The Franco-German fighter jet: an ambitious but overly political project
Launched in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project is suffering from competition between manufacturers as well as differences between Berlin and Paris.
On 1 October, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Emmanuel Macron called on France and Germany to
‘stay the course of what we consider to be in the general Franco-German interest’. This ‘general interest’ is the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a defence programme launched in July 2017 by the French President at the beginning of his first term and the then Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
The largest Franco-German industrial cooperation project, with a total estimated cost of between €80 billion and €100 billion, this ultra-modern air combat system, combining new-generation fighter aircraft, combat drones, sensors, hypersonic missiles, and computer and communication networks that are protected and resistant to electronic warfare, is set to replace the French Rafale fighter jet, manufactured by Dassault Aviation, and the Eurofighter, produced by the Franco-German-Spanish Airbus, Italy's Leonardo and Britain's BAE Systems, by 2040. The aim is to have an operational system in place until 2080.
At its launch, SCAF symbolised the renewal of relations between Paris and Berlin. It also laid the foundations for a possible European defence policy. Spain joined the programme in February 2019 and Belgium obtained observer status in April 2024, which will enable it to join the organisation at a later stage.
Eight years later, despite thirty-six months of research, nearly 2,000 engineers working on plans for the new-generation fighter jet, the central pillar of the programme, and an initial budget of nearly €3 billion, the promise of the SCAF has never been so fragile. With phase 2, which aims to produce a demonstrator, due to begin in 2026, differences between Dassault Aviation and Airbus, which are responsible for manufacturing the aircraft, threaten to lead to an implosion. Last-ditch meetings between the French, German and Spanish defence ministers are expected in the coming weeks to try to get the project back on track, as requested by Emmanuel Macron.
If it fails, which cannot be ruled out, who would be responsible? The manufacturers, of course. The battle of egos between Dassault and Airbus over who is the most competent undermined the first phase of the programme. The two groups mistrust each other,
a mistrust that has persisted since the failed merger in 1997 between Dassault and Aerospatiale, the French predecessor of Airbus.
Industrial property protection rules were hard-negotiated for SCAF, but both groups feared having to reveal some of their secrets. As for the ‘best athlete’ principle, which normally means choosing who will manufacture a particular part based on skills rather than nationality, it was not necessarily well accepted.
"In certain areas, Dassault and Safran [the manufacturer of the new-generation fighter jet engine] may have to stop working with some of their usual French subcontractors and turn to German or Spanish companies instead. This is one of the obvious costs of international cooperation,‘ acknowledged a Senate information report, ’2040, the SCAF odyssey," published in July 2020.
"Furthermore, the SCAF programme is not viewed in exactly the same way by each of the partners.
For France, it is essential for major manufacturers, who cannot afford to remain without a fighter aircraft and fighter aircraft engine project. German and Spanish manufacturers are not quite in the same situation: for them, it is more a question of developing expertise in these areas," the senators pointed out.
But the states will also have to take their share of the blame for the failure.
Symbolic and ambitious, the 2017 political agreement underestimated the differences between the two countries. On the French side, the SCAF should assume the nuclear deterrence provided by Dassault Aviation's Rafale, a 100% French aircraft. On the German side, it should fulfil Berlin's nuclear responsibility on behalf of NATO. Is this compatible, particularly in view of France's imperative of full sovereignty in matters of deterrence?
Conversely, could the strategic autonomy defended by the French armed forces enable the development of the German aeronautics industry, as Berlin hoped with the SCAF?
The two countries also have different needs.
For France, the SCAF should be able to land and take off from the new-generation aircraft carrier, as the Rafale currently does on the Charles-de-Gaulle. This requires an aircraft that is easy to manoeuvre and lightweight. Germany, on the other hand, does not need a naval version. It can therefore afford to have a heavier aircraft capable of carrying more weapons. This would mean developing two versions.
Finally, there is the question of cost sharing. In recent weeks, the Bundestag has been particularly reluctant to support the SCAF, including some members of the Chancellor's coalition, such as Friedrich Merz. His fear is that ‘fair geographical return’ will not be guaranteed, meaning that the German economy will not benefit from economic spin-offs commensurate with the financial commitment of its taxpayers.
In the French camp, it is believed that the principle of fair geographical return is primarily a factor in additional costs and that sharing tasks does not necessarily mean savings. Supporters of a Plan B, i.e. a 100% French SCAF, including Dassault, like to point out that the Eurofighter, manufactured in three countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain), cost each participating country more than the Rafale cost France.
