High reliability penetration delivery system is a more stabilizing development than the alternative: saturation attack. (and China can mostly afford the latter)

What is more likely to happen imo is Pearl Harbor II: HGV herp derp~
 
This is extremely destabilising. The only counter move is to develop a similar system and a space-based ABM network like Brilliant Pebbles.

I don't get the manufactured concern that's resulted because of this test. No country has been adequately protected by any type of ABM shield, not even the United States. This doesn't change anything.
 

China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile
China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before speeding towards its target, demonstrating an advanced space capability that caught US intelligence by surprise. Five people familiar with the test said the Chinese military launched a rocket that carried a hypersonic glide vehicle which flew through low-orbit space before cruising down towards its target. The missile missed its target by about two-dozen miles, according to three people briefed on the intelligence.

But two said the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than US officials realised. The test has raised new questions about why the US often underestimated China’s military modernisation. “We have no idea how they did this,” said a fourth person. The US, Russia and China are all developing hypersonic weapons, including glide vehicles that are launched into space on a rocket but orbit the earth under their own momentum. They fly at five times the speed of sound, slower than a ballistic missile. But they do not follow the fixed parabolic trajectory of a ballistic missile and are manoeuvrable, making them harder to track.

Taylor Fravel, an expert on Chinese nuclear weapons policy who was unaware of the test, said a hypersonic glide vehicle armed with a nuclear warhead could help China “negate” US missile defence systems which are designed to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. “Hypersonic glide vehicles . . . fly at lower trajectories and can manoeuvre in flight, which makes them hard to track and destroy,” said Fravel, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fravel added that it would be “destabilising” if China fully developed and deployed such a weapon, but he cautioned that a test did not necessarily mean that Beijing would deploy the capability.

Mounting concern about China’s nuclear capabilities comes as Beijing continues to build up its conventional military forces and engages in increasingly assertive military activity near Taiwan. Tensions between the US and China have risen as the Biden administration has taken a tough tack on Beijing, which has accused Washington of being overly hostile.

US military officials in recent months have warned about China’s growing nuclear capabilities, particularly after the release of satellite imagery that showed it was building more than 200 intercontinental missile silos. China is not bound by any arms-control deals and has been unwilling to engage the US in talks about its nuclear arsenal and policy.

Last month, Frank Kendall, US air force secretary, hinted that Beijing was developing a new weapon. He said China had made huge advances, including the “potential for global strikes . . . from space”. He declined to provide details, but suggested that China was developing something akin to the “Fractional Orbital Bombardment System” that the USSR deployed for part of the Cold War, before abandoning it. “If you use that kind of an approach, you don’t have to use a traditional ICBM trajectory. It’s a way to avoid defences and missile warning systems,” said Kendall.

In August, General Glen VanHerck, head of North American Aerospace Defense Command, told a conference that China had “recently demonstrated very advanced hypersonic glide vehicle capabilities”. He warned that the Chinese capability would “provide significant challenges to my Norad capability to provide threat warning and attack assessment”.

Two of the people familiar with the Chinese test said the weapon could, in theory, fly over the South Pole. That would pose a big challenge for the US military because its missiles defence systems are focused on the northern polar route. The revelation comes as the Biden administration undertakes the Nuclear Posture Review, an analysis of policy and capabilities mandated by Congress that has pitted arms-control advocates against those who believe the US must do more to modernise its nuclear arsenal because of China.

The Pentagon did not comment on the report but expressed concern about China. “We have made clear our concerns about the military capabilities China continues to pursue, capabilities that only increase tensions in the region and beyond,” said John Kirby, spokesperson. “That is one reason why we hold China as our number one pacing challenge.”

The Chinese embassy declined to comment on the test, but Liu Pengyu, spokesperson, said China always pursued a military policy that was “defensive in nature” and its military development did not target any country. “We don’t have a global strategy and plans of military operations like the US does. And we are not at all interested in having an arms race with other countries,” Liu said. “In contrast, the US has in recent years been fabricating excuses like ‘the China threat’ to justify its arms expansion and development of hypersonic weapons. This has directly intensified arms race in this category and severely undermined global strategic stability.” One Asian national security official said the Chinese military conducted the test in August.

China generally announces the launch of Long March rockets — the type used to launch the hypersonic glide vehicle into orbit — but it conspicuously concealed the August launch. The security official, and another Chinese security expert close to the People’s Liberation Army, said the weapon was being developed by the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics. CAAA is a research institute under China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the main state-owned firm that makes missile systems and rockets for China’s space programme. Both sources said the hypersonic glide vehicle was launched on a Long March rocket, which is used for the space programme. The China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, which oversees launches, on July 19 said on an official social media account that it had launched a Long March 2C rocket, which it added was the 77th launch of that rocket. On August 24, it announced that it had conducted a 79th flight. But there was no announcement of a 78th launch, which sparked speculation among observers of its space programme about a secret launch. CAAA did not respond to requests for comment.
 
I don't get the manufactured concern that's resulted because of this test. No country has been adequately protected by any type of ABM shield, not even the United States. This doesn't change anything.
The problem is the greatly reduced time taken for the strike, almost halves it. So it's like having IRBMs based in Cuba effectively.
 
This is extremely destabilising. The only counter move is to develop a similar system and a space-based ABM network like Brilliant Pebbles.
As long as identification of warhead and counter fire capabilities are not destroyed, nothing is destabilising.
 
Published around the time of this test coincidentally

 
I don't get the manufactured concern that's resulted because of this test. No country has been adequately protected by any type of ABM shield, not even the United States. This doesn't change anything.
The problem is the greatly reduced time taken for the strike, almost halves it. So it's like having IRBMs based in Cuba effectively.
There is no way a FOBS/HGV hybrid going over the South Pole halves anything. There's this thing called physics. Only way to halve times is to use depressed trajectories over the shortest possible range with light payloads, preferably with an SLBM.
 
There is no way a FOBS/HGV hybrid going over the South Pole halves anything. There's this thing called physics. Only way to halve times is to use depressed trajectories over the shortest possible range with light payloads, preferably with an SLBM.
It doesn't need to take the long route, that would only be to try evade defences. The problem was well explained by TomcatVIP in the other FOBS thread. You can see there's a reduced warning before ground radar picks it up and I'm guessing that makes it much harder to target with the first two lines of ABM defence, GBI and SM-3 IIA. Also very difficult for SBIRS and space assets to determine where it's a FOBS or ordinary LEO satellite.

Double posting:
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FOBS/HGV is not faster than a depressed trajectory ICBM. And GBI/SM3 do not have the capability to target Russian or Chinese ICBMs anyways. Space assets can easily distinguish between FOBS and a satellite launch, since FOBS will be placed with conventional ICBMs, take the Russian FOBS system for example which will likely use Sarmat boosters and will go into Sarmat silos.

HGV/FOBS is not a small system that can go on just any booster, you need a SS-18/Sarmat sized booster which has to go either in a silo or a vulnerable and very open space launch facility.
 
FOBS/HGV is not faster than a depressed trajectory ICBM. And GBI/SM3 do not have the capability to target Russian or Chinese ICBMs anyways. Space assets can easily distinguish between FOBS and a satellite launch, since FOBS will be placed with conventional ICBMs, take the Russian FOBS system for example which will likely use Sarmat boosters and will go into Sarmat silos.

HGV/FOBS is not a small system that can go on just any booster, you need a SS-18/Sarmat sized booster which has to go either in a silo or a vulnerable and very open space launch facility.
GBI and certainly doesn't have the ability to deal with Russian and Chinese ICBMs by number, but a single warhead, in principle, certainly. SM-3 IIA is debatable. FOBS+HGV has to be faster than any ICBM because it's faster and follows a shorter path to the target. It's a bullet vs a rifle grenade.

You're ignoring the potential for mobile systems. SS-18 is an old, old design, 55 years old, and the warhead bus is essentially just a payload, it could be fitted to any non-descript booster and launched, awaiting instructions to fire off the warheads.
 
There is this thing called Physics... A satellite in a 150km orbit will take 1.5 hours to orbit the Earth (~40k km). An ICBM takes about 30 minutes to hit its target (~10k km). Theoretically, it is faster but not by much and less so when you account for orbital insertion and deorbiting maneuvers and the need for lower acceleration boosters. Then you throw an HGV on top of that, and HGVs are both slower than FOBS and ICBMs and require their own insertion maneuvers, and you basically threw away every speed advantage you might have had. And speed is only really noticeable the longer the range, you want fast delivery? Use a depressed trajectory.

There is no way you are getting a mobile SS-18 system. Both FOBS and HGVs are heavy and require big boosters. You are not throwing both of them on an SS-27. As for pre-deploying them in space... That's a possibility but extremely risky, since it allows people time to figure out what it is, an HGV payload will be quite hard to disguise. No one is going to be happy to find out theres nukes just hanging out in space.
 
A hypersonic trajectory is generally never going to be faster than an ICBM due to the need to deorbit the RV and the air resistance when it re-enters, on top of the fact the main advantage of such a system would be using indirect flight paths. What it might do is avoid ABM radar detection for longer due to the lower altitude, but the booster launch should be clear as day to IR satellites like SBIRs. An SLBM depressed trajectory will easily be the fastest of type of weapon delivery because submarine basing physically reduces the distance to target.

This development isn’t a direct threat to the US - the test was on a liquid fueled space booster, not an ICBM. And the US deterrent is survivable and much larger than the PRC nuclear force, particularly the small percentage that currently can reach the US. But it is unsettling news when combined with other developments in Chinese nuclear posture that indicate a policy change to peer nuclear capability.
 
There is this thing called Physics... A satellite in a 150km orbit will take 1.5 hours to orbit the Earth (~40k km). An ICBM takes about 30 minutes to hit its target (~10k km). Theoretically, it is faster but not by much and less so when you account for orbital insertion and deorbiting maneuvers and the need for lower acceleration boosters. Then you throw an HGV on top of that, and HGVs are both slower than FOBS and ICBMs and require their own insertion maneuvers, and you basically threw away every speed advantage you might have had. And speed is only really noticeable the longer the range, you want fast delivery? Use a depressed trajectory.

There is no way you are getting a mobile SS-18 system. Both FOBS and HGVs are heavy and require big boosters. You are not throwing both of them on an SS-27. As for pre-deploying them in space... That's a possibility but extremely risky, since it allows people time to figure out what it is, an HGV payload will be quite hard to disguise. No one is going to be happy to find out theres nukes just hanging out in space.
More like 1.4 hours at 8km/s, so for a partial orbit of 10,000km, it will take 20 minutes. A depressed trajectory would not be faster. Basically a FOBS missile is faster because it's faster. You could depress the trajectory of a FOBS too if you so wished. Sure it wouldn't be orbital but it would be faster. Depressing the trajectory of a 10,000km range ICBM would reduce range below that. A FOBS could still manage that range with a depressed trajectory.

Who says it has to be SS-18 sized? It's an old missile. You've also missed the other points, the bus could be launched via a non-descript booster and left loitering in orbit as a 'civilian LEO sat' awaiting command.

A hypersonic trajectory is generally never going to be faster than an ICBM due to the need to deorbit the RV and the air resistance when it re-enters, on top of the fact the main advantage of such a system would be using indirect flight paths. What it might do is avoid ABM radar detection for longer due to the lower altitude, but the booster launch should be clear as day to IR satellites like SBIRs. An SLBM depressed trajectory will easily be the fastest of type of weapon delivery because submarine basing physically reduces the distance to target.

This development isn’t a direct threat to the US - the test was on a liquid fueled space booster, not an ICBM. And the US deterrent is survivable and much larger than the PRC nuclear force, particularly the small percentage that currently can reach the US. But it is unsettling news when combined with other developments in Chinese nuclear posture that indicate a policy change to peer nuclear capability.
Just because a HGV can glide for long distances it doesn't mean it has to be used in that way, nor does a FOBS have to be fitted with HGVs.
 
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FOBS by definition requires an orbital insertion burn and a deorbiting burn, for the same amount of fuel you can have faster ballistic trajectories. A depressed trajectory is not FOBS and you can't have true FOBS at anything less than 100km altitude. The only reason to have FOBS is if you are taking the long route over say the South Pole, otherwise you are wasting payload capability.

The specific system we are discussing is FOBS + HGV, so yes for this discussion it must be FOBS + HGV. And for that you need something SS-18 SIZED (not necessarily an SS-18). Maybe you could squeeze it into say something as small as a SS-19/SS-24, but its not going on a SS-27/Minuteman sized booster.

This "civilian LEO" is exactly what I was talking about. It is hard to hide (if HGV), and once found can be easily shot down. And no one is going to complain if it is. That is a very risky move that can be easily done in other ways (container nukes).
 
I think the main goal of the PRC is to test very energetic HGVs and potentially keep their nuclear arsenal relevant in a situation where US ABM becomes far more prolific.

It also is possible that the intended purpose is not nuclear and a conventional capability is being sought, though outside of a CVN I can’t think what the target set would be.

Didn’t the Soviet FOBS system detonate at high altitude for an EMP effect? The fact that this weapon impacted the ground seems to indicate a different usage.
 
FOBS by definition requires an orbital insertion burn and a deorbiting burn, for the same amount of fuel you can have faster ballistic trajectories. A depressed trajectory is not FOBS and you can't have true FOBS at anything less than 100km altitude. The only reason to have FOBS is if you are taking the long route over say the South Pole, otherwise you are wasting payload capability.

The specific system we are discussing is FOBS + HGV, so yes for this discussion it must be FOBS + HGV. And for that you need something SS-18 SIZED (not necessarily an SS-18). Maybe you could squeeze it into say something as small as a SS-19/SS-24, but its not going on a SS-27/Minuteman sized booster.

This "civilian LEO" is exactly what I was talking about. It is hard to hide (if HGV), and once found can be easily shot down. And no one is going to complain if it is. That is a very risky move that can be easily done in other ways (container nukes).
Nobody says it has to be used as a FOBS, it could be used on a depressed trajectory, only faster than a conventional ballistic missile. The warheads could be fitted with the propellant. Instead on gliding HGVs could invert and pull down towards the target. The warhead bus could be disguised and placed in orbit by a non-descript civil booster. Once a FOBS has been created, there is no way of knowing whether it will be used as an OBS.

Depends on warhead size, LV materials. A 100 ton missile would be possible and that could be mobile.

SLBMs - You have to have the submarines in range for a depressed trajectory, they have to have not been destroyed by other submarines, ASW surface ships/helis, or nuclear depth charge/mine. Depressed trajectory probably means non-strategic range too. I mean technically the fastest nuclear strike is the USS Missouri parked 20 miles off the coast firing a 20kT round.
 
For the US, placing Ohio’s off the coast of another country within depressed trajectory ranges isn’t particularly challenging.
 
For the US, placing Ohio’s off the coast of another country within depressed trajectory ranges isn’t particularly challenging.
Why would you want to waste them in such a way? That's the beauty of tactical nukes. Russia or China can park a sub with nuclear armed supersonic/hypersonic missiles, just off the coast. Short reaction time and not counted by treaties so they don't impact the number of ICBMs/SLBMs they can own. Imagine the chaos an Oscar II, armed with 48 nuclear-equipped Zircon, could cause sitting off the coast of Virginia. It could begin, win, and end WWIII all by itself.
 
For the US, placing Ohio’s off the coast of another country within depressed trajectory ranges isn’t particularly challenging.
Why would you want to waste them in such a way? That's the beauty of tactical nukes. Russia or China can park a sub with nuclear armed supersonic/hypersonic missiles, just off the coast. Short reaction time and not counted by treaties so they don't impact the number of ICBMs/SLBMs they can own. Imagine the chaos an Oscar II, armed with 48 nuclear-equipped Zircon, could cause sitting off the coast of Virginia. It could begin, win, and end WWIII all by itself.
No it wouldn’t; the large majority of the US nuclear trident would survive and unleash a devastating retaliation. Then everyone looses the war.
And even if it could win the WW3 the logical counter move would be develop your early warning and the robust of your command and control; more or different ICBMs or even your own hypersonic weapons wouldn’t be a deterrent or counter in this scenario (at least not to any material degree).
And if it’s truly a war winning weapon why would the Russians care if it was captured (but not banned) by a treaty?

And couldn’t the same argument be made (with potentially greater validity) re: B-2s and B-21s armed with B61s?
 
Nobody says it has to be used as a FOBS, it could be used on a depressed trajectory, only faster than a conventional ballistic missile. The warheads could be fitted with the propellant. Instead on gliding HGVs could invert and pull down towards the target. The warhead bus could be disguised and placed in orbit by a non-descript civil booster. Once a FOBS has been created, there is no way of knowing whether it will be used as an OBS.
We are literally talking about a FOBS system. FOBS is NOT depressed trajectory, they are two different things that require different busses to work properly. HGVs have their own can of worms, you cant just "pull down" into target. HGVs require precise entry conditions to work properly, they have to be injected at the correct altitude, speed, and orientation, if you do it wrong you pull too many Gs and break up or simply burn up in the atmosphere.

Same thing with deorbiting RVs, if you just want the RV to deorbit just a bit of fuel will do the trick, but if you want the RV to deorbit with the correct reentry angle, accuracy, and reentry speed (to avoid burning up) you need alot more fuel and a bit more time. This is literally rocket science.
 
For the US, placing Ohio’s off the coast of another country within depressed trajectory ranges isn’t particularly challenging.
It's definitely possible but you have to sail them there in the first place and they're more vulnerable to attack from that countries ASW defences, especially if they have a good sonar network. And you're sacrificing strategic range to use a depressed trajectory. Assuming vessels aren't going to be attacked until they fire, you could park an Iowa-class battleship loaded with 20kT shells off the coast. It's not the same capability though. And if you want to talk about pre-positioning then compare with disguised FOBS buses that've been placed there by a non-descript civil LV. We're assuming stealth buses don't exist at this point.

We are literally talking about a FOBS system. FOBS is NOT depressed trajectory, they are two different things that require different busses to work properly. HGVs have their own can of worms, you cant just "pull down" into target. HGVs require precise entry conditions to work properly, they have to be injected at the correct altitude, speed, and orientation, if you do it wrong you pull too many Gs and break up or simply burn up in the atmosphere.

Same thing with deorbiting RVs, if you just want the RV to deorbit just a bit of fuel will do the trick, but if you want the RV to deorbit with the correct reentry angle, accuracy, and reentry speed (to avoid burning up) you need alot more fuel and a bit more time. This is literally rocket science.
A rocket is a rocket, it will travel on whatever trajectory you send it. You can use a HGV's control surface to manoeuvre downwards. So your bus is in orbit pointing downwards at 150km altitude, to mimic gravity over 50km the axial thruster on the RV only has to provide the equivalent or 1g for 100s, or 10g for 10s and then uses DACT to provide orientation. Once in the atmosphere the control surfaces direct the tangential component of the velocity downwards. We only need be talking about a TSV here, not a full-on HGV. And you can depart that warhead as early or late as you like.
 
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Have you taken a class in orbital mechanics? Do you understand Delta-V requirements to change orbits? Deorbiting a satellite and going from a circular orbit (FOBS) to a parabolic reentry orbit (ICBM) are two very different things, with very different Delta-V and guidance requirements. And for FOBS you have to do all this in a very small window of time towards the end of the flight, unlike an ICBM when you do it very early in flight. An ICBM only has to put the warhead into "orbit", a FOBS system has to put the warhead and a significantly bigger bus into orbit.

If you want pre-positioned "stealthy" nukes, its a lot easier, cheaper, and politically safer, to pre-position some "suitecase" nukes or smuggle them in shipping containers that some sort of big expensive OBS. Because, you know the US and anyone with the capability will be looking at that OBS.
 
For the US, placing Ohio’s off the coast of another country within depressed trajectory ranges isn’t particularly challenging.
It's definitely possible but you have to sail them there in the first place and they're more vulnerable to attack from that countries ASW defences, especially if they have a good sonar network. And you're sacrificing strategic range to use a depressed trajectory. Assuming vessels aren't going to be attacked until they fire, you could park an Iowa-class battleship loaded with 20kT shells off the coast. It's not the same capability though. And if you want to talk about pre-positioning then compare with disguised FOBS buses that've been placed there by a non-descript civil LV. We're assuming stealth buses don't exist at this point.

A depressed trajectory launch of Trident D5 is going to have a sub ten minute flight time, and realistically neither the Russians or Chinese will know it’s there til it fires.

As for orbiting RVs, it is probably hard to make them stealthy while having sufficient fuel for a rapid and accurate deorbit. My understanding is that the Soviet system based on R-36 used essentially an entire third rocket stage for its deorbit - it wasn’t a small or subtle piece of equipment.

Also parking nukes in orbit runs the risk of them being detected. The US is known to operate GEO based inspection satellites; it wouldn’t be a huge stretch for there to be LEO satellites as well. For the detection of warheads, they probably just need a gama ray detector as is used in border control scenarios in the states. It could easily be a cubesat. Does the US deploy those? No idea. Would anyone want to find out the hard way?
 
Have you taken a class in orbital mechanics? Do you understand Delta-V requirements to change orbits? Deorbiting a satellite and going from a circular orbit (FOBS) to a parabolic reentry orbit (ICBM) are two very different things, with very different Delta-V and guidance requirements. And for FOBS you have to do all this in a very small window of time towards the end of the flight, unlike an ICBM when you do it very early in flight. An ICBM only has to put the warhead into "orbit", a FOBS system has to put the warhead and a significantly bigger bus into orbit.

If you want pre-positioned "stealthy" nukes, its a lot easier, cheaper, and politically safer, to pre-position some "suitecase" nukes or smuggle them in shipping containers that some sort of big expensive OBS. Because, you know the US and anyone with the capability will be looking at that OBS.
A depressed trajectory launch of Trident D5 is going to have a sub ten minute flight time, and realistically neither the Russians or Chinese will know it’s there til it fires.

As for orbiting RVs, it is probably hard to make them stealthy while having sufficient fuel for a rapid and accurate deorbit. My understanding is that the Soviet system based on R-36 used essentially an entire third rocket stage for its deorbit - it wasn’t a small or subtle piece of equipment.

Also parking nukes in orbit runs the risk of them being detected. The US is known to operate GEO based inspection satellites; it wouldn’t be a huge stretch for there to be LEO satellites as well. For the detection of warheads, they probably just need a gama ray detector as is used in border control scenarios in the states. It could easily be a cubesat. Does the US deploy those? No idea. Would anyone want to find out the hard way?
Assumptions assumptions. The Chinese and Russians would never think of a depressed trajectory SLBM strike and have a strategy to defend against it would they?

If you put the motor on the RVs you have to accelerate maybe 300kg to 1000m/s to mimic graphics over 50km, except you will actually get a gravity assist once you go below orbital altitude and there are no opposing forces. If you disguise the bus it doesn't need to be stealthy. You could have each RV orbiting separately disguised as a spy satellite/telescope or something. Then you're looking at less than half the time of a depressed SLBM trajectory for a strike.

Parking a 20,000t submarine off someone's coast also runs the risk of detection and you might not even be able to detect when it's being attacked either, especially if by a torpedo mine. With a modicum of shielding it would be damn difficult to detect anything against a background of unfiltered cosmic radiation.

I'd imagine suitcase nukes aren't as easy as you would think given anti-terrorism checks, especially at airports and good luck getting one near a missile silo.
 
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I know I had a friend who tripped a radiation detector because of a thyroid treatment at the Canadian border. How easy it would be to detect in orbit I can’t say. But it would be non zero. The danger of putting such a payload in a nations military architecture is that those are exactly the satellites that receive the most attention - at a minimum they are thoroughly examined by ground telescopes and radars from Colorado to Hawaii to Diego to Ascension, even if we assume no on orbit LEO assets. Anything that seemed the wrong shape, mass, or electronic or orbital behavior would probably get a lot of attention. It likely wouldn’t work as a long term basing strategy at a minimum, particularly after a country went through the testing necessary to validate the design. The US was aware of the existence of the R-36 FOBS based on its testing regime.

It’s not physically impossible that a country could base a small number of weapons in space, but the option has to be weighed against the disadvantages of such a position, particularly for country that would have issues maintaining 24/7 contact with the satellite. Shoot downs, recovery, and preemptive strikes would all be risks.

If USN SSBNs truly were vulnerable then that would be a far larger problem, but given the amount of water they have to operate in and paucity of Russian platforms and Chinese ASW experience, it’s hard to picture that being an issue. Barring a technological breakthrough from out of the blue, it seem doubtful the PLAN could do more than provide local ASW to a task force outside the first island chain, and that’s being a little generous.
 
It appears that fundamentally, unless there were adopted in very large numbers and practically replace the “balistic” ICBM mirv as a system, these hypersonic weapons don’t fundamentally change the calculus of a US/Russia/China nuclear war (no 1st strike will be so successful to prevent an opponent’s devastating 2nd strike).
The potentially destabilising point is if it (or equally missile defense in this regard) gave an illusion to one or more party that their 1st strike would so successful or that they were now vulnerable to such a successful 1st strike themselves. This would make everyone’s nuclear trigger more hair-like; this does not appear to currently be the case. However it does reflect the idiocy at the core tenants of missile defence advocates beliefs; they are now terrified by the counter they prompted into existence.
 
I know I had a friend who tripped a radiation detector because of a thyroid treatment at the Canadian border. How easy it would be to detect in orbit I can’t say. But it would be non zero. The danger of putting such a payload in a nations military architecture is that those are exactly the satellites that receive the most attention - at a minimum they are thoroughly examined by ground telescopes and radars from Colorado to Hawaii to Diego to Ascension, even if we assume no on orbit LEO assets. Anything that seemed the wrong shape, mass, or electronic or orbital behavior would probably get a lot of attention. It likely wouldn’t work as a long term basing strategy at a minimum, particularly after a country went through the testing necessary to validate the design. The US was aware of the existence of the R-36 FOBS based on its testing regime.

It’s not physically impossible that a country could base a small number of weapons in space, but the option has to be weighed against the disadvantages of such a position, particularly for country that would have issues maintaining 24/7 contact with the satellite. Shoot downs, recovery, and preemptive strikes would all be risks.

If USN SSBNs truly were vulnerable then that would be a far larger problem, but given the amount of water they have to operate in and paucity of Russian platforms and Chinese ASW experience, it’s hard to picture that being an issue. Barring a technological breakthrough from out of the blue, it seem doubtful the PLAN could do more than provide local ASW to a task force outside the first island chain, and that’s being a little generous.
They get attention but nobody is going to shoot them down, no one has to date, international law theoretically prevents it, attention isn't much use.

Satcoms - same as we use.

And here we go underestimating the enemy again. That's always a great way to lose.
 
If a country capable of ASAT suspected an opponent orbiter was carrying a nuke, yes I think it would be engaged, possibly even forcibly contacted by a satellite. The US, PRC, and Russia have all experimented with small satellite maneuvers around larger satellites, likely for the purposes of investigation and disabling.

China’s submarine force is predominantly SSKs Ill suited to hunting SSBNs in open water, both because of endurance/range and sensor suit. It’s SSN force is generally not considered as advanced as the Soviets before the Cold War ended, and in any case numbers a half dozen platforms. Trident II D5 is credited with anywhere from 7000-11,000km (numbers classified and variable with payload). Take a look at how much of the Pacific that would include.
 

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