A senior systems engineer with the (UK) MoD who has decades of experience across the defense industry is highly critical about Palantir's access across data sets:

MoD Systems engineer said:
Ministers clearly have a lack of understanding of Palantir’s technology. The statements with respect to sovereign data appear to be missing the point entirely. [They’re] missing the realities of data scraping, of aggregation, and the fact that Palantir is building its own rich picture of our nation that they can use for their own ends.

Allowing a single entity, foreign or domestic, to have such far-reaching, pervasive access is inherently dangerous. How our national cybersecurity centre has allowed this beggars belief.

Whether or not the UK technically owns the data is almost irrelevant. That’s like reading a secret love letter and saying the secrets in it are safe, just because you’ve promised never to copy it word for word or take it out of the room.

When you have that mosaic built from UK sovereign defence, health, roads, power networks, power stations, and our major industrial bases, you have a detailed understanding of virtually every aspect of the sovereign United Kingdom. For an adversary, or even a nation with whom we have a special relationship, that picture is worth more than all the fine art on Earth.

A second source, whom I gather from the description(s) is also a MoD systems engineer with an intelligence background backs her/him up.

Intelligence source said:
(Palantir probably has) ... a complete profile on the whole UK population. They have visibility into wildly different focus areas, yet their data is all condensed into one foreign supplier’s control/visibility. At the very least I’d call that a security risk.

Other quotes, apparently from them but not individually attributed.

Both MoD sources said:
Palantir does not need to own the data or even have stewardship. They can extract, transform and exploit the metadata to build their own rich picture.

...

(On metadata and restricted information) A parcel is sent out by a defence supplier with a Nato part number, an address and an arrival date. Even if the label is a QR code and isn’t human-readable, the data it contains would allow Palantir to know that a nuclear submarine would be in Diego Garcia on 4 April. Those three bits of information – the part number, Diego Garcia and 4 April – are, individually, completely unclassified. Together, they are secret.

From this article:


The sources claim that the Palantir contracts as a whole pose "a national security threat to the UK" and that that notions about data ownership and sovereignty in relation to the company's access on the part of the UK are "ignorant".

Somewhat akin to how private citizens are now unthinkingly giving "AI agents" (and more significantly, the companies providing them) truly unprecedented access to their own data, apparently not realizing how fundamentally they're compromising their privacy in the process compared to all precedents. For example, I've seen first hand accounts on top people from premier academic institutions using these agents for the most mundane reasons and giving blanket access to all their research in the process; ostensibly some of the most accomplished, analytical minds around FOMOing their way around in this brave new LLM environment.
 

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