The Future of the Royal Navy and the 'Hybrid Navy' Initiative - News, Platforms, Development and Speculation

[zen]

Finally the tide is turning.
Correct moves by Labour.

So I expect the worst.

 

[Reuben James]

https://www.navylookout.com/uk-plan...ft-capacity-as-ageing-ships-near-replacement/

The RFI also explored fitting a helicopter or uncrewed air system flight deck, command facilities and modular mission spaces. Future ships are expected to operate closer to contested areas than conventional merchant Ro-Ro, so the requirement also considers provision for defensive weapons, electronic warfare and other protection measures. Each vessel is intended to be UK-registered and British-owned, with the whole fleet able to undertake at least four simultaneous global tasks. The future requirement also calls for continued high availability, each ship averaging 355 days a year and readiness for new tasking within 72 hours.

Future strategic sealift vessels may also have a role to play in the future hybrid navy, potentially transporting uncrewed systems into theatre. Small and medium-sized USVs generally lack the range and endurance to self-deploy over long distances, so may need to be transported by vessels of opportunity to forward operating bases, or to join up with warships operating closer to the action.

These are sounding closer to the Littoral Strike Ship concept proposed as a replacement for the RN amphibs than to the existing Points.

 

[TorpedoJ]

https://www.navylookout.com/uk-plan...ft-capacity-as-ageing-ships-near-replacement/


These are sounding closer to the Littoral Strike Ship concept proposed as a replacement for the RN amphibs than to the existing Points.

It makes sense, if the Army is largely either forwards deployed or road deploying (ie Boxer) that the Point replacements can fulfil a role closer to that of an LST or LSD and be closer to contested areas conducting over the beach logistics while also having flexibility as carriers for uncrewed systems. It fits with the ATS as a less logistics focussed commando fighting platform, too, and makes up for the reduction in size and numbers there.

As I have said elsewhere in the past, for the sake of future flexibility we should be looking at something closer to Davie's CANFLO concept or the slightly smaller Combi Dock design with large cranes, partially submersible and with the ability to be reconfigured for a wide range of roles.

 

[Reuben James]

https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/

An interesting article, especially from an outsider perspective of British submarine woes, but it seems to me fundamentally flawed. The Australians are building Australian boats, not the UK.

The author seems to have forgotten that the SSN-A deal is not the same as the Virginia deal, and is attempting to apply the same criticisms of the American bottle-necked construction to the British bottle-necked maintenance. Those aren't the same things, though, for obvious reasons.

On the whole, plenty of accurate criticisms about the RN's submarine service, but a weak connection to Australia.

 

[Stellerfella]

The author seems to have forgotten that the SSN-A deal is not the same as the Virginia deal, and is attempting to apply the same criticisms of the American bottle-necked construction to the British bottle-necked maintenance. Those aren't the same things, though, for obvious reasons.

On the whole, plenty of accurate criticisms about the RN's submarine service, but a weak connection to Australia.

I think that's because they no longer teach comprehension at school, or perhaps not in the UK at least. If you read and understood what was written you would have picked up these crucial points:

For Australia, which is relying on receiving a mature, fully debugged submarine design in time to commence construction, these UK baseline failures carry profound strategic risk.

the UK enterprise is in no condition to deliver the promised one boat every 18 months build rate, let alone support an allied construction line on the other side of the globe.

What he's saying is that Australia is relying on the UK getting it right and debugging the first in class before we are meant to start construction, so we can sort those issues out in our first build and do so without any schedule slippage.

This would not be the first time that BAE has told us they have a mature design only discover it wasn't that mature and infact had some serious issues that needed resolving and put our delivery schedule back. That was the GCS/Type 26 and resulting Hunter class. HMS Glasgow was meant to be in the water ages ago so we could debug that as well.

The DIP didn't inspire confidence either, as well as the continued reluctance to spend money of defence. The admiral is Anti-Aukus and has a thing for the French, but unfortunately he also makes some good points.

We need Britain to do a perfect job with this one.

 

[TorpedoJ]

This would not be the first time that BAE has told us they have a mature design only discover it wasn't that mature and infact had some serious issues that needed resolving and put our delivery schedule back. That was the GCS/Type 26 and resulting Hunter class. HMS Glasgow was meant to be in the water ages ago so we could debug that as well.

There's the slight difference that AUS and the RN will hopefully be operating identical submarines, whereas the Hunter fiasco stems largely from Australia's requirement to install one of the heaviest radar sets in the West on a frigate designed for a small rotating set.
Even last year the CEAFAR mast on Hunter was still changing in appearance with new panels.

PS Leh isn't someone to go after about reading comprehension

 

[Stellerfella]

There's the slight difference that AUS and the RN will hopefully be operating identical submarines, whereas the Hunter fiasco stems largely from Australia's requirement to install one of the heaviest radar sets in the West on a frigate designed for a small rotating set.
Even last year the CEAFAR mast on Hunter was still changing in appearance with new panels.

That makes no sense for reasons I'm going to explain:

1) Installing the radar -which you don't know the weight of but somehow it's one of the heaviest in the west? - was part of the mandated program designs for the competition. BAE knew this -and they were a late entrant- and would have assured us these additions were possible.

2) Type 26 had rapidly gained 700t of weight and suddenly the 10% margin was gone. It was no longer the 6900t it was believed to be. Both teams in Australia and the UK had to put Type 26 on a diet to claw back margin. Australia had to widen the ship as well get their upgrades in.

3) If the radar is so heavy and caused the issues with the design, then why would they be adding more tiles late in the stage of development?

BAE are good at over-promising and under-delivering. And this is going to hit Australia really hard in the back pocket if they can't be competent shipbuilders for a change.

 

[TorpedoJ]

1) Installing the radar -which you don't know the weight of but somehow it's one of the heaviest in the west? - was part of the mandated program designs for the competition. BAE knew this -and they were a late entrant- and would have assured us these additions were possible

CEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy, and regardless of its actual ranking is still miles beyond Artisan. BAE might well have thought they were able to install CEAFAR at the point they won the contract- though there were concerns right from the start that the spec was too large for a frigate- but as I said the mast has got bigger since.

2) Type 26 had rapidly gained 700t of weight and suddenly the 10% margin was gone. It was no longer the 6900t it was believed to be. Both teams in Australia and the UK had to put Type 26 on a diet to claw back margin. Australia had to widen the ship as well get their upgrades in.

I'm probably misreading this but 700t of growth wiping out a 10% margin on a 6900t ship sounds pretty reasonable to me. The ship is overweight but the delays to Hunter have been exacerbated by the extra Aussie requirements, which won't be present on SSN-AUKUS

3) If the radar is so heavy and caused the issues with the design, then why would they be adding more tiles late in the stage of development?

No idea, but it's definitely happening. Look at the changes in the size of the mast from the early SEA5000 images to the gargantuan mushroom we have at the moment.

 

[Reuben James]

I think that's because they no longer teach comprehension at school, or perhaps not in the UK at least. If you read and understood what was written you would have picked up these crucial points:

• The section on maintenance problems is a category issue, and doesn't directly feed into his point about design readiness.
• His writing on V-boat safety protocols is reliant on assumed events about which he is not informed, whilst being presented as fact.
• He makes no mention of recovery efforts for the maintenance problems, choosing rather to present it as a constant state.
• His concern of design maturity relies on condensing timelines to an inaccurate degree.
• He criticises the use of reactor technologies as unproven, but brushes aside that those will be in operation and construction prior to his self-appointed deadline.

He makes valid points in places (commentary about operational woes, for example, or low crew availability, to point out another), but those valid points do not universally feed into his conclusion.

As the author is someone with an open dislike for the programme, and rumoured (but importantly not clearly evidenced) links to French industry, this article makes a lot of sense.

The insults aren't needed.

 

[Reuben James]

On a completely unrelated note to the submarines, I saw this image of HMAS Choules, and wondered whether the RN could spare Mounts Bay for use as a FADS trial platform, now that we don't have the barge anymore. The Australians have done the integration work already for the planned CEA radars.

 

[Felocie]

CEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy

What

 

[Stellerfella]

CEAFAR is always described as being unusually large and heavy

Not by anyone who knows what they're talking about.

(1)BAE might well have thought they were able to install CEAFAR at the point they won the contract- (2)though there were concerns right from the start that the spec was too large for a frigate- (3)but as I said the mast has got bigger since.

Three points that all kind of contradict each other. If 1 is true, then 2 can't be true. If 2 is true then BAE shouldn't have bid for the contract. We know for a fact that 3 is true. But this is just silly assumptions. I'd like to know where and when these concerns where voiced. Maybe you have a reference?

I'm probably misreading this but 700t of growth wiping out a 10% margin on a 6900t ship sounds pretty reasonable to me.

The First Ship Hasn't Sailed Yet! It is not reasonable to gain that much weight in build! Over its lifetime is fine, but it hasn't left the bloody Clyde.

The ship is overweight but the delays to Hunter have been exacerbated by the extra Aussie requirements, which won't be present on SSN-AUKUS

..... Sigh.
Because the base design was overweight, our upgrades couldn't be installed until the weight issues were solved. That is a BAE Systems UK issue that they created. That is the point. I don't know why you felt you needed to add that our upgrades to a surface ship wouldn't be installed on the submarines... But you've missed the point. It's about having no confidence in BAE saying that their design is "mature".

No idea, but it's definitely happening. Look at the changes in the size of the mast from the early SEA5000 images to the gargantuan mushroom we have at the moment.

Yes.... This is my point. Why are you using my point as your point? How heavy can it be if we've added to it in the late stages of the design? Especially as, with no data, you have claimed it to be one of the heaviest radar sets in the world.

 

[Stellerfella]

• The section on maintenance problems is a category issue, and doesn't directly feed into his point about design readiness.
• His writing on V-boat safety protocols is reliant on assumed events about which he is not informed, whilst being presented as fact.
• He makes no mention of recovery efforts for the maintenance problems, choosing rather to present it as a constant state.
• His concern of design maturity relies on condensing timelines to an inaccurate degree.
• He criticises the use of reactor technologies as unproven, but brushes aside that those will be in operation and construction prior to his self-appointed deadline.

1) The maintenance issues reflect very poorly on the state of the submarine service in the UK and feeds back negatively into the sustainment and delivery apparatus.
2) I would think that a man in his position would have contacts in the RN former or present who could have checked his work or informed him.
3) Until those recovery efforts start to materialise then yes, it is a continuing state.
4) Does it though? He's not setting the timelines
5) While PWR3 might draw from the US S9G reactor design, choosing not to build a shore-based test reactor for the same of cost is another telling sign of an industry run with not much seriousness but rather skinflint values.

He makes valid points in places (commentary about operational woes, for example, or low crew availability, to point out another), but those valid points do not universally feed into his conclusion.

But you decided to overlook the points he made that I brought up. BAE and Barrow are not in a good position to deliver on time and if there are issues that need work then it's going to have a flow on effect to our builds. And trusting BAE when they say the design is mature is not a wise idea.

On a completely unrelated note to the submarines, I saw this image of HMAS Choules, and wondered whether the RN could spare Mounts Bay for use as a FADS trial platform, now that we don't have the barge anymore. The Australians have done the integration work already for the planned CEA radars.
View attachment 825217

FADS was never really anything but a buzzword. Seeing the air picture is half the job, but dominating it requires having something substantial to do that... Unfortunately that got cancelled and now you have CCV

 

[Brett Davidson]

From Navy Lookout. A retired Australian Navy admiral has serious doubts about the AUKUS subs arriving on schedule. While his concern is for the RAN, he describes the problems afflicting the RN's nuclear submarine force and industrial base. With all Astutes tied up or not yet in service at the moment, and the aging Vanguards doing very long patrols, he's not the only one.

E.g.:

A vivid illustration of this structural bottleneck is the leadership assigned to take the sixth hull, HMS Agamemnon, out of Barrow-in-Furness as she finally sails for Faslane to commence sea trials. Her Commanding Officer is undertaking his fifth command of an Astute-class submarine, highlighting a severe deficit in command-qualified personnel.

https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/

 

[Reuben James]

From Navy Lookout. A retired Australian Navy admiral has serious doubts about the AUKUS subs arriving on schedule. While his concern is for the RAN, he describes the problems afflicting the RN's nuclear submarine force and industrial base. With all Astutes tied up or not yet in service at the moment, and the aging Vanguards doing very long patrols, he's not the only one.

E.g.:

A vivid illustration of this structural bottleneck is the leadership assigned to take the sixth hull, HMS Agamemnon, out of Barrow-in-Furness as she finally sails for Faslane to commence sea trials. Her Commanding Officer is undertaking his fifth command of an Astute-class submarine, highlighting a severe deficit in command-qualified personnel.

https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/

That's the one we're talking about above.

 

[Stellerfella]

On a completely unrelated note to the submarines, I saw this image of HMAS Choules, and wondered whether the RN could spare Mounts Bay for use as a FADS trial platform, now that we don't have the barge anymore. The Australians have done the integration work already for the planned CEA radars.
View attachment 825217

I have heard that Type 26 might get some standalone L band panels in 4 corners to give it a better view

 

[Reuben James]

1) The maintenance issues reflect very poorly on the state of the submarine service in the UK and feeds back negatively into the sustainment and delivery apparatus.
2) I would think that a man in his position would have contacts in the RN former or present who could have checked his work or informed him.
3) Until those recovery efforts start to materialise then yes, it is a continuing state.
4) Does it though? He's not setting the timelines
5) While PWR3 might draw from the US S9G reactor design, choosing not to build a shore-based test reactor for the same of cost is another telling sign of an industry run with not much seriousness but rather skinflint values.

But you decided to overlook the points he made that I brought up. BAE and Barrow are not in a good position to deliver on time and if there are issues that need work then it's going to have a flow on effect to our builds. And trusting BAE when they say the design is mature is not a wise idea.

FADS was never really anything but a buzzword. Seeing the air picture is half the job, but dominating it requires having something substantial to do that... Unfortunately that got cancelled and now you have CCV

1) The maintenance issue reflects poorly, but that doesn't absolve the category error.
2) A retired Australian admiral privy to the goings on of a foreign deterrent? I'm not sure. That's moot, though; the connection relies of circumstantial and unverifiable claims, and is therefore a weak connection.
3) By that logic, until problems start to have a material impact on deliverability, we should consider everything to be going well.
4) He might not be setting the timelines, but he's well-aware of them, and chooses the brush them aside in the article.
5) PWR3 does a little more than 'draw from' S9G. Let's not imply that they're just YOLO-ing the reactor either, given there's been significant digital modelling and access to American plants.

I didn't ignore what you'd written; I just didn't feel like I needed to repeat myself after I'd already said above that he raised some valid points.

I think FADS as a term is still in use, it's just now shifted from destroyer to frigate + drones.

 

[Reuben James]

I have heard that Type 26 might get some standalone L band panels in 4 corners to give it a better view

Interesting, it'd be useful for long-range search. Good to get one in the fleet ahead of full-scale introduction if we can.

Where'd you hear it?

 

[Scott Kenny]

From Navy Lookout. A retired Australian Navy admiral has serious doubts about the AUKUS subs arriving on schedule. While his concern is for the RAN, he describes the problems afflicting the RN's nuclear submarine force and industrial base. With all Astutes tied up or not yet in service at the moment, and the aging Vanguards doing very long patrols, he's not the only one.

E.g.:

A vivid illustration of this structural bottleneck is the leadership assigned to take the sixth hull, HMS Agamemnon, out of Barrow-in-Furness as she finally sails for Faslane to commence sea trials. Her Commanding Officer is undertaking his fifth command of an Astute-class submarine, highlighting a severe deficit in command-qualified personnel.

https://www.navylookout.com/mounting-concern-in-australia-over-uk-ability-to-deliver-ssn-aukus/

No, that is not a lack of command-qualified personnel.

That is a lack of kicking out personnel who are not selected for Squadron or higher command. IIRC, the RN runs the Perisher course on Department Heads, selecting who will be XOs.

In the American vernacular, "too many Chiefs, not enough Indians."