AIM-152 AAAM Phoenix replacement projects

Do you think the Tomcat would actually have carried that many though?
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

Wow. Seems like somebody at the highest ranks of USN, was thoroughly traumatized by Tom Clancy all time masterpiece - Red Storm rising, Dance of vampires. o_O o_O o_O

Oh, Clancy didn't invent that nightmare, he just wrote it down.

Remember that Larry Bond, who pretty much scripted the naval battle scenes in RSR, had been an actual working naval intelligence analyst in the early 1980s. A lot of what made it into RSR were the very specific things that were freaking people out around Norfolk and the Beltway at the time.

And Bond's Harpoon naval wargame rules, which were used to model the RSR Backfire strike*, have just been released in the long awaited fifth edition. There's a lot of interesting stuff been coming out of the work his co-author Chris Carlson (also a naval intel analyst, though of more recent vintage ) has been doing in the naval archives on what was known about the threat and what was planned to oppose it. They've had to add entirely new guidance modes to cover how the Russian missiles actually worked.

* There's a Harpoon supplement "Dance of the Vampires" that solely covers how they did that : https://www.wargamevault.com/product/140136/Dance-of-the-Vampires
 
I don't doubt that they planned to hang them on anything that flew in that scenario. What I mean is, how realistic was the GD/W proposal to hang 15 of them on a single Tomcat? That just strikes me as kind of "pie in the sky/if you also develop this seperate launch rail," type thinking. In other words, how serious was the proposal to hang 15 missiles on a single plane? Was it a, "you can 100%, no doubt do this?" Or was it a, "we think you can fit this many?"

If you have the interface to talk to it, and the load capability to carry it, and it doesn't screw up the aerodynamics too badly, there's not actually that much difference. You'd need to test fly the combination, and do release trials, but that's about it. It's not even the most missiles I've seen hung on an fighter, there are plenty of pics showing it's possible to hang 18 Brimstones and 4 AAMs on a Typhoon, though the standard loadout would be 12 and 6.
 
I don't doubt that they planned to hang them on anything that flew in that scenario. What I mean is, how realistic was the GD/W proposal to hang 15 of them on a single Tomcat? That just strikes me as kind of "pie in the sky/if you also develop this seperate launch rail," type thinking. In other words, how serious was the proposal to hang 15 missiles on a single plane? Was it a, "you can 100%, no doubt do this?" Or was it a, "we think you can fit this many?"

If you have the interface to talk to it, and the load capability to carry it, and it doesn't screw up the aerodynamics too badly, there's not actually that much difference. You'd need to test fly the combination, and do release trials, but that's about it. It's not even the most missiles I've seen hung on an fighter, there are plenty of pics showing it's possible to hang 18 Brimstones and 4 AAMs on a Typhoon, though the standard loadout would be 12 and 6.
So they were fairly confident than that this loadout was entirely possible. Thanks.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
Honestly, it makes sense. With the AWG-9's track-while-scan capability and ability to theoretically engage up to 24 targets at once, it makes sense to maximize it's ability by guiding weapons launched by other platforms using Link-16. It turns every tactical aircraft on the carrier into a defense asset and makes it so that instead of maybe 140 AAMs coming at you, now you've got 300+ flying at you. Plus SAMs launched from the escorts. The downside to this is, it would have essentially forced the Soviets into going nuclear against carrier battle groups for the simple fact that they couldn't count on more than one or two missiles actually making it through all that.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
Honestly, it makes sense. With the AWG-9's track-while-scan capability and ability to theoretically engage up to 24 targets at once, it makes sense to maximize it's ability by guiding weapons launched by other platforms using Link-16. It turns every tactical aircraft on the carrier into a defense asset and makes it so that instead of maybe 140 AAMs coming at you, now you've got 300+ flying at you. Plus SAMs launched from the escorts. The downside to this is, it would have essentially forced the Soviets into going nuclear against carrier battle groups for the simple fact that they couldn't count on more than one or two missiles actually making it through all that.


You still need to be able to illuminate in the terminal phase; the time slicing implied by the engagement you describe would have
required ICWI time-slices approaching the infinitesimal or levels of sub-array beamforming not found on anything smaller
than destroyer AESA radars which didn't show up until the early 2000's.

From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
Honestly, it makes sense. With the AWG-9's track-while-scan capability and ability to theoretically engage up to 24 targets at once, it makes sense to maximize it's ability by guiding weapons launched by other platforms using Link-16. It turns every tactical aircraft on the carrier into a defense asset and makes it so that instead of maybe 140 AAMs coming at you, now you've got 300+ flying at you. Plus SAMs launched from the escorts. The downside to this is, it would have essentially forced the Soviets into going nuclear against carrier battle groups for the simple fact that they couldn't count on more than one or two missiles actually making it through all that.


You still need to be able to illuminate in the terminal phase; the time slicing implied by the engagement you describe would have
required ICWI time-slices approaching the infinitesimal or levels of sub-array beamforming not found on anything smaller
than destroyer AESA radars which didn't show up until the early 2000's.

From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.
Not for the missiles in question though. Even the GD/W offering only used SARH for the l midcourse updates then switched to IR homing for the terminal phase while the H/R offering used inertial guidance for the midcourse phase and ARH for the terminal phase.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
Honestly, it makes sense. With the AWG-9's track-while-scan capability and ability to theoretically engage up to 24 targets at once, it makes sense to maximize it's ability by guiding weapons launched by other platforms using Link-16. It turns every tactical aircraft on the carrier into a defense asset and makes it so that instead of maybe 140 AAMs coming at you, now you've got 300+ flying at you. Plus SAMs launched from the escorts. The downside to this is, it would have essentially forced the Soviets into going nuclear against carrier battle groups for the simple fact that they couldn't count on more than one or two missiles actually making it through all that.


You still need to be able to illuminate in the terminal phase; the time slicing implied by the engagement you describe would have
required ICWI time-slices approaching the infinitesimal or levels of sub-array beamforming not found on anything smaller
than destroyer AESA radars which didn't show up until the early 2000's.

From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.
Not for the missiles in question though. Even the GD/W offering only used SARH for the l midcourse updates then switched to IR homing for the terminal phase while the H/R offering used inertial guidance for the midcourse phase and ARH for the terminal phase.

IR homing was the backup mode or for use at short-range since the drag associated with popping-off the high L/D radome
was substantial.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.
Honestly, it makes sense. With the AWG-9's track-while-scan capability and ability to theoretically engage up to 24 targets at once, it makes sense to maximize it's ability by guiding weapons launched by other platforms using Link-16. It turns every tactical aircraft on the carrier into a defense asset and makes it so that instead of maybe 140 AAMs coming at you, now you've got 300+ flying at you. Plus SAMs launched from the escorts. The downside to this is, it would have essentially forced the Soviets into going nuclear against carrier battle groups for the simple fact that they couldn't count on more than one or two missiles actually making it through all that.


You still need to be able to illuminate in the terminal phase; the time slicing implied by the engagement you describe would have
required ICWI time-slices approaching the infinitesimal or levels of sub-array beamforming not found on anything smaller
than destroyer AESA radars which didn't show up until the early 2000's.

From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.
Not for the missiles in question though. Even the GD/W offering only used SARH for the l midcourse updates then switched to IR homing for the terminal phase while the H/R offering used inertial guidance for the midcourse phase and ARH for the terminal phase.

IR homing was the backup mode or for use at short-range since the drag associated with popping-off the high L/D radome
was substantial.
Ahh. I misunderstood it then.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.

Just to be clear, the quoted text about the Outer Air Battle was DWG, not me.
 
According to Friedman (and in this case he was part of the team working on it, not simply the author recording it later), for the Outer Air Battle against a Soviet regimental strength attack they were talking about hanging missiles on anything that would fly, so even the A-6s would be working as missile shooters. So there's definitely a case for assuming they would have flown more if they had the hardpoints available to take them.

This was the heyday of the Navy's "forward pass" concept where you had various platforms including ships
launching long range anti-air missiles with another platform (everything from AWACS to airships)
providing midcourse and/or terminal illumination.

Just to be clear, the quoted text about the Outer Air Battle was DWG, not me.

Apologies. Do not attempt to unwrap that many nested quote blocks without sufficient Starbucks.
 
I should point out that the infrared aspect was in part a response to late-Cold War Soviet bombers and
ASCMs equipped with terrain-bounce jammers where the jammer would repeat and
bounce the illuminator or other seeker signal off the ocean surface into the missile's radome at an angle.

The missile then goes into Home-on-jam mode and plummets into the ocean.
That's why, in part, you started to see things like SM-2 Block IIIB.
 
From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.

The Zaslon radar was able to support 4 R-33s against widely separated targets using semi-active homing at once. With 1970s Soviet technology passive phased array. Using a phased array was the key though, a mechanically scanned planar array would not be able to illuminate many targets at once. AWG-9 could get Phoenix to terminal seeker range, but it needed its own radar to complete the engagement.
 
From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.

The Zaslon radar was able to support 4 R-33s against widely separated targets using semi-active homing at once. With 1970s Soviet technology passive phased array. Using a phased array was the key though, a mechanically scanned planar array would not be able to illuminate many targets at once. AWG-9 could get Phoenix to terminal seeker range, but it needed its own radar to complete the engagement.


Yes, sub-array beamforming is something you can do with passive arrays.
As above, you get four quadrants since analog beamforming needs physical replication.
The Zaslon radar is also huge; it has half the emitters of an APAR face.

In comparison, we are talking about a small Ku-band ESA (AESAs for Ku-band were not mature in this period) that did time-sliced ICWI.
 
From memory, a single, big APAR face can support 8 ICWI missiles in flight with a shoot-shoot doctrine: each face is divided into four
quadrants and each quadrant can support two missiles provided they are shoot-shoot i.e. a 2:1 engagement.

The Zaslon radar was able to support 4 R-33s against widely separated targets using semi-active homing at once. With 1970s Soviet technology passive phased array. Using a phased array was the key though, a mechanically scanned planar array would not be able to illuminate many targets at once. AWG-9 could get Phoenix to terminal seeker range, but it needed its own radar to complete the engagement.


Yes, sub-array beamforming is something you can do with passive arrays.
As above, you get four quadrants since analog beamforming needs physical replication.
The Zaslon radar is also huge; it has half the emitters of an APAR face.

In comparison, we are talking about a small Ku-band ESA (AESAs for Ku-band were not mature in this period) that did time-sliced ICWI.

Indeed, I can't see how that could ever work in the terminal phase. GD Pomona would be familiar with this via their Standard SAM though. It would make sense if the IIR seeker was always used in the terminal phase for accuracy. with the Ku band radar more of a mid course guidance correction. That's not how it is described though.
 
Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?
 
Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?
Yes in theory no in reality since you need to wrangle the three different companies into agreeing for that.

And you literally need a act of Congress to do that without some hefty benefits.
 
Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?
Yes in theory no in reality since you need to wrangle the three different companies into agreeing for that.

And you literally need a act of Congress to do that without some hefty benefits.

GD and Westinghouse and Hughes would all be out of the missile business in a few years.

Given the forced pairings that have occurred due to industrial base considerations, "the best of both worlds"
approach is not too far fetched.

The Big Lessons Learned from this project:

a. Don't lie to the SECDEF about the progress of your contemporary acquisition programs
- esp: don't permit the SECDEF to repeat your lies to Congress under oath such that the SECDEF has to retract his testimony
b. Don't massively underperform as a service in Gulf War I
c. Don't be a scandal ridden service
d. Don't make the primary carrier of your wunderwaffe be an aircraft the SECDEF (correctly) views as a Grumman jobs program.
 
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Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?

At the time, packing an active radar seeker into the smaller fuselage was probably just out of reach (remember it's smaller than AMRAAM).
 
Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?

At the time, packing an active radar seeker into the smaller fuselage was probably just out of reach (remember it's smaller than AMRAAM).
Dog pilling onto this, the AIM-120 had a ten year development cycle from Dec 1981 to IOC in Sept 1991. A bit of a protracted development in itself...
 
Would it have been possible for the Navy to have combined the two proposals? Say, take the propulsion system and generally smaller body of the GD/W design and combine it with the guidance system and seeker head of the H/R design? Kind of a, "best of both worlds" approach?

At the time, packing an active radar seeker into the smaller fuselage was probably just out of reach (remember it's smaller than AMRAAM).
Dog pilling onto this, the AIM-120 had a ten year development cycle from Dec 1981 to IOC in Sept 1991. A bit of a protracted development in itself...

Solid state transmitters at X-band in the AMRAAM form factor weren't mature in the 80's which led to the redesign using TWT.

At 5.5 inches in diameter, I tend to think you'd have to go MMW for an active system
and there were some transmitters in the period that could fit.
 
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I don't doubt that they planned to hang them on anything that flew in that scenario. What I mean is, how realistic was the GD/W proposal to hang 15 of them on a single Tomcat? That just strikes me as kind of "pie in the sky/if you also develop this seperate launch rail," type thinking. In other words, how serious was the proposal to hang 15 missiles on a single plane? Was it a, "you can 100%, no doubt do this?" Or was it a, "we think you can fit this many?"

If you have the interface to talk to it, and the load capability to carry it, and it doesn't screw up the aerodynamics too badly, there's not actually that much difference. You'd need to test fly the combination, and do release trials, but that's about it. It's not even the most missiles I've seen hung on an fighter, there are plenty of pics showing it's possible to hang 18 Brimstones and 4 AAMs on a Typhoon, though the standard loadout would be 12 and 6.
So they were fairly confident than that this loadout was entirely possible. Thanks.

I can't speak for the Tomcat guys, but if it had been Typhoon instead I wouldn't have expected it to be an issue.
 
I don't want to drag this too far off topic but why isn't the "bank to turn" method used by the Hughes/Raytheon design more commonly used in missiles if it is more efficient?
 
The impact of the end of the requirement to reinforce Western Europe in the teeth of the Soviet.Union was similar to the impact of 1918 and the years before the rise of the dictators.
"Resurgent Russia" was still used to develop war scenarios in NATO but even today this does not have the same clout.
The "War on Terror" from 2001 until 2016 altered the role of forces to the detriment of their ability to match traditional threats.
China has untested military forces. I am reluctant to buy the idea that they are now rivaling the old Soviet Union (which had fought and beaten Germany only a few decades before the Cold War). China's wars against India and Vietnam have hardly shown it to be a serious military power
 
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Bank to turn is preferable when you have intakes on your missile to simplify the design of the intakes, but its more complicated to control and takes longer to turn. Probably less drag which is important for a long range (but thrust vectoring would also help there).
 
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The impact of the end of the requirement to reinforce Western Europe in the teeth of the Soviet.Union was similar to the impact of 1918 and the years before the rise of the dictators.
"Resurgent Russia" was still used to develop war scenarios in NATO but even today this does not have the same clout.
The "War on Terror" from 2001 until 2016 altered the role of forces to the detriment of their ability to match traditional threats.
China has untested military forces. I am reluctant to buy the idea that they are now rivaling the old Soviet Union (which had fought and beaten Germany only a few decades before the Cold War). China's wars against India and Vietnam have hardly shown it to be a serious military power
At what point does "reluctant to buy" become "underestimating"? The armed forces that fought those wars no longer exist. Following the first gulf war, the PRC invested in a massive restructuring, transforming its military from one along the lines of the conscript military that failed Iraq into a smaller, much more professional one. They aren't a paper tiger.
 
At what point does "reluctant to buy" become "underestimating"? The armed forces that fought those wars no longer exist. Following the first gulf war, the PRC invested in a massive restructuring, transforming its military from one along the lines of the conscript military that failed Iraq into a smaller, much more professional one. They aren't a paper tiger.
They're not a paper tiger, but at the same time, the media has drastically over stated what the Chinese military can do. They've made out the PLAAF and PLAN to be the equal, if not superior, of the USAF and USN. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Good, but not great. If the US and PRC ever fought, I'm 100% sure it would be bloody for both sides. And I'm also sure the US would win.
 
Ahem. Since we're talking about what-if and the outer air battle. . .

View attachment 640765
Another "coulda woulda shoulda". What a missed opportunity. What was the diameter of the ASALM anyway? I was under the impression it was too wide for mk41, but this article shows it would fit. Since it fits, then it could work for anti-shipping and ground attack as well, which would be a fine capability to possess. Although the range might be less depending on warhead weight.
And ASALM was conservative compared to the Ballistic Intercept Missile; surface (possibly sub-surface) launched
SWERVE BGV + active seeker against the bomber streams.
I haven 't heard of this. Do you have more details or links?
 
Ahem. Since we're talking about what-if and the outer air battle. . .

View attachment 640765
Another "coulda woulda shoulda". What a missed opportunity. What was the diameter of the ASALM anyway? I was under the impression it was too wide for mk41, but this article shows it would fit. Since it fits, then it could work for anti-shipping and ground attack as well, which would be a fine capability to possess. Although the range might be less depending on warhead weight.
And ASALM was conservative compared to the Ballistic Intercept Missile; surface (possibly sub-surface) launched
SWERVE BGV + active seeker against the bomber streams.
I haven 't heard of this. Do you have more details or links?
 
Ahem. Since we're talking about what-if and the outer air battle. . .

View attachment 640765
Another "coulda woulda shoulda". What a missed opportunity. What was the diameter of the ASALM anyway? I was under the impression it was too wide for mk41, but this article shows it would fit. Since it fits, then it could work for anti-shipping and ground attack as well, which would be a fine capability to possess. Although the range might be less depending on warhead weight.

At least one version would have fit a Mk41 canister. We have a full thread on ASALM, which went through several configurations and missions. It includes a drawing showing the canisterized version and a cross-sectional drawing giving a diameter of only 18 inches. Of course, it wasn't totally symmetrical, so the height might have been a bit more than 18. The nominal diameter for the SLAT drone derived from ASALM was 21 inches.
 
There is a thread around somewhere as well on the 'original' 1980s SM-6 program. For the life of me, I can't find it at the moment though.
 
Ahem. Since we're talking about what-if and the outer air battle. . .

View attachment 640765
Another "coulda woulda shoulda". What a missed opportunity. What was the diameter of the ASALM anyway? I was under the impression it was too wide for mk41, but this article shows it would fit. Since it fits, then it could work for anti-shipping and ground attack as well, which would be a fine capability to possess. Although the range might be less depending on warhead weight.

At least one version would have fit a Mk41 canister. We have a full thread on ASALM, which went through several configurations and missions. It includes a drawing showing the canisterized version and a cross-sectional drawing giving a diameter of only 18 inches. Of course, it wasn't totally symmetrical, so the height might have been a bit more than 18. The nominal diameter for the SLAT drone derived from ASALM was 21 inches.

And let's not forget LRASM-B. Basically they stretched ASALM to the length of that SAM above and added a Mk72 booster to it.

LRASM-B1.jpg

asalm-sam.jpg
 
Interestingly, the F-14A 157990 (eleventh of twelve test aircrafts) that is preserved at March Field Museum, Riverside (California) is carrying General Dynamics/Westinghouse AIM-152 mock-ups.
 

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While searching for more information about this specific aircraft, I've found older pictures with a different color scheme and more AIM-152s. According to the Wiki (yeah, I know) source:

["The aircraft at the March Field Museum is a preproduction A model, serial number BUNO 157990, and it is on loan from the U.S. Navy. It was number 11 of 12 test aircraft built. One of the many important tasks that #11 participated in was on the USS Independence , testing it's suitability for carrier use. It was transferred from General Dynamics - Pomona, along with the ground support equipment seen inside the museum, where it was used to mount missiles for test evaluation. It was towed on its landing gear in the middle of the night along Highway 60 from Pomona to March Field in September of 1992."

March Field Air Museum TDelCoro

October 21, 2012]

So maybe the missing ones and more related items could be inside the museum? If someone lives in the vicinity...
 

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