Strike Cruiser from the 80s

The constraint wasn't on space so much as on the avilaability of missiles. Remember that at the time, Tomahawk was being thought of primarily as a nuclear strike weapon. Eight nuclear warheads was plenty.

Hm, aren't BGM-109B TASM considered as parallel development almost from the beginning?
 
2) The helo pad markings are probably not right. Even on large ships with helo pads, I've rarely seen two side-by-side spots like that; you almost always have a single landing spot on centerline (the only exception I know if is the Newport LSTs, for some reason). See below, for example: (and the link here for more references)
As for the Helideck painting, yes.... even the much wider Independence had a single circle though that carries (according to the wiki) only 1 Helicopter and 2 small Drones....
It should be point out that even thicc San Antonio class who role is to launch and retieve helicopters have inline circles and not side by side.

Its because of safety since you need a certain amount of distance between copters for flight ops. Those circles are a target for landing ops, it helps the pilots judge the distance and angle apperantly from my reading. Likely having them side by side like that fucks up the pilots prespective and well we can guess what happens then...
 
Interesting that modern Russian warships show similar one circle helideck paints while drawings of earlier ships shows two circles like the Udaloy
bpk-proekta-1155.jpg
 
Well, Russians do things differently, just to confuse us. Actually I think that this specific pattern on the Udaloy's has something to do with a hauldown landing system and/or the track for bringing the helicoipter into the hangar. Remember they are intended to work in some of the roughest seas around in icing conditions.
 
Here is the single gunned and less "tall" version of the Long Beach AEGIS variant:
debnc18-5300ebd0-e460-430c-b0a2-173d8dc2b96d.png
Your superstructure is a bit too far backwards: The aft SPY installation covers the aft reactor access panel.

If you look at the decommissioned hull of the LB, you can see the two circular reactor panels. The main SPY structure cannot be over them, because it will make refueling impossible.
 

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Well, Russians do things differently, just to confuse us. Actually I think that this specific pattern on the Udaloy's has something to do with a hauldown landing system and/or the track for bringing the helicoipter into the hangar. Remember they are intended to work in some of the roughest seas around in icing conditions.

It was the result on enlargement of helipad, the original one have only one circle in center. Our helos do not use hauldown system, they are more stable during landing & use stretched deck net to avoid sliding. The idea of two circles is simply to simplify the moving of the helicopter into side-mounted hangars; the helo landed into the center of one circle, and immediately moved right forward into the hangar.
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
The SPY structure is hugely complicated and heavy and would require removing a lot of expensive electronics. Removing half of an Aegis installation is a bit different from removing a few SPG-55. Seriously, the whole reason the proposed Aegis LB conversion has that short superstructure is so it wouldn't fuck up access to the reactor cores.
 
I've always wondered why they didn't use the Talos magazine to store 50 or so Tomahawks, on Long beach and the Albanys. I'd think that the Talos handling equipment could be modded to carry Tomahawks. The rammers would have to be replaced with something that could load the 4 tubes of an ABL. However, assuming a 1-1 replacement of Talos with THawk, then 52 or 104 missiles is a ay better deterrent than the 32 on the BBs.
 
Question both Standard Missile Magazines would be equipped with ASROC Missiles or just one?
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
The SPY structure is hugely complicated and heavy and would require removing a lot of expensive electronics. Removing half of an Aegis installation is a bit different from removing a few SPG-55. Seriously, the whole reason the proposed Aegis LB conversion has that short superstructure is so it wouldn't fuck up access to the reactor cores.
What about reactor refuel from the Hanger? Remove the used fuel cells from there rather all the way up?
 
I've always wondered why they didn't use the Talos magazine to store 50 or so Tomahawks, on Long beach and the Albanys. I'd think that the Talos handling equipment could be modded to carry Tomahawks. The rammers would have to be replaced with something that could load the 4 tubes of an ABL. However, assuming a 1-1 replacement of Talos with THawk, then 52 or 104 missiles is a ay better deterrent than the 32 on the BBs.

I think it was just too costly to rebuild the hangars & handling equipment for just three ships, of which two were rather old & have little service life left.
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
The SPY structure is hugely complicated and heavy and would require removing a lot of expensive electronics. Removing half of an Aegis installation is a bit different from removing a few SPG-55. Seriously, the whole reason the proposed Aegis LB conversion has that short superstructure is so it wouldn't fuck up access to the reactor cores.
What about reactor refuel from the Hanger? Remove the used fuel cells from there rather all the way up?
The hangar is mostly empty space. Chances are there was a clear path to the roof for refueling, or that whatever equipment was in the way was "easily" removable.
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
The SPY structure is hugely complicated and heavy and would require removing a lot of expensive electronics. Removing half of an Aegis installation is a bit different from removing a few SPG-55. Seriously, the whole reason the proposed Aegis LB conversion has that short superstructure is so it wouldn't fuck up access to the reactor cores.
What about reactor refuel from the Hanger? Remove the used fuel cells from there rather all the way up?
The hangar is mostly empty space. Chances are there was a clear path to the roof for refueling, or that whatever equipment was in the way was "easily" removable.

It should be pointed out that this Conversion be probably the Last Refueling of Long Beach Reactors.

With her going cold 20 years later. Like in real life. The Long Beach was pushing 40 when they did retire her in real life. Plus she did get better reactor cores in real so that she could have serve up 2010 without refueling.

SO I can easily see the Navy being fine with the reactor hatches being covered, they will not be needing them anymore after this refit...
 
Yeah the 2010's especially 2015 would be her end life like USS Enterprise maybe even 2020 if she isn't used that many times.
 
The constraint wasn't on space so much as on the avilaability of missiles. Remember that at the time, Tomahawk was being thought of primarily as a nuclear strike weapon. Eight nuclear warheads was plenty.

Hm, aren't BGM-109B TASM considered as parallel development almost from the beginning?

Sort of. They merged the SLCM (TLAM-N) requirement with a requirement for a Submarine-launched Tactical Antiship Missile (STAM) in 1972, but I'm not sure whether a surface-launched TASM was envisaged from the outset.

The main goal was to proliferate nuclear warfighting capability so that the Soviets had to diversify from just worrying about the carriers and SSBNs and also worry about killing surface combatants with Tomahawk tubes. (Or to give SWOs a piece of the nuclear delivery mission and hence budget priority, depending on what theory of organizational behavior you subscribe to.)

I've always wondered why they didn't use the Talos magazine to store 50 or so Tomahawks, on Long beach and the Albanys. I'd think that the Talos handling equipment could be modded to carry Tomahawks. The rammers would have to be replaced with something that could load the 4 tubes of an ABL. However, assuming a 1-1 replacement of Talos with THawk, then 52 or 104 missiles is a ay better deterrent than the 32 on the BBs.

At the time, there probably weren't enough missiles to go around.

Interestingly, before Tomahawk was settled on, there was discussion of a cruise missile that could be launched from otherwise obsolete Polaris missile tubes (multiples per tube, shades of the Trident SSGNs) and also possibly from Terrier launchers.
 
The Variant 2 would have freed up a lot of internal space by the looks of it.
 
Remember reading some where, that the MK41 VLS module was design so that the 61/64 count cell will be be able to fit in the same space as a 44 count MK26 launcher takes up..

So I wonder how many VLS you could fit in the Strike cruisers 64 count MK26 areas...

Probably more then we have USE for but it is an interesting thought for those who like more boom....
 
Well even on the Long Beach they had to deconstruct the decks above the reactors including removing the SPG-55 radars so I don't see a problem with the SPY-1 ones had to be removed partially for a refuel (every 10-15 years or so)
Any source for the SPG-55's being removed for reactor refueling? they are quite a bit forwards of the forward reactor (which is just in front of the superstructure block) and the second set is on top of the superstructure block.
 
The attached exchange from a 1978 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, key narrative from then CNO Admiral Holloway, seems to be the definitive answer on the viability of Aegis modernisation for the CGN-36 and CGN-38 classes. In summary, the CGN-36 conversion was technically undesirable but probably possible, the CGN-38 was possible and viable but expensive and would have resulted in modern ships being out of commission for long periods. Also attached is an exchange involving Admiral Meyer from a 1979 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing suggesting the cost per conversion would have been $600-700 million in FY79 dollars.

I guess such conversions would have utilised the Aegis modular deckhouse concept, Deckhouse Mark 20, with the new deckhouses mounted on a revised and strengthened superstructure. Each of the loaded deckhouses for the CGN-38 would have weighed over 200 long tons each according to a 1988 article in The Naval Engineers Journal.
Sorry for the very late response to this, but do you happen to have more information on that Deckhouse Mark 20 Modular deckhouse concept? Or even a scan of that article you mention? I'm researching the CGN-38 AEGIS conversion, trying to recreate how it might have looked accurately, and this is the first mention I have seen on how it would actually be done.....
 
The attached exchange from a 1978 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, key narrative from then CNO Admiral Holloway, seems to be the definitive answer on the viability of Aegis modernisation for the CGN-36 and CGN-38 classes. In summary, the CGN-36 conversion was technically undesirable but probably possible, the CGN-38 was possible and viable but expensive and would have resulted in modern ships being out of commission for long periods. Also attached is an exchange involving Admiral Meyer from a 1979 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing suggesting the cost per conversion would have been $600-700 million in FY79 dollars.

I guess such conversions would have utilised the Aegis modular deckhouse concept, Deckhouse Mark 20, with the new deckhouses mounted on a revised and strengthened superstructure. Each of the loaded deckhouses for the CGN-38 would have weighed over 200 long tons each according to a 1988 article in The Naval Engineers Journal.
Sorry for the very late response to this, but do you happen to have more information on that Deckhouse Mark 20 Modular deckhouse concept? Or even a scan of that article you mention? I'm researching the CGN-38 AEGIS conversion, trying to recreate how it might have looked accurately, and this is the first mention I have seen on how it would actually be done.....

Relevant bits:
Screenshot_20220304-132336~2.png
Screenshot_20220304-132350~2.png
 
The earliest Typhon designs when the missiles still called Super Tartar and Super Talos (There seems to be no Super Terrier??? ) one wwas envisioned with the SPS-32/33 set the other a more simple what looks like enlarged SPG-51's?

View attachment 646244

But I don't think the SPS-32/33 were simplified SPG-59's as the SCANFAR was a search radar though maybe the SPS-33 (The vertical sets) could be used for guidance while the SPG-59 was a dedicated missile guidance system.
The Terrier was to be taken over by the Super Tarter since it had the same max range of the older Terrier while retaining the minumun range of the older Tarter.

The SPG59 was to the Full Detected to Kill set, in a very similar way to the Army's Patriot System, a full proper one and done system ment replace the 12 different radars usual found on warships at the time. Air search ground search, navigation, target control it was to do it ALL.

Then they got around to do the power curve testing and the maths for it.

And found the system Took a metric ASS TON of power.

As in take thousand of miles off a ship range to run it types of power limiting the ship usage to the nuke boats.

So they decide to make the SPS systems, which later became SCANFAR, to take over the general search settings to save power, That didn't work since Scanfar itselt was a very power hunger system since it was an early version of the AESA types*. That brings to the usual line of designs we see with the SPS-43 and similar search radars while the SPG59 was limited to combat use only. Which gave use some funky designs like the Des Moines Typhon refit with four SPS-43 set up in panels around the main SPG59 fire control group. That didn't do the trick either causing the navy to cancel it in December of 63.

Then the Navy finaly tested it on the Norton Sound in the 63/64 and nearly fried that ships electric system, THAT BEEN OVERBUILT IN THE REFIT just for that. Which was the final nail in the coffin for the system.

*During this time SCANFAR was order in designing phases originally to take over the search, then it was divorced from the program all together for use on the Long Beach and Enterprise nearing completion since it could also use the regalur SPG-49/55 systems as well and the navy figured it may as well get something for its money. That system had it's own issues as we know it and never really did work how the Navy wanted it.

Which leads us to 64 when a certain Program call the ASMS, Advanced Surface Missile System, was started to met the anti missile requirements the Navy felt was needed for the future. With alot of the Typhon and Scanfar personal being dropped over to work on it.

A few years later in 69, ASMS was remained AEGIS and the rest is history.

Do you know how much power the SPS-32/33 and the SPG-59 required?
I've heard that at full power the SCANFAR could basically jam or partially disable entire electronic systems in it's range like radios TVs etc!
Were the SCANFAR too large and heavy to be mounted on a rotating base and hence only use 1-1 or 2-2 panels at a time? Something like a super sized SPS-48 or a pair of SPS-48 back to back?
 
The earliest Typhon designs when the missiles still called Super Tartar and Super Talos (There seems to be no Super Terrier??? ) one wwas envisioned with the SPS-32/33 set the other a more simple what looks like enlarged SPG-51's?

View attachment 646244

But I don't think the SPS-32/33 were simplified SPG-59's as the SCANFAR was a search radar though maybe the SPS-33 (The vertical sets) could be used for guidance while the SPG-59 was a dedicated missile guidance system.
The Terrier was to be taken over by the Super Tarter since it had the same max range of the older Terrier while retaining the minumun range of the older Tarter.

The SPG59 was to the Full Detected to Kill set, in a very similar way to the Army's Patriot System, a full proper one and done system ment replace the 12 different radars usual found on warships at the time. Air search ground search, navigation, target control it was to do it ALL.

Then they got around to do the power curve testing and the maths for it.

And found the system Took a metric ASS TON of power.

As in take thousand of miles off a ship range to run it types of power limiting the ship usage to the nuke boats.

So they decide to make the SPS systems, which later became SCANFAR, to take over the general search settings to save power, That didn't work since Scanfar itselt was a very power hunger system since it was an early version of the AESA types*. That brings to the usual line of designs we see with the SPS-43 and similar search radars while the SPG59 was limited to combat use only. Which gave use some funky designs like the Des Moines Typhon refit with four SPS-43 set up in panels around the main SPG59 fire control group. That didn't do the trick either causing the navy to cancel it in December of 63.

Then the Navy finaly tested it on the Norton Sound in the 63/64 and nearly fried that ships electric system, THAT BEEN OVERBUILT IN THE REFIT just for that. Which was the final nail in the coffin for the system.

*During this time SCANFAR was order in designing phases originally to take over the search, then it was divorced from the program all together for use on the Long Beach and Enterprise nearing completion since it could also use the regalur SPG-49/55 systems as well and the navy figured it may as well get something for its money. That system had it's own issues as we know it and never really did work how the Navy wanted it.

Which leads us to 64 when a certain Program call the ASMS, Advanced Surface Missile System, was started to met the anti missile requirements the Navy felt was needed for the future. With alot of the Typhon and Scanfar personal being dropped over to work on it.

A few years later in 69, ASMS was remained AEGIS and the rest is history.

Do you know how much power the SPS-32/33 and the SPG-59 required?
I've heard that at full power the SCANFAR could basically jam or partially disable entire electronic systems in it's range like radios TVs etc!
Were the SCANFAR too large and heavy to be mounted on a rotating base and hence only use 1-1 or 2-2 panels at a time? Something like a super sized SPS-48 or a pair of SPS-48 back to back?
No clue on the exact powered needed sets.

And considering the antenna size of the Scanfar it make sense for there being no Rotating versions. Like the biggest rotating radar on a combat ship I know of is the European S1850M/Smart-l which is a good bit smaller then either of the Scanfar systems.

For the Spg-59.

It was notorious power hungry.

Enough so that it cuts into a ships range noticeably. Like remember remember the Des Moines class Typhon refit adding bout 1k tons more in Fuel to offset the range lose. And considering that class started with 3k tons of fuel...

That puts into prospective on the power needed.

For output...

The SPY-1 it puts out bout 8 megawatts of power, and it does similar stuff to electronics so right around that power live likely.
 
The earliest Typhon designs when the missiles still called Super Tartar and Super Talos (There seems to be no Super Terrier??? ) one wwas envisioned with the SPS-32/33 set the other a more simple what looks like enlarged SPG-51's?

View attachment 646244

But I don't think the SPS-32/33 were simplified SPG-59's as the SCANFAR was a search radar though maybe the SPS-33 (The vertical sets) could be used for guidance while the SPG-59 was a dedicated missile guidance system.
The Terrier was to be taken over by the Super Tarter since it had the same max range of the older Terrier while retaining the minumun range of the older Tarter.

The SPG59 was to the Full Detected to Kill set, in a very similar way to the Army's Patriot System, a full proper one and done system ment replace the 12 different radars usual found on warships at the time. Air search ground search, navigation, target control it was to do it ALL.

Then they got around to do the power curve testing and the maths for it.

And found the system Took a metric ASS TON of power.

As in take thousand of miles off a ship range to run it types of power limiting the ship usage to the nuke boats.

So they decide to make the SPS systems, which later became SCANFAR, to take over the general search settings to save power, That didn't work since Scanfar itselt was a very power hunger system since it was an early version of the AESA types*. That brings to the usual line of designs we see with the SPS-43 and similar search radars while the SPG59 was limited to combat use only. Which gave use some funky designs like the Des Moines Typhon refit with four SPS-43 set up in panels around the main SPG59 fire control group. That didn't do the trick either causing the navy to cancel it in December of 63.

Then the Navy finaly tested it on the Norton Sound in the 63/64 and nearly fried that ships electric system, THAT BEEN OVERBUILT IN THE REFIT just for that. Which was the final nail in the coffin for the system.

*During this time SCANFAR was order in designing phases originally to take over the search, then it was divorced from the program all together for use on the Long Beach and Enterprise nearing completion since it could also use the regalur SPG-49/55 systems as well and the navy figured it may as well get something for its money. That system had it's own issues as we know it and never really did work how the Navy wanted it.

Which leads us to 64 when a certain Program call the ASMS, Advanced Surface Missile System, was started to met the anti missile requirements the Navy felt was needed for the future. With alot of the Typhon and Scanfar personal being dropped over to work on it.

A few years later in 69, ASMS was remained AEGIS and the rest is history.
You have the development schedules for SCANFAR and the SPG-59 the wrong way around. SCANFAR predated the AN/SPG-59 by several years, as evidenced by the fact that Long Beach preliminaries with SCANFAR were first drawn up in 1956 (although the design process for Long Beach started in 1954). Both Long Beach and Enterprise were ordered in FY 57 and FY 58 respectively (this would have been around 1956).

Typhon only started to appear in long term building programs in 1958, and even then, the first ship wasn't expected to be ordered until FY 63 (and so probably would not have been laid down until 1964 or 1965 even under the extremely over optimistic plans of the late 1950s).

The original BuShips Sketch designs for the first ships with Typhon in 1958 actually had both SCANFAR and the SPG-59 (although at this point it seems the SPG-59 was only intended for illumination), and detailed work on ships with "only" the SPG-59 started in December 1960, by which time both Long Beach and Enterprise had been launched.
 
To be honest, I wonder why not just put four SPY-1Ds on the original box structure? I really want to know why rebuild the bridge?

Probably because of how the system is arranged behind the antenna faces. SPY-1 isn't all in those visible antennas, it has a really specific geometry between the antenna faces, the waveguides, and the signal generators that sit way down inside the structure. And remember that this is before SPY-1D, so there are two transmitters associated with those four antenna faces. I think what we're seeing here is basically grafting the AEGIS modular deckhouse design (for pre-Ticonderoga AEGIS concepts) onto the CGN-9 hull, so as to avoid reengineering the whole waveguide layout for one ship.

Also, putting SPY-1D (when it became available) on a cruiser would have been seen as a big retrograde step. With two transmitters, SPY-1A/B could handle more targets than SPY-1D, at least until SPY-1D(V) came along.
 
Also the SPY1 had different angles of search over the scanfar.

Scanfar had closer to a full 100 degree search fan, which allowed for the Box design.simce you can still look up a respectable ways.

SPY1 has roughly 90 degrees of seach. Meaning you had to tilt the radar back to keep the same search attitude capabilities.
 
CGN-42 details. Note the Tomahawk box launchers, I have not been able to find a quantification of what the greater command and control capability and more capable over the horizon targeting (OTH-T) installation was compared to the DDG-47. The increased survivability was fragment, overpressure and shock protection across most of the vitals. Being able to load so much onto the CGN-38 hull was presumably a product of the hull volume made available by abandoning the helicopter hangar under the fantail and the weight allowance that was available, apparently sufficient to accommodate the earlier and heavier (prior to the weight reduction to support DDG installations) DLGN-38 Aegis Weapon System. Even so, adding 1,500 tons of weight, swapping the Mod 0 Mk-26 with a Mod-1 for 20 extra missiles, and adding 161 crew to the same basic hull and machinery plant would surely have created a denser ship with notably different draft and stability characteristics. With a 15 year core life alongside the other features it would have been a very capable vessel though.
 

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The evolution of launch systems in the USN becomes so rapid in the 1980s that VLS systems make older ships increasingly.obsolete.
Even without the end of the Cold War I think by 1995 all cruisers except the Bunker Hill class and all destroyers except Burke and Spruance mods would have gone anyway.
So not modernising the Long Beach or building Strike Cruiser probably freed up resources for Bunker Hills and Burkes. But in the early 80s faced with the Kirov class it seemed mistaken. So the modified Iowa class filled a psychological gap.
 
I have not been able to find a quantification of what the greater command and control capability and more capable over the horizon targeting (OTH-T) installation was compared to the DDG-47.
That's been in the back of my mind as well.
Were DDG-47s always equipped with space for the "air warfare commander" due to their AEGIS suite?
Both DDG-47 and CGN-42 were to have SPY-1 and SPS-49; what other "over the horizon targeting" sensors existed?
 
I have not been able to find a quantification of what the greater command and control capability and more capable over the horizon targeting (OTH-T) installation was compared to the DDG-47.
That's been in the back of my mind as well.
Were DDG-47s always equipped with space for the "air warfare commander" due to their AEGIS suite?
Both DDG-47 and CGN-42 were to have SPY-1 and SPS-49; what other "over the horizon targeting" sensors existed?

OTH targeting probably means Classic Outboard or its successors (like Combat DF). An MF/HF/VHF direction finding system that could detect, localize, and track targets at rather long distances using their radio emissions. It was widely associated with Tomahawk ASM as a way of providing adequate cueing for over-the-horizon strikes. Outboard was fielded on the Spruance class but not on the Ticos, because there just wasn't room after AEGIS was shoehorned in.

 
DG/Aegis concept from 1972. According to Friedman the ship was "too austere even for Admiral Zumwalt." Price was limited to $150 million in FY 72 dollars.

Note the limitation of the two illuminators and the single Mk26 launching system, with gas turbine propulsion. The demise of DG/Aegis has been blamed variously on proponents of nuclear propulsion and on the rather limited capabilities of this austere ship.
Page 321, US Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Revised Edition)

Prior to April 1971 the Navy was planning for all Aegis ships to be nuclear powered and based on the DLGN-38 class, of which 24 (32 is also given) were planned with Aegis installation beginning with the sixth ship. In April 1971 the Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird) cancelled plans for building Aegis equipped nuclear cruisers. In December 1971 CNO (Zumwalt) redirected the Aegis programme to produce potential fits for smaller ships, this initiated a simplification programme that dramatically reduced weight and cost (albeit at the cost of some reduction in long-range volume search capability and some system redundancy). This pushed the programme back by about two years with an operational system intended to be installed in FY80 rather than FY78 as previously planned. DG/Aegis ship development was initiated with a 17 month concept exploration in April 1972, followed by a 12 month preliminary design phase in September 1973. Apparently, a preliminary design baseline was never established but the concept does apear to have been relatively well defined in terms of equipment and specifications based on what was stated in May 1974, about the time all work was stopped:

Basic specifications as of 1974:
Aegis Mk.7 Mod 1 with 2 illuminators
1 x Mk.26 Mod 2 GMLS (64 round version)
1 x AN/SPS-49 surveillance radar
1 x AN/SPS-55 surface search radar
1 x AN/SQS-56 sonar (as used in FFG-7/Patrol Frigate)
2 x Mk-32 triple torpedo tubes
Harpoon
1 x LAMPS helicopter
Space and weight for AN/WLR-8 ECM
Space and weight for 2 x Phalanx
Propulsion: 2 x FT9 gas turbines, one on each shaft with 30-35,000 SHP each
5,700 tons displacement

The development of the FT9 gas turbine, based on the Pratt & Whitney JT9D and funded by the Navy starting in August 1973 is described here (document also attached in case the link dies).

Zumwalt chose a programme of 16 DG/Aegis ships with 8 CSGNs to provide 2 Aegis ships for each CV, the CSGNs would accompany the CVNs and there was an assumption that the ultimate Forrestal replacements would be fossil-fuel powered. Title VIII became law in August 1974 but had been in the works for several months. Admiral Holloway replaced Zumwalt as CNO in July 1974 and initially supported the mixed programme chosen by Zumwalt but subsequently, December 1974, proposed a programme of 18 CSGNs and no conventionally powered Aegis ships.

The DG/Aegis concept has taken a lot of criticism and it is hard not to think that it would have been too weak to adequately support CVs in the striking fleet role in the 1980s, let alone the 1990s based on the then expected threat. In particular, AN/SQS-56 instead of AN/SQS-53 and only a single LAMPS is light on the ASW side (though these vessels would be accompanied by DD-963 class vessels that would have complimentary ASW capabilities) whilst only a single Mk-26 and two Illuminators was probably a waste of Aegis' capabilities. On the other hand, with just two gas turbines, it would have been a very cheap ship (comparatively) to procure, man and sustain and I can imagine a role for it working alongside V/STOL support ships and the FFG-7 class in non-striking fleet roles.
 

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Does the original CSGN Strike Cruiser designs hull based on an enlarged Spruance hull? Or was it to be a new hull development?
 
Does the original CSGN Strike Cruiser designs hull based on an enlarged Spruance hull? Or was it to be a new hull development?
No.

It was a purpose build design for the role it was ment to full.

Hell even the lowest end specs are still far bigger then the Spruance could ever be.
 
Like Tzoli I was wondering whether the hull design drew on the Spruance rather than the CGN41 Virginias which were designed earlier.
 
The design lineage of fully nuclear powered warships is also completely separate from that of conventional powered ships. This is partially because of their heavy powerplant (although that would put them somewhat comparable to steam ships) but also their lower amount of fluids on board and the fact that not fuel but power is the limiting factor in cruising speed and top speed characteristics.

Even when considering the far bigger specs, a Virginia class can largely be comparable to an Kidd class in all specs but propulsion and it could even be said that an DDG-2 class is not that different in combat system than a California class. This comparision remains valid in Leahy-Bainbridge and Belknap-Truxtun, where the conventional powered ships are very similar to the nuclear ones in everything but the hull design (and of course propulsion). The nuclear "versions" are always quite a bit heavier and often at least somewhat longer.
 
The strike cruiser designs are very impressive looking ships but also ones tied to old fashioned weapons launchers.
The Arleigh Burke destroyers with AEGIS and VLS are actually more heavily armed (except for the 5 rather than 8 inch gun).
The initial Ticonderoga CG47s soon gave way to the Bunker Hills with VLS.
The six California and Virginia class DLGN served with their Tartar/Standard launchers and only received modest boxes for Tomahawk and cannisters for Harpoon as upgrades. Were VLS boxes ever considered to upgrade them? I doubt if it could have been done cheaply.
So the Strike Cruiser designs are fun to examine because they were the end of the line of ships which began with Long Beach and Bainbridge at the end of the 1950s.
 

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