ACCESS: Top Secret
- Aug 25, 2012
- Reaction score
TaiidanTomcat said:"Tough choices" means having to make tough choices. I know a lot of mouth breathers are going to huff and puff and blame the USAF's top 3 priorities for this, but the reality is sequestration means choosing between nice to have and need to have, and the A-10 falls into nice to have. We get more money they can be saved, but if sequestration is here to stay, the A-10 goes.
Next mind that specialized ground support has been the majority of the Air Force mission for quite some time now.
I think the truth is simpler, and ahem; call me a mouth breather if you want; it's what comes from humping rucks up hills, I guess. The USAF has a particular self-narrative and the A-10 does not and has never fit it.
most generalists fail to excel at any one role.
beachhead1973 said:Insects have done pretty well in my opinion and most generalists fail to excel at any one role.
sferrin said:beachhead1973 said:Insects have done pretty well in my opinion and most generalists fail to excel at any one role.
That's why they're called generalists. (And insects are a poor analogy.) Tell me, when you've kept your A-10 and ditched your generalist are you going to fly those Warthogs out the intercept Bears? ;D
yasotay said:Lets just hope the enemy never comes up with things like GPS jammers and laser spoffers....
A good argument Taiidan. Still while the US would not allow A-10 into Libya, both France and the UK committed attack helicopters to action there, even though the uber-MANPAD (SA-24) was rumored to be operational, not just the SA-18. They did do more than hover off the coast as well.
Also GPS jammers are not overly "high tech" any more, and some "non-state" actors most likely have them. As more of the world gains access to information I suspect that ways and means to surmount our technology will be found.
There is another challenge in that the USAF will NOT allow anyone other than a TACP to call in air launched fires. Just hope every ground unit below battalion has one (hint: they don't).
Also I would say that if you do not stop the enemy from closing with you and you are throwing grenades and curses at each other from shouting distances, a laser guided bomb is of no avail to the ground forces.
A slower aircraft with a cannon might be able to do the job though... it has in the past. The CAS baton has been handed to the attack helicopter (who can be called in by Army Sargeants or anyone else needing help).
TaiidanTomcat said:I don't disagree with this at all, but it also kind of highlights the USAF's hesitation to use/risk the A-10 for its intended role, and would rather assign alternates. This is especially true as the A-10s are flying at medium height, with targeting pods, deploying PGMs-- just like everything else. In that case, why risk them when other stuff will do? As long as the USAF has the option, it will opt to send other things in high threat cases.
beachhead1973 said:As for specialization; I have heard it said it is for insects. Insects have done pretty well in my opinion and most generalists fail to excel at any one role.
The problem lies in the length of time that will necessarily take place between the moment such a realization is made and the beginning of operational service of that new "stealthy, fast and maneuverable aircraft." You don't just retire an aircraft until there is something better to take its place when it's gone. If the A-10 goes to retirement in the mid-2010s, that means another 20 years, judging from the typical timeline of other defense programs of that scope, and a further 5 years at least to take into account the usual political hassle that plagues most such programs. That means 2040 at best...sublight is back said:The Air Force “has to have a fifth generation force out there” of stealthy, fast and maneuverable aircraft, and the low and slow A-10 just didn’t fit in, Clarke said.
Ok then, If you ever win the lottery (or maybe you already can afford) A Ferrarri or other sports car of you're choice, make sure you get one that has a pickup bed in the back to haul around concrete. That way you can haul concrete uphill in you're brand new ferrarri. Or how about this, lets mount a large 20 foot cell phone tower on you're new Ferrarri. According to you specialization is only for insects. Or how about an F-22 that can also carry 6 paratroopers and a drogue refuelling device. No thanks, A dedicated CAS should have certain abilities that other aircraft do not. Specialization is good. Like finding the best person for the job. Do you want a plumber to help deliver you're wife's newborn? I didn't think so.TaiidanTomcat said:beachhead1973 said:As for specialization; I have heard it said it is for insects. Insects have done pretty well in my opinion and most generalists fail to excel at any one role.
Here is the full quote BTW:
A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.
-Robert A. Heinlein
Its a giant knock against specialized
Triton said:And if the Air Force has better platforms to perform the CAS mission, why does the Army covet the A-10? Why does the Army not agree with the Air Force's position on the A-10? A reasonable person would presume that if the A-10s were truly obsolete the Army would not want them either.
Stargazer2006 said:The problem lies in the length of time that will necessarily take place between the moment such a realization is made and the beginning of operational service of that new "stealthy, fast and maneuverable aircraft." You don't just retire an aircraft until there is something better to take its place when it's gone.
If the A-10 goes to retirement in the mid-2010s, that means another 20 years, judging from the typical timeline of other defense programs of that scope, and a further 5 years at least to take into account the usual political hassle that plagues most such programs. That means 2040 at best...
Also, by retiring both the F-117A and now A-10A, the USAF will be practically deprived a great amount of ground attack capability,
Tough targets in Serbian territory could only be reached by the B-2 bomber, which made its combat debut by flying directly from its base in Missouri. The B-2 successfully struck heavily defended fixed targets and mobile targets such as an SA-3.
Afghanistan presented another showcase for range and payload. B-1s and B-52Hs ended up dropping about 70 percent of the total tonnage during the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in the fall of 2001.
A new appreciation for the bombers emerged during the ongoing operations when B-52Hs and B-1s proved the value of turning range into loiter time, allowing the aircraft to stay overhead with large weapons loads to support varied ground operations.
On missions in 2004 and 2005, it was common for aircraft to drop just one weapon, or none at all. By the fall of 2006, strikes increased as larger formations of Taliban fighters emerged in Afghanistan. One B-1 crew told of releasing eight 2,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions, plus six 500-pound bombs, on a single mission that fall.
There’s another wrinkle. The days of fighters (or bombers, or unmanned systems) operating alone are over. In 21st century scenarios, all these platforms will need to share information and achieve a tactical dependence to get the job done. Heavily defended airspace will present challenges that call for platforms to work together in new ways.
since the Strike Eagle cannot be used in the same type of missions as these two.
Makes me wonder why such thinking happens now,
why does the army want the A-10?
simple. the A-10, to invert an old airforce saying, has "every pound for air to ground"
it'll never be suddenly retasked to go intercept some enemy fighter. it'll never be reassigned from CAS duties to nursemaid some AWACS.
it'll never be told to load up on recon pods and overfly wherethefuckarewe-stan.
it'll never need to fly with a large part of its stores dedicated to air to air missions.
it's a pure air to ground specialist. which means that unlike the F-15's, F-16's, and others, it'll never be told to do something else when a non-ground-support mission comes along.
while the Airforce would never ignore the CAS duties, the army just wants to know that when they call in for CAS, there will be a plane ready to respond RFN.. and that it'll be able to do the CAS job every time they call for support.
kcran567 said:Ok then, If you ever win the lottery (or maybe you already can afford) A Ferrarri or other sports car of you're choice, make sure you get one that has a pickup bed in the back to haul around concrete. That way you can haul concrete uphill in you're brand new ferrarri. Or how about this, lets mount a large 20 foot cell phone tower on you're new Ferrarri. According to you specialization is only for insects. Or how about an F-22 that can also carry 6 paratroopers and a drogue refuelling device. No thanks, A dedicated CAS should have certain abilities that other aircraft do not. Specialization is good. Like finding the best person for the job. Do you want a plumber to help deliver you're wife's newborn? I didn't think so.
CAPITOL HILL: While the federal government remains supine and Congress fails to pass appropriations bills, at least one lawmaker is engaged in a classic use of senatorial privilege: placing a hold on the nomination of a senior administration official.
Sen. Kelly Ayotte, who has made clear her unease with what appears to be the Air Force’s intent to scrap the entire fleet of the beloved and ugly 326 A-10 close air support jets, told the service today she would not let the nomination of Air Force Secretary nominee Debbie Lee James proceed. Why? Answers to questions she posed to the service about the A-10 were “insufficient.” She has sent follow-up questions to the Air Force.
“As Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, Senator Ayotte’s central concern is that our troops have the close air support they need to accomplish their missions and return home safely. The A-10 has saved many American lives, and Senator Ayotte is concerned that the Air Force might prematurely eliminate the A-10 before there is a replacement aircraft-creating a dangerous close air support capability gap that could put our troops at risk,” a congressional aide said on background.
This isn’t really about the quality of the Air Force responses, which probably said no final decisions had been reached since the next fiscal year’s budget isn’t final yet. (I bet they even used that fabulous and most hated term that no decent person would ever use — pre-decisional.) This is all about the Air National Guard (which flies almost one third of the A-10 fleet) and deep-seated suspicion that the F-35A, due to replace the A-10 in its close air support role, just isn’t nearly as good as the Warthog at flying low and killing tanks, other military vehicles and even troops on the ground.
Air Force Times recently ran this compelling account of a recent A-10 sortie:
In July, the A-10’s capabilities were evident when two pilots came to the rescue of 60 soldiers during a convoy ambush in Afghanistan.
The convoy came under attack while patrolling a highway. They became pinned behind their vehicles, facing heavy fire from a close tree line. The group didn’t have a JTAC, but a joint fire observer was able to communicate an estimated location to the A-10s.
“I flew over to provide a show of force while my wingman was looking for gunfire below,” the flight lead said, according to an Air Force release on the mission. “Our goal with the show of force was to break the contact and let the enemy know we were there, but they didn’t stop. I think that day the enemy knew what they were going to do, so they pushed even harder and began moving closer to our ground forces.”
One A-10 fired two rockets to mark the area with smoke. The wingman came in next and pulled the trigger on the Avenger cannon. The enemy moved closer to the friendly forces.
“We train for this, but shooting danger-close is uncomfortable, because now the friendlies are at risk,” the second A-10 pilot said. “We came in for a low-angle strafe, 75 feet above the enemy’s position and used the 30-mm gun — 50 meters parallel to ground forces — ensuring our fire was accurate so we didn’t hurt the friendlies.”
Of course, F-35 advocates would note that the plane possesses stunning sensors (far better than anything the A-10 will ever have) that allow the plane to operate at higher altitudes with excellent precision. They would also point out it can carry a heavier weapons load (18,000 pounds) than can the A-10 (16,000 pounds). Of course, the A-10′s 30 millimeter machine gun is one of the world’s most formidable ground attack weapons, far more potent than the F-35′s 25 mm gun, and the F-35 cannot carry nearly as much ammunition as the A-10 does (180 rounds vs. 1,170 rounds).
Then there’s the indelible impression the A-10 makes on ground troops. The good guys love the fact it flies low and slow. And they adore the impressive sound of the machine gun as it unloads its rounds into the enemy, not to mention the effect of the rounds that spew forth. The enemy hates all of those things.
A-10 pilots are also encased in a titanium tub that protects them from ground fire, allowing them to feel much more confident as they stare down at the enemy. We won’t really know how successful the F-35A is at its ground support role until JTACs guide some in and they have to do the dirty work the A-10 does so well.
The A-10 isn’t alone in facing the axe. The Air Force is considering scrapping its fleet of KC-10 tankers, F-15C fighter jets and the planned $6.8 billion purchase of new combat search-and-rescue helicopters.
The Air Force leadership made clear at last month’s Air Force Association conference that they wanted to cut weapon systems that have only one role, even if those systems perform that role fabulously well. It’s all part of the increasingly desperate push to find big enough savings to either forestall or meet the demands of the mandatory budget cuts known as sequestration. The fight over the A-10 will only be one of many come February, when the new budget is rolled out.
John21 said:I started a thread on this same issue on spacebattles.com. While its sad to see the A-10 go, I can see why they are thinking about doing this. I figured, why not retire the B-52 instead and give nuclear capability back to a percentage of our B-1B force? The B-1B can do the exact same missions as a B-52 and be quicker and more survivable to boot.
Here's the thread on spacebattles:
WASHINGTON — Proponents of the A-10 close air support aircraft have inserted language into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that should protect the plane through the end of 2014.
Section 143 of the bill also protects Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV from further cuts, the latest blow to Air Force attempts to divest itself of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform.
The language prohibits that any funds appropriated by the NDAA “or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to make significant changes to manning levels with respect to covered aircraft or to retire, prepare to retire, or place in storage a covered aircraft.”
In plain terms, that means that if the NDAA passes as is, the Air Force will be unable to spend any money to prepare to divest itself of either the A-10 or the RQ-4 for fiscal 2014. To drive the point home, further language stipulates that the same rule applies to the A-10 through the end of calendar 2014 as well, ensuring that the first three months of fiscal 2015 are covered as well.
There is one exception: A-10s that the service planned to retire as of April 9, 2013 will be allowed to retire. But otherwise, any wholesale attempts to divest the A-10 will be halted by this language.
That’s a potential blow to the Air Force, which has maintained a stance for months that removing entire platforms from the fleet is the only way to achieve savings needed under the sequestered budget.
But the A-10 has become a lightning rod in Congress, most notably with Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., holding up the nomination of Deborah Lee James to be Air Force secretary over concerns that the A-10 may be cut.
Speaking Wednesday at the American Enterprise Institute, Gen. Mark Welsh, Air Force chief of staff, expressed frustrations with what he called a “strange situation.”
“I find myself arguing to get rid of things that I don’t want to get rid of to pay a bill we’ve been handed, and the people telling me I can’t give up anything to pay it are the people who gave us the bill,” said Welsh, a former A-10 pilot himself. “You can’t continue to defend everything and pay a $1.3 trillion bill. It won’t work.”
While the A-10 may be the most visible platform the Air Force wishes to divest, an older battle over the RQ-4 continues.
In 2012, the service attempted to kill the Global Hawk in favor of its older U-2 platform. But Congress intervened, protecting the unmanned system. It appears poised to do so again.
The same language that protects the A-10 during fiscal 2014 applies to the Global Hawk. The NDAA as written also requires the secretary of defense to file a report on “all high-altitude airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems operated, or planned for future operation” to the Armed Services, Appropriations and Intelligence committees of the House and Senate.
That report, due 180 days after passage of the NDAA, will include details on capabilities, cost-per-flying-hour, and planned upgrades for all high-altitude ISR systems, along with other relevant information.
Triton said:Specific language in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014 protects A-10 Thunderbolt II and RQ-4 Global Hawk through the end of fiscal 2014.
"A-10 Supporters Include Protective Language in NDAA"
Dec. 12, 2013 - 02:19PM |
By AARON MEHTA | Comments
The US Air Force’s fleet of Fairchild Republic A-10s has escaped the chopping block again – at least until 2015.
The recently-passed National Defense Authorisation Act for fiscal year 2014 prohibits the service from spending money to retire more of the venerable close air-support aircraft, or from “making significant changes” to A-10 “manning levels” during the fiscal year, which ends on 30 September.
In addition, the bill, which was signed by President Barack Obama on 26 December, prohibits the USAF from retiring or planning to retire additional A-10s between October 2014 and the end of the calendar year.
A joint statement from US congressional committees says the law is intended to “provide breathing space for congress to conduct oversight and to consider what actions to take on any force structure changes the air force may propose in fiscal year 2015.”
The bill does not apply to A-10s that have been approved for retirement in previous fiscal years.
The air force had roughly 320 of the aircraft at the end of November 2013, and is retiring A-10s at a rate of roughly two per month. When those scheduled retirements conclude, the service says it will be left with 283 of the aircraft.
The authorisation bill comes amid discussion in Washington DC and within the air force about the future of the A-10 in the current budget-constrained environment.
In a media briefing on 13 December, air force chief of staff Gen Mark Welsh called the close air-support mission critical to the service, but noted that it is considering “fleet divestitures” as a means of achieving some $12 billion in required budget savings. He added that other aircraft can provide close air support and that the USAF has long planned to replace A-10s with Lockheed Martin’s F-35A, which the air force hopes will have initial operational capability by December 2016.
The air force said in mid-October 2013 that it could save $3.5 billion over five years by cutting its fleet of 326 A-10s, reports suggested. In November, however, A-10 supporters in Washington argued that close air support would suffer with type's retirement.
Pierre Sprey, who worked for US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the late 1960s and helped lead the air force’s A-10 concept design team, said during a seminar that only several thousand people in the armed services understand close air support.
He said A-10 divestitures would “scatter” those personnel, and the people “who know how to bring air power to bear will be gone”.
After a tense budget battle last year, the Air Force is gearing up to defend what service officials have called a series of hard choices about what to keep and what to dump. With finances tight, the biggest fight is over whether to modernize older platforms or risk a capabilities gap while pushing that funding toward recapitalization programs.
Charged with keeping the combat air forces ready to go at a moment’s notice is Gen. Michael Hostage, head of Air Combat Command. He discussed the upcoming budget and challenges the Air Force faces Jan. 27 in a wide-ranging interview.
Q. What should we expect to see for ACC in this coming budget?
A. We made some very hard choices. The only way you save the amount of money that we are being told we have to cut from the budget is to make entire weapon systems go away.
We talked specifically about the A-10, a weapon system I would dearly love to continue in the inventory because there are tactical problems out there that would be perfectly suited for the A-10. I have other ways to solve that tactical problem.
It may not be as elegant as the A-10, but I can still get the job done, but that solution is usable in another level of conflict in which the A-10 is totally useless.
It does not make any sense to cut the other program and cut A-10s if I have to give one up for the other.
I really save the big bucks when I take an entire [platform] and shut it down because I save the squadrons of those airplanes but I also save the logistics infrastructure, the training infrastructure and all of the overhead.
Q. Should we expect to see multiple platforms removed from the budget?
A. Yes. That is the only way to make the numbers meet, the direction we were given. Now, again, whether the politics will let us do those things are another thing. Unfortunately, if I am told, “OK, we understand about the A-10, you can take half the A-10 fleet” — that, sadly, does not leave me in a very good place because now we have to keep all of that infrastructure that supports the A-10. I get to save some portion of money by cutting certain squadrons, but they will save the large dollars that goes with that infrastructure piece, and now I have to go after squadrons of other airplanes so I reduce the overall capability of the Air Force, and I am in a worse place then I would have been if I just cut the whole A-10 fleet.
Q. Do you believe those program cuts can make it through Congress?
A. Your guess is as good as mine. With the budget, we told them what we thought we needed to do, and now it is a matter of the politics of things, whether they will allow us to do it. There is a lot of opposition on the Hill, but that opposition does not come with money saying, “Here. You use this money and keep that fleet.” They are just saying, “No, you cannot get rid of that fleet.”
But they are still cutting the budget so I have to do something, and, unfortunately, the something that is left is worse than cutting the A-10 fleet. It is far worse for the nation if I have to keep the A-10 and cut a bunch of other stuff because they will not give me enough money to keep it all.
Q. ISR is another area that has been politically difficult in the past. Is that impacting your plans?
A. Well, we are being driven by politics to take on a weapon system that is very expensive, the Global Hawk. It appears that I will be told I have to continue to purchase Global Hawks, and given the budget picture that we have, I cannot afford both the U-2 and the Global Hawk. I will likely have to give up the U-2. What that means is that we are going to have to spend buckets of money to get the Global Hawk up to some semblance of capability that the U-2 currently has. It is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to take time, and as I lose the U-2 fleet, I now have a high-altitude ISR fleet that is not very useful in a contested environment. It will change how I am able to employ that airplane in a high-end fight or a contested domain.
Q. Are there any programs you would fight tooth and nail for in the budget?
A. I am going to fight to the death to protect the F-35 because I truly believe the only way we will make it through the next decade is with a sufficient fleet of F-35s.
If you gave me all the money I needed to refurbish the F-15 and the F-16 fleets, they would still become tactically obsolete by the middle of the next decade. Our adversaries are building fleets that will overmatch our legacy fleet, no matter what I do, by the middle of the next decade.
I have to provide an Air Force that in the middle of the next decade has sufficient fifth-generation capability that whatever residual fourth-generation capability I still have is viable and tactically useful. I am willing to trade the refurbishment of the fourth gen to ensure that I continue to get that fifth-gen capability.
I am fighting to the end, to the death, to keep the F-35 program on track. For me, that means not a single airplane cut from the program, because every time our allies and our partners see the United States Air Force back away, they get weak in the knees.
Q. So you remain committed to the 1,763 figure that has come out?
A. Absolutely. Not one plane less.
Q. What about upgrades to the F-22?
A. The F-22, when it was produced, was flying with computers that were already so out of date you would not find them in a kid’s game console in somebody’s home gaming system. But I was forced to use that because that was the spec that was written by the acquisition process when I was going to buy the F-22.
Then, I have to go through the [service life extension plan] and [cost and assessment program evaluation] efforts with airplanes to try to get modern technology into my legacy fleet. That is why the current upgrade programs to the F-22 I put easily as critical as my F-35 fleet. If I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant. The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform. It needs the F-22. Because I got such a pitifully tiny fleet, I’ve got to ensure I will have every single one of those F-22s as capable as it possibly can be.
Q. Has the readiness issue subsided?
A. The bottom line is, despite the budget deal, we are still going to the same spot at the bottom of the cliff that we were going to when they started the sequestration madness. They have shallowed the glide path a little bit over the next two years, but we pay it all back in the out years and we still hit at the same spot at the bottom of the cliff.
We still have an urgent need to be allowed to reshape our force, to resize ourselves to fit within the amount of money the country is putting for defense, and as long as Congress is stopping us from doing that, we are going to have difficulty making readiness.
Q. Given budget constraints, how do you encourage the development of new technology?
A. What I am trying to spark is partnerships between labs and industry to produce capability of this leading edge technology that potentially is out there.
Q. What areas might have the highest probability of payback?
A. Obviously, we are very interested in directed energy. We are very interested in the materials technology that is burgeoning.
Nanotechnology is very exciting and holds some great promise.
There are some interesting technological areas out there, but I am sure not going to give away secrets of what the cool toys are we are looking for next. I want my adversaries to be surprised.
RyanCrierie said:Q1: At what point will our satcomm capability reach the point of being able to support "x" number of UCAV orbits over a country about 200,000 square miles (between Iraq and Afghanistan in size) in area?