These are sounding closer to the Littoral Strike Ship concept proposed as a replacement for the RN amphibs than to the existing Points.The RFI also explored fitting a helicopter or uncrewed air system flight deck, command facilities and modular mission spaces. Future ships are expected to operate closer to contested areas than conventional merchant Ro-Ro, so the requirement also considers provision for defensive weapons, electronic warfare and other protection measures. Each vessel is intended to be UK-registered and British-owned, with the whole fleet able to undertake at least four simultaneous global tasks. The future requirement also calls for continued high availability, each ship averaging 355 days a year and readiness for new tasking within 72 hours.
Future strategic sealift vessels may also have a role to play in the future hybrid navy, potentially transporting uncrewed systems into theatre. Small and medium-sized USVs generally lack the range and endurance to self-deploy over long distances, so may need to be transported by vessels of opportunity to forward operating bases, or to join up with warships operating closer to the action.
It makes sense, if the Army is largely either forwards deployed or road deploying (ie Boxer) that the Point replacements can fulfil a role closer to that of an LST or LSD and be closer to contested areas conducting over the beach logistics while also having flexibility as carriers for uncrewed systems. It fits with the ATS as a less logistics focussed commando fighting platform, too, and makes up for the reduction in size and numbers there.https://www.navylookout.com/uk-plan...ft-capacity-as-ageing-ships-near-replacement/
These are sounding closer to the Littoral Strike Ship concept proposed as a replacement for the RN amphibs than to the existing Points.
I think that's because they no longer teach comprehension at school, or perhaps not in the UK at least. If you read and understood what was written you would have picked up these crucial points:The author seems to have forgotten that the SSN-A deal is not the same as the Virginia deal, and is attempting to apply the same criticisms of the American bottle-necked construction to the British bottle-necked maintenance. Those aren't the same things, though, for obvious reasons.
On the whole, plenty of accurate criticisms about the RN's submarine service, but a weak connection to Australia.
For Australia, which is relying on receiving a mature, fully debugged submarine design in time to commence construction, these UK baseline failures carry profound strategic risk.
What he's saying is that Australia is relying on the UK getting it right and debugging the first in class before we are meant to start construction, so we can sort those issues out in our first build and do so without any schedule slippage.the UK enterprise is in no condition to deliver the promised one boat every 18 months build rate, let alone support an allied construction line on the other side of the globe.
There's the slight difference that AUS and the RN will hopefully be operating identical submarines, whereas the Hunter fiasco stems largely from Australia's requirement to install one of the heaviest radar sets in the West on a frigate designed for a small rotating set.This would not be the first time that BAE has told us they have a mature design only discover it wasn't that mature and infact had some serious issues that needed resolving and put our delivery schedule back. That was the GCS/Type 26 and resulting Hunter class. HMS Glasgow was meant to be in the water ages ago so we could debug that as well.
That makes no sense for reasons I'm going to explain:There's the slight difference that AUS and the RN will hopefully be operating identical submarines, whereas the Hunter fiasco stems largely from Australia's requirement to install one of the heaviest radar sets in the West on a frigate designed for a small rotating set.
Even last year the CEAFAR mast on Hunter was still changing in appearance with new panels.
CEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy, and regardless of its actual ranking is still miles beyond Artisan. BAE might well have thought they were able to install CEAFAR at the point they won the contract- though there were concerns right from the start that the spec was too large for a frigate- but as I said the mast has got bigger since.1) Installing the radar -which you don't know the weight of but somehow it's one of the heaviest in the west? - was part of the mandated program designs for the competition. BAE knew this -and they were a late entrant- and would have assured us these additions were possible
I'm probably misreading this but 700t of growth wiping out a 10% margin on a 6900t ship sounds pretty reasonable to me. The ship is overweight but the delays to Hunter have been exacerbated by the extra Aussie requirements, which won't be present on SSN-AUKUS2) Type 26 had rapidly gained 700t of weight and suddenly the 10% margin was gone. It was no longer the 6900t it was believed to be. Both teams in Australia and the UK had to put Type 26 on a diet to claw back margin. Australia had to widen the ship as well get their upgrades in.
No idea, but it's definitely happening. Look at the changes in the size of the mast from the early SEA5000 images to the gargantuan mushroom we have at the moment.3) If the radar is so heavy and caused the issues with the design, then why would they be adding more tiles late in the stage of development?
I think that's because they no longer teach comprehension at school, or perhaps not in the UK at least. If you read and understood what was written you would have picked up these crucial points:
WhatCEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy
Not by anyone who knows what they're talking about.CEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy
Three points that all kind of contradict each other. If 1 is true, then 2 can't be true. If 2 is true then BAE shouldn't have bid for the contract. We know for a fact that 3 is true. But this is just silly assumptions. I'd like to know where and when these concerns where voiced. Maybe you have a reference?(1)BAE might well have thought they were able to install CEAFAR at the point they won the contract- (2)though there were concerns right from the start that the spec was too large for a frigate- (3)but as I said the mast has got bigger since.
The First Ship Hasn't Sailed Yet! It is not reasonable to gain that much weight in build! Over its lifetime is fine, but it hasn't left the bloody Clyde.I'm probably misreading this but 700t of growth wiping out a 10% margin on a 6900t ship sounds pretty reasonable to me.
..... Sigh.The ship is overweight but the delays to Hunter have been exacerbated by the extra Aussie requirements, which won't be present on SSN-AUKUS
Yes.... This is my point. Why are you using my point as your point? How heavy can it be if we've added to it in the late stages of the design? Especially as, with no data, you have claimed it to be one of the heaviest radar sets in the world.No idea, but it's definitely happening. Look at the changes in the size of the mast from the early SEA5000 images to the gargantuan mushroom we have at the moment.
1) The maintenance issues reflect very poorly on the state of the submarine service in the UK and feeds back negatively into the sustainment and delivery apparatus.
- The section on maintenance problems is a category issue, and doesn't directly feed into his point about design readiness.
- His writing on V-boat safety protocols is reliant on assumed events about which he is not informed, whilst being presented as fact.
- He makes no mention of recovery efforts for the maintenance problems, choosing rather to present it as a constant state.
- His concern of design maturity relies on condensing timelines to an inaccurate degree.
- He criticises the use of reactor technologies as unproven, but brushes aside that those will be in operation and construction prior to his self-appointed deadline.
But you decided to overlook the points he made that I brought up. BAE and Barrow are not in a good position to deliver on time and if there are issues that need work then it's going to have a flow on effect to our builds. And trusting BAE when they say the design is mature is not a wise idea.He makes valid points in places (commentary about operational woes, for example, or low crew availability, to point out another), but those valid points do not universally feed into his conclusion.
FADS was never really anything but a buzzword. Seeing the air picture is half the job, but dominating it requires having something substantial to do that... Unfortunately that got cancelled and now you have CCVOn a completely unrelated note to the submarines, I saw this image of HMAS Choules, and wondered whether the RN could spare Mounts Bay for use as a FADS trial platform, now that we don't have the barge anymore. The Australians have done the integration work already for the planned CEA radars.
View attachment 825217
That's the one we're talking about above.From Navy Lookout. A retired Australian Navy admiral has serious doubts about the AUKUS subs arriving on schedule. While his concern is for the RAN, he describes the problems afflicting the RN's nuclear submarine force and industrial base. With all Astutes tied up or not yet in service at the moment, and the aging Vanguards doing very long patrols, he's not the only one.
E.g.:
A vivid illustration of this structural bottleneck is the leadership assigned to take the sixth hull, HMS Agamemnon, out of Barrow-in-Furness as she finally sails for Faslane to commence sea trials. Her Commanding Officer is undertaking his fifth command of an Astute-class submarine, highlighting a severe deficit in command-qualified personnel.
https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/
I have heard that Type 26 might get some standalone L band panels in 4 corners to give it a better viewOn a completely unrelated note to the submarines, I saw this image of HMAS Choules, and wondered whether the RN could spare Mounts Bay for use as a FADS trial platform, now that we don't have the barge anymore. The Australians have done the integration work already for the planned CEA radars.
View attachment 825217
1) The maintenance issue reflects poorly, but that doesn't absolve the category error.1) The maintenance issues reflect very poorly on the state of the submarine service in the UK and feeds back negatively into the sustainment and delivery apparatus.
2) I would think that a man in his position would have contacts in the RN former or present who could have checked his work or informed him.
3) Until those recovery efforts start to materialise then yes, it is a continuing state.
4) Does it though? He's not setting the timelines
5) While PWR3 might draw from the US S9G reactor design, choosing not to build a shore-based test reactor for the same of cost is another telling sign of an industry run with not much seriousness but rather skinflint values.
But you decided to overlook the points he made that I brought up. BAE and Barrow are not in a good position to deliver on time and if there are issues that need work then it's going to have a flow on effect to our builds. And trusting BAE when they say the design is mature is not a wise idea.
FADS was never really anything but a buzzword. Seeing the air picture is half the job, but dominating it requires having something substantial to do that... Unfortunately that got cancelled and now you have CCV
Interesting, it'd be useful for long-range search. Good to get one in the fleet ahead of full-scale introduction if we can.I have heard that Type 26 might get some standalone L band panels in 4 corners to give it a better view
No, that is not a lack of command-qualified personnel.From Navy Lookout. A retired Australian Navy admiral has serious doubts about the AUKUS subs arriving on schedule. While his concern is for the RAN, he describes the problems afflicting the RN's nuclear submarine force and industrial base. With all Astutes tied up or not yet in service at the moment, and the aging Vanguards doing very long patrols, he's not the only one.
E.g.:
A vivid illustration of this structural bottleneck is the leadership assigned to take the sixth hull, HMS Agamemnon, out of Barrow-in-Furness as she finally sails for Faslane to commence sea trials. Her Commanding Officer is undertaking his fifth command of an Astute-class submarine, highlighting a severe deficit in command-qualified personnel.
https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/
1) It does highlight a broader problem of replicating a system from our build partner which is flawed and plagued with issues. What's being missed in this maintenance shortfall that could have made subsequent A class boats better?1) The maintenance issue reflects poorly, but that doesn't absolve the category error.
2) A retired Australian admiral privy to the goings on of a foreign deterrent? I'm not sure. That's moot, though; the connection relies of circumstantial and unverifiable claims, and is therefore a weak connection.
3) By that logic, until problems start to have a material impact on deliverability, we should consider everything to be going well.
4) He might not be setting the timelines, but he's well-aware of them, and chooses the brush them aside in the article.
5) PWR3 does a little more than 'draw from' S9G. Let's not imply that they're just YOLO-ing the reactor either, given there's been significant digital modelling and access to American plants.
I didn't ignore what you'd written; I just didn't feel like I needed to repeat myself after I'd already said above that he raised some valid points.
I think FADS as a term is still in use, it's just now shifted from destroyer to frigate + drones.
A friend in the MoD. Of course they spitball about 1000 ideas a day only to implement nearly none of them.Where'd you hear it?
If you're going to mention names, Cameron can't be left out.It's clear that sustainability has increased in importance in design of SSN-AUKUS, they have been open about that.
So I'd say a lot of lessons have bern learned.....again....from the Astute class.
The reactor thing is a puzzler, but changes in standards mean it became impossible to meet those changed standards affordably with new PWR-2.
Integration of passive cooling required a completely revised design, hence PWR-3.
That uses proven design technology from S9G. The source of certain claims.
But ultimately the Peace Dividend and Blair-Brown era has saddled the UK with a lot of problems. Only made worse by the Conservative era.
It was Cameron who took defence spending below 2%True, and in fairness lets name them.
Cameron, Cleg, Osborne, May, Johnson, Sunak.
No point with Truss as she didn't do anything before getting couped out.
To get more people to fund the cure obviously.Why would they want to makes other people sick by intentionally spreading Hybrid Navy?
Does this suggest that Denmark's next-generation frigate is most likely to be the AH140?Relevent perhaps?
View: https://x.com/CoffeReport/status/2106992552263962822
NEW: Britain is proposing a major new naval partnership with Denmark that could fundamentally reshape the Danish Navy.
The proposal goes far beyond Denmark purchasing new British-designed frigates.
Britain wants Denmark to join a deeply integrated “hybrid fleet” combining manned warships with unmanned surface vessels, underwater drones and aerial systems - primarily operating in the North Atlantic.
Unmanned systems could eventually be controlled across Danish, British and Norwegian warships, allowing another allied frigate to take control if one vessel is lost or disabled.
The proposal would also significantly deepen intelligence sharing between Denmark and the UK.
Denmark and Britain are already in talks.
1) The missing thing is dry-docks. A-boat design does have an impact, though that's much more minor in comparison to the major problem, which is a lack of space to do the maintenance (and a lack of crews).1) It does highlight a broader problem of replicating a system from our build partner which is flawed and plagued with issues. What's being missed in this maintenance shortfall that could have made subsequent A class boats better?
2) Even if you take out friendly contacts between service chiefs, his point about V boats only being out for less than a week before it takes over the CASD is a very small window. Not breaking the CASD would appear to be the focus. The schedule is apparently derived from public information sources; maybe that can be a personal investigative project for you.
3) Logically, you could argue that, yes.
4) I mean... He's using the MoDs own design and delivery terminology. He points out a confliction of doing Detailed Design and Long Lead in 2023, and then suddenly it's back to concept design completing in 2026. Those two things can't be in that order. So which one is true?
5) Yeah, again, computer modelling is great, and having a design influenced heavily by S9G, a long-running design, is great. But having an actual reactor substantially running is the best, and nuclear deserves the best. It reminds me of the decision not to build a shore based model of the Daring class propulsion system on the matter of cost. It certainly cost a lot more later in PIP and downtime and destroyer availability.
Not sure FADS is still in use but I guess we can keep our eyes peeled for the term in MoD releases.
A friend in the MoD. Of course they spitball about 1000 ideas a day only to implement nearly none of them.
Maybe, maybe not.Does this suggest that Denmark's next-generation frigate is most likely to be the AH140?
It certainly looks very Damen. NL are right that it looks like a much smaller ship, close to the MPV concept of half the size.I also agree that it's risky to try to flog the ships to Denmark as part of the Hybrid Navy.
View attachment 825445
New model of the amphibs, though I wouldn't read too much into it. Very Italian-coded IMO.
Actually there's quite a lot of information enclosed here.I wouldn't read too much into it
It means the UK is trying to infect other nations with CCV and hybrid navy. (CCV is very likely T31 with maybe some differences)Does this suggest that Denmark's next-generation frigate is most likely to be the AH140?
Actually... They spend their days creating sensible proposals and research only for it all to be either ignored and pushed aside or cancelled for the dumb option or deferral by politicians.Very true. Bright idea factory
It certainly looks very Damen. NL are right that it looks like a much smaller ship, close to the MPV concept of half the size.
That's interesting, and I quite like the concept overall. Seems sensible to downsize this capability and direct the funds elsewhere.Actually there's quite a lot of information enclosed here.
Overall the model is indistinguishable from the KM concept with a lot more of the Damen visual features:
- There's no way at all this can have a stacked hangar and well dock as most LHDs use. It is therefore limited to either a Dokdo/Santi style combined deck or an above deck hangar. The fat island to me suggests that an above deck hangar is being used, which is annoying as it all but guarantees a limit of 1 Merlin plus UAVs.
- The model is just under 8 times the length of the boat bay. As the shoe-in candidate for JCC, ESNA's eponymous concept, is about 22m that actually confirms the 160m length and suggests that the ship is remarkably bulky for its size.
- There is no room aft of the boat bay for a longer vessel, though there might be room for one of the same length in a well dock or ramp. This confirms no LCU replacement in ATS and explains the expanded role for the future sealift vessel.
View attachment 825449
If they pull it off, I'll eat my words, but to me, this seems to be a poor strategy.It means the UK is trying to infect other nations with CCV and hybrid navy. (CCV is very likely T31 with maybe some differences)
Disappointing to see another UK procurement program turn into a train wreck.Type 31s getting seriously delayed.