A different V force in the 1960s

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is Bomber Command's portion of Plan M which covers the period from 31st March 1960 to 31st March 1965.

I compiled the spreadsheet from a document dated 18th February 1960 that was provided by @yellowaster.



The salient differences between this plan and the September 1957 version of Plan L in Post 21 are:

• There were 247 aircraft in 26 squadrons at 31/03/60 in Plan L. This included 132 Medium Bombers in 16½ squadrons and 12 L.R.P.R. aircraft one-and-a-half squadrons.
• There were 196 aircraft in 20 squadrons at 31/03/60 in Plan M. This included 102 Medium Bombers in 12 squadrons and 8 L.R.P.R. aircraft in one squadron.

The Victor and Vulcan were behind schedule. That is the main reason why Plan L had more Medium Bombers and L.R.P.R. aircraft (34 aircraft in 5 squadrons) than Plan M.

The other reason was that a squadron of 8 Valiants was transferred from the Medium Bomber Force to the Tactical Bomber Force at the beginning of 1960.

• There were to be 263 aircraft in 28 squadrons from 30/09/60 to 31/03/63 under Plan L.
• There were to be 224 aircraft in 27 squadrons from 31/12/61 to 31/03/65 under Plan M.

Both plans included 144 Medium Bombers in 18 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R aircraft in 2 squadrons. However, Plan L would reach this strength before Plan M which once again was due to slippages in the Victor and Vulcan programmes.

Both plans had peak strengths of 32 Victor B.1s in 4 squadrons and 24 Vulcan B.1s in 3 squadrons. However, this would reduce to:

• 24 Victor B.1s in 3 squadrons and 16 Vulcan B.1s in 2 squadrons in Plan L.
• 16 Victor B.1s in 2 squadrons and 24 Vulcan B.1s in 3 squadrons in Plan M.

Both plans had an eventual total of 48 Victor B.2s in 6 squadrons and 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons. This included 16 Victors in 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons. Plan M would reach this strength later than Plan L and as usual this was due to slippages in the Victor and Vulcan programmes.

Plan L had 71 Valiants in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60 and Plan M had 77 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60. The reason for the discrepancy was that that Plan L had 56 Valiant medium bombers in 7 squadrons of 8 aircraft while Plan M had 54 Valiant medium bombers in 6 squadrons of 9 aircraft and 8 Valiant tactical bombers in one squadron.

• Under Plan L the Valiants were to be reduced from 71 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60 to 7 aircraft in one squadron at 31/03/62.
• Under Plan M the Valiants were to be reduced from 77 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/12/60 to 47 aircraft in 6 squadrons in at 31/03/62.

This was because:

• 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons were retained as Tankers and;
• 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons were retained as Tactical Bombers .

The Valiant Tactical Bombers replaced the 64 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons that were in Plan L.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is Plan P which is dated March 1964 and covers the period from 31st March 1964 to 31st March 1975.



The Command had 166 aircraft in 22 squadrons at 31/03/64 which was to decline to 158 aircraft in 20 squadrons at 31/03/65. The February 1960 version of Plan M had 224 aircraft in 27 squadrons on both of these dates.

The difference at 31/03/64 was 58 aircraft in 5 squadrons as follows:

• No. 18 Squadron with its 8 E.C.M. aircraft (7 Valiants and one Canberra) was disbanded on 31/03/63, but that was offset by...
• No. 51 Squadron with its 6 Elint aircraft (3 Canberras and 3 Combets) was transferred from Signals Command to Bomber Command. I don't know when the Squadron became part of Bomber Command, but I suspect that the transfer took place in March 1963 when the Squadron moved from Watton to Wyton.
• Both plans had one Canberra M.R.P.R. squadron, but it had 16 aircraft in Plan M and 8 aircraft in Plan P.

That's a difference of 10 aircraft in no squadrons. The remainder of the difference (48 aircraft in 5 squadrons) was because there were:

• 40 fewer Medium Bombers - 144 in 18 squadrons Plan M and 104 in 14 squadrons Plan P.
• 8 fewer L.R.P.R. aircraft - 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons Plan M and 8 in one squadron in Plan P.

The difference at 31/03/65 (when Plan M ended) was 58 aircraft in 7 squadrons because Plan P had a Medium Bomber Force of 96 aircraft in 12 squadrons.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Plan P of March 1964 again.



The Medium Bomber Force

At 31/03/64 there were:

3 squadrons Victor B.1/B.1A with 24 aircraft.​

2 squadrons Victor B.2 (Blue Steel) with 8 aircraft. (The squadrons were at half-strength.)​

3 squadrons Vulcan B.1 with 24 aircraft.​

3 squadrons Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) with 24 aircraft.​

3 squadrons Vulcan B.2 (Blue Steel) with 24 aircraft.​

Total - 14 squadrons with 104 aircraft. (Plan M had 18 Medium Bomber squadrons with 144 aircraft at 31/03/64.)

There were only 56 Mk 2 V-Bombers (8 Victors and 48 Vulcans) when there should have been 104 Mk 2 V-Bombers (32 Victors and 72 Vulcans).

The shortfall was partially due to the decision to reduce the number of Victor Mk 2s from 59 to 34. According to Wynn on Page 332 of RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces the Defence Committee decided to reduce the Victor Mk 2 order on 25th July 1960. It was also because the Vulcan B.2s and remaining Victor B.2s were delivered behind schedule.

There would be 112 aircraft in 14 squadrons on 30/09/64 which is when the Victor B.2 squadrons were planned to be at full-strength. However, this would be reduced to 96 aircraft in 12 squadrons at 31/03/65.

There would be a further reduction to 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons at 31/03/66. That is 16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons and 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons. All the Victor B.2s and a third of the Vulcan B.2s would be armed with Blue Steel.

I don't know when the decision to reduce the Medium Bomber force from 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons to 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons was made.

This force of 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons would be maintained until 31/03/70.

The Vulcan B.2 would be withdrawn between 01/04/70 and 31/03/73. That is:

72 aircraft in 9 squadrons (including 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/70​

48 aircraft in 6 squadrons (including 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/71​

24 aircraft in 3 squadrons (including 8 aircraft in one squadron armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/72 and...​

No aircraft in zero squadrons on 31/03/73.​

This left the 2 Victor B.2 (Blue Steel) squadrons which would be retained until 31/03/75.

24 Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) aircraft in 3 squadrons were to have an overseas reinforcement role from October 1964 to 1970. Thereafter the task was to be taken over by the 3 Victor B.2 squadrons in Serials 2 and 10. That is the 2 Victor B.2 squadrons in the Medium Bomber Force and the Victor B.2 Strategic Reconnaissance squadron.

The original document says that there would be insufficient aircraft to back the Victor B.2 squadrons and the Victor O.C.U. to normal standards which would explain why the number of aircraft declines from 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31/03/72 to 14 aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31/03/75.

The Strategic Reconnaissance Force - Formerly the Long-Range Photographic Reconnaissance (L.R.P.R.) Force

At 31/03/64 there were 16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons that were in Plan M and 8 Valiants in one squadron in Plan P.

The Valiant squadron was to convert to the Victor B.2 in the first half of 1965. This was several years behind Plan M which had the first Victor reconnaissance squadron formed between 01/10/60 & 31/03/61 and the second squadron convert from Valiants to Victors in the first half of 1961.

As already explained 3 Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) squadrons would have an overseas reinforcement role from October 1964 to 1970 and that thereafter the task was to be taken over by the 3 Victor B.2 squadrons, i.e. this one and the 2 Victor medium bomber squadrons.

The original document says that there would be insufficient aircraft to back the Victor B.2 squadrons and the Victor O.C.U. to normal standards which would explain why the number of aircraft in the squadron declines from 8 at 31/03/72 to 7 on 31/03/73.

The Tactical Bomber and Tactical Reconnaissance Forces

At 31/03/64 there were 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons as per Plan M. These aircraft and the Medium Bomber Force were assigned to NATO.

The force was to be replaced by the TSR.2 on a one-for-one basis between 01/04/67 and 31/03/70. However, but the plan was to form 2 squadrons of 12 aircraft instead of 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft. The TSR.2s were earmarked to NATO rather than assigned to NATO. I don't know that the difference between earmarked and assigned was.

The Tactical Reconnaissance squadron was to convert from 8 Canberras to 8 TSR.2s between 31/03/69 and 31/03/70.

The Tanker Force

At 31/03/64 there were 16 Valiants in 2 squadrons as per Plan M.

A squadron of 8 Victor Mk 1 tankers was to be formed between 01/10/65 and 31/03/66 which would increase the size of the tanker force to 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.

Another pair of Victor Mk 2 tanker squadrons would form between 01/04/66 and 30/09/66 and replace the Valiant tankers. However, these squadrons would have 7 aircraft each rather than 8 so there would be 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons instead of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.

There was no note in the original document that says so, but it looks as if there weren't enough Victor Mk 1s to back this force because it would decline from 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons at 30/06/67 to 18 on 31/03/74 and be maintained at 18 aircraft in 3 squadrons until 31/03/75.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Plan H was mentioned earlier in this thread. Could you do spreadsheet of that? It would be fairly interesting to see the sort of forces the RAF thought they would require to fight a prolonged war.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Plan H was mentioned earlier in this thread. Could you do spreadsheet of that? It would be fairly interesting to see the sort of forces the RAF thought they would require to fight a prolonged war.

I have a few documents and they don't agree. However, the one I'm quoting below says:

At 31/03/53 - 2,496 aircraft in 221 squadrons and independent flights.​

​

At 31/03/54 - 3,058 aircraft in 266½ squadrons and independent flights.​

​

At 31/03/55 - 3,600 aircraft in 304 squadrons and independent flights.​

​

The document is dated 30th June 1952.

 

[uk 75]

Aircraft assigned to NATO were already at the disposal of NATO in peacetime.
Aircraft earmarked for NATO had other assignments in peacetime. The UK based TSR2s and 1154 Harriers were assigned to support the brigades of the UK Strategic Reserve which might be deployed anywhere in the world, but with Singapore and the Gulf as likely theatres. In the event of a war in Europe the Strategic Reserve (3 Division and 16 Airborne Brigade) would also go to NATO.
It is clear from various places that NATO wanted the UK to increase its contribution.
This was met to some extent by removing the East of Suez commitment and buying Phantoms, Harriers, Buccaneers, Jaguars and eventually Tornado.
Our land forces contribution did not benefit as much since the units available after 1968 (for a brief period forming 5 Division) were soon involved in Northern Ireland.

 

[alertken]

Fog. Overkill.

All military Seniors, 6/52, had survived 2 Wars of Attrition, last man standing wins. None was wed to ardour - our men are better than theirs: they all knew it was what lies to the other side of the hill...git thar fustest with the mostest. It's kit, stupid, lots in the right place, right time - NOW! They had trained for CBW, had seen squib HE grow to Earthquake, range from throw to very remote. AW was just a Bigger Bang. CASs LeMay and Slessor knew some hundreds of Bombers in inventory becomes some dozens over, then a few on target - GC Cheshire had observed the Nagasaki miss by 4nm, clear blue sky, no opposition. So: 2,496 RAF B/ECM/PR for 31/3/53 (!?! on 30/6/52 83 Valiant, 513 B, 114 T/PR Canberras were on order, part-US-funded).

None of NOM's Plans here was funded to deployment, crewed, AW armed. Peak V-Force by MT was 1/1-1/5/65: 104 (64 Yellow Sun 2, 40 Blue Steel); peak by a/c was Berlin Wall, 8/61 (58, UK Bombs, 72 US, plus 59 Thor). SecDef McNamara was briefed 18/6/62 that UK had 8 Bombs "certainly opnl": that day we had 75 YS 1/2 (+34 Red Beards on Canberra B.15/16 and Scimitar - plus 64 US Bombs in RAFG, 48 on 24 Valiant/Marham - which would have been briefed to McN, with Thor, as "US").

These Plans were for nuclear war-fighting. Churchill settled 15/7/52 for CoS Global Strategy Review: Massive Deterrence, and set about clawing USAF/AW into E.Anglia, more $-subsidy, plus ops. integration, RAF Medium Bomber Force+USAF/SAC. He hoped to extract from his friend Ike US AW Art and Articles - loan Bombs. Cabinet 21/6/54 took Ike's offer of B-47/Mk.5, available before Valiant, long before Blue Danube, so the Air Minister was supportive. 1 Minister stopped it, as it “would have the most serious effect (on Aero) making such an important contribution to (exports)” J.Engel, Cold War @30Kft,HUP,07,P.185.

Even when that Minister went to Defence he was presented 27/7/57 with an AW shopping list of “c.100xMt, 1,500xkt Bombs (again, 17/12/59 for 1970) “200xMt, 850xkt, 1,300xsub-kt” I.Clark,Nuc.Diplomacy,Clarendon,94,P385. He caused UK to buy, crew and operate Force sufficient to Deter. Does anybody here still accept the wrecker fallacy of the Sandys Storm?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

So: 2,496 RAF B/ECM/PR for 31/3/53 (!?! on 30/6/52 83 Valiant, 513 B, 114 T/PR Canberras were on order, part-US-funded).

Those weren't the totals for Bomber Command... They were the total RAF including the RAuxAF and the auxiliary squadrons to be raised in Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. Bomber Command was a much smaller proportion.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

None of NOM's Plans here was funded to operational deployment, crewed, AW armed. Peak V-Force by MT was 1/1-1/5/65: 104 (64 Yellow Sun 2, 40 Blue Steel); peak by deployable a/c was Berlin Wall, 8/61 (58, UK Bombs, 72 US, plus 59 Thor). SecDef McNamara was briefed 18/6/62 that UK had 8 Bombs "certainly opnl": we actually that day had 75 YS 1/2 (and 34 Red Beards on Canberra B.15/16 and Scimitar).

I was quoting the plans to show that the OP wasn't feasible.

That is it wasn't possible to withdraw Valiants from the Medium Bomber Force to the Tactical Bomber and Tanker forces sooner than happened in the real world because they were needed to maintain the strongest possible Medium Bomber Force (i.e. the nuclear deterrent) until enough Victors and Vulcans were available.

Furthermore, forming a pair of Valiant tanker squadrons and having 3 Valiant squadrons replace the 4 Canberra squadrons did not become possible until the decision to reduce the MBF from 184 aircraft in 23 squadrons to 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons was made.

I was also doing it to show that Victors would have replaced the Valiant in the L.R.P.R. and Tanker roles around the time that it actually happened regardless of the Valiants metal fatigue problems.

 

[alertken]

NOM not criticising you in any way - tks for all this: it's the notion of nuclear war fighting that I am criticising. Forget the money: where would the horsepower come from. Wynn,Pp.371/467 has 1,475 of our finest, qualifying as Valiant aircrew, 1955-64. Press articles lauded them as £1,000 a year men when that was indeed something. How would we crew these Plans?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

NOM not criticising you in any way - tks for all this: it's the notion of nuclear war fighting that I am criticising. Forget the money: where would the horsepower come from. Wynn,Pp.371/467 has 1,475 of our finest, qualifying as Valiant aircrew, 1955-64. Press articles lauded them as £1,000 a year men when that was indeed something. How would we crew these Plans?

Point taken Part 1.

More than a few years ago I compiled a RAF Squadrons 1950-70 spreadsheet using C.G. Jefford's RAF Squadrons book as a guide.

According to the latest version of that the peak strength was the month ending 31st March 1962 when there were 16 medium bomber squadrons. That is 4 Valiant, 4 Victor B.2, one Victor B.2, 3 Vulcan B.1 and 4 Vulcan B.2 squadrons. That's 128 aircraft at a U.E. of 8 aircraft per squadron.

That doesn't include the 24 Valiants in the Tactical Bomber Force squadrons, the 8 Valiants in the L.R.P.R. squadron or the 7 Valiants in the ECM squadron.

2 of the 4 Valiant medium bomber squadrons (Nos. 90 and 214) became tanker squadrons on 1st April 1962. However, my source for that (Wynn's RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces) also says that No. 214 Squadron had been flight refuelling since August 1958 and No. 90 Squadron went into the FR role in October 1961. Which means that there were only 14 medium bomber squadrons at 31st March 1962.

If you remove them from the equation the peak strength of the Medium Bomber Force was the period from 31st December 1962 to 29th February 1964 when there were 15 squadrons which at a U.E. of 8 aircraft per squadron is a nominal strength of 120 aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

NOM not criticising you in any way - tks for all this: it's the notion of nuclear war fighting that I am criticising. Forget the money: where would the horsepower come from. Wynn,Pp.371/467 has 1,475 of our finest, qualifying as Valiant aircrew, 1955-64. Press articles lauded them as £1,000 a year men when that was indeed something. How would we crew these Plans?

Point taken Part 2.

In the following all the squadrons have a nominal strength of 8 aircraft unless I have specifically written the contrary.

If you thought...

• ...the plan dating from January 1957 to maintain a force 184 medium bombers in 23 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons in the first half of the 1960s...
• ...and the plans from September 1957 and February 1960 for a force of "only" 144 medium bombers in 18 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons in the first half of the 1960s...

...were not realistic you may change your mind after I tell you about the plans that were made in the period 1951-55 for the medium bomber and L.R.P.R. forces.

Plan H ended on 31st March 1955 with 152 medium bombers in 19 squadrons. That came from a document dated 30th June 1952. That document did not say which aircraft were to equip the 19 squadrons, but I have some handwritten notes that I made from another National Archives document. It shows 152 medium bombers in 19 squadrons on 31st March 1955. That is 48 Lincolns in 6 squadrons, 64 Washingtons (Boeing B-29s) in 8 squadrons and 40 Valiants in 5 squadrons. I didn't record the date of the second document in my notes but it my educated guess is that it dates from the summer of 1951.

The succeeding Plan J had 144 medium bombers in 18 squadron and 8 L.R.P.R. squadrons at 31st March 1955 which is a total of 152 aircraft in 19 squadrons, i.e. the same number of squadrons and aircraft as Plan H. This document was dated 30th June 1952. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows 64 Lincolns in 8 squadrons, 56 Washingtons in 7 squadrons and 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons in the medium bomber force plus 8 Valiants in the L.R.P.R. squadron.

However, actual medium bomber force at 31st March 1955 was 50 Lincolns in 5 squadrons (i.e. 10 instead of 8 aircraft per squadron) and one Valiant squadron. The Valiant L.R.P.R. squadron that should have existed on 31st March 1955 wasn't formed until 1st April 1955.

Plan J ended on 31st March 1958 with a force of 304 medium bombers in 38 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons. That came from a document dated 30th June 1952. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows that the 304 medium bombers in 38 squadrons were to consist of 112 Valiants in 14 squadrons, 80 Victors in 10 squadrons and 112 Vulcans in 14 squadrons, plus 16 Valiants in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

This is the only "squadron patterns" document I have that mentions the Valiant Mk 2. The 112 Valiant medium bombers on 31st March 1958 were to be a mix of Mk 1s and Mk 2s (it didn't say how many of each) and both reconnaissance squadrons were to be equipped with the Valiant Mk 2.

Plan K had 240 medium bombers in 30 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. That came from a document dated 6th February 1953. The spreadsheet I made from the original document shows 96 Valiants in 12 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons plus 16 Valiants in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

Plan K (Star) had 224 medium bombers in 28 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. That came from a document dated 1st April 1954. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows 80 Valiants in 10 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons plus 16 Victors in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

Plans K and K (Star) end on 31st March 1958. I suspect that if Plan K (Star) had continued beyond that date the medium bomber force would have increased to 240 aircraft in 30 squadrons by the end of June 1958 because this is what happened in the next document that I have. See below.

The 15th January 1955 version of Plan L ended on 31st March 1960 and according to the spreadsheet that I compiled from the original document the Medium Bomber Force was to have...

• 224 aircraft in 28 squadrons at 31st March 1958. This is the same as Plan K (Star) and in common with that plan there would be 80 Valiants in 10 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons.
• 240 aircraft in 30 squadrons at 30th June 1958 when there would be 72 Valiants in 9 squadrons, 72 Victors in 9 squadrons and 96 Vulcans in 12 squadrons. This is why I think Plan K (Star) would have shown 240 medium bombers in 30 squadrons at this date if it didn't end at 31st March 1958.
• 240 aircraft (72 Valiants, 72 Victors and 96 Vulcans) in 30 squadrons were to be maintained from 30th June 1958 to 31st March 1960 which is when this version of Plan L ended.

In common with the earlier plans there would also be 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. These squadrons would be equipped with the Victor or the Vulcan. A note in the original document said, "No decision has yet been made as to whether the Victor or the Vulcan will be chosen as the Valiant replacement in the L.R.P.R. role. These patters have been based, from the point of view of production, on the provisional assumption that the Victor will ultimately be selected."

What actually happened

According to my RAF squadrons 1950-70 spreadsheet there were 9 medium bomber squadrons (7 with Valiants and 2 with Vulcans) and one L.R.P.R. squadron (equipped with Valiants) at 31st March 1958. That's a total of 10 squadrons which is a quarter of what was expected at that date under Plan J and a third of what was expected under Plans K, K (Star) and the January 1955 version of Plan L.

This increased to 11 medium bomber squadrons (7 with Valiants, one with Victors and 3 with Vulcans) and one Valiant L.R.P.R. squadron at the end of June 1958 for a total of 12 squadrons. That is is 20 squadrons short of the 32 squadrons that should have existed at that date under the January 1955 version of Plan L.

There were only 11 medium bomber squadrons (5 Valiant, 3 Victor Mk 1 & 3 Vulcan Mk 1) and one L.R.P.R. squadron equipped with Valiants at 31st March 1960. However, that does not include the Valiant squadron that had recently been transferred to the Tactical Bomber Force or the Valiant squadron which had been operating in the tanker role since August 1958 but was officially a medium bomber squadron which increases the total to 14 squadrons.

However, there should have been 30 medium bomber squadrons (9 with Valiants, 9 with Victors and 12 with Vulcans) plus 2 Victor L.R.P.R. squadrons at that date under the January 1955 version of Plan L.

N.B.

My intention was to check my spreadsheets against the photocopies of the original documents before writing this post. However, due to my poor time management skills and the enormous amount of time it took correct the spreadsheet for the February 1953 version of Plan K the only one that I have checked is said February 1953 version of Plan K.

Therefore, the above may not be 100% correct.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If the Vickers Valiants had been transferred from strike to tankers earlier could the fatigue problems have been avoided?

No.

The Valiants weren't transferred from strike to tankers. The peak force was 7 medium bomber squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron and one ECM squadron. 2 medium bomber squadrons became tanker squadrons, 3 medium bomber squadrons became tactical bomber squadrons (replacing 64 Canberras in 4 squadrons), 2 medium bomber squadrons were disbanded in 1962 and the ECM squadron was disbanded in 1963.

I'm assuming that you mean the TBF by strike and not the Medium Bomber Force. If you mean all the Valiant bomber squadrons regardless of whether they were in the TBF or MBF it's not possible to to transfer the 2 squadrons to the tanker role any earlier than happened in the real world because:

a) They were transferred to that role between 1958 and 1961 in the real world.​

​

and​

​

b) An earlier transfer would result in an unacceptable weakening of the nuclear deterrent.​

In any case the 2 tanker squadrons were only a third of the 6 squadrons that were left at the end of 1964 (i.e. when the Valiant's metal fatigue problem was discovered). Therefore, an earlier transfer of 2 squadrons to the tanker role would not have made much difference.

Their strike role could have been taken on by Vulcan or Victor B1s.

This could have been done anyway.

The Vulcan B.2 was replacing the Vulcan B.1 in the MBF (which was being reduced to 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons) when the Valiants were prematurely retired.

According to Wynn the RAF conducted a feasibility study into re-equipping the TBF force with the Vulcan B.1. The conclusion of said study was that there were enough Vulcan B.1s for a one-for-one replacement of the TBF Valiants.

It had been planned to keep the 3 Valiant TBF squadrons in service until the TSR.2 could replace them. The study also concluded that the cost of maintaining 3 Vulcan B.1 TBF squadrons until the TSR.2 entered service wasn't much more than the the cost of maintaining the 3 Valiant TBF squadrons until the TSR.2 entered service.

However, the Top Brass decided against re-equipping the TBF squadrons with the Vulcan B.1 because it thought that the money would be better spent elsewhere.

Replacing the TBF Valiants with Victor B.1s wasn't an option because the plan had been to convert them to tankers for several years. A Victor Mk 1 could have 3 refuelling points to one on the Valiant. Plus a Victor could fly higher at a faster cruising speed and could transfer a considerably greater amount of fuel.

With the Valiants serving into the 1970s the Victors could have continued in the recce and conventional bombing role, providing an alternative to the Vulcan.

As I have explained a force of 2 Valiant tanker squadrons was considerably less capable than the 3 Victor Mk 1 tanker squadrons that was created in the middle 1960s. Therefore, I think keeping the Victor B.1s in service as bombers instead of converting them to tankers would have done more harm than good.

In any cast there were the surplus Vulcan B.1s and 2 squadrons worth of Victor B.2s and 2 squadrons worth of Vulcan B.2s that became available the late 1960s as I shall now explain.

A force of 88 medium bombers in 11 squadrons was maintained from the end of 1965. It was supposed to consist of 16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons and 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons but the Vulcan B.1 wasn't retired until October 1967. This force became redundant when the Polaris submarine force was fully operational.

The pair of Victor B.2 squadrons and 2 Vulcan B.2 squadrons were disbanded 1967-69. A pair of the 7 remaining Vulcan B.2 squadrons was transferred to Cyprus where they replaced the 4 Canberra squadrons in the Akrotiri Strike Wing. This left 40 Vulcans in 5 squadrons in RAF Strike Command that were assigned to SACEUR and were effectively belated replacements for the 3 Valiant squadrons in the Tactical Bomber Force.

Therefore, the RAF could have had another 3 Vulcan B.1 squadrons, 2 Vulcan B.2 squadrons and 2 Victor B.2 squadrons in the first half of the 1970s without keeping the Valiants. That's in addition to the 7 Vulcan B.2, one Victor SR.2 and 3 Victor Mk 1 tanker squadrons that it did have.

 

[alertken]

NOM. Valiant also applies to your patience in unravelling all this. Min. of Defence (1/57) Sandys is recorded as "abrasive", hostile to all 3 Chiefs. If I had inherited the fantasies you have shown, I would be..>abrasive. Valiant had just been baptised in action at Suez: Wynn,P131/2 has: "(Nav/attack un)suitable or non-existent (fairly) high unserviceability rate”: 2 of 1st.5xValiant sorties.

Mis-match does not do justice to the chasm between what we might deduce from records of intent, and actual factual.
I have tried to identify Sqdns' operational tenure, not merely time Up for payroll. So, Wynn,Pp.150/460/1: 2/6/58 “we have had (Valiant for >)3 years it was not until (1957) that we had (1) complete to opnl. standards.” Blue Danube CA Release was 7/57 Moore/Illusion,P.112, so UK Deterrence was effective from that date, 138 Sqd/Valiant/Wittering: only then did RAF have tools, manuals, spares for Bombs fit for the average man... Jefford has 138 Sqdn. on Valiant 2/55.

So: #47 I have 8/61 as RAF peak by number of deliverable (I said a/c, I meant) Bombs: 59 Thor, 106 a/c. TBF's 24 Valiants had dual Mk.28, so 189 Bombs. You have the period to 29/2/64, when upto 80 Yellow Sun Mk.2 and 40 Blue Steel, plus 24x2 Valiant/Mk.28, 170 Bombs in RAF hands, and I have periods in 1963 when 144 a/c were in 18 Sqdns (these numbers fluctuate almost monthly), not all armed, serviceable, crewed. But what really matters here is generation - what is ready to go NOW! and penetration - what Force will do the business. Wynn,P.371 has 26/1/62 recognition of Valiant vulnerability to MiG-17, deployed 1953! Those numbers can be found nowhere, least of all in briefings to those paying. Because the answer is awful. 75% generation was sought, after a hefty warning. The second number was the reason for the fantasies.

​

 

[Hood]

Manning the larger plans would have been difficult.
V-Bomber captains were required to have 1,750 flying hours as captains, at least one Canberra tour and (for the initial captains at least) four-engine piston experience (ex-Lincoln or Washington). Co-pilots needed 700 hours as captains and a full Canberra tour. Navigator/bomb aimers had to have a tour under their belts and be recommended by their Commanding Officers and needed to complete the Bombing School syllabus. Signallers had to have completed a tour in either Bomber, Coastal or Transport Command.

So early expansion was probably limited to some extent by available ex-Canberra crews. With the larger plans that had greater numbers of Canberras it might have balanced itself out to some extent. Though it would have had knock-on effects on Coastal and Transport Commands. Presumably the two OCUs would have needed expansion too.

Plan H looks highly unrealistic in terms of manpower, by 1953 the Korean training expansion of reservists etc. had been drastically cut back, which seems at odds with the projections of Plan H ahead to 3,600 aircraft by 1955.

Interestingly, from some biographies I've read, a V-Bomber posting was often not a popular choice.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth I've been tidying the formatting of my transcript of the January 1955 version of Plan L.

According to that the establishment of the RAF at 31st December 1954 was 2,216 aircraft in 199½ squadrons and independent flights.

The projected strength for 31st March 1955 was 2,285 aircraft in 210½ squadrons and independent flights. That's 63% of the number of aircraft that was projected for that date in Plan H.

The plan ends on 31st March 1960 when there were to be 2,199 aircraft in 220 squadrons and independent flights.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If the Vickers Valiants had been transfered from strike to tankers earlier could the fatigue problems have been avoided.
Their strike role could have been taken on by Vulcan or Victor B1s.
With the Valiants serving into the 1970s the Victors could have continued in the recce and conventional bombing role, providing an alternative to the Vulcan.

My different V-Force in the 1960s

The decision to transfer the nuclear deterrent from the RAF's V-Force to Polaris submarines operated by the RN is brought forward from 1962 to 1960 which avoids the "Skybolt Interlude".

However, Polaris would still be scheduled to enter service circa 1970 so a credible V-Force would have to be maintained for the duration of the 1960s. This would be done in the same fashion as the real world which is to adapt the V-bombers and the Blue Steel missile for low-level operations. The difference is that the decision to do so would be brought forward 2 years.

The money not spent on Skybolt in the real world would be used to buy more Blue Steels. It wasn't the best weapon in the world due to its safety and reliability "issues" but the low-level version of Blue Steel was all that was available to fill the gap between the V-bombers becoming obsolete as high-level bombers and Polaris coming into service.

When the decision to buy Skybolt was made the plan was for a Medium Bomber Force of 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons and a LRPR force of 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons for a total of 160 aircraft in 20 squadrons. This included 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons and 48 Victor B.2s in 6 squadrons with 16 of the Victor B.2s equipping the 2 LRPR squadrons.

72 Vulcan B.2s each carrying 2 Skybolts could attack 144 targets which is the primary reason why the Victor B.2 order was cut from 59 to 34 aircraft (i.e. from enough to maintain 6 squadrons of 8 aircraft to enough to maintain for 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft). However, I think that the Victor B.2 order would still be reduced from 59 to 34 aircraft in this version of history.

I also think that the Medium Bomber and LRPR forces would still be reduced from the projected 160 aircraft in 20 squadrons to 96 aircraft in 12 squadrons. That is 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons and 24 Victor B.2s in 3 squadrons with 8 of the Victors equipping one LRPR squadron. That's a total reduction of 64 aircraft in 8 squadrons. However, in this version of history more of the 88 medium bombers in 11 squadrons that were maintained until Polaris came into service would be carrying Blue Steel missiles.

This is for financial reasons. I think that the Treasury would be unable to find the money required to buy the 25 extra Victor B.2s. I also think that it wouldn't be able to find the money required to pay the operating costs of 64 aircraft in 8 squadrons.

The Valiant left the Medium Bomber Force in 1962.

• 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons were transferred from the Medium Bomber Force to the new Tactical Bomber Force 1960-61 and replaced Bomber Command's Light Bomber Force of 64 Canberras in 4 squadrons.
• 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons officially left the Medium Bomber Force on 1st April 1962 and became tanker squadrons. However, one squadron had been "tanking" since 1961 and the other had been "tanking" since 1958.
• 16 aircraft in 2 medium bomber squadrons which were disbanded in 1962.
• Outside the Medium Bomber Force were 7 Valiants in the ECM squadron (which was disbanded in 1963) and 8 aircraft in the LRPR squadron.

I think the changes that I've proposed for the Medium Bomber Force wouldn't have any effect on the Valiants. The 48 aircraft in 6 squadrons would still be grounded at the end of 1964 and the type would be taken out of service in 1965.

The tankers and LRPR aircraft would still be replaced by Victor Mk 1s and Mk 2s respectively. However, that had been the plan before the Valiant was retired so all the earlier than expected retirement of the Valiant did was to accelerate the implementation of an existing plan.

In common with our timeline replacing the tactical bombers with redundant Vulcan B.1s would be studied. The conclusion would still be that the cost of maintaining 24 Vulcan B.1s in 3 tactical bomber squadrons until TSR.2 came into service was the same as the projected cost of maintaining the 24 Valiants until TSR.2 came into service. Therefore, the money to replace the Valiants with Vulcan B.1s was there, but the "Top Brass" would still decide that the money would be better spent elsewhere.

In practice it's not much different from the actual V-Force of the 1960s. The only difference is that the decision to have Medium Bomber Force go "low level" is taken two years earlier and that more Blue Steel missiles are bought with the money spent on Skybolt between 1960 and 1962.

 

[uk 75]

Nomisyrruc Very interesting and detailed programme.
You have answered my Valiant question along with other posters.
There is a lot of material available now about Blue Steel and I think it was almost worse than useless as a weapon. Not sure if it was recoverable.
The tactical nuclear role carried out by RAF Canberras and Valiants should probably (with hindsight of course) gone to Buccaneer S2s in the 60s with a VG supersonic design replacing them and the Vulcans in the 70s.
The Victors could probably have left the bombing role earlier.
The Macmillan government was pretty sceptical about the "independence" of the UK deterrent.
The various super weapons proposed to use TSR2 to fill the gap until Polaris foundered both on cost but also a realisation that UK industry wasnt delivering good weapons.
Skybolt had been a lifeline for the V Force, without it, the bombers became much less effective.

 

[Pete 608]

1. Hard not to argue the Valiants should have still gone low level given what happened but they were clearly inferior tankers to what came after them (and apart from tanking they had no other role, and had to go low level for any vestige of survivability). Not seeing the obvious gain.
2. The RAF effectively favoured the Vulcan over the Victor as a bomber, despite the Victor having some advantages in terms of weapon load, range etc. They clearly saw it as the better bet in this regard, hence why the Victor became the new RAF tanker. Not sure what in your scenario changes that view and decision.
3. Legitimate questions re: why so many V-bomber types (I .e going into production - prototypes more understandable given chances of project failures and or serious issues at this time). However Valiant developments (particularly the low altitude B2) are perhaps generally overhyped in this context (was the B2 really that good or capable a low altitude bomber, even just in comparison with the Vulcan?).

I am sorry to say that you are very misguided in your approach to the Valiant.

1. The fatigue problem which arose and which was attributed to Low Level ops causing premature failures was due to the poorly understood problems existing with the DTD 683 alloy used. Vickers had assumed that the stress problems experienced were due to machining problems which were inducing stress to the material and decided that their more modern machining processes could alleviate the problem. However this was not the case. The problem with DTD 683 was that it was an unstable alloy, the metals from which it was constructed, slowly migrated due to the weak electrical current that was generated between them. Handley Page who were building the Hastings at the same time, recalled all of the airframes constructed and changed any load bearing fittings constructed from DTD 683. This was also incorporated on the assembly line. Vickers went ahead on the findings of their mistaken conclusions and built the Valiant. Whether it was the Mk1 Valiant which entered into RAF Service, or the Mk2, [Pathfinder low level variant] was immaterial, as the same alloy was used in both airframes. So neither sustained Ops at a high level or the introduction of the Mk2 for low level ops would have made any difference to the outcome. Also by the time that the Valiant problem arose, there were already twenty two redundant airframes in storage at St Athan. The aircraft was already reaching the end of its useful life. The Valiant disposition at the "End of Play" in 1965 was - Finningley 2 ECM Aircraft - Honnington 8 Tankers - Marham 25 Strike and 9 Tankers - Wyton 10 PR Aircraft - Gaydon 4 Aircraft, with a further 3 undergoing deep servicing at St Athan. One of these WZ390 had completed servicing and had been awaiting deployment for almost a year. The biggest casualty was SHAPE, which lost the capability to strike at 50 targets overnight, and the limitation of RAF Operations to the Mediterranean Theatre, due to the loss of the Tankers.

2. The Valiant filled a very necessary and speedy solution to the problem of delivering a heavy nuclear weapon onto its target. By the time that the Valiant entered Service, Blue Danubes had already been deployed on the ground to their storage sites for over a year. The Valiant came along on budget, on time and filled the void. This was due to its simpler construction techniques. The Vulcan and Victor aircraft using more modern methods, took somewhat longer to produce. By the time that the first Vulcan prototype appeared on the scene the Valiant was already in Service and operating effectively at Squadron Strength.

 

[kaiserd]

1. Hard not to argue the Valiants should have still gone low level given what happened but they were clearly inferior tankers to what came after them (and apart from tanking they had no other role, and had to go low level for any vestige of survivability). Not seeing the obvious gain.
2. The RAF effectively favoured the Vulcan over the Victor as a bomber, despite the Victor having some advantages in terms of weapon load, range etc. They clearly saw it as the better bet in this regard, hence why the Victor became the new RAF tanker. Not sure what in your scenario changes that view and decision.
3. Legitimate questions re: why so many V-bomber types (I .e going into production - prototypes more understandable given chances of project failures and or serious issues at this time). However Valiant developments (particularly the low altitude B2) are perhaps generally overhyped in this context (was the B2 really that good or capable a low altitude bomber, even just in comparison with the Vulcan?).

I am sorry to say that you are very misguided in your approach to the Valiant.

1. The fatigue problem which arose and which was attributed to Low Level ops causing premature failures was due to the poorly understood problems existing with the DTD 683 alloy used. Vickers had assumed that the stress problems experienced were due to machining problems which were inducing stress to the material and decided that their more modern machining processes could alleviate the problem. However this was not the case. The problem with DTD 683 was that it was an unstable alloy, the metals from which it was constructed, slowly migrated due to the weak electrical current that was generated between them. Handley Page who were building the Hastings at the same time, recalled all of the airframes constructed and changed any load bearing fittings constructed from DTD 683. This was also incorporated on the assembly line. Vickers went ahead on the findings of their mistaken conclusions and built the Valiant. Whether it was the Mk1 Valiant which entered into RAF Service, or the Mk2, [Pathfinder low level variant] was immaterial, as the same alloy was used in both airframes. So neither sustained Ops at a high level or the introduction of the Mk2 for low level ops would have made any difference to the outcome. Also by the time that the Valiant problem arose, there were already twenty two redundant airframes in storage at St Athan. The aircraft was already reaching the end of its useful life. The Valiant disposition at the "End of Play" in 1965 was - Finningley 2 ECM Aircraft - Honnington 8 Tankers - Marham 25 Strike and 9 Tankers - Wyton 10 PR Aircraft - Gaydon 4 Aircraft, with a further 3 undergoing deep servicing at St Athan. One of these WZ390 had completed servicing and had been awaiting deployment for almost a year. The biggest casualty was SHAPE, which lost the capability to strike at 50 targets overnight, and the limitation of RAF Operations to the Mediterranean Theatre, due to the loss of the Tankers.

2. The Valiant filled a very necessary and speedy solution to the problem of delivering a heavy nuclear weapon onto its target. By the time that the Valiant entered Service, Blue Danubes had already been deployed on the ground to their storage sites for over a year. The Valiant came along on budget, on time and filled the void. This was due to its simpler construction techniques. The Vulcan and Victor aircraft using more modern methods, took somewhat longer to produce. By the time that the first Vulcan prototype appeared on the scene the Valiant was already in Service and operating effectively at Squadron Strength.

That’s bizarre - digging up my comment approx. 10 months a full page (dozens and dozens of comments ago) to take my comments out of context and say how misguided I was while actually agreeing with 90 percent of what I said and arguably strengthening my main points rather than weakening them.
I was not aware of the some of the metallurgical aspects you’ve mentioned but was aware that the Valiants structural issues weren’t entirely to do with the low level switch; my point was that the low-level Valiant B2 was being overhyped (particularly versus Victors and especially the Vulcan B2) and your comments (indicating likely impacted by same structural issues) only underlines this.
And objectively, including the Sperrin, there were too many v-bomber production types.
There is a valid argument for 2 types (the earlier simpler type and a successor more advanced type) reaching production but even then with would have been more objectively logical to limit production of one versus the other (like the US did for the B-45 and the B-47 - the success of latter reduced orders for the former). As a theoretical example - throttle back Valiant production as the Vulcan test flights built confidence in the the latter (and don’t then take the Victor to production), or reduce Vulcan orders as the Valiant proved itself in service.
However I do appreciate there is an element of being wise after the fact with such a view and it’s fair to note that whilst the bombers had less issues (if you go out of your way to ignore the Valiants late crippling structural problems) than contemporary Uk fighter aircraft designs there was an element of luck on how that worked out. And I have degree of scepticism about an apparent need/ desire by some to big-up the Valiant considering it’s relatively short service life ended by a combination of the previously discussed career ending structural problems and being replaced by significantly superior aircraft after this relatively short service life.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The problem with DTD 683 was that it was an unstable alloy, the metals from which it was constructed, slowly migrated due to the weak electrical current that was generated between them.

That this was the issue has been in the public domain for decades, and I'm surprised that the myth that the Valiant B.2 would have avoided the issues with DTD 683 has the legs that it does.

I have read that it was such an unstable alloy that when structural spares were examined, they were found to be almost at the point of failure despite being totally unused and kept in storage.

 

[alertken]

Pete: tks for alloy info. I saw 9 Hastings (all Mks) in Radlett 1/63 cluttered amongst prod Heralds and Victors. They were not on Majors and I wondered why they were there. Knowlege comes in its own good time.

Why did we do 3 AW Mediums?

Valiant R&D ITP was 16/4/48: we had funded R&D of Victor 19/11/47, Vulcan 21/11/47, Sperrin 11/12/47 (and would put experimental money on AWA's flying- and Shorts aero-isoclinic wings). And we were broke. Q: What was our thought process?

A: Pres Truman and everybody knew he would lose 11/48 to isolationists. We thought McMahon had stolen our Bomb 1/8/46, so had authorised work 8/1/47 for (to be) Blue Danube A-Bomb. It needed a delivery platform; everone in Aero procurement well remembered the piston Heavies starting with Warwick/Manchester/Halifax twins, Stirling/V-S 317 4-motors, for much grief and delay.

Truman's win 2/11/48 led to 4/9/49 Washington Treaty founding NATO and 6/10/49 Mutual Defense Aid Act. UK asked for US Bombs +Bombers. Truman was so disposed and UK was poised to abandon attempts at AW independence, when AWRE spy Fuchs was uncovered 1/50: US/UK talks to the "deep freezer". K.Harris,Attlee,Weidenfeld,1982,P.290; A.J.Pierre,Nuclear Politics,OUP,1972 P133.
25 Valiant were ordered 9/2/51.

Churchill won 26/10/51, ordered 25 ea. Vulcan/Victor 22/7/52 but hoped not to deploy them or to incur the cost of UK AW, by accessing US "Art and Article": B-47+Mk.5. He visited his friend GA (imminent Pres) Ike 7/1/53. Failing, he proceeded with Independence. J.Simpson, Independent Nuclear State,Macmillan,1983,Pp.88,283n.1. UK did extract 50% $ contribution to Valiant prodn. H.Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, HMSO, 1994,P.55. Sandys tried for Victor/Vulcan $, to no avail.

So we did 3, in part to get inventory deployed NOW! We 2nd.-sourced Hunter/Swift/Javelin/Canberra: it was little dearer/no slower to single-source duplication, and that insured the risk of failure of a monopoly type.

 

[Nick]

The problem with DTD 683 was that it was an unstable alloy, the metals from which it was constructed, slowly migrated due to the weak electrical current that was generated between them.

That this was the issue has been in the public domain for decades, and I'm surprised that the myth that the Valiant B.2 would have avoided the issues with DTD 683 has the legs that it does.

I have read that it was such an unstable alloy that when structural spares were examined, they were found to be almost at the point of failure despite being totally unused and kept in storage.

How has XD818 survived all these years? Was the only surviving Valiant reworked or resparred at some point?

 

[Archibald]

Exhaustive list of every single Vulcan ever build. Interesting to note the last ever B.2 rolled out in January 1965.

Air Frame List

For the sake of comparison, the last B-52 and the last B-58 rolled out the exact same day: October 26, 1962. At the height of the Cuban missile war: the next day, submarine B-59 almost nuked USS Randolph while a U-2 was shot down merely a few hours later - Major Rudolph Anderson was killed.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You have to wonder if Valiants would have lasted that much longer anyway, lugging full loads of fuel on long loitering sorties would still have eaten up precious fatigue life. Even if they lasted until 1968-70 the RAF would have needed to have converted Victors. In the worst case the post-Polaris cuts might have seen too many Victors chopped up before tanker conversion were needed and then we might really have been in the do-do. At a push Labour might have ordered more VC-10s to keep Weybridge open, but then would BAC have let FRL get on with the necessary conversion work without slapping a huge bill on the price to cover the changes?

Low level flying is much more abusive/exhausting than cruising along at 30,000ft.

If the B-52s hadn't gone low level for SAC missions we'd be able to fly them past year 2100. Boeing designed them with 50-80,000 hours altitude cruise life. Flying at low level dropped that to something like 20,000 hours.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Interestingly, from some biographies I've read, a V-Bomber posting was often not a popular choice.

Depending on how much the planes were on short alert or flying, I'd believe it.

Imagine being an RAF pilot, assigned to a base in the UK, and still not seeing your family but once every few months? That was a noted problem for SAC crews in the US, made worse because the SAC bases were in the absolute middle of nowhere so your family had nothing to do that wasn't on base!

 

[Hood]

Low level flying is much more abusive/exhausting than cruising along at 30,000ft.

DTD 683 was an unstable alloy, there would have been spar problems regardless of the operating regime.
RLBH indicated in a post above that even unused spars in store had deteriorated without any flying hours on them!

 

[Scott Kenny]

DTD 683 was an unstable alloy, there would have been spar problems regardless of the operating regime.
RLBH indicated in a post above that even unused spars in store had deteriorated without any flying hours on them!

Replied that before I got to RBLH's post.

Which scares the (expletives deleted) out of this old aircraft mechanic!

 

[Scott Kenny]

Tankers fly quietly at medium height, in circles, waiting for thirsty fighters and bombers.
So I suppose indeed the Valiants could have lasted longer.
Being the least capable of the V-bombers it also make sense to make it into a tanker ASAP. This also applies to the Mark.1 variants of the other two.

GB should have really focused on the Victor mk.2 first and foremost, with the Vulcan B2 as backup. Everything else - tanker or recon ASAP.

Recon is not necessarily an easier flight than tanking, especially if some yahoo back in Great Britain decides they need low level recon.

You have to wonder if Valiants would have lasted that much longer anyway, lugging full loads of fuel on long loitering sorties would still have eaten up precious fatigue life. Even if they lasted until 1968-70 the RAF would have needed to have converted Victors. In the worst case the post-Polaris cuts might have seen too many Victors chopped up before tanker conversion were needed and then we might really have been in the do-do. At a push Labour might have ordered more VC-10s to keep Weybridge open, but then would BAC have let FRL get on with the necessary conversion work without slapping a huge bill on the price to cover the changes?

Lots less fatigue life used up than being down in the weeds dodging flak and SAMs.

As to ordering more VC-10 tankers, depends on just how hard the Ministers bargain. "Oh, you want to charge how much for the retooling? Forget it, we'll just buy KC-135s."

As far as I have read there was no US double key officer on RN subs.

That was after the Nassau agreement that got the UK US-made Polaris missiles with UK-made warheads.