An under-appreciated effect of the Cancelation-class frigate is the reduction in future ASW capacity for the American CSG. At a time when the the PLAN is rapidly building its SSN force, the addition of a moderately capable ASW ship to the American CSG would have been welcome. But now, US ASW capabilities will not keep up with advances in Chinese undersea warfare. An NSC-derived frigate will not cut it. F/A-XX is not the only thing needed to keep the CVN viable.
 
You can search "Overmatch Brief" and see why they cancelled it. It does not matter. Moving forward 10 years and making it about drones makes crew less important and crew quality is the USA's strongest area by far.
 
A SINKEX is done using a hull, one without fuel, electricity running, weapons onboard and generally speaking without an awful lot of flamable bits of hardware that are needed to actually have a ship in working order.
In these conditions every combat hull of any major NATO nation demonstrates "an astounding resilience to damage". HMS Boxer, a T22 decomissioned in 99 was merrily floating after getting hit by two Harpoons... To sunk that hull, the RN had to use a Spearfish after hitting it with an ungodly number of Harpoons, Sea Skuas and 4.5 shells. This type of resilience is the norm.
If you want to see what happens to a small combatant built for the US Navy after being hit by missiles, i present to thee the TCG Muavenet.
Two Sea Sparrows. Only one detonated, five dead chaps, 22 wounded a huge fire and a floating wreck.
Not Harpoons, not Exocet´s, not Shipwrecks. Sparrows.
Had the USS Stark faced the same sea state and multi day trip to the nearest port like HMS Sheffield got and with that initial list... it would have ended at the bottom of the sea.
TCG Muavenet was a WW2 era destroyer. Extremely bad example.
Post Falklands British Damage Control standards were increased and hey came closer in line to American standards due to deficiencies identified from combat losses. Was the Royal Navy wrong to increase these standards? They removed or mitigated the flammable bits. Flammable bits also aren't all that mitigatable, survivability standards in large part seek to decrease flooding so that hulls remain afloat and are mission killed but not sunk.
 
Post Falklands British Damage Control standards were increased and hey came closer in line to American standards due to deficiencies identified from combat losses. Was the Royal Navy wrong to increase these standards? They removed or mitigated the flammable bits. Flammable bits also aren't all that mitigatable, survivability standards in large part seek to decrease flooding so that hulls remain afloat and are mission killed but not sunk.
Boxer was built between '79 and '81, she was pre-Falklands. Nothing would have been changed to the extent that modifications were made to Constellation, surely?
The RN assumed they had good damage control until ships got sunk. When will the Americans find out either way? You don't have a FOST equivalent, as far as I can tell.
 
Boxer was built between '79 and '81, she was pre-Falklands. Nothing would have been changed to the extent that modifications were made to Constellation, surely?
The RN assumed they had good damage control until ships got sunk. When will the Americans find out either way? You don't have a FOST equivalent, as far as I can tell.
The USN has proven its damage control standards after hitting mines and being struck by missiles. The constant argument to reduce them is both ridiculous and worn out. Now can we get back to FFG(X) and make substantive arguments for the topic? Or will you, as so many have, consistently continue to derail the topic with trivial matters as such arming cargo ships while genuine analysis or cited information is ignored? Or will you, as so many have, persist in the myth that US shipbuilding is utterly failed and worthless while ignoring programs that clearly demonstrate neither is the case?
Behold the quality of discourse about FFG(X); you can’t even discuss FFG(X)!
 
I think they are delusional if they think a new start is going to deliver any sooner than FFG(X).
Well, if they use the existing in-production hull - either one of LCS, or Coast Guard large cutters - and just up-gun it with additional missile launchers, it might be actually possible.
 
Well, if they use the existing in-production hull - either one of LCS, or Coast Guard large cutters - and just up-gun it with additional missile launchers, it might be actually possible.
The National Security Cutter is no longer in production. NSC has a certain degree of equipment (a small number of VLS, RAM, SVTT, etc.) fitted for but not with (FFBNW) however to meet any sort of standard it would need a significant redesign, likely a hull plug for expanded VLS, an all new stern for a VDS and TA, etc.

The LCS derivative you describe is not altogether similar to the MMSC yet MMSC has serious problems that will not be resolved for a year at least
 
The National Security Cutter is no longer in production. NSC has a certain degree of equipment (a small number of VLS, RAM, SVTT, etc.) fitted for but not with (FFBNW) however to meet any sort of standard it would need a significant redesign, likely a hull plug for expanded VLS, an all new stern for a VDS and TA, etc.
Well, they were in production till 2024, so re-starting the run - at least in terms of hulls - would likely be possible without much troubles. Yes, it would likely require more redesign than LCS (which were designed with large spaces in mind), true.

The LCS derivative you describe is not altogether similar to the MMSC yet MMSC has serious problems that will not be resolved for a year at least
My concept was to design a cheaper ship than MMSC, mostly relying on existing LCS hardware.
 
Well, they were in production till 2024, so re-starting the run - at least in terms of hulls - would likely be possible without much troubles. Yes, it would likely require more redesign than LCS (which were designed with large spaces in mind), true.
Not really, the entire line has been retooled and so building NSCs now means essentially starting from scratch. Not the difficulties with the Burke Flt II restart as an example of how deceptively difficult it can be
My concept was to design a cheaper ship than MMSC, mostly relying on existing LCS hardware.
This ship is useless, you would do better to refit existing hulls. Building new hulls that are less capable than MMSC is worse than building nothing at all
 
The National Security Cutter is no longer in production. NSC has a certain degree of equipment (a small number of VLS, RAM, SVTT, etc.) fitted for but not with (FFBNW) however to meet any sort of standard it would need a significant redesign, likely a hull plug for expanded VLS, an all new stern for a VDS and TA, etc.
Frankly, extending the NSC hull to accommodate 32 Mk41 launchers and anti-submarine equipment is theoretically feasible.

However, realistically, we need to address the following issues: 1. Does SEA 05D/Ingalls have enough designers to complete the design in a short time? 2. Does the USN refrain from making any additional capability requests? 3. Whether the Navy will re-establish an organization similar to the SCB to act as a balancer in case of conflicts between the USN and the designers, preventing the project from spiraling out of control again? 4. How to improve the shipyard's industrial capacity? Only when all four issues are resolved can this new project be executed quickly and smoothly.
 
Frankly, extending the NSC hull to accommodate 32 Mk41 launchers and anti-submarine equipment is theoretically feasible
Ingalls identified it as a subpar solution, This is why they switched to a T31(?) derived entry for FFG(X).
However, realistically, we need to address the following issues: 1. Does SEA 05D/Ingalls have enough designers to complete the design in a short time? 2. Does the USN refrain from making any additional capability requests? 3. Whether the Navy will re-establish an organization similar to the SCB to act as a balancer in case of conflicts between the USN and the designers, preventing the project from spiraling out of control again? 4. How to improve the shipyard's industrial capacity? Only when all four issues are resolved can this new project be executed quickly and smoothly.
I don’t understand what you mean by “balancing conflicts”. There were no conflicts. FMM was contracted for a design and couldn’t meet the design requirements. NAVSEA was arguably naive to believe that the design would work as advertised but that doesn’t change because the SCB exists.
 
I don’t understand what you mean by “balancing conflicts”. There were no conflicts. FMM was contracted for a design and couldn’t meet the design requirements. NAVSEA was arguably naive to believe that the design would work as advertised but that doesn’t change because the SCB exists.
According to GAO’s report in 2024, "continuous design changes due to the U.S. Navy's constantly evolving requirements" is one of the reasons for the Constellation-class delays. This indicates that the Navy simply doesn't know what performance it actually needs. How can a ship design be completed without clearly defining primary and secondary performance requirements? The purpose of the Ship Characteristics Board (SCB) is to introduce an arbitrator between the fleet user and the ship designer, in order to eliminate unreasonable requirements from the fleet user that cause confusion for the designer.

Returning to the Constellation-class frigate, the Navy's initial primary objective was to utilize existing, proven hull designs. Therefore, the Navy's decision to upgrade from a 16-cell VLS to a 32-cell VLS was unacceptable, as this would result in a longer hull, which in turn necessitates changes to the ship's hull form and displacement. Furthermore, modifications to the electrical system layout altered the ship's spatial arrangement, piping, and even weight balance; these design changes, along with the necessary testing, increased costs.

The primary function of the SCB is coordination, because ship users and designers have different interests, perceptions, concepts, and constraints. In fact, he proposer of the requirement should not be NAVSEA, as NAVSEA itself is also a designer. When athletes and referees are the same person, bad things are bound to happen.
 
This indicates that the Navy simply doesn't know what performance it actually needs.
False, it indicates that requirements are shifting extremely quickly. This is a trend across the military, for instance the US Army has struggled to integrate drones into there arsenal due to the rapidly shifting nature of drone technology and strategy.
How can a ship design be completed without clearly defining primary and secondary performance requirements?
There are clearly defined performance requirements, it’s just that to meet those requirements there is a need for constant system modification. There is no proof that structural requirements changed, and structural requirements have been cited as the main cause of program failure. The problems they refer to would likely be a SPAWAR issue.
Returning to the Constellation-class frigate, the Navy's initial primary objective was to utilize existing, proven hull designs. Therefore, the Navy's decision to upgrade from a 16-cell VLS to a 32-cell VLS was unacceptable, as this would result in a longer hull, which in turn necessitates changes to the ship's hull form and displacement. Furthermore, modifications to the electrical system layout altered the ship's spatial arrangement, piping, and even weight balance; these design changes, along with the necessary testing, increased costs.
A hull plug does not substantially modify the complexity of the ship, America has done it for Burkes, Ticos, etc. Similarly modifying electrical and piping is needed to meet requirements. If FMM couldn’t do it then they shouldn’t have bid a design they couldn’t build.
The primary function of the SCB is coordination, because ship users and designers have different interests, perceptions, concepts, and constraints. In fact, he proposer of the requirement should not be NAVSEA, as NAVSEA itself is also a designer. When athletes and referees are the same person, bad things are bound to happen.
Nice quote from Wikipedia there. NAVSEA no longer has a serious in house design capability, that’s why they didn’t do design work for FFG(X). NAVSEA served to coordinate Navy and Industry cooperation throughout the Constellation class program, essentially filling the role you describe. Again, this is directly from the head of BIW’s design who described the program as “very well run”. Do you know better than him?
 
Again, this is directly from the head of BIW’s design who described the program as “very well run”. Do you know better than him?
Very well run but ultimately unsuccessful. We are measured by success, not by how well we followed the script.
 
Very well run but ultimately unsuccessful. We are measured by success, not by how well we followed the script.
You’ll do anything but blame FMM for overpromising a design they couldn’t deliver, huh. Yes, there is a decent argument to be made that NAVSEA should’ve picked up on it being too good to be true so to speak but no other offer presented the full spectrum of capabilities Navy was looking for. Logically FMM was the only choice, practically accepting some compromises for BIWs bid was the better choice
 
You’ll do anything but blame FMM for overpromising a design they couldn’t deliver, huh. Yes, there is a decent argument to be made that NAVSEA should’ve picked up on it being too good to be true so to speak but no other offer presented the full spectrum of capabilities Navy was looking for. Logically FMM was the only choice, practically accepting some compromises for BIWs bid was the better choice

I am not finger pointing. I am stating the simple fact the program ultimately was unsuccessful.

When a large, expensive and important program like FFGX fails, there sould be a post mortum and accountability.

The GAO has their opinion. Others have theirs.

The fact the Phelan says changes to LSM must go through him personally at 5pm on Fridays gives you an idea of where he thinks "A" problem lies.
 
Last edited:
An under-appreciated effect of the Cancelation-class frigate is the reduction in future ASW capacity for the American CSG. At a time when the the PLAN is rapidly building its SSN force, the addition of a moderately capable ASW ship to the American CSG would have been welcome. But now, US ASW capabilities will not keep up with advances in Chinese undersea warfare. An NSC-derived frigate will not cut it. F/A-XX is not the only thing needed to keep the CVN viable.
Don't worry, NAVSEA safety standard will ensure that China can launch 10 torpedos at any US ship and it will stay afloat after these 10 hits, someone very knowledgeable told me so.
 
BIWs bid was the better choice
As mentioned previously the primary mission of the FFG(X) was stated to be ASW and as the BIW-Navantia Spanish F100 was an AAW ship with unsilenced CODAG propulsion and did not have the current de facto standard spec for a ASW frigate with a quiet hull/hybrid electric propulsion and so ruled itself out whereas FREMM did comply.


If the Navy had ironically not enforced its hard and fast rule that ships had to be in the water to "minimize" any delays, one possible option they could have perhaps chosen was the new Navantia F110 class program frigate specifically designed as an ASW frigate with its quiet hull and hybrid electric propulsion, currently one ship in water and is fitting plus two others in build replacing their six ex-USN Perry frigates. It seems every possible decision on this program the Navy made they got wrong.
 
False, it indicates that requirements are shifting extremely quickly. This is a trend across the military, for instance the US Army has struggled to integrate drones into there arsenal due to the rapidly shifting nature of drone technology and strategy.

There are clearly defined performance requirements, it’s just that to meet those requirements there is a need for constant system modification. There is no proof that structural requirements changed, and structural requirements have been cited as the main cause of program failure. The problems they refer to would likely be a SPAWAR issue.

A hull plug does not substantially modify the complexity of the ship, America has done it for Burkes, Ticos, etc. Similarly modifying electrical and piping is needed to meet requirements. If FMM couldn’t do it then they shouldn’t have bid a design they couldn’t build.

Nice quote from Wikipedia there. NAVSEA no longer has a serious in house design capability, that’s why they didn’t do design work for FFG(X). NAVSEA served to coordinate Navy and Industry cooperation throughout the Constellation class program, essentially filling the role you describe. Again, this is directly from the head of BIW’s design who described the program as “very well run”. Do you know better than him?
This is completely different from drones, which are emerging technologies. The RFI of the Constellation-class corvettes does not include any emerging technologies. VLS and CODLAG are all existing, mature technologies.

Leaving aside the changes in RFI between 2017 and 2019, let's only discuss the changes that occurred after the constellation-class scheme was determined. According to the report of the Constellation-class frigate program released by CRS on September 15, 2021, compared to the original FREMM design, the Constellation-class is 23.6 feet longer(The hull has been lengthened to the point where a new model test is necessary.), has a slightly larger waterline beam of 3.61 feet, and a displacement increase of approximately 500 tons, while other dimensions remain largely the same. According to GAO reports over the years, the U.S. Navy has formulated a total of 511 functional design changes. So why did the Navy choose such a design that requires major changes? Or why doesn't SCIB prevent the Navy from choosing thedesign based on FREMM?

The original design by FMM in May 2019, the Constellation-class is 23.6 feet (7.19m) longerIn the original design of FREMM's electrical system, the generator and switchboard were placed in different locations. However, according to U.S. Navy standards, the generator and switchboard of the Constellation class need to be placed together. This design change altered the ship's spatial layout, piping layout, and weight balance.

I know that NAVSEA has lost its ship design capabilities for many years. So in August, Admiral Peter D. Small, Chief of SEA 05, said that the Navy will strengthen its in-house design capabilities, and that the DDGX and SSNX will be designed under the Navy's leadership. Although I'm not optimistic.
 
Seems like the Good Idea faeries keep moving Burke replacements to unaffordable prices. Ultimately Burke got pushed over time to acts as destroyers, which was way beyond the original mission. Capability for FFG(X) has becomes a destroyer program. Maybe get it back towards its original mission scope. Instead of one-size fits all, perhaps aim for two derivatives with one 80% of the other in terms of length and tonnage, to fit the different theaters for which USN covers. One design to fill niche roles is nonsensical.

Burkes were always good AAW platforms, but started a few tiers below Ticonderoga levels. The modern Burke probably is better than the Ticonderoga launched at save for the magazine capacity of the platform. Why does an FFG(X) need a SPY-1? Why not reduce to a SPY-5 like higher resolution but shorter range system and stick to a tighter scope? SPY-5 would have detected periscopes at incredible ranges and was a high resolution but shorter range solution. While ESSM won't engage at 90 miles, it requires substantially less to support. And ESSM hits at ranges that many SM-1 variants did. For shorter ranges you can still use a cheaper array of ever-improving IIR and active radar homing missiles. Many of these COTS systems outrange the original ESSM. But aim for a radar set that enhances ASW without breaking the bank.

I think they need to focus on common systems, like Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR), that will simplify the design but enhance the frigate role.
 
Don't worry, NAVSEA safety standard will ensure that China can launch 10 torpedos at any US ship and it will stay afloat after these 10 hits, someone very knowledgeable told me so.
I’m not even going to bother with your arrogant bullshit. Frankly it is embarrassing that you can’t debate an argument in good faith or present a point with a modicum of understanding of the topic at hand. Standards are abhorrent if you are the standard.
The RFI of the Constellation-class corvettes
Frigates, bordering on small DDGs*
does not include any emerging technologies. VLS and CODLAG are all existing, mature technologies.
Hardware is a comparatively small chunk of what I am discussing.
So why did the Navy choose such a design that requires major changes? Or why doesn't SCIB prevent the Navy from choosing thedesign based on FREMM?
The US government pushed most hard for the modification of an existing design. The FREMM based design was the only design that had the whole package the Navy wanted, especially IEP. FREMM may be behind schedule but, as proven by the decision to build two hulls, the design is indeed ultimately workable. All the RnD costs will still be paid for.
The original design by FMM in May 2019, the Constellation-class is 23.6 feet (7.19m) longerIn the original design of FREMM's electrical system, the generator and switchboard were placed in different locations. However, according to U.S. Navy standards, the generator and switchboard of the Constellation class need to be placed together. This design change altered the ship's spatial layout, piping layout, and weight balance.
These are normal changes that any good design team should account for. Same with changing parts from European to American built. These are nessecary, common sense changes.
I know that NAVSEA has lost its ship design capabilities for many years. So in August, Admiral Peter D. Small, Chief of SEA 05, said that the Navy will strengthen its in-house design capabilities, and that the DDGX and SSNX will be designed under the Navy's leadership. Although I'm not optimistic
You should be optimistic given there has already been a significant effort to do so for DDG(X) and they have met that requirement. A bigger problem is that they can’t seem to fulfil more than one program requirement at once in house
 
I’m not even going to bother with your arrogant bullshit. Frankly it is embarrassing that you can’t debate an argument in good faith or present a point with a modicum of understanding of the topic at hand. Standards are abhorrent if you are the standard.

Frigates, bordering on small DDGs*

Hardware is a comparatively small chunk of what I am discussing.

The US government pushed most hard for the modification of an existing design. The FREMM based design was the only design that had the whole package the Navy wanted, especially IEP. FREMM may be behind schedule but, as proven by the decision to build two hulls, the design is indeed ultimately workable. All the RnD costs will still be paid for.

These are normal changes that any good design team should account for. Same with changing parts from European to American built. These are nessecary, common sense changes.

You should be optimistic given there has already been a significant effort to do so for DDG(X) and they have met that requirement. A bigger problem is that they can’t seem to fulfil more than one program requirement at once in house

The decision to build two Fremmish FFGs is as much about keeping the shipyard (and it's workforce) going as anything.

They will surely be needed in the future.
 
The decision to build two Fremmish FFGs is as much about keeping the shipyard (and it's workforce) going as anything.

They will surely be needed in the future.
That doesn’t make sense, the navy has programs they could assign to FMM. Paying for all the RnD and only building two ships lends more credibility to a “requirements have changed” argument than a “the program isn’t workable” argument
 
I’m not even going to bother with your arrogant bullshit. Frankly it is embarrassing that you can’t debate an argument in good faith or present a point with a modicum of understanding of the topic at hand. Standards are abhorrent if you are the standard.

Frigates, bordering on small DDGs*

Hardware is a comparatively small chunk of what I am discussing.

The US government pushed most hard for the modification of an existing design. The FREMM based design was the only design that had the whole package the Navy wanted, especially IEP. FREMM may be behind schedule but, as proven by the decision to build two hulls, the design is indeed ultimately workable. All the RnD costs will still be paid for.

These are normal changes that any good design team should account for. Same with changing parts from European to American built. These are nessecary, common sense changes.

You should be optimistic given there has already been a significant effort to do so for DDG(X) and they have met that requirement. A bigger problem is that they can’t seem to fulfil more than one program requirement at once in house
The best damage control is to not get hit at all. I'm 1000% willing to sacrifice some survivability in the form of build standards to save some money for either more hulls, better radars, better LO, better missiles.

It's not WW2 anymore, where you can put a vessel into port for a few weeks and weld the hull or boilers back together and be good to go. Most hits are going to totally destroy your electrical generation capability in addition to key combat system like radar, battle management system, sonar, or just propulsion. These components have lead times in years especially in war time with supply chain disruptions and existing hull building program accelerations. Having a hull that limps back into harbor means that hull is effectively killed for the duration of the war even if the war is 2-3 years long. At this point having sailors that survive isn't very meaningful as there's no ships for them to man. This also ignores the fact that the ship is now a slow defenseless target for your enemy to finish off before it returns to harbor.

This coupled with slow building speeds means you effectively start the war with as many ships as you'll ever have and any significant damage to a critical system means that hull is lost. If looser survivability standards means that you have more ships or ships sooner, it is absolutely worth it.
 
The best damage control is to not get hit at all. I'm 1000% willing to sacrifice some survivability in the form of build standards to save some money for either more hulls, better radars, better LO, better missiles
Sacrificing survivability has never ever lead to better radars, missiles, etc. They are two fundamentally different parts of the construction of a USN warship. They are not mutually exclusive.
It's not WW2 anymore, where you can put a vessel into port for a few weeks and weld the hull or boilers back together and be good to go. Most hits are going to totally destroy your electrical generation capability in addition to key combat system like radar, battle management system, sonar, or just propulsion. These components have lead times in years especially in war time with supply chain disruptions and existing hull building program accelerations. Having a hull that limps back into harbor means that hull is effectively killed for the duration of the war even if the war is 1-2 years long. At this point having sailors that survive isn't very meaningful as there's no ships for them to man.
This doesn’t make sense on a few levels. First, survivability mitigates a mission kill such that it allows for quicker repair and turnaround. So that a hit that damages sensors just damages sensors and doesn’t write off the hull.
Secondly there is no US program to accelerate wartime build timelines because this has been assessed since the 70s to be an untenable way to fight a war. New build ships would be deprioritised over sustaining, upgrading, and repairing existing ships.
Third, if the ship is mission killed for 2-3 years it also means it is easier to rebuild the ship postwar and retain sea control. Enduring sea control maintains the position of the USN as a premiere fighting force, instead of just fighting one war and falling into obscurity.
Fourth, why would having sailors survive not be meaningful? You know sailors aren’t robots, right? They have families and lives beyond the navy. Mitigating the deaths of sailors has been a primary focus of survivability standards. Beyond that, crews aren’t useless just because they don’t have a ship to crew. Having more sailors available raises mission readiness rates by making maintenance the primary availability metric, not crew.

Survivability is not why American programs fail, I don’t understand why anyone would want to reduce them to the detriment of sailor’s lives. I’d wager none of you pushing for lower standards are sailors given your insistence on making them less safe. It’s such a pointless argument to make that doesn’t address FFG(X) or indeed lay a solid platform for future FFG/LSC designs
 
Sacrificing survivability has never ever lead to better radars, missiles, etc. They are two fundamentally different parts of the construction of a USN warship. They are not mutually exclusive.
You can have cheaper hulls and hence more or more capable hulls for the same total cost. Or in this case not have killed ffg(x) due to needing to redesign for survibility standards, which results many fewer hulls likely delayed by close to a decade.
This doesn’t make sense on a few levels. First, survivability mitigates a mission kill such that it allows for quicker repair and turnaround. So that a hit that damages sensors just damages sensors and doesn’t write off the hull.
Secondly there is no US program to accelerate wartime build timelines because this has been assessed since the 70s to be an untenable way to fight a war. New build ships would be deprioritised over sustaining, upgrading, and repairing existing ships.
Third, if the ship is mission killed for 2-3 years it also means it is easier to rebuild the ship postwar and retain sea control. Enduring sea control maintains the position of the USN as a premiere fighting force, instead of just fighting one war and falling into obscurity.
Fourth, why would having sailors survive not be meaningful? You know sailors aren’t robots, right? They have families and lives beyond the navy. Mitigating the deaths of sailors has been a primary focus of survivability standards. Beyond that, crews aren’t useless just because they don’t have a ship to crew. Having more sailors available raises mission readiness rates by making maintenance the primary availability metric, not crew.

Survivability is not why American programs fail, I don’t understand why anyone would want to reduce them to the detriment of sailor’s lives. I’d wager none of you pushing for lower standards are sailors given your insistence on making them less safe. It’s such a pointless argument to make that doesn’t address FFG(X) or indeed lay a solid platform for future FFG/LSC designs
1) You're missing the point. You the hull doesn't matter if your radars, sonar, hybrid propulsion etc don't work/exist as there's a many year lead time.

2) Exactly, you can suddenly accelerate the building of these long lead time items. So you wouldn't have any additional spares for battle damage. Additionally you would still finish building the hull already under construction.

3) If it's a war, losing is an existential threat. Worrying about rebuilding burned out hulls for after the war is non-sensical, as who knows how much technology or economics will have changed afterwards.

4) You'll lose more lives by having not enough vessels to cover your needs. Most of types battle damage will result in a mission killed ship for the rest of the war, having excess crew from other mission killed ships won't help.

Again you're missing the point. The requirement to modify the FREMM design to US survivability standards is a large part of why ffg(x) failed. Lower survivability standards means we can more or less copy and paste a foreign design and start building frigates now instead of waiting another decade for a clean sheet US design or avoid a highly compromised NSC derived design.
 
Sacrificing survivability has never ever lead to better radars, missiles, etc. They are two fundamentally different parts of the construction of a USN warship. They are not mutually exclusive.

This doesn’t make sense on a few levels. First, survivability mitigates a mission kill such that it allows for quicker repair and turnaround. So that a hit that damages sensors just damages sensors and doesn’t write off the hull.
Secondly there is no US program to accelerate wartime build timelines because this has been assessed since the 70s to be an untenable way to fight a war. New build ships would be deprioritised over sustaining, upgrading, and repairing existing ships.
Third, if the ship is mission killed for 2-3 years it also means it is easier to rebuild the ship postwar and retain sea control. Enduring sea control maintains the position of the USN as a premiere fighting force, instead of just fighting one war and falling into obscurity.
Fourth, why would having sailors survive not be meaningful? You know sailors aren’t robots, right? They have families and lives beyond the navy. Mitigating the deaths of sailors has been a primary focus of survivability standards. Beyond that, crews aren’t useless just because they don’t have a ship to crew. Having more sailors available raises mission readiness rates by making maintenance the primary availability metric, not crew.

Survivability is not why American programs fail, I don’t understand why anyone would want to reduce them to the detriment of sailor’s lives. I’d wager none of you pushing for lower standards are sailors given your insistence on making them less safe. It’s such a pointless argument to make that doesn’t address FFG(X) or indeed lay a solid platform for future FFG/LSC designs

I think there is a reasonable debate to be had over quality vs quantity.

Quantity at least has to be part of the analysis.
 
You can have cheaper hulls and hence more or more capable hulls for the same total cost. Or in this case not have killed ffg(x) due to needing to redesign for survibility standards, which results many fewer hulls likely delayed by close to a decade
You do know that this is entirely contrary to American doctrine and naval thinking? This was studied and deemed as less effective.
1) You're missing the point. You the hull doesn't matter if your radars, sonar, hybrid propulsion etc don't work/exist as there's a many year lead time.
This is a nonissue given US procurement accounts for this sand the focus is maximising hull survivability so that the navy doesn’t run out during a peer conflict. Again, all sensor, weapons, etc. production will be prioritised away from new builds as per US Doctrine
Exactly, you can suddenly accelerate the building of these long lead time items. So you wouldn't have any additional spares for battle damage. Additionally you would still finish building the hull already under construction.
Same argument again, new builds will be deprioritised and production will be diverted to maintain existing hulls. This is as per US studies which have demonstrated a mobilisation frigate, transport, etc. are all useless in the modern age. Longlead items are a comparably small issue when compared to the complexity of shipbuilding.

3) If it's a war, losing is an existential threat. Worrying about rebuilding burned out hulls for after the war is non-sensical, as who knows how much technology or economics will have changed afterwards.
Is that why the Constellation program was specifically designed to be mostly available after the likely 2027 year for war with China? The idea that you only build for one war at a time is not just shortsighted but contrary to common sense and US doctrine.
4) You'll lose more lives by having not enough vessels to cover your needs. Most of types battle damage will result in a mission killed ship for the rest of the war, having excess crew from other mission killed ships won't help.
Having excess crew does help, especially when the alternative you propose is more dead sailors and officers

Again you're missing the point. The requirement to modify the FREMM design to US survivability standards is a large part of why ffg(x) failed. Lower survivability standards means we can more or less copy and paste a foreign design and start building frigates now instead of waiting another decade for a clean sheet US design or avoid a highly compromised NSC derived design.
Foreign designs don’t meet American needs. Only a clean sheet or heavily modified design works. Pumping out FREMMs as built in Italy would have the same result; a compromised design unfit for American requirements.
I think there is a reasonable debate to be had over quality vs quantity.

Quantity at least has to be part of the analysis.
The problem is that American strike power is carrier centric. Spamming out cheap FFGs detracts from the carrier because they can’t effectively engage the primary threats (submarine and missile)
 
Ultimately Burke got pushed over time to acts as destroyers, which was way beyond the original mission.

No, the Burke was always a destroyer -- specifically a replacement for the DDG-2s. That's why the original Burkes didn't have the helicopters, as they were replacing other ships without helos.

Why does an FFG(X) need a SPY-1? Why not reduce to a SPY-5 like higher resolution but shorter range system and stick to a tighter scope?

The FFG-62s have SPY-6, not SPY-1. They have a much smaller and less powerful version than the SPY-6 variants on the new DDGs or even the retrofit version for the old DDGs. (Three faces with 9 array panels versus four panels with 24-37 panels on the DDGs). That's probably around half the range performance as the variant on the refit DDGs.
 
The FFG-62s have SPY-6, not SPY-1. They have a much smaller and less powerful version than the SPY-6 variants on the new DDGs or even the retrofit version for the old DDGs. (Three faces with 9 array panels versus four panels with 24-37 panels on the DDGs). That's probably around half the range performance as the variant on the refit DDGs.
But roughly equivalent to legacy PESA systems iirc
 
Also this is batshit insane to say and proof the average commentator on defence has no appreciation for the costs of war
That's a very antagonistic stance. I would say the same of you. I can see what that posted who knew some shipyard heads left the forum.
 
Hardware is a comparatively small chunk of what I am discussing.

The US government pushed most hard for the modification of an existing design. The FREMM based design was the only design that had the whole package the Navy wanted, especially IEP. FREMM may be behind schedule but, as proven by the decision to build two hulls, the design is indeed ultimately workable. All the RnD costs will still be paid for.

These are normal changes that any good design team should account for. Same with changing parts from European to American built. These are nessecary, common sense changes.

You should be optimistic given there has already been a significant effort to do so for DDG(X) and they have met that requirement. A bigger problem is that they can’t seem to fulfil more than one program requirement at once in house
These are another 2 points.

Point one. Did the Navy inform all contractors during the bidding that their proposals had to be converted from the original design standards to USN standards? According to normal industrial project procedures, FMM should have designed the Constellation-class frigates complying with USN standards during the bidding, or consulted with the Navy to check if the Navy would accept FREMM's original design standards(Because the user changed from the Italian Navy to the US Navy.). In retrospect, the change in design standards directly led to the failure of the Constellation-class project.

Point two. Have SEA 05D, SEA 05V, and SEA 05U all lost their design capabilities? If so, can they be merged together for the DDGX and SSNX projects to help them recover their design capabilities as soon as possible?
 
Point two. Have SEA 05D, SEA 05V, and SEA 05U all lost their design capabilities? If so, can they be merged together for the DDGX and SSNX projects to help them recover their design capabilities as soon as possible?
I'd argue that the Submarine design standards are sufficiently different that it's not particularly feasible to merge all three together. And frankly, carrier and small boy standards are also likely different enough that it's not feasible to merge them, either.

I can see loaning out the quieting engineers to the surface folks if they're not getting used on a sub design, but not a permanent merge.
 
Point one. Did the Navy inform all contractors during the bidding that their proposals had to be converted from the original design standards to USN standards?
Yes, of course they were. Meeting OPNAV 9070 was a precursor to submitting a design and FMM said that they could do it. I believe they vastly underestimated the design changes and focused on the capability they could deliver instead of the realities of delivering this capability. I believe the other, more experienced teams likely delivered the maximum that their hulls could practically offer which appeared lacking when compared to FMM.
FMM should have designed the Constellation-class frigates complying with USN standards during the bidding, or consulted with the Navy to check if the Navy would accept FREMM's original design standards(Because the user changed from the Italian Navy to the US Navy.).
FMM was inexperienced and their team mostly consisted on those who had previously worked on LCS which was designed to a lower survivability standard. There project lead was a mostly political and administrative appointee, not a naval architect (a former admiral who had studied telecommunications and bacteriology iirc).
In retrospect, the change in design standards directly led to the failure of the Constellation-class project.
The change in design standards certainly dragged out the design process however the failure of the project shouldn't be laid upon the standards, it should be laid upon the political processes which forced a modified foreign design and not a purpose built ship. The standards aren't the problem, politics was. They should've never forced a foreign built design which was a political choice.
Point two. Have SEA 05D, SEA 05V, and SEA 05U all lost their design capabilities? If so, can they be merged together for the DDGX and SSNX projects to help them recover their design capabilities as soon as possible?
DDG(X) is already a mostly in house design from what I understand, with subcontracted support.

SSN(X) is sufficiently different as Scott pointed out and there have been no issues with delivering submarine programs. As a matter of fact there have not even been significant problems with DDG(X) thus far as it is mostly proven technology based upon Zumwalt development.
I can see loaning out the quieting engineers to the surface folks if they're not getting used on a sub design, but not a permanent merge.
I wonder how similar it would be, I would guess surface ship quieting would be markedly different given propulsion systems, operating speeds, etc.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom