Early Western articles about the J-10

kaiserbill

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I want to ask a question about when the J-10 programme first became known publically in the West, as well as the contentious issue of the possible Lavi connection, even if it is simply cosmetic, and hope that Deino perhaps can give some clarity on this.


When were the first rumours of the J-10 programme mentioned in Western circles, particularly open source? Or another question...when was the first time a possible Lavi connection was mentioned with regard to the J-10?
I'm not personally speculating on a definitive Lavi connection...the reason I'm asking is that I've been reading through some back issues of an open source South African military magazine, and an admittedly highly speculative (and in some cases wrong) article in May 1990 mentions a "rumoured Chinese Lavi lookalike".


This seems very early to me.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
I believe it was about 1994, for example:

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1994/1994%20-%202663.html


Late 1970s saw various speculation about a delta "J-10" which was probably the Shenyang J-9 project, but this seems to be the first public mention of the Chengdu J-10 I have traced to date.


Thanks.
Below is a portion of a highly speculative article dealing with a new combat aircraft for South Africa. The author is basing the article mainly on that Flight International article and speculative drawing from around 1989 that purported to show the twin engined Cava (but really Carver as we now know) and is really just a series of musings (some of them wild or ridiculous enough to make you wonder about deliberate misinformation/obfuscation, which abounded at the time) in an era of almost complete secrecy surrounding the project. I guess it's called "Reflections" for a reason...


Either way, the interesting couple of throwaway lines, in connection with China are "should the rumoured Chinese Lavi lookalike ever materialise.." and "although the Lavi project has been cancelled, the design may already have been sold- for instance to the PRC, as noted above".


http://www.aafonline.co.za/view_journal/2459


This is from May 1990, so although the actual designation "J-10" itself is not used, it looks very much like to me that the J-10 configuration was already known about then already, as well as a possible/probable Lavi connection. Pretty clear what is being inferred here IMHO, which is not the earlier canard delta design (J-9?).
This is the earliest open source mention/description I've seen. I'd been aware of mid 1990's articles, but this is quite a few years before then.
I wonder where he got his info (rumours) from? Perhaps from some of those newly signed-on technicians from Atlas Aircraft mentioned briefly in the article? ;)


Anyway, I found it interesting because of the date.
 

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Some ex-Lavi engineers went to Atlas for Carver, so its possible there was a connection there.
 
Israel co-operates with China on secret fighter


ISRAEL AND China are collaborating on a next-generation fighter programme based on technology from the Lavi combat aircraft, the development of which was cancelled in 1987. The secret programme is at an advanced stage: Chinese sources say that the prototype is scheduled to have its maiden flight in the first months of 1996. Israel Aircraft industries (IAI) is involved in developing the new fighter for the Chinese air force. A development contract was signed with IAI in 1992. Chinese sources say that the prototype will be built by IAI, while final assembly of the series aircraft will be in China. The production-aircraft powerplant will be of Chinese origin. With much of the original Lavi development underwritten by the USA, the programme could cause considerable strain between China and the USA. Details of the highly sensitive programme remain scant, but the sources say the aircraft "...will look different" on the Lavi. The avionics suite is believed to resemble closely the suite which had been developed for the Lavi. China has a pressing need for a combat aircraft to replace the Xian J-7 interceptor, Nanchang Q-5 Fantan strike/attack aircraft and the Shenyang J-6 attack aircraft. It has purchased a limited number of Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker interceptors from Russia, but needs a multi-role combat aircraft as a complement to them. China has had a long-standing defence relationship with Israel: The PL-8 and PL-9 air-to-air missiles are generally regarded as licence-built Rafael Python 3 missiles, for example.


November 1994
 
DOUGLAS BARRIE/LONDON


In late 1991, Lt Gen Dan Shomron, ex-Israeli chief of staff, and then chairman of Israel Military Industries, led a high level delegation to China. High on the agenda for discussion was probably the joint development of an advanced combat aircraft for the Chinese air force (PLAAF). The development contract for the project was signed in 1992. The revelation that Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is working on a single-engined multi-role fighter for the PLAAF, based on technology from the "defunct" Lavi fighter programme {Flight International, 2-8 November), marks a significant change in the level of defence collaboration between the two states. Although at first glance Israel and China may appear to make strange bedfellows, defence collaboration between the two is not new. Previous programmes are thought to have included the PL-8 short range infra-red-guided air-to-air missile, which is believed to be a licence-produced variant of the Rafael Python 3 missile. The marked difference is in the scale of the programme being undertaken and its potential political impact both in the USA and throughout the rest of Asia. The original Lavi design was intended to give the Israeli air force an aircraft which was more combat-capable than the Lockheed F-16. Such an aircraft entering service in considerable numbers with the PLAAF would be likely to send China's neighbouring states looking for advanced-combat aircraft, too. When the Lavi was originally cancelled there was considerable speculation that Soudi Africa might continue the programme. The South African Air Force is believed to have considered this option, but settled instead for an upgrade of its IAI Kfirs (Cheetahs). The most likely Chinese "partner" for the Israeli company in the development programme would either be Shenyang Aircraft, which was previously believed to have been working independently on a single-seat, single-engined delta-canard design, or Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation. The IAI prototype of the PLAAF fighter is due to be flown in early 1996, a decade after the Lavi was first flown. The aircraft will have an in-service date of just after the turn of the century. While based on the Lavi design, the prototype is said to look different. Its avionics systems, however, are claimed to be almost exactly the same as those developed for the Lavi. The aircraft may also be equipped with the Elta EL/M-2035 multimode pulse-Doppler radar. When the Lavi was cancelled in August 1987, Israel had already spent $1.5 billion on the programme, some 50% of the contracts going to US companies. It remains to be seen how the US Government will react publicly to having inadvertently been involved in the development of a new combat aircraft for China. The three Lavi prototypes were powered by the Pratt & Whitney PW1120 turbojet, with the digital flight-control system (FCS) developed by Lear Siegler/MBT. The powerplant for the PLAAF prototype combat aircraft is not known, although the production aircraft will have a Chinese engine. The extent to which the Lavi FCS is used in the "new" aircraft is uncertain. IAI has continued to fly the third aircraft, prototype B-3, as a technology-demonstrator aircraft. It now seems likely that some results of flight testing from this aircraft will have been fed into the Chinese programme. At one level, Israel may be merely trying to recoup some of the investment it had originally made, apparently fruitlessly, in the Lavi programme. There were also those in the USA who lobbied determinedly for the cancellation of the Lavi programme, pushing for the Israelis to purchase US combat aircraft instead. Israel may also be signalling its political independence from the USA in pursuing defence relationships of which its erstwhile guarantor does not necessarily approve. The USA has previously blocked Chinese attempts to replace its obsolescent combat fleet of Xian J-7 interceptors, Nanchang Q-5 Fantan strike/attack and Shenyang J-6 attack aircraft. Grumman's involvement in the Peace Pearl upgrade project for the J-8 II Finback air-superiority fighter collapsed following US governmental ire over the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, as did its work on the Super- 7 upgrade programme, intended for export. Since then, China has been courting Russia, with a deal concluded in 1991 to purchase the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker counter-air fighter. So far, it has bought 26 aircraft, with negotiations continuing on a follow-on batch. Negotiating the second shipment has proved difficult, however, with Russia unwilling effectively to "barter" the aircraft for goods, and instead demanding hard currency. Such difficulties have almost certainly reinforced China's desire to manufacture, if not design independently, its primary next generation fighter. While there may be those in the West whose "knee-jerk" reaction will be to condemn the Israeli move, it reflects no more than the new world disorder brought about by the end of the Cold War. Such collaborative military programmes are likely to become more, rather than less, common.


November 1994
 
Ex-Israeli chief of staff to visit China


Lt Gen Dan Shomron, the former Israeli chief of staff and now the chairman of Israel Military Industries, is to visit China as part of a high-level commercial delegation due in Beijing in the next few days. China could purchase Israeli made weapon systems and related technologies if ties between the two countries lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In the early 1980s there were a number of reports concerning the purchase of Israeli-made arms by China. Missiles and tank guns were said to be among arms deliveries valued at over $400 million. After cancellation of the Lavi fighter programme by Israel in 1987, there were further reports of Chinese interest in avionics developed for the aircraft. In recent months, a number of visits have taken place by both sides.


20 - 26 November, 1991


https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1991/1991%20-%203003.html
 
THE CHINESE AIR force has flown an airborne earlywarning (AEW) testbed, believed to be an Ilyushin 11-76, fitted with a GEC-Marconi Avionics AEW radar and processing suite based on that developed for the abortive Nimrod AEW programme for the Royal Air Force. The Chinese have had a longstanding requirement for an AEW aircraft, with GEC one of several companies (including Beriev, with the A-50 Mainstay) which had been pursuing the programme. It is also possible that Israel could be trying to interest the Chinese in the Phalcon AEW as part of widening defence links between the two countries. A GEC team visited China in 1993 to discuss its AEW system, dubbed the Argus. Sources now indicate that a trial aircraft is being flown in China. This is thought to be fitted with the two radar design intended originally for the Nimrod AEW. GEC declines to discuss the programme, saying that it will not comment on any specific customer for the Argus. The AEW programme is a key plank in the Chinese air force's programme to revamp its fleet. Alongside the programme, the air force is funding Chengdu and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) for development of the XJ-10 fourth generation fighter, based on IAI's cancelled Lavi fighter for the Israeli air force (Flight International, 2-8 November). US Government officials admit that there is considerable concern within Government and military circles in the USA over the Israeli/Chinese programme. They say that "high-level" discussions about the nature of the Israeli collaboration have taken place. According to one official, Israel maintains that it is not contravening a US-Israeli technology-transfer agreements by developing a Lavi-based combat aircraft for the Chinese. One key area of concern in the USA is whether Israel is providing an air-intercept radar for the aircraft. Israel has had access to the Westinghouse APG-66 (for its Lockheed F-16s) and the Hughes APG-63 (for its McDonnell Douglas F-15s). Israeli manufacturer Elta may be offering a derivative of its EL/M2021 for the Chinese programme. There are concerns, however, that much of this radar may be based on US technology. Alternatively, China could turn to GEC for its fighter radar, as well as its AEW radar. The UK company has been pushing its Blue Hawk for China's Super-7 upgrade of the Chengdu F-7. This radar could be adapted for the XJ-10.

7 - 13 December 1994

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1994/1994%20-%202920.html
 
CHINA'S CHENGDU F-10 fighter aircraft, being developed jointly with Israel, may be fitted with a Russian air-intercept radar and powerplant. Russian radar-design house Phazotron is proposing an advanced variant of its Zhuk (Beetle) multimode pulse-Doppler radar for the fighter, as the Israelis try to convince die Chinese to fit their systems. Phazotron officials say that they are offering the Zhemchoug (Pearl) radar — described as a "development of the Zhuk, but with a better performance in terms of target detection range". Previous reports on the development of the F-10 had suggested that the aircraft — effectively a continuation of Israel's Lavi programme, cancelled in 1987 — would have an Elta radar. The Russians also claim that the aircraft is to be powered by a single Lyulka AL-31F engine, two of which are fitted to the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. With a first flight expected as early as 1996, a powerplant for the prototype will already have been selected and possibly fitted. The Lavi was fitted with the 91.7kN (20,6201b)-thrust Pratt & Whitney PW1120 turbojet, although the release of the US engine to China is highly unlikely. A single Lyulka AL-31F produces 122kN of thrust with reheat. The Chinese air force already has 26 Flankers in service, with a second batch of 24 believed to be on order. China has ambitions eventually to licence-produce the airframe and Lyulka engine. The latter would probably be produced by Wopen in Guiyang. While the Chinese may in effect be holding a radar competition, the Israelis have run into serious opposition from the USA over the potential supply of advanced air intercept-radar technology to the Chinese. When Flight International first revealed in 1994 that the F-10 was a Chinese-Israeli collaborative programme, the US State Department announced publicly that it would examine whether Israel was in breach of US export regulations. The US Government had been aware of the programme for several years and tried to get Tel Aviv to drop the project — the Lavi fighter programme having received much of its funding and technology from the USA. The first pictures of the aircraft are reported to have been taken by US intelligence satellites in 1994, prompting US defence secretary William Perry to make a personal plea earlier this year to recently assassinated Israeli prime minister, Yitzak Rabin to drop the programme — without success. The prototype of the new fighter is being assembled in a special site at Chengdu Aircraft, in Sichuan. In the late 1980s, at least 20 engineers from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) were part of the fighter's design team at Chengdu. IAI also helped with windtunnel testing in the early design stage. The Israeli presence has been scaled down in the last three years. The Israeli design and development input in the programme is valued at more than $500 million. Overall programme costs are said to top $5 billion.


22 - 28 November 1995

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1995/1995%20-%203342.html
 

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US intelligence claims that China has Lavi technology
RAMON LOPEZ/WASHINGTON DC
A US MILITARY-intelligence assessment claims that China has acquired US technology used on the Israeli Lavi fighter for its own Chengdu F-10 next-generation combat-aircraft programme. Israel and China deny that US technology supplied for Israel's cancelled Lavi fighter was used to develop China's F-10. The US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) says: "US technology has been acquired through Israel in the form of the Lavi fighter and possibly SAM [surface-to-air missile] technology." Word of the military-technology transfer was contained in a recently released 36-page report entitled Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare. The report concludes that China's indigenous fighters are "very simple" and lack "great combat effectiveness", but that China's aviation industry "...is gaining the required technologies to build first-rate aircraft". It adds: "China has shown a willingness to spend some of its newfound wealth on advancing the industry's technological level with an eye toward eventual self-sufficiency." The report adds that Russia's dire economic straits "...have given China an unexpected windfall of military-aircraft technology." The ONI says that the 48 Sukhoi Su-27SK interceptors purchased recently purchased from Russia will allow China "...to bridge the gap until the indigenously built point-defence F-10 enters service after 2000". The report says that China has given the development of aircraft carriers "top priority." It says that China has indicated that two 48,000t ships with a complement of up to 40 fixed-wing aircraft will be built by 2005. "A number of fighters, including the new F-10, are being considered for at-sea basing," the report continues. The ONI suggests that the F-10 may challenge the McDonnell Douglas F-18E/F in speed and agility. "The F-10 represents a dramatic step forward for Chinese military aviation. The aircraft has particularly good agility," the report states.

13 - 19 March 1996

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1996/1996%20-%200584.html

Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA314821



Seems to have an artist's impression of the J-10 but reproduction is too poor to see it.
 
Very interesting Paul. Thanks for splitting it up, as there is probably no point in cluttering the actual J-10 thread.


That reference I posted seems indeed to be the first mention of a possible link, as well general "Lavi like" configuration.
Like you, I also sort of connected the dots of possibly the ex IAI engineers brought over to beef up the Carver design team mentioning the link, and the author of that May 1990 piece either getting wind of it, or possibly being told directly of it by those people.


From what I can gather, the Lavi was looked at by South Africa, but an indigineous design was settled upon, but probably leveraging sub systems and know-how from the Lavi programme. David Fabish employment in the Carver programme sort of confirms that.
The Cheetah C started in 1989/90 was meant to be interim.
What is interesting is that the author has written good quality books of behind the scenes developments in the SA weapons industry, yet this article is full of conjecture and some pretty off beat suggestions, which is why I wondered whether a lot of it was disinformation. Either that, or he wasn't really privy to what was still a top secret project. Certainly, the reference to China, "Lavi-like fighter", and the probably sale of design work is very interesting at such an early stage, and is what really caught my eye from the article.
 
Interesting topic ...

Regarding reports I have to look thru my collection, for images however these are two very early ones:

1. from a Chinese source ... some say even an early configuration.

2. at least the first realistic (even if still way off) image somewhere posted in an old AFM-report. Funny, how close it already was to the current J-10B !


Deino
 

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NEW CHINESE FIGHTER NEARS PROTOTYPING

defense officials are circulating drawings within the Pentagon of the proposed next—generation F-10 Chinese fighter that show a relatively compact multirole aircraft resembling a cross between the U.S.-built F-16 and Israeli-built Lavi. The design calls for a single-engine fighter with a planform similar to the Lavi's delta wing and canard. It also incorporates advanced cockpit avionics including a headup display, radar for beyond-visual-range combat and provisions for radar-guided, air-to-air missiles. A US. official called the equipment package ”analogous to the F-16's” and appropriate for both interceptor
and ground attack missions. The F-10 program is said to be nearing prototype production, with First flight expected in the next year or two and initial
operating capability in 10 years. It represents one of China’s key Iong«term modernization efforts. Modernization of the Chinese air force and navy is expected to be fueled in part by a 21 % increase in I995 Chinese defense spending proposed two weeks ago. The official I994 Chinese defense budget was $6 billion, but analysts believe this year’s spending increase may have been offset by a double-digit inflation rate.

However, China analyst Thomas McNaugher, a Rand senior political scientist, said the actual defense spending is probably $20- 30 billion if the purchase of new military equipment and the income from military-run enterprises is included. The Chinese budget has seen double~digit raises since I990, he said.

Today, the Chinese air force and navy are "a line-of—sight fighting force, which in modern combat means it’s a dead force," a second pressing need for a beyond-visuaI-range multirole fighter drives modernization of China’s air force and draws Israeli technology support defense official said. As a result, the Chinese government is putting renewed emphasis into advanced technology for its air force and navy. Development of the F-10 complements the purchase of Russian-built Su-27 fighters as central elements of the country's aviation modernization.

”THERE [ALSO] IS CLEAR need for an airrefueling capability” on the fighter; although, it is unclear whether that will be part of the final design, the second official said. Fighter aircraft with greater range are a key Chinese mission need, considering the nation's commitment to preserving its sovereignty in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (claimed by Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines) and the ParaceI Islands also in the South China Sea (claimed by the Vietnamese), he said. In February, China occupied Mischief Reef (claimed by the Philippines) about I30 mi. west of the Philippines.

Additionally, the Chinese surface navy has a very limited ability to defend itself from air attack, so "they need 0 CAP [combat air patrol] capability” that would demand long-range aircraft and in-flight refueling, the second official said. However, the Chinese have made little progress in developing an in-air-refueling or airborne early warning capability beyond identifying mission needs, he said. Israeli and U.S. defense officials confirmed that Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is offering help with the Chinese fighter's avionics package. Israeli officials deny any classified information or technology has migrated to China as a result of the collaboration. Israeli officials insist they are in full compliance with U.S. technology transfer law. The US. supplied Israel with technological support for the canceled Lavi. A U.S. official said the Pentagon is ”not in a position to say if the technology transfer is legitimate or not.”

The radar and other avionics that the Israelis are offering also are thought to be part of IAI’s Northrop F-5 Plus upgrade, which the company has offered to several countries including Chile (AW&ST Mar. 25, I99I, p. 46).

”If the only thing Israel [contributed] to the F-10 is a radar package and avionics, they are correct in saying they are violating no laws,” Richard A. Bitzinger said. He is a defense industry analyst for the Defense Budget Proiect, an independent, Washington-based research organization. ”But, if the Israelis also offered design assistance or manufacturing technologies to the Chinese that were based on the Lavi proiect, then there may have been a violation of at least the spirit of U.S. export controls.”
The F-5 Plus avionics upgrade is a scaled-down Lavi package, with options
* Video camera and recorder.
* Two multifunction displays.
* Helmet-mounted sight.
* Integrated electronic warfare suite.

Israeli officials point out that the U.S. has been the biggest customer for the country’s defense business for the last three years and, as a result, they would not do anything to irritate the Us. and endanger that lucrative market. However, within the U.S. restrictions, Israel, among other countries, has the capacity to supply many of China’s technology needs including updated avionics, early warning capability and in-flight refueling.

PART OF THE PENTAGON’S seeming indifference to Israel's marketing to China is that it sees little danger to the U.S. from the F-10. However, the aircraft could be a worrisome opponent to the air forces of Vietnam, the Philippines or even Malaysia’s small MiG-29 force.

”I’ve seen [the data on the ChineseF-10]," a senior Air Force official said. ”I was not a lot concerned.”

China appears to be pursuing the same strategy as India with its light combat aircraft (LCA). Indian officials are not trying to build an aircraft that outperforms the F-I6 or MiG-29. Rather, they want to field in some numbers an aircraft with improved performance to replace their aging MiG-21s (AW&STJuly 25, I994, p. 42). In fact, Chinese officials have expressed interest in participating in the LCA proiect during a recent visit to India. A planning dele gation from Hindustani Aeronautics, Ltd., visited China last month. The first prototype LCA is now expected to roll out in October, a slip of five months.

The Chinese are looking to the Russians for an engine to power their F-10s. The Israelis used the U.S.-built Pratt & Whitney I I20 turbojet to equip their Lavi, but there Lockheed Ft. Worth’s FM is said to be the apparent model for the F-10’s nose-to-tail profile. is almost no chance the Chinese could buy engines or engine-building technology from the US. Instead, the Chinese are expected to build off the technology, logistics and maintenance base they are developing in fielding a proposed force of 60 Russian-built Su-27s. The fighter’s 27,557—lb.-thrust with afterburning Saturn/Lyulka AL-3IF turbofan
engines are more durable (approximately 1,500 hr. versus 500 hr. or less) than MiG-29 engines, and are considered a likely candidate for the F-10. The Chinese currently have 24 of the front-line Su—27 fighters and have at least another ”26 or so" on order, the first defense official said, ”and we think they will ask for more” before the ”Russian window” closes.

Some analysts believe a combination of growing U.S. pressure to stop arms technology transfers, a disappearing supply of completed new combat aircraft and redirection of the aviation industry will dampen Russian weapons sales within a few years, thus closing the so-called Russian window.

THE FIRST CHINESE SU'27 Unit is not fully operational, but it has progressed to ”about where you would expect” any new user of the aircraft to be, the first official said. The unit is expected to be fully operational within the next 12 months. China’s purchases of Su-27s and Kilo class diesel submarines are considered aberrations in China's continuing policy of industrial self-reliance. The Chinese intend to learn from operating a fourth-generation
fighter what it takes to maintain, operate and generally ”deal with” modern aircraft, the first official said.

An earlier attempt to add Western technology to an indigenous airframe—the Shenyang Aircraft Corp. F-8-2 Finback B fighter/ground attack proiect foundered after US avionics deals were canceled in the wake of the I989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The program was canceled in 1990.

But then in I991, the allies’ quick dismemberment of the huge Iraqi army (fourth largest in the world) in Desert Storm ”had a devastating impact on Chinese force planners," the second defense official said. The graphic example of what an integrated force can do during high-intensity operations to a force incapable of combined operations came as a ”deep psychological shock.”

BUILDING FROM THE BASE of knowledge established with the Su-27, the Chinese intend a longer-term technology leap with the F-10. The new indigenous fighter is intended to be available in ”2000 or soon after," the first official said. ”What we don’t know is whether the PTO will appear with [less sophisticated] F-16A technology or [advanced] F-16C technology," the first defense official said. ”And we won't know until the proiect gets further along. The technology is hard to see at this point. We need more insight into their interests and the availability of technology.”

If the F-10 program is successful, U.S. officials expect the Chinese to build ”a couple of hundred or more,” the first defense official said. There is yet no indication that the Chinese are pursuing a naval version of either the Su-27 or F-IO. Purchase of the surplus Ukrainian-built aircraft carrier Varyag was tempting to the Chinese and money could have been found, US. defense officials said. But top Chinese defense officials considered the political cost of being seen as a potential regional aggressor as too high for the present.
AWST 13 March 1995
CHINA PURSUING TWO-FIGHTER PLAN
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON
China has adopted a two—prong fighter modernization program, both of which rely on the country's ability to manufacture the Russian—designed Su-27 fighter’s powerful, increased-reliability engine.

If China can obtain a coproduction agreement for the Su—27 and its engine, US. defense officials contend that the combination will become one of the country’s main aviation modernization programs. The 1,500- hr.-life, Saturn/Lyulka AL-31F turbofan produces 27,557—lb. thrust with afterburning.

Several hundred modern, dual-role fighter/attack aircraft are needed to start replacing the badly aging 4,000+ fighters in the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force. This replacement would allow the PLAAF to shrink in numbers while growing in effectiveness.

However, if Russia balks, US. officials contend the Chinese will attempt to coproduce or reverse-engineer only the engine with Western, probably Israeli, assistance. The engine would then become the powerplant for China’s indigenously designed and built Fl 0 multirole fighter. All of the PLAAF's modernization efforts would focus on this parallel track, they said.

If the Russians reject selling coproduction of the Su-27 or its engine, and if the Chinese fail to reverse-engineer the Russian engine in a timely manner, PLAAF planners would likely turn to developing a derivative of a commercial engine for the F-I0, a senior US. defense official said.

CURRENT CHINESE PLANS are believed to call for building a half-dozen prototypes,of the F-I 0 over the next two years. An initial operating capability for the F—10 by 2005 is considered optimistic without foreign assistance (AW&STMar. 13, p. 26).

Currently, Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corp.” is the leading contender” for the F- 10 proect, one U. S. defense official said. The Ilsraeli technical assistance team is believed to be based at the Chengdu facility.

However, U.S. satellites spotted an F-I 0 mockup or unfinished prototype on the ramp at the Xian Aircraft Co., which leaves some Asia specialists wondering if the project will actually be based there, where more manufacturing space is thought to be available and the flying weather is better.
Xian is a flight test as well as a manufacturing center, and the company is one of China’s busiest. Last year it was selected to produce vertical and horizontal tail assemblies for Boeing 7375. It also will produce forward fuselage sections and other assemblies for the McDonnell Douglas MD—80/90 Trunkliner program.

The Chinese are expected to buy a total of no more than 60 completed Su-27s from the Russians, enough to equip two regiments of 24-plus fighters each, in addition to training aircraft and attrition reserves. ”[The Chinese] will not buy more without a coproduction agreement,” the US. official contended.

Defense officials call the decision on Su- 27 coproduction a toss-up at this point. Russia does not want to create its own competition, but government officials are desperate to keep the aerospace industry alive.

China’s Ministry of Aero—Space Industry faces the same problem with the West that it does with the Russians, according to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document obtained by AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY. ”Aircraft manufacturers do not want to sell technology that will create a new competitor,” it said.
However, there are compelling reasons why the Chinese and Russians might reach some agreement, the DIA said. ”Such an agreement . . . would have little to do with threats, politics or socialist friendship. Both sides are looking for bargains in an international market where foreign sales—equipment or technology—may be the only way to rescue some defense industries.”

In addition, China is Russia’s leading customer for aerospace products. That constitutes leverage the Chinese will no doubt apply to secure coproduction of the Su-27 or, at least, its engine.

”Russia needs to export to preserve its industry” even if it ultimately allows China to build competing aircraft, the defense official said. Right now China has both the money and desire to start building what its leaders hope will ultimately turn into a world class industry, he said.

EARLIER CHINESE FIGHTER projects have shown little success, including the F-I 2, a lightweight, single—seat fighter of which three prototypes were built; the F-11, a reverse-engineered MiG-23, and the F-9 interceptor.

Both an indigenously built Su~27 and F-10 could be important in modernizing and shrinking the PLAAF. Moreover, a long-range fighter is a key part of China's air defense plans. They are predicated on a multirole fighter that can fly from China’s Woody Island base in the Paracels, east of Vietnam, and patrol for at least an hour over the contested Spratly Islands,also in the South China Sea.

In a recent incident, three Chinese warships were identified in the Mischief Reef region of the South China Sea, which the Philippines claims. To keep the dispute from worsening, the two countries moved bilateral talks forward to March from July. In addition, ”they'll want to keep decent aircraft opposite Taiwan” to counter that country’s modernization with F-16, Mirage 2000-5 and Indigenous Defense Fighters, the defense official said. Eventually, ”they want to be dominant in the region.”

In a speech to army delegates in Beijing this month, President Jiang Zemin said modernization of the military was indispensable for safeguarding China’s ”oceanic rights and interests.” Jiang, who is chairman of the Central Military Commission, also said the military ”must make new contributions to national unification” and warned that Beijing could not rule out a ”military option”against Taiwan.

A revitalized aerospace industry could speed China’s military modernization and growing influence while producing hard currency. Additionally, China will have a ”good customer base in Pakistan, Iran, maybe Iraq” and other countries the Westernpowers currently will not sell to, ”if China learns to produce [modern] aircraft,” he said.

In the short term, however, China’s goal of modernizing its air force is a daunting task because more than 3,000 aircraft in its fighter force are still late 1950s-technology F—6s, an indigenous version of the Soviet—designed MiG-19. This antiquated force ”holds back training to any modern concept” of warfare, the defense official said.

The DIA document said the PLAAF's inability to maintain basic quality control has resulted, for example, in chronic hydraulic system contamination. ”This problem alone contributed to an average of 30-40% of all aircraft malfunctions,” the report on the PLAAF said. ”It was as high as 70% in one F-7 unit.”
AWST 27 March 1995
 
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However, U.S. satellites spotted an F-10 mockup or unfinished prototype on the ramp at the Xian Aircraft Co., which leaves some Asia specialists wondering if the project will actually be based there, where more manufacturing space is thought to be available and the flying weather is better.
Xian is a flight test as well as a manufacturing center, and the company is one of China’s busiest. Last year it was selected to produce vertical and horizontal tail assemblies for Boeing 7375. It also will produce forward fuselage sections and other assemblies for the McDonnell Douglas MD—80/90 Trunkliner program.

Some Chinese sources mention these images where taken in October of 1994 and released to NBC on November 9th, but I didn’t see any mention in the NBC nightly news archive.

Apparently the picture of the J-10 model with what was mistaken for a shock cone was from a public Chinese publication from 1991, it just wasn’t named.


Mention of the defector. Air force’s monthly 36 March 2002
 

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I've just realised that the author of that article that prompted this thread, an article all the way back in 1990, has since joined this forum as a member.:)
 
Confirmation this image came from US intelligence. Appears to have been based on the 1994 satellite images. Early photogrammetry?
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January 1996, pgs. 12, 96

Special Report​

U.S. Military Technology Sold by Israel To China Upsets Asian Power Balance​

By Tim Kennedy

ISRAEL'S LAVI FIGHTER-BOMBER was designed to be one of the deadliest weapons in the air. However, it now has been revealed that after Israel discontinued the largely U.S.-funded project, it sold China the plans for the Lavi and the associated secret U.S. technology. This has enabled the Chinese to build their own version of this new generation of fighter aircraft.

The illegal transfer of plans for the Lavi aircraft from Tel Aviv to Beijing first became known by the Pentagon when an American surveillance satellite orbiting over China spotted several new fighter planes on the runway of a Chinese air base traditionally used for the test and evaluation of prototype aircraft. Imagery experts at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created rough sketches of the jet, then processed the graphic data through high-speed supercomputers in order to obtain three-dimensional representations of the prototype Chinese fighter planes.

STUNNING IMAGES​

CIA officials specializing in aviation technology were stunned at the 3-D images generated by the computers. China's newest fighter jet was in fact a copy of the Israeli Lavi, which itself was modeled upon the U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role aircraft.

Although Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Israel's biggest state-owned manufacturer of arms and defense technology, was the Lavi's prime contractor, nearly 90 percent of the Lavi was funded by the Pentagon. This is just one astonishing aspect of the story of the U.S.-Israeli aircraft, the evolution of which was almost as Byzantine as its surprise ending as the most formidable weapon in China's military arsenal.

The Lavi program, as conceived in the early 1980s by Israeli military planners and their supporters in the Pentagon and Congress, was intended as an exceedingly generous gift from America to the people of Israel. The Pentagon never had any intention of including the Lavi in its own military aviation fleet.

The thinking among U.S. Defense Department officials was that the United States, having provided Israel for two decades with some of America's best fighter aircraft—including F-4 Phantoms, F-15 Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons—now should give the Jewish state the ability to manufacture its own state-of-the-art fighter planes.

It took American military officials very little time to decide which American fighter plane should serve as the model for the Lavi. They chose the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

The F-16 was—and still is—the American fighter plane most sought after by foreign governments. Compact and with a highly maneuverable design, it has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack.

General Dynamics, the prime contractor for the F-16, touts the Fighting Falcon as an "aircraft that provides a relatively low-cost, high performance weapon system...While operating in air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets under all weather conditions and detect low-flying aircraft in radar clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles, deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions."

Foreign military sales officials at the U.S. Department of Defense traditionally are tolerant of Israeli mismanagement of U.S. arms programs. However, as the delays, cost overruns and blatant moves by IAI to stamp "Made in Israel" on American-made Lavi avionics evolved, the Pentagon decided to terminate the program.

The U.S. Department of Defense therefore formally ceased sending money to Israel for the Lavi program in 1987, but only after American taxpayers had paid some $1.5 billion to fund the project. The interruption of cash flow effectively killed the program, but left Israel with two fully functional Lavi prototypes.

While the Lavi program was underway, China repeatedly initiated talks with U.S. government officials regarding purchase of the F-16. These requests always were turned down, largely because American defense officials feared China's possession of the F-16 could destabilize Beijing's relationships with its neighbors, specifically Taiwan, India, Russia, Japan, and the Philippines.

Unbeknownst to U.S. officials, however, at some point the Chinese also initiated talks with Israel. As a result, according to a declassified Air Force study obtained by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,, the Chinese version of the Lavi—which has been dubbed the F-10 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—will be "built in large numbers" by the year 2003 "and will possess a radar-evading [read stealth] capability."

Currently, China's most sophisticated aircraft are domestically-produced copies of the Russian MiG-21 Fishbed fighter, a relatively slow, short-range day fighter which first saw service in 1956.

Morton Miller is a retired State Department intelligence analyst who formerly tracked sales to Beijing of other Israeli weapons, some of which also have involved illegal Israeli export of other sophisticated U.S. defense technology to China. He has told journalists that the close defense relationship between Israel and China dates back to the mid-1980s, and involves the transfer of "five billion dollars' worth" of U.S.-made computers, high-tech electronics and advanced manufacturing equipment used to create long-range missiles, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Ignoring these charges, the Israeli Ministry of Defense officially acknowledges that it is working with China to manufacture jointly an advanced fighter plane, but denies that any of the technology from the Lavi is used in the Chinese F-10. Nevertheless, IAI documents dating from 1985 credit the enormous role the Pentagon played in helping to build the Lavi, and acknowledge that "about 50 percent of the Lavi is built in the United States...The program is supported by the capabilities of no less than 120 American firms."

Pentagon sources revealed to the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,that when U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry confronted Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the allegations concerning transfer to China of U.S. stealth and other fighter aircraft technologies last year in Tel Aviv, Rabin promised to "resolve the issue." That was before Rabin's Nov. 4 assassination.

Requests to IAI by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, for further details on the Lavi technology transfer to China were stonewalled. "That's a story that's been going around for a number of years," said Lisa Gordon, assistant to the director of IAI's military aircraft office in Washington, DC. "We're just seeing it come around again," she said. "Beyond that, we aren't commenting on it."

The CIA, which for some time has been concerned about the increasingly close link between Israeli and Chinese defense industries, and the threat this alliance poses to world stability, has been similarly frustrated.

Former CIA director R. James Woolsey informed the U.S. Senate in late 1993 that he was "alarmed" by the military partnership between Tel Aviv and Beijing, and officially accused Israel of "illegally supplying China with classified defense technology from sources in the West."

Reading from a declassified CIA report while appearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Woolsey added: "We believe the Chinese seek from Israel advanced military technologies that U.S. and Western firms are unwilling to provide."

Woolsey revealed that Israel has been selling military technology to China for over a decade, and that the sales may amount to several billion dollars.

During subsequent testimony, Woolsey said the CIA is convinced China also is relying on its friends in Israel to assist in developing advanced engines for the next generation of Chinese combat vehicles. He said also that China will rely on Israeli expertise to create sophisticated airborne radar that employs super-secret technology that has been entrusted to Israel for another multibillion dollar joint project—production in Israel of the Arrow missile defense program which also has been funded largely by the United States.

"[These are] systems," concluded Woolsey in his testimony, "the Chinese would have difficulty producing on their own." Now it appears that, thanks to Israeli transfer of highly classified U.S. military technology, the Chinese have done just that, setting off alarm bells among China's neighbors, and America's allies, all around the rim of Asia.



U.S. Says Israel Gave Combat Jet Plans to China​

JIM MANNTIMES STAFF WRITER

Seven years ago, in the face of mounting costs, the United States withdrew from an elaborate project to help build an advanced combat aircraft for Israel. The idea was scrubbed--or so it seemed.
Now, to the consternation of U.S. officials, much of the American know-how and initial planning for the canceled "Lavi" fighter plane are about to be put to use in China.

U.S. government officials have recently concluded that China and Israel are collaborating to develop and produce an improved fighter for the Chinese air force. Comparable to an American F-16, the new plane will be based on the Lavi and will incorporate extensive technological innovations derived from that project, according to U.S. government experts on the Chinese military.
China and Israel already have finished work on a prototype, and production will probably start soon at a plant in the Sichuan province capital of Chengdu, U.S. officials said. The plane's deployment is seen as a major step in Beijing's effort to modernize its air force, and some observers believe it has negative implications for China's longstanding rival, Taiwan.


"This plane would fit in with a scenario for (conflict over) Taiwan 10 years from now," one U.S. government expert said. "And for someone to help the Chinese build a production line, a turnkey facility, for this aircraft is ominous."
The U.S. government's confirmation of Israel's role in developing the new Chinese plane could create tensions between Washington and the Jewish state. The joint work on the plane is the latest in a series of military projects in which Israel has helped China over the past 15 years.
Although China's impending production of the Lavi-style fighter has been closely monitored and discussed in the U.S. intelligence community in recent months, White House and State Department officials say there has been no official diplomatic protest to Israel about it.
Some Administration officials are said to believe the issue is of no great concern. While the plane represents a big step forward for China, they say, it is based on 1980s-era technology and will not be placed in service for several years.


Marvin Klemow, vice president for government affairs of Israeli Aircraft Industries International, the Washington subsidiary of Israel's state-owned export firm, denied that his company is transferring U.S. technology to China.
"IAI does not transfer any technology illegally. Any U.S. technology that requires a license (from the United States), we apply for that license," Klemow said. "And we have not applied for any license for any Lavi-associated technology for China."
Klemow would not say whether his company is providing China with other, non-American aircraft technology from the Lavi project. "We never confirm or deny who we do business with," he said.
An official at the Israeli Embassy in Washington also denied that Israel had passed on U.S. technology based on the Lavi.
For several years, there was speculation that China and Israel were working together on a new plane based on technology from the Lavi project.
But the first report that the plane is nearing production came in November in a British aviation publication, Flight International. U.S. officials confirmed that report in recent interviews.
"The plane is in the prototype stage. The prototype has been built," one U.S. official said. "It is a very capable aircraft. It uses extensive U.S. technology." The official said the combat fighter will be ready for flight-testing in about a year and will be in full service in China's air force about a decade from now.
The plane, which China intends to call the F-10 fighter, represents the latest in a prolonged effort by Beijing to obtain modern combat planes and to be able to manufacture them on its own soil.
Most of China's current combat planes are 1960s-era aircraft based on Soviet designs. In 1986, the Ronald Reagan Administration agreed to provide modern-day electronics, navigation and radar equipment for some of those Chinese planes in a $550-million project called Peace Pearl. The project was suspended when the George Bush Administration imposed sanctions on military sales to China after the 1989 Tian An Men Square crackdown. China, which became increasingly irritated by mounting costs associated with Peace Pearl, pulled out of the deal in 1990.
It was after Peace Pearl's cancellation that China turned to Israel, apparently aiming to obtain indirectly some of the American-style military technology it could not obtain from the United States itself. The principal U.S. defense firm in the aborted Peace Pearl project, Grumman Corp., was heavily involved in the Lavi project too, according to U.S. experts.
By producing the new plane, China's once-antiquated air force will take a quantum leap forward, U.S. officials said.
"Right now, China can't establish air superiority even over China itself. India has a better air force than China does," one U.S. official said. "But 10 years from now, China will be able to establish air superiority over all of China's territory, and also over the periphery of China, in places like Vietnam and the South China Sea."
China has made extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratly Islands, many of which are claimed by other countries in the region, including Vietnam and Taiwan.
Two years ago, in the first big step toward modernization of its air force, China bought 26 Sukhoi-27 advanced jet fighters from Russia. U.S. experts said the Russian planes have a longer range than the F-10 China is about to build. But the F-10 will be faster and will have a greater ability to intercept enemy aircraft.
"A competent air force would need both of them, just like we have the F-16s and F-15s," one U.S. official said. "The SU-27 fits for a scenario involving the Spratlys. The F-10 would fit in better with a scenario for Taiwan 10 years from now."
Unlike the SU-27 deal, in which China simply purchased jet fighters made in Russia, the new project with Israel will give China the ability to manufacture its own advanced jet fighters.
According to Flight International, officials of Israel Aircraft Industries have helped guide the way for the Chinese air force to develop and produce the plane under a contract signed in 1992.
Over the past 15 years, China has established itself as the biggest customer for Israel's arms export industry. The first public demonstration of this cooperation came in a Chinese National Day parade in 1984 when foreign military attaches in Beijing were surprised to find Israeli guns, cannons and electronic equipment mounted on top of Chinese tanks.
U.S. laws forbid Israel to pass on to another country any military technology obtained directly from the United States. Any company that violates those laws can be suspended from doing military business in this country.
But it is often difficult to prove conclusively that U.S. technology has been re-exported, because a foreign government or company can claim that it has changed the U.S. technology or has produced something similar on its own.

In 1992, U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Israel might have transferred Patriot missile technology to China in violation of American laws. A State Department team found there was not enough evidence to support the charge, and a department spokesman said the case is closed.
At the same time, State Department Inspector General Sherman Funk reported that a leading recipient of American military technology, separately identified as Israel, had engaged in a "systematic and growing problem of unauthorized transfers" of U.S. technology to other countries.
A congressional staff member suggested recently that the U.S. government might have quietly accepted or encouraged Israel's decision to help build the Chinese plane--in effect using Israel as a proxy to supply China with military technology that the United States can't provide directly to Beijing.
"The question is, was there a conscious decision on the part of someone in Washington to let this happen?" he asked.
Other officials insist, however, that transfers of the Lavi technology to China are not something the United States wants or accepts.
Chen Guoqing, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, declined to comment on the production of the new aircraft.
LA Times
 

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