Dunno. Let's hash this out a bit.
I'm not privy to the procurement process of the GCC nor to how in the loop they were, intelligence wise, insofar as it came to this phase of the war. The GCC is ~four times the area of Ukraine but I think its locations requiring AD might be fewer and more localized (there are qualitative differences about their respective urban areas, energy infrastructures and defense installations, though). The mere interceptor costs (lowest I could find) for the Iron Dome is ~$40k and APKWS $22k; I've seen interceptor drones quoted at $1-$4k, so an order of magnitude cheaper at that level (beyond my pay grade to start comparing employment, ancillary costs, perhaps you're up to speed on these). Not suggesting that different systems can be replaced one-to-one but different mixes can certainly be equally effective? In any case, we might be about to find out.
The operational environment in the GCC for AD crews is (seemingly, mostly) much more permissive than in Ukraine (not discounting Iran might have intelligence assets and Russia's help in targeting, just considering the distances involved and Iranian units currently having to improvise under far more challenging circumstances). Interception before the shoreline is an issue but for countering relatively low-flying most likely autonomous UAVs a persistent presence of high(-est) end attack helos doesn't necessarily seem entirely sustainable, however large the fleets might be? Have you considered/any news on naval assets in this role? Launching interceptor drones from somewhat less technically involved helicopters and/or aircraft might also be an interesting development, for the Gulf region and Ukraine alike.