Army Equipment Modernization Strategy

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/...faced-problems-supplying-them-weapons/383601/
What the unit received, though, was not always up to snuff. Issued equipment had operational-readiness rates below 90 percent, according the Inspector General report, which cited vehicle maintenance as a key issue.

Some equipment was functioning but lacked important components. More than 60 percent of M88 recovery vehicles were missing secondary equipment, which forced 1ABCT to cannibalize “multiple other M88 vehicles to create working M88s,” the report said.

Other problems cropped up as well. Much of the equipment was not ready for combat, the report said, citing multiple 1st ABCT officials. Making equipment combat-ready requires replacing vehicle fuel, installing batteries, and making quick-fix repairs. Vehicles were issued without certifications for hazardous cargo, as required for European roads, leading 1st ABCT to certify the vehicles at a cost of $5.8 million.

At least part of the problem, the report said, was that the vehicle storage requirements set by the U.S. Army Sustainment Command laid out generic inspection times, rather than the more rigorous inspection times based on each equipment piece’s technical manual.

Even these less-rigorous standards were physically impossible for the 405th to meet. Per the standards, the vehicles should be regularly exercised on special tracks. Neither supply center had these tracks.

Workers for the 405th were aware of the issue, with one contracting officer telling the Inspector General’s investigators that the vehicles “always” have maintenance faults, especially if not exercised for two to four years. Another 405th employee said that the basic standards laid out by the Sustainment Command did not reveal problems a more thorough inspection would find.
 
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/ira...Toverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
“And so, the era of close combat clearly had not ended in 2003; and the experience in Ukraine is demonstrating that it hasn’t ended as of 2023,” Biddle said. ”That means that skills, equipment, and organizations you need to do close combat right remained important in 2003 and they remain important today.”

While the conventional phase of the Iraq war in 2003 holds tactical and operational lessons that still apply today, the biggest lesson from the war is arguably that capturing an adversary’s capital is not the same as victory, Biddle said.


Within weeks of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Baghdad had fallen and Iraqi forces were more destroyed than the German army at the end of World War II, he said. But instead of ending, the war morphed into an insurgency that lasted for years.

Yet the U.S. military seems to still believe that the way to win wars is by destroying an enemy’s military, and that has shaped the U.S. government’s approach toward Ukraine, Biddle said.

“The war doesn’t end until both sides decide to stop shooting,” Biddle said. “If one side decides to keep shooting, even if their conventional military has been driven from the field, the war doesn’t end and it isn’t yet clear who’s going to win and who’s going to lose. That’s just as true for Ukraine as it was for Afghanistan in 2001 and it was for Iraq in 2003.”
 
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/03/army-wishlist-tank-upgrades-augmented-reality/384474/The largest single item is for $533 million for upgrading the Army’s Abrams tanks to the newest SEPV3 configuration. The service had previously proposed spending $698 million on SEPV3 upgrades for 2023, down from just over $1.2 billion spent last year. The new figure, if approved, will bring the total cost of upgrades similar to last year’s cost.

The Army is also seeking just over $120 million for its augmented reality Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS, goggles, with $98 million for development and $22.4 million for procurement.
 
https://www.defensenews.com/digital...ilthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=army-dnr
...
The center of gravity for the next fight? To me, it’s the joint strategic support area, right where we sit, because it’s got some vulnerabilities that I need to work on with industry to fix. So the organic and defense industrial bases, they are where we’ve got to ... focus through technology. Then we’ve got to shorten that gap, close that gap, with industry on how they get requirements so they can make investments to increase capacity.

Sustainment has to be bad for our enemies. If they see that we have the capacity through our industrial bases, they’re going to think twice about taking that next step. ....
 
jsport said:
https://www.defensenews.com/digital...ilthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=army-dnr
...
The center of gravity for the next fight? To me, it’s the joint strategic support area, right where we sit, because it’s got some vulnerabilities that I need to work on with industry to fix. So the organic and defense industrial bases, they are where we’ve got to ... focus through technology. Then we’ve got to shorten that gap, close that gap, with industry on how they get requirements so they can make investments to increase capacity.

Sustainment has to be bad for our enemies. If they see that we have the capacity through our industrial bases, they’re going to think twice about taking that next step. ....
Click to expand...
https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...Toverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...Toverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
 

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