems and networks.

During Phase 0 (Shape the Battlespace) operations, FFG(X) will operate independently to develop a Recognized Maritime Picture and Recognized Air Picture, perform presence missions, conduct security cooperation activities, support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts; and conduct security assistance and security force assistance (SFA). This ship will reduce demand on high end cruisers and destroyers that currently conduct ASW, SUW, and Theater Security Cooperation missions; allowing for an increase of more capable assets to maintain a stabilizing presence in regions where tensions with nations that have highly capable naval forces may exist.

During Phase 1 (Deter Aggression) and Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative) operations, the FFG(X) will normally aggregate into strike groups and Large Surface Combatant led surface action groups but also possess the ability to robustly defend itself during conduct of independent operations while connected and contributing to the fleet tactical grid. FFG(X) will perform its missions in complex electronic warfare and anti-ship missile threat environments, and, therefore, when available from other Navy efforts, will integrate hard-kill with advanced soft-kill systems at the combat systems level to enable the most effective offense and defense management of onboard weapons and decoy inventories. FFG(X) missions during these phases include:
•· Complement the surface warfare (SuW) capabilities of a Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group with capacity in aggregated operations (e.g., as a pack) to deter or defeat aggression by adversary warships with over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles. Concepts of employment for this type of ship will include integrated operations with area air defense capable destroyers and cruisers as well as independent operations while connected and contributing to the fleet tactical grid. Additionally, this platform must defend against raids of small boats
•· Perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW) scout and patrol missions that complement the capabilities of Strike Group and theater operations with enhanced active and passive undersea sensing capabilities.
•· Support transoceanic logistics movements by serving as a force multiplier to area air defense capable destroyers. If equipped with weapons providing the required capability and capacity, the ship will independently escort logistics ships during transit through low and medium threat regions.
•· Provide robust electromagnetic sensing and targeting capabilities and contribute to force level electromagnetic spectrum control
•· Provide electromagnetic information exploitation capabilities and intelligence collection

The FFG(X) aviation capability will include secure and traverse systems for aircraft handling and incorporate the aircraft systems and sensors into an integrated combat system.

To achieve these missions, the Navy desires to use common Navy systems across the radar, combat system, C4ISR systems, and launcher elements. Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical systems commonality with other US Navy platforms is also encouraged.

SAM.gov

sam.gov

SAM.gov

sam.gov

 

[johnpjones1775]

Am I reading this wrong?
Whole point of Constellation was that the USN had lost all of its specialist ASW ships and that Burkes wouldn't cut it as an anti-submarine escort any more. That's why FREMM, one of the world's best ASW hulls, and CAPTAS 4, the world's best escort TA, were chosen. Or that's what I thought, anyway.
Why the faff about 'AAW frigate' and raw VLS numbers? Doesn't matter if you can survive the 20th anti-ship missile if the first torpedo sinks you, and SSKs aren't getting any less common or less capable.

Doesn’t matter if you know where every submarine within 100 miles is, if you can’t defend yourself from an air attack.
VLS also Carrie’s ASROCs, so number of VLS directly corresponds to how good of an ASW asset a ship is.
A ship that can hear subs but can’t attack them is pretty useless as an ASW asset.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Do you have any actual source for NAVSEA “continuously changing the design over 5 years?” I glanced through the March 2025 GAO report and can’t find anything suggesting that to be the case.

The original design was supposed to have 80% commonality with her European cousins. That ratio has since inverted to 20% commonality. Not sure if NAVSEA has acknowledged this, but I’m pretty sure this information comes from the GAO.

Constellation-class: the US Navy’s struggle to forge a new generation of frigates | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

The recent articles about the ship growing by nearly 800tons is just one very recent example.

 

[TorpedoJ]

Doesn’t matter if you know where every submarine within 100 miles is, if you can’t defend yourself from an air attack.
VLS also Carrie’s ASROCs, so number of VLS directly corresponds to how good of an ASW asset a ship is.
A ship that can hear subs but can’t attack them is pretty useless as an ASW asset.

I'm looking at this from a British perspective, where 'local area air defence' means the 25km range, Mach 3 CAMM, which was apparently a great success defending cargo ships in the Red Sea with 32 per Type 23.
Type 26, with roughly equivalent VLS (more but shorter range missiles) is considered a great leap forwards and the limited mk41 is not supposed to be a problem because a cruise on which you fire 8 anti-submarine missiles is a near-apocalyptic scenario (upthread someone suggested that Constellation won't have VL-ASROC anyway). Similarly, Type 26 will rely on the (admittedly superior) Merlin helicopter for actually killing subs.
If America wants two tiers of destroyers then say so and base your second tier of the F110 or some of the Japanese Akizuki class, rather than buying a specialist ASW frigate and trying to shoehorn a destroyer into it. That sort of thing breaks programmes, as the Australians nearly found with the Hunter class.

 

[TorpedoJ]

I was a GM so SOPs for engaging subs aren’t my forte, but I find it hard to believe that it wouldn’t be pretty standard to salvo at least 2 or 3 ASROCs at an enemy sub. They have decoys and things sometimes just fail, and if you sink one sub 1/5 of the way crossing from Hawaii towards Taiwan, there’s a lot of ocean left to need to engage other subs potentially, still more ocean to need to engage a third, and then possibly a fourth once you’re actually near Taiwan. So 8 seems like a bare minimum, I’d want 10-12 to feel more comfortable.

I'm not anything, so don't apologise! But what I've heard from some people who were ASW specialists is that the helicopter is always the preferred means of killing a sub. It might be different in the US with ASROC, but it makes sense to drop your torpedoes from a platform that also has a dipping sonar for final location of the submarine, and has its own reloads.
So (at least in the RN) anti-sub missiles are seen as a snap-shot weapon, in case you suddenly come across a submarine with no helo in the air. For a ship like the Constellation that should really be hunting subs rather than the other way round, you shouldn't use as many ASROCs,

The US unfortunately wants a ship that will be less capable than a burke overall while still somehow being top of the line. The only real way for that to happen is expensive ass SPY radar arrays and a good sonar set up, and fewer VLS.

This is the core fallacy that I see as the core of the US military's problems. It killed Booker, it's crippled Constellation and it's about to kill E7.
Had the USN left FREMM with its bow sonar, a half decent rotating radar array and some illuminators for ESSM in 24-32 mk41, they could already have frigates in the water and 50 more to come that are perfectly capable of dealing with the Houthis and escorting cargo ships, and would have been superb submarine hunters in the Pacific in places where SSNs can't safely travel.
What they will end up with is about 20 very elegant but very inefficient destroyers that just happen to have exceptional ASW equipment.
You can't drive down costs for the same capability, and surface ASW is one huge gap in the USN as things stand.