Current Nuclear Weapons Development

If I had to guess if the US said today “here’s money crash course to develop a “Pershing III” it would be deployed in about 2040 probably.
The obvious thing would be to slap a W80 in a maneuvering RV on a 2-stage GBI stack, and make it mobile. (Tell Northrop Grumman they have 1 year to make it work. Given all the experience Orbital Science had with cobbling together targets from retired Legos I'd think they could do it.) If you REALLY needed a crash program stuff a W80 in a Zombie, make it mobile, and roll it around Poland:

(minus the Terrier booster)

5b2a6c1c63dc0.image.jpg
 
Their analysis is that the US isn't going to ramp up productions outside of its existing programs. Those existing programs include new ICBMs, new boomers, new bombers, completion of the B-61-12 program, and a new air launched cruise missile. Given the current disparity of PRC to US nuclear weapons, it hardly seems like they are going to achieve parity with the US even if the US holds still until 2030. And I suspect the end of New START will see the US upload its weapons, or at least threaten to do so if Russia and China continue their respective build ups. The US could more than double its strategic warheads just by reMIRVing MM3, reactivating the mothballed silo squadron, and increasing the loads on Trident.

So I read the whole situation as a slow moving arms race that likely cannot be solved by treaty due to the 'three body problem' of the situation, with Russia as the significantly smaller economy ultimately being hard pressed to maintain parity.
 
 
"Math", again. There are currently 64 Russian missile defence interceptors available to counter a US SLBM retaliatory strike, and all of them are defending a grand total of one target.

Under the old ABM treaty notes of understanding, anything over a 3 km/sec VBo was an ABM interceptor.

MIM-104A PATRIOT: 1.1 km/sec VBo (can enage 150 km ranged SRBMs for self defense)
SA-5 GAMMON (S-200): 1.5 km/sec VBo
MIM-104C PATRIOT PAC-2: 1.7 km/sec VBo
SA-23A GLADIATOR (S-300VM with Small 9M83ME Missile): 1.7 km/sec VBo
SA-10 (S-300P): 1.7~ km/sec VBo
SA-20 (S-300 PMU-1/PMU-2): 2 km/sec VBo
SA-12B GIANT (S-300V with Large 98M2 Missile): 2.5 km/sec VBo -- circa 1983-84
SA-23B GIANT (S-300VM with Large 9M82ME Missile): 2.6 km/sec VBo
THAAD TBM: 2.6 - 2.8 km/sec VBo
RIM-161A/B/C SM-3 Block I/IA/IB: 3.0 to 3.5 km/sec VBo
RIM-161-D SM-3 Block II: 4.5 to 5.5 km/sec VBo
Ground Based Interceptor (3 Stage): 7.2 km/sec VBo

You can see how THAAD is basically just under the ABM treaty limit of "I think we can get away with this", while SM-3 and later SM-3 Block II basically kick the ABM treaty in the groin.

Essentially, by the end of the Cold War; everyone was working towards ABM interceptors in all but name that while they wouldn't be able to do wide area ABM defense; could do local site defense against incoming RVs, given appropriate battle management "heads up" and cuing.
 
So basically, Russia wants to "formalise" 9M729 SCREWDRIVER GLCM deployments and bring it in from the "Cold".

A bit off topic, but my personal theory is that the current unpleasantness over NATO and the Ukraine is actually driven not by Ukraine's actions as much as the fact the LRHW and MRC rather immediately created a mobile intermediate range option that the Russians feel could alter the strategic status quo. Think of the LRHW as the new Pershing II and MRC literally is just a new version of ground launched Tomahawk with the additional threat of SM-6 in a ground mode. The Russians also can't be happy with a mobile Mk41 launcher that could take SM-3, were it integrated with some kind of mobile fire control ABM radar...like THAAD's.
 
Under the old ABM treaty notes of understanding, anything over a 3 km/sec VBo was an ABM interceptor.

MIM-104A PATRIOT: 1.1 km/sec VBo (can enage 150 km ranged SRBMs for self defense)
SA-5 GAMMON (S-200): 1.5 km/sec VBo
MIM-104C PATRIOT PAC-2: 1.7 km/sec VBo
SA-23A GLADIATOR (S-300VM with Small 9M83ME Missile): 1.7 km/sec VBo
SA-10 (S-300P): 1.7~ km/sec VBo
SA-20 (S-300 PMU-1/PMU-2): 2 km/sec VBo
SA-12B GIANT (S-300V with Large 98M2 Missile): 2.5 km/sec VBo -- circa 1983-84
SA-23B GIANT (S-300VM with Large 9M82ME Missile): 2.6 km/sec VBo
THAAD TBM: 2.6 - 2.8 km/sec VBo
RIM-161A/B/C SM-3 Block I/IA/IB: 3.0 to 3.5 km/sec VBo
RIM-161-D SM-3 Block II: 4.5 to 5.5 km/sec VBo
Ground Based Interceptor (3 Stage): 7.2 km/sec VBo

You can see how THAAD is basically just under the ABM treaty limit of "I think we can get away with this", while SM-3 and later SM-3 Block II basically kick the ABM treaty in the groin.

Essentially, by the end of the Cold War; everyone was working towards ABM interceptors in all but name that while they wouldn't be able to do wide area ABM defense; could do local site defense against incoming RVs, given appropriate battle management "heads up" and cuing.

Not sure if you were trying to contradict my statement, but none of your data actually does. Even though you can probably up the velocities by some 0.2km/s for many if not most of the systems you list, the fact remains that those deployed pre-2002 stay below the threshold. And it follows that, according to the definition, the only ICBM-class interceptors in Russia (for the time being, with S-500/550 round the corner) are some five dozen point-defence 53T6s. The cut-off was placed at the value agreed upon for a reason, it was not pulled out of thin air!

The US deploys a similarly modest number of terrestrial GBIs, but these can ostensibly protect any location in the entire country, not just one city. Admittedly characterizing Moscow with its huge cluster of high value installations as a single target was not entirely accurate on my part, but basically the point stands. And as mentioned, that is before we even get into the highly mobile, possibly soon also on land, SM-3. Certainly crediting Russia with tens of thousands of interceptors available to ward of retaliation by US forces depleted in a first strike is egregious nonsense, by about two orders of magnitude.

If anything, it's the US which has been putting Russia in the predicament outlined in the article with its large arsenal of mobile and forward-deployed SM-3s, not the other way round! With the S-500/550 Russia may be on the cusp of clawing back some lost ground, but kindly remind me how long SM-3 has been around by now? And with the ABM Treaty gone (whose idea was that, again?), Russia is now well within its rights to deploy such a system anyway. If that's such a big problem for the US deterrent, then maybe this entirely predictable development should have been factored into the decision to leave 20 years ago?

No matter how you approach the issue, the argument made in the article remains a gross distortion of the facts, and abandoning the ABM Treaty remains a strategic blunder of monumental proportions. Simple as that.
 
A bit off topic, but my personal theory is that the current unpleasantness over NATO and the Ukraine is actually driven not by Ukraine's actions as much as the fact the LRHW and MRC rather immediately created a mobile intermediate range option that the Russians feel could alter the strategic status quo. Think of the LRHW as the new Pershing II and MRC literally is just a new version of ground launched Tomahawk with the additional threat of SM-6 in a ground mode. The Russians also can't be happy with a mobile Mk41 launcher that could take SM-3, were it integrated with some kind of mobile fire control ABM radar...like THAAD's.

Bit of a charitable way to look at the Russian position here. They brought that problem unto themselves by giving the US every excuse to kill off INF, in a very similar manner to the abrogation of ABM ultimately incentivizing uncomfortable responses. Yet in one respect the article highlights (without explicitly drawing attention to the fact) something which does go a long way toward explaining Russia's anxieties. After INF ended, they voluntarily refrained from deploying 9M729 in parts of their *own territory* where it might be perceived as threatening to European NATO members. The contrast to the US (after the demise of ABM) planting missile defence sites not only far outside its territory but on Russia's very doorstep is plain to see for anybody who's not ideologically blinkered.

That's the most frustrating part of all this - these supposedly new security challenges are actually old ones which had already been solved, solutions which were then undone by irresponsible behaviour on both sides.
 
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I wasn't trying to cast judgement on either side, merely noting that the timing of Russia suddenly finding NATO expansion back in 2004 unacceptable seems to oddly coincide with the US being within a little of a year of deploying its first experimental batteries of INF breaching weapons. I think the Russian calculation was that the US couldn't build an intermediate range capability for a decade or more based on its previous procurement messes. The speed with which the MRC requirement was written up and designed (using basically off the shelf parts) must have been especially alarming.

I suspect the Bush administration left the ABM treaty for similar reasons...the thought was the Russians wouldn't be able to keep up with or deploy ABM systems with their early 2000's economy, so the US was free to break the treaty without repercussion (and in the short term this was more or less correct). I'm not sure this was as tragic of a decision as you portray, because I'm not convinced US anti missile developments that were within the ABM treaty would have been drastically less concerning to the Russians. The GMD is if anything the least flexible and perhaps least effective (in tests) of US anti missile systems, and the SM-3 Blk I could have perhaps been justified as inside the ABM treaty or certainly designed to do so. I still think we'd still might have Saramats, nuclear UUVs, and nuclear powered cruise missiles in that context even if technically ABM was still in force. The Russians were very paranoid of the SDI program even though it seemed pretty clear at the time it was a pipe dream.

I still however supported the US staying in the ABM treaty and probably still would, so long as the Russians abided. The INF on the other hand didn't include the Chinese and the Russians were violating it anyway, so I fully supported that decision. I think the Russians are having some buyers remorse over ending that reaty - there is no way the US will join another INF-like treaty without Chinese participation, which is a non starter for the PRC. Any restrictions concerning intermediate weapons deployments in NATO would probably force Russia to limit its deployments on its own land in any quid pro quo, which I suspect is also a non starter.
 
Correction- the Russians were allegedly violating it, and for the sake of fairness they had credible concerns about the US sidestepping or violating (in spirit) aspects of the treaty as well.

I'm still not sure I believe the hooplah over 9M729, I definitely don't believe it was deployed (a unit no less, according to "US sources" and the NYT), but perhaps there was something being tested that was troublesome.
BTW: https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3523229.html
Shoigu and Putin talking about need to develop land based Kalibr now that INF is gone- why would they talk about it unless 9M729 really is sub 500km in range? Unless it is disinformation to cover up a missile that was already developed, which I suppose is possible.

TBH I think Russia should have stuck to Kalibr sized missiles on boats only, and avoided R-500 on land based MZKT TELs of the same size and appearance as normal Iskander ballistic missile TELs. It was just too close for comfort and needlessly agitated the US, although the latter has such low credibility in arms control at this point it might not have made any difference.

Now that INF is over both countries gained nothing and face more fundamentally destabilizing weapons, or will in the near future. Lose-lose!
 
I suspect the Bush administration left the ABM treaty for similar reasons...the thought was the Russians wouldn't be able to keep up with or deploy ABM systems with their early 2000's economy, so the US was free to break the treaty without repercussion (and in the short term this was more or less correct). I'm not sure this was as tragic of a decision as you portray, because I'm not convinced US anti missile developments that were within the ABM treaty would have been drastically less concerning to the Russians. The GMD is if anything the least flexible and perhaps least effective (in tests) of US anti missile systems, and the SM-3 Blk I could have perhaps been justified as inside the ABM treaty or certainly designed to do so. I still think we'd still might have Saramats, nuclear UUVs, and nuclear powered cruise missiles in that context even if technically ABM was still in force. The Russians were very paranoid of the SDI program even though it seemed pretty clear at the time it was a pipe dream.
Sarmat, Poseidon, and Burevesnik, are directly linked to the US leaving ABM. Remember in 2002 Russia was still following START II even if it had not been ratified and left START II the day after the US left ABM. Part of START II was banning all land-based MIRVed missiles (which would include Sarmat). At that time Russia was fielding the Topol-M and began development of the Yars with MIRVs immediately after.

I can confirm that Russia most definitely had a treaty-buster cruise missile. I don't think it was deployed at the time but Russia was moving foward with plans to deploy them. Land-based Kalibr is just a cover for their treaty busting. Note the TEL they use is not the same as the Iskander one and Iskander already includes a sub 500km cruise missile.
 
I suspect the Bush administration left the ABM treaty for similar reasons...the thought was the Russians wouldn't be able to keep up with or deploy ABM systems with their early 2000's economy, so the US was free to break the treaty without repercussion (and in the short term this was more or less correct).

By leaving the treaty first, the US ensured that it was not technically breaking anything. "Technically", because the consequences in terms of escalating tensions and increased mistrust were largely the same, it was just the legalistically clean way of doing it.

I'm not sure this was as tragic of a decision as you portray, because I'm not convinced US anti missile developments that were within the ABM treaty would have been drastically less concerning to the Russians. The GMD is if anything the least flexible and perhaps least effective (in tests) of US anti missile systems, and the SM-3 Blk I could have perhaps been justified as inside the ABM treaty or certainly designed to do so. I still think we'd still might have Saramats, nuclear UUVs, and nuclear powered cruise missiles in that context even if technically ABM was still in force. The Russians were very paranoid of the SDI program even though it seemed pretty clear at the time it was a pipe dream.

What Desertfox said, and you can add Avangard to his list. A particularly apt example this, because its roots can be traced to a project which formed part of the Soviet response to SDI. When SDI faded away, so did the Avangard forerunner, until it was dusted off in the early 2000s, for reasons that require no prizes for guessing. As I mentioned in an earlier post, the link between ABM and the 03/2018 "wonderweapons" is as clear as can be. It is always advisable not to take Russian government rhetoric at face value, but if the observable facts match, there's no reason to continue cooking up willfully contrived alternative explanations either. If it walks like a duck...

And yes, GMD with a handful of interceptors is not the real problem here, SM-3 in its numerous mobile or forward-deployed guises is.

You might say that with their novel delivery systems the Russians have coped from a deterrence perspective, and that therefore everything is well. I disagree, ABM was the start of a downward spiral in mutual trust in the arms control field, a development that ultimately landed us where we are today. Who knows, it may have been the straw which broke the camel's back on INF, perhaps Russian attitudes to that treaty would otherwise have been more amenable?

And what's next - as you say, future treaties, strategic or sub-strategic, will now have to include China. But what will watching US (and Russian, but it's the US which is perceived as the leading nation) behaviour have done to that country's traditionally suspicious attitude toward arms control? Had the framework of treaties endured, Russia (which has every bit as much of an interest in getting China to join, actually sharing a border) and the US could have exerted pressure from a position of moral authority. But now? It's a gift that's going to keep on giving for some time.

I still however supported the US staying in the ABM treaty and probably still would, so long as the Russians abided. The INF on the other hand didn't include the Chinese and the Russians were violating it anyway, so I fully supported that decision. I think the Russians are having some buyers remorse over ending that reaty - there is no way the US will join another INF-like treaty without Chinese participation, which is a non starter for the PRC.

Yes, neither Russia nor the US were beneficiaries of INF (Europe was by design, China by accident) and with the PLA missile force heavily relying on INF class weapons, neither had much of an interest in the survival of the treaty. Unfortunately, Europe seemed to be blissfully unaware of the implications of this and contented itself with simply adopting the US position, after assuring themselves that the accusations against Russia were valid. There seemed to be zero realization that neither of the treaty parties was seriously interested in saving it, and it was on Europe to save the agreement and its benefits.

Any restrictions concerning intermediate weapons deployments in NATO would probably force Russia to limit its deployments on its own land in any quid pro quo, which I suspect is also a non starter.

Theoretically that could happen - in fact Russia has been doing exactly that (or at least has claimed to be - with INF gone there is no framework for verification) and is now threatening to end that moratorium. I'm not optimistic about the prospects when even far easier steps (such as re-instating JCPOA) are not achieved, but one can hope.
 
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Russia pursuing an INF busting cruise missile probably can be traced to ABM as well. I wouldn't be surprised if those missiles were targeted against AEGIS ashore sites from deep enough in Russia to be safe from US airstrikes.

Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.

In another universe we are negotiating START IV including China, with both the US and Russia dropping under 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, and no Ukraine conflict.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.
 
Sarmat, Poseidon, and Burevesnik, are directly linked to the US leaving ABM. Remember in 2002 Russia was still following START II even if it had not been ratified and left START II the day after the US left ABM. Part of START II was banning all land-based MIRVed missiles (which would include Sarmat). At that time Russia was fielding the Topol-M and began development of the Yars with MIRVs immediately after.

I can confirm that Russia most definitely had a treaty-buster cruise missile. I don't think it was deployed at the time but Russia was moving foward with plans to deploy them. Land-based Kalibr is just a cover for their treaty busting. Note the TEL they use is not the same as the Iskander one and Iskander already includes a sub 500km cruise missile.

I won't argue that the US leaving ABM was a good idea. How bad of an idea, I'm not sure, but it would not have been my choice either way.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.

I do have to agree that China was going to build missiles regardless of ABM or INF. They felt they had a lot of catching up to do, and they did, and short of economically starving the country there was no way the CCP wasn't going to produce a prolific amount of medium and intermediate range missiles. I actually think that even if the Russians hadn't violated INF, it was a treaty that would have died under a Democrat or Republican watch. It just tied the US hands in the Pacific too much to allow it to exist indefinitely.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.

Haha, I subscribe to the same line of thinking too. China acts independent of everyone. Always has. I forget who I was trying to explain that to on here but they were adamant it was because of the US treaties.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.
No they did not wait 20 years. You do understand that the infrastructure required to develop a hypersonic and strategic nuclear weapons program doesnt just spring out of a vacuum right? It takes time to develop the programs to what you see today, same with the Russian hypersonics program. What we are seeing today is the results of decisions made long ago and those in the know, know that those decisions where made as a result of the US leaving ABM.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.
No they did not wait 20 years. You do understand that the infrastructure required to develop a hypersonic and strategic nuclear weapons program doesnt just spring out of a vacuum right? It takes time to develop the programs to what you see today, same with the Russian hypersonics program. What we are seeing today is the results of decisions made long ago and those in the know, know that those decisions where made as a result of the US leaving ABM.
China's been doing whatever they want regardless of whatever treaties were present or expired. As for Russia, I agree with you.
 
Yes China will do whatever they please, but you can not ignore the effect the US leaving ABM had on them. China had a specific number of warheads-on-target in mind as a requirement to deter the US, the US deploying a BMD system most definitely changed that equation. Its not about the treaties but about what those treaties prevented the US from deploying. As soon as China felt its current strategic nuclear arsenal was no longer a viable deterrent, they moved forward with developing one that was.
 
Note that China's recent boom in long-range delivery systems can also be traced back to the US leaving ABM. China doesn't need hypersonics if the US doesn't have BMD. A handful (say 50?) of single warhead silo-based ICBM plus a few SLBMs, was enough to fulfill China's strategic nuclear deterrence needs, but between the US BMD and Russia's own efforts there (because of the US), China had to upgrade and expand its strategic arsenal.
China waited 20 years huh?

Everyone wants some complicated geostrategic reason that usually adds a blame America component. When actually China is simply taking the opportunity to tell the world we will be an equal military superpower to Russia and the US.
No they did not wait 20 years. You do understand that the infrastructure required to develop a hypersonic and strategic nuclear weapons program doesnt just spring out of a vacuum right? It takes time to develop the programs to what you see today, same with the Russian hypersonics program. What we are seeing today is the results of decisions made long ago and those in the know, know that those decisions where made as a result of the US leaving ABM.
So China a nuclear power since the 60s had no capacity to add warheads for the past 20 years and the sudden massive breakout today (new ICBM missile fields, SSNBS, bombers) is the culmination of their plan starting in 2002?
 
Russia pursuing an INF busting cruise missile probably can be traced to ABM as well.

You know....

Heavy ABM (USA)

GBI count is about 44 missiles in Alaska. Maybe going up to 60~ when it's all done, there's talk of 20 new missiles with modernized EKVs; and of course a replacement.

Heavy ABM (Soviet/Russia)

A-35 - about 64 launchers (all retired) built out of 128 planned.

A-135 - About 68 launchers of 53T6 Sprint-skis and 16 (all retired) launchers of 51T6 Spartan-skis.

A-235 - Under Development, tests of missiles began in Summer 2014.

It's clear that Heavy ABM is not causing the "OMG ARMS CONTROL RACE", due to the extremely close numbers and the fact that the US has half-assedly gone forward with GBI deployment on/off depending on who is in charge (Obama couldn't kill it, but he could slow it to a walk).

More to the point -- the numbers of missiles deployed by the US and Russia for Heavy ABM are low enough that you don't need to deploy intercontinental nuclear powered cruise missiles, nuclear powered torpedoes, or boost-glide hypersonic gliders to get past just 45 to 60 missiles on either side US or Russian.

What's causing all the new construction is the increasing spread of quality light ABM over the last 30 years.

All these crazy new designs aren't really meant to threaten the US.

They're meant to develop commercial designs using Russian military R&D money which can then be sold by Rosboronexport to third world nations to counter the increasing proliferation of light ABM around the world.

Just take a look at the Houthi vs Saudi missile fest that's been going on since 2017 or so.


The Houthis are using Burkan-2 missiles:


They're basically super evolved SCUD missiles; and the Saudis are shooting them down with US supplied PATRIOTs and other forms of Light ABM.

Everyone and their uncle now has Light ABM -- China has their own THAAD-SZ clone in HQ-19 under development, in addition to their S-300+++ clone in HQ-18.

The Russians now have 57 Battalions of S-400 in Russian Service as of September 2019 (A battalion has 8 launchers and 32 missiles); for 1,824 missiles.

The Russians also have one S-500 Regiment (2 battalions) on active duty as of October 2021; or about 64 missiles.

The Europeans have:
Aster 30 Block 1: 600 km range missiles
Aster 30 Block 1NT: 1,500 km range missiles
Aster 30 Block 2 BMD: 3,000 km range missiles (under development.)

Indians have their own XRSAM (eXtra-long Range Surface to Air Missile) under development, and they already own S-400, so...
 
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You know....

Heavy ABM (USA)

GBI count is about 44 missiles in Alaska. Maybe going up to 60~ when it's all done, there's talk of 20 new missiles with modernized EKVs; and of course a replacement.

Heavy ABM (Soviet/Russia)

A-35 - about 64 launchers (all retired) built out of 128 planned.

A-135 - About 68 launchers of 53T6 Sprint-skis and 16 (all retired) launchers of 51T6 Spartan-skis.

A-235 - Under Development, tests of missiles began in Summer 2014.

It's clear that Heavy ABM is not causing the "OMG ARMS CONTROL RACE", due to the extremely close numbers and the fact that the US has half-assedly gone forward with GBI deployment on/off depending on who is in charge (Obama couldn't kill it, but he could slow it to a walk).

More to the point -- the numbers of missiles deployed by the US and Russia for Heavy ABM are low enough that you don't need to deploy intercontinental nuclear powered cruise missiles, nuclear powered torpedoes, or boost-glide hypersonic gliders to get past just 45 to 60 missiles on either side US or Russian.

What's causing all the new construction is the increasing spread of quality light ABM over the last 30 years.

All these crazy new designs aren't really meant to threaten the US.

They're meant to develop commercial designs using Russian military R&D money which can then be sold by Rosboronexport to third world nations to counter the increasing proliferation of light ABM around the world.

Just take a look at the Houthi vs Saudi missile fest that's been going on since 2017 or so.


The Houthis are using Burkan-2 missiles:


They're basically super evolved SCUD missiles; and the Saudis are shooting them down with US supplied PATRIOTs and other forms of Light ABM.

Everyone and their uncle now has Light ABM -- China has their own THAAD-SZ clone in HQ-19 under development, in addition to their S-300+++ clone in HQ-18.

The Russians now have 57 Battalions of S-400 in Russian Service as of September 2019 (A battalion has 8 launchers and 32 missiles); for 1,824 missiles.

The Russians also have one S-500 Regiment (2 battalions) on active duty as of October 2021; or about 64 missiles.

The Europeans have:
Aster 30 Block 1: 600 km range missiles
Aster 30 Block 1NT: 1,500 km range missiles
Aster 30 Block 2 BMD: 3,000 km range missiles (under development.)

Indians have their own XRSAM (eXtra-long Range Surface to Air Missile) under development, and they already own S-400, so...

This argument does not get any less wrong by repetition.

You are once more indiscriminately mixing sub-strategic missile defence (which was irrelevant under the ABM Treaty and has no bearing on nuclear deterrence) and things like A-135 or GBI. This distinction under ABM was not an idle one.

Further, you are completely disregarding the historical context and treaty frameworks in force at the time. The problem which is spooking the Russians isn't a couple of dozen GBIs, it's the total lack of a binding upper limit on ICBM-capable interceptors while simultaneously ICBMs are capped by a hard ceiling. Recent actions by the USA have called into question just how useful even binding agreements really are (a sentiment actually articulated loud and clear in the latest Putin speeches), but that's another discussion entirely. At any rate, with ICBM-capable SM-3s (nice try not mentioning that one!) on potentially almost 100 Aegis ships as well as forward deployed far outside US territory, it's hard not to admit Russian concerns after 2002 have been largely vindicated.

Consider that it is very questionable if the dramatic cuts on strategic nuclear arsenals that SALT/START secured could ever have come to pass without ABM first removing concerns about open-ended strategic BMD. If the US, Russia and China fail to come to an agreement to replace New START, a large measure of the blame will rest squarely with unrestricted missile defence. Same with the fact that we still have MIRVed missiles like the Sarmat which seems to cause so much anguish in the US, as has been mentioned before.

Want to re-evaluate the appraisal that (unrestricted) ABM isn't driving the arms race? The Russian leadership is on record as stating it does from their perspective, and quite apart from mere rhetoric the trajectory of their strategic weapons developments matches that perception.
 
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Notice the bias in the headlines in back to back Politico articles? Biden’s “team” wants to cut nukes but GOP “hawks” want to keep them
 
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Notice the bias in the headlines in back to back Politico articles? Biden’s “team” wants to cut nukes but GOP “hawks” want to keep them
This blasted back and forth in US politics I am surprised anything gets done these days. Time for their wholesale replacement by chimps. (See planet of the apes)
 

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