Continuing relevance of the A-10 Warthog today and tomorrow?

RyanCrierie said:
Retiring the A-10 so fast is not too bright... because even if the A-10 is no longer survivable in it's intended design role as heavy CAS during a high intensity peer to peer competitor conflict....it's very efficient in the wars we are fighting now.

It's not just cost per flight hour that's driving their decision. To really save money you need to kill an entire type/supply chain which is why they're also looking at the short-sighted notion of killing off the KC-10. This, while they are in such desperate need of tankers that they're going to protect the KC-46 at all costs.
 
One thing is for certain, the A-10 won't go quietly.

"A-10 Warthog faces elimination. Will Congress save it again?"
by Peter Grier
Feb. 26, 2014

Source:
http://news.yahoo.com/10-warthog-faces-elimination-congress-save-again-171324585.html;_ylt=A0SO80xaRw5TfwEAN1ZXNyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTByNDV0ZTJpBHNlYwNzYwRjb2xvA2dxMQR2dGlkA1VJQzFfMQ--

The A-10 “Warthog” is facing elimination. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel is proposing to eliminate funds for the venerable ground support aircraft in the Pentagon’s 2015 budget. The move would save $3.5 billion over the next five years, according to Secretary Hagel – money the Air Force needs to help pay for newer weapons, such as the F-35.

Is this finally the end for the A-10? Maybe – the plane is old, slow, and ungainly. It’s low-tech in a high-tech world, an ancient piece of US iron in an air combat environment vastly different from the one for which it was designed.

But it would be a mistake to write the Warthog off. It is a tough survivor, in both the skies and the halls of Congress. The Department of Defense has tried to kill the aircraft before, and failed.

Look at the reaction of Sen. Carl Levin (D) of Michigan to see why this is so. Senator Levin is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, though he is retiring in the fall. There are 24 A-10s based at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in his home state. He also remembers how Congress pushed for the A-10's original production, over some military objections, and has voted to keep the plane alive over the years.

“The A-10 has a vital capability, and we must ensure that we maintain that capability,” said Levin, earlier this week. “Those who propose eliminating the A-10 have a heavy burden of proof. Any such proposal will receive close scrutiny.”

The Republic A-10 is officially named the “Thunderbolt II," after the ungainly ground support Thunderbolt of World War II. Designed in the early 1970s, it is a cross-shaped aircraft built around a 30-mm cannon, the heaviest such weapon in the air. The plane is heavily armored against ground fire. The pilot, for instance, sits in a titanium tub. It’s intended to attack enemy tanks and other armored vehicles.

The Air Force of the era was not enamored of the plane. It was slow and ugly, as opposed to the service’s fast and graceful fighters. Originally, Air Force leaders tolerated its development because they saw it as a way to keep the Army out of the close air support mission, according to a National Defense University student thesis written in 2003. Eventually they discovered that the A-10 “had picked up enough congressional and [Office of the Secretary of Defense] support to resist the dominant ‘high-tech’ USAF culture,” wrote NDU student Arden Dahl.

Fast forward to the 21st century. The A-10 had played a crucial role in the Gulf War, destroying more than 900 Iraqi tanks and hundreds more military trucks and other vehicles. It provided suppressive gunfire to support troops in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.

But it was also 40 years old and increasingly expensive and difficult to maintain. The advent of precision-guided munitions meant that many Air Force aircraft could attack enemy ground forces engaged in combat.

That meant the plane’s time might be up.

However, in recent years Congress has repeatedly pushed back against Pentagon efforts to cut the aircraft and its associated Air National Guard units.

The powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Levin, has A-10s in his state, which has helped. In 2012, lawmakers rejected a plan to pull A-10s out of Michigan, for instance. The Arizona congressional delegation has also united in support of the aircraft, which is a mainstay at Davis-Monthan Air Base near Tucson.

One of the A-10s' most vociferous defenders is Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R) of New Hampshire, whose husband flew the aircraft in the Gulf War. Last September, she blocked the nomination of Deborah Lee James as secretary of the Air Force until the service responded in writing to questions about the A-10’s future. She later relented but has continued to watch warily as the service decided to do away with the program.

She has pledged to fight the forced retirement.

“Instead of cutting its best and least expensive close air support aircraft in an attempt to save money, the Air Force could achieve similar savings elsewhere in its budget without putting our troops at increased risk,” Senator Ayotte said this week.
 
Your mileage may vary...

"A-10 Attack Jets Rack Up Air-to-Air Kills in Louisiana War Game
‘Single-purpose? Single-mission? My ass,’ commander says of Warthogs"
by David Axe in War is Boring

Source:
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/a2299445b2a4

Two squadrons of A-10 Warthog attack planes scored a military record in Louisiana in March, shooting down unprecedented numbers of “enemy” aircraft during an intensive war game.

Flying low over the forest canopy at Fort Polk’s Joint Readiness Training Center, the twin-engine jets—from Idaho and Louisiana Air National Guard squadrons—simulated attacks on the Opposing Force, the specialized U.S. Army role-players who stand in for enemy troops.

The officer in charge of the semi-annual “Green Flag” exercise praised the 1980s-vintage A-10s. “They unleashed the Hogs,” Air Force Lt. Col. Brett Waring said of the Idaho and Louisiana squadrons.

Waring added a thinly veiled criticism of the Air Force, which wants to retire all 340 of the cheap, rugged Warthogs by 2019 and replace them with flimsy, pricey F-35 stealth fighters.
An Opfor Lakota. Christopher Ebdon photo

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel described the A-10 as a “40-year-old, single-purpose airplane originally designed to kill enemy tanks on a Cold War battlefield.”

Waring rejected that assessment. “Single-purpose, single-mission? My ass. That bird out there kicks ass.” The armored A-10 carries missiles and bombs and packs a powerful 30-millimeter cannon. In 1991, a Warthog used its gun to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter. A-10s sank enemy warships during the 2011 international intervention in Libya.

The March 9 to 26 exercise pitted Army units and the supporting Air Force squadrons against JRTC’s highly-trained Opfor. Firing lasers instead of live rounds, the two sides battled on the ground and in the air. Opfor uses Lakota helicopters painted to represent Russian-style gunships.

The Opposing Force quickly gained the advantage. “The Army got it handed to them,” Waring said. “No other way to put it.” Opfor “killed” the entire Army force twice, forcing it to “regenerate”—like getting extra lives in a video game.
A soldier aims a Javelin missile into the sky at JRTC. Army photo

Soldiers at JRTC must defend against “the constant threat of enemy aviation,” according to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment’s Facebook page. A squadron photo depicts a soldier aiming his Javelin anti-tank missile into the sky. Optimized for killing tanks, in a pinch the Javelin can also bring down low-flying aircraft.

The Army rallied, calling in the A-10s for intensive air strikes that turned the tide of the mock battle. “We had the most kinetic strike operations in the last three years of Green Flag, just in those last few days,” Waring said.

And in the course of their counter-attacks, the Warthogs shot down a record number of Opfor aircraft—presumably the Lakota gunships. The Idaho and Louisiana squadrons “now hold the Green Flag record for the most air-to-air kills,” Waring boasted.

Equally enthusiastic about the fearsome A-10, a coalition of lawmakers is working to save the Warthog, by crafting legislation preventing the planes’ retirement.
 
Posting this story should not be considered my endorsement of such story. Added for discussion purposes.

"Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) refuses to discuss A-10 success (Army failure) at recent exercise..."
May 12, 2014

Source:
http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2014-05-12T16:22:00-05:00&max-results=7

If you don't then follow the above link, but here's a quick run down. The US Army sent a unit to JRTC at Ft. Polk, LA and the Red Force proceeded to kick major league ass. It was so bad that an Air Force Lt. Colonel said the following....

The Opposing Force quickly gained the advantage. “The Army got it handed to them,” Waring said. “No other way to put it.” Opfor “killed” the entire Army force twice, forcing it to “regenerate”—like getting extra lives in a video game.

I have huge respect for my bro's in the Army (one team, one fight and we all suck mud) so I was surprised to hear that one performed so poorly.

Honestly I was stumped, so I sent an e-mail to JRTC to find out exactly what happened. Well after dealing with "Big Army" I'm becoming a bit less proud of the way that the Big Green does business. My request got bounced around a couple of offices until it landed on the desk of Ft. Polk Public Affairs.

This is when sunshine turned to shit.

This is the response I got back...

Apologies that you had to wait a week for a reply. I am Fort Polk's media relations officer; your email should have been directed to me.
JRTC rotations are designed for training joint forces to prepare for any challenges that lie ahead. Part of that training consists of after-action reviews so joint forces can learn from their mistakes, if mistakes have been made. That's what makes a JRTC rotation one of the most valuable tools a member of our armed forces can undergo.
It's not our policy to release specific details of any given rotation.
You are, of course, welcome to file a Freedom of Information Act request.

Are you kidding me?

Seriously?

Really?

A USAF Lt. Colonel is out in public basically chest thumping and high five-ing his squadron...while at the same time telling the whole world that without A-10's flying support the US Army is lost and they don't want to get there side of the story out?

I'll jump through the hoop.

I'll fill out the Freedom of Information Request.

I'll get my hands on the After Action Reports to the Units and the Brigade/Division along with the lessons learned. But this points to something that should worry everyone. From what we know, the Blue Force ran into a moderately technologically capable force that had helicopters in support. Facing this threat they were easily defeated.

China is a high tech, mechanized, heavily armored force that has the backing of air assets that would make the Red Force look like Boy Scouts.

Maybe the erosion of conventional warfare capabilities has already taken hold?
 
Triton said:
Your mileage may vary...

"A-10 Attack Jets Rack Up Air-to-Air Kills in Louisiana War Game
[

Note: The "Air-to-Air Kills" were simply helicopters. ::)
 
GTX said:
Note: The "Air-to-Air Kills" were simply helicopters. ::)

The article was written to address Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's criticism of the A-10 Thunderbolt II as an obsolete single-purpose tank killing aircraft intended for Cold War battlefields. Neither article claims that the A-10 Thunderbolt II is a fighter. Unfortunately, David Axe couldn't resist criticizing the F-35.
 
There has been good discussion on this forum how modern targeting systems (made since the nineties) have made it possible to do accurate ground attack missions with an F-16. So I think it's evidence for not keeping the A-10 around.

There was another thread about why there are no modern propeller ground attack planes. Once you really look at the problem, you realize that a relatively simple jet trainer is more versatile and survivable for that role, because it is so much faster. Somewhat similar reasons.
 
mz said:
There has been good discussion on this forum how modern targeting systems (made since the nineties) have made it possible to do accurate ground attack missions with an F-16. So I think it's evidence for not keeping the A-10 around.

There was another thread about why there are no modern propeller ground attack planes. Once you really look at the problem, you realize that a relatively simple jet trainer is more versatile and survivable for that role, because it is so much faster. Somewhat similar reasons.

And yet not everyone agrees that a fast jet can perform the close air support mission, even in the United States Air Force.
 
mz said:
There has been good discussion on this forum how modern targeting systems (made since the nineties) have made it possible to do accurate ground attack missions with an F-16. So I think it's evidence for not keeping the A-10 around.

There was another thread about why there are no modern propeller ground attack planes. Once you really look at the problem, you realize that a relatively simple jet trainer is more versatile and survivable for that role, because it is so much faster. Somewhat similar reasons.


Is the A-10 really that slow? It has good subsonic speed and is agile. The A-10 has more loiter time than an F-35 will ever have, sure an f-35 can target something and make one pass at it and then pooof! is gone while the A-10 is still loitering in the area can rapidly pick out new targets. How much armor protection does an F-35 have. There are going to be scenarios (and continue to be) where an A-10 will be much needed. I think its a mistake. Sure it will free up money for other programs. And just because someone is pro A-10 doesn't necessarily mean they are anti F-35 or against newer systems that can do the job.
 
Meanwhile I imagine that Boeing, and partner Korean Aerospace Industries, are still being paid to deliver 233 new sets of wings for the A-10C. The contract was expected to be completed in 2018 and would extend the life of the A-10C through 2040.
 
kcran567 said:
mz said:
There has been good discussion on this forum how modern targeting systems (made since the nineties) have made it possible to do accurate ground attack missions with an F-16. So I think it's evidence for not keeping the A-10 around.

There was another thread about why there are no modern propeller ground attack planes. Once you really look at the problem, you realize that a relatively simple jet trainer is more versatile and survivable for that role, because it is so much faster. Somewhat similar reasons.


Is the A-10 really that slow? It has good subsonic speed and is agile. The A-10 has more loiter time than an F-35 will ever have, sure an f-35 can target something and make one pass at it and then pooof! is gone while the A-10 is still loitering in the area can rapidly pick out new targets. How much armor protection does an F-35 have. There are going to be scenarios (and continue to be) where an A-10 will be much needed. I think its a mistake. Sure it will free up money for other programs. And just because someone is pro A-10 doesn't necessarily mean they are anti F-35 or against newer systems that can do the job.


When the Hog has gotten where it's going, it's great. Loiter away, swoop down for gun runs, then clamber back up to its perch. It's when you need it somewhere else, fast (and that somewhere else always needs it fast), that the speed deficiency....starts....to....make....itself....an....issue. That's a problem unique to the A-10.


On the other hand, anything can perform CAS now. Hogs, UCAVs, rotors, B-52s, B-1s, F-Teens...the sophistication of modern guided munitions and designation tools and the skills and experience of the FAC community have allowed the workload to be spread far and wide. The only reason that the A-10 is still the god of the gun pass is because that's what it's built around and it's probably the most precise weapon that the Hog carries, since I don't think they're hefting Mavericks on the routine in Afghanistan.
 
"Senators gear up to preserve A-10 in FY15 defense budget"
By Travis J. Tritten
Stars and Stripes
Published: May 14, 2014

Source:
http://www.stripes.com/news/senators-gear-up-to-preserve-a-10-in-fy15-defense-budget-1.283054


WASHINGTON — Retired Air Force Master Sgt. Eric Brandenburg says he probably never would have returned from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan if not for the A-10 Warthog.

The Silver Star recipient and former joint terminal attack controller stood beside powerful Senate lawmakers Wednesday and urged the Air Force to back off a proposed retirement of the aircraft, saying it is uniquely capable of providing close air support, saving the lives of American troops on the battlefield.
INTERACTIVE MAP | Where the A-10 bases are in the U.S.

The press conference, which included Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., was the most recent push by lawmakers on Capitol Hill to block the Air Force 2015 budget proposal to phase out the hard-fighting aircraft, known for the belch of its massive Gatling gun and its ability to fly slow and low to support of infantry on the ground.

“If our leaders don’t listen to the troops fighting on the ground, [the troops] are going to fail. Our troops need the A-10,” said Brandenburg, who deployed repeatedly in support of the Army’s 75th Ranger Battalion for eight years after 9/11 and who was awarded five Bronze Stars for combat valor.

McCain said the aircraft is a favorite of infantry soldiers. “We listened very carefully to the U.S. Army,” he said. “They are the ones who need the close air support, they are ones who are in grave danger without it.”

With the A-10’s combat record as a backdrop, a group of 10 senators called the proposed Air Force retirement premature. They want the chamber to save the Warthog from extinction when it marks up its version of the National Defense Authorization Act on Tuesday. The House Armed Services Committee already rejected the A-10 plan in its draft defense budget passed last week.

“I believe and hope the Senate will also act to protect the A-10 for our men and women in uniform,” said Ayotte, who has helped lead the effort to preserve the aircraft.

The Senate coalition, which also includes Sens. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, and Johnny Isakson, R-Ga., disagreed with the Department of Defense position that the A-10 is too expensive and dated to keep around. The cost per flying hour is actually less than other aircraft that provide support for ground troops, including the F-15E and F-16 fighter jets, the B-1 bomber, the AC-130 gunship, and the B-52 Stratofortress, they argue.

But the DOD is scraping for savings and has been unhappy with Congress’ refusal so far to support a phase-out of the A-10. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel unveiled the proposal earlier this year, saying the retirement of the Air Force fleet of some 300 Warthogs would save the department $3.5 billion over five years.

A Pentagon spokesman said last week that Hagel was “certainly not pleased” — a rare comment on active legislation.

The DOD is under intense pressure to cut costs due to the Budget Control Act of 2011, also known as sequestration, which triggered deep, automatic reductions in the federal spending after a divided Congress could not reach a budget agreement.

Many popular defense programs and equipment could be on the chopping block in the coming year, including subsidies to base supermarkets, health care benefits, pay raises, the A-10 program, the Navy’s littoral combat ship funding, and the USS George Washington aircraft carrier, which needs an expensive nuclear overhaul to stay in operation.

The military’s top brass say the cuts are unwanted — Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey said he had personally been saved by A-10 air support — but necessary due to the funding squeeze.

House lawmakers, especially Republicans, have balked at slashing defense spending, saying it could weaken national security and erode trust among servicemembers.

Now, A-10 support is growing in the Senate.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he may vote to keep the aircraft if spending offsets can be found.

“I support preserving the A-10. To accomplish that, we must find a realistic way to pay for it,” he said Tuesday in a statement to Stars and Stripes. “I’m optimistic that when the Senate Armed Services Committee marks up the defense authorization bill next week, we will be able to do so.”

The Senate coalition may just be successful, at least at saving the Warthog in the chamber’s upcoming draft defense budget, said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“I fully expect they are going to push hard, and they may very well succeed,” Harrison said. “It’s going to be an uphill battle for the Air Force to retire the A-10 even in the Senate.”

With elections looming, lawmakers would not want to vote against the Warthog program and risk military cuts and job losses in a number of communities outside bases where the aircraft is operated, he said.

The A-10 is “almost as important to Moody [Air Force Base] as it is to troops on the ground,” said Sen. Johnny Isakson, R-Ga., who represents the base along with Chambliss and spoke at the news conference Wednesday.

Davis-Monthan Air Base in Tucson, Ariz. — McCain’s state — is home to about 80 of the aircraft, the largest concentration in the world. Nine U.S. bases and one U.S. base in South Korea have the Warthog.

Many races are already heating up, with this issue being front and center in Tucson.

Rep. Ron Barber, who added an amendment to save the A-10 to the House Armed Services Committee draft defense budget last week, is running against Martha McSally, a former A-10 pilot who is campaigning on defeating the aircraft’s retirement.

The A-10 is the largest mission at Davis-Monthan and the retirement could mean the loss of 2,000 jobs, said Bruce Dusenberry, chairman of the Southern Arizona Defense Alliance, a group comprising private-sector leaders who represent military interests in the Tucson area.

“The immediate reaction was, ‘Oh no,’ ” Dusenberry said.

The loss could also affect the other military bases and vast training ranges that dot southern Arizona and are interconnected to the A-10 program, according to Dusenberry.

“It’s hard to know the ripple effect,” he said. “It would be a major impact.”
 
Jeb said:
On the other hand, anything can perform CAS now. Hogs, UCAVs, rotors, B-52s, B-1s, F-Teens...the sophistication of modern guided munitions and designation tools and the skills and experience of the FAC community have allowed the workload to be spread far and wide. The only reason that the A-10 is still the god of the gun pass is because that's what it's built around and it's probably the most precise weapon that the Hog carries, since I don't think they're hefting Mavericks on the routine in Afghanistan.


I would highly recommend reading accounts of the A-10 applied in combat to anyone interested in this thread. "A-10s over Kosovo" in particular does illustrate the differences between the A-10 and other platforms in real world combat (and it's not the gun).
 
January 22, 2014

"Save the A-10: Give It to the Army"
by Everett Pyatt

Source:
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/01/22/save_the_a-10__give_it_to_the_army_107047.html

Many articles have been written and speeches made about the exploits and success of the A-10 fleet. It has been a phenomenal airplane in its close air support role. Support for the A-10 remains so strong that the current National Defense Authorization Act precludes additional retirements. The confirmation of the Air Force Secretary was delayed while the issue was deliberated in Congress.

Despite widespread recognition of this success, the Air Force wants to junk all 340 aircraft by 2020. In order to achieve significant savings, the Air Force must cut entire fleets, says Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh. Retiring the A-10 fleet would achieve a projected $3.7 billion in savings, a decent chunk of the $12 billion the Air Force must cut each year under sequestration.

The Air Force never wanted this aircraft from the start in the 1970s. It was designed to be a tank killer in Western Europe. Never used in this role, it became a weapon of significance killing armored vehicles in Iraq and providing close air support to ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it has never really been accepted by the Air Force. Modifications to support modern precision ordnance were slow to be installed and pilots had to use the weapon sensors to find targets, rather than cockpit displays.

The A-10’s orphan heritage is further complicated by the split custody of the aircraft between the Air Force’s active, Guard, and Reserve components. Half the A-10 fleet resides within the Air National Guard, for example.

The A-10 fleet is over 30 years old, but does not have many flying hours and will be available for many years. The design is low tech having been designed to operate from unprepared airfields. This design is still relevant in current military scenarios involving ground forces and assures that many more years of flight hours can be obtained.

Yet current plans call for the Air Force to acquire 1,743 F-35As, about 300 of which would replace the A-10. Significant testing of the F-35 ground support capabilities has yet to occur. But the multi-mission design of the aircraft is likely to reduce ground support emphasis. Pilots have to learn interdiction, air combat and defense suppression before turning to ground support techniques. It has been done with the F-16, but ground troops prefer support from the A-10 or helicopters.

At current projected prices, 300 F-35s will cost about $37 billion, and operate at much higher cost.

One alternative worthy of consideration would be to transfer the A-10 fleet to the Army with sufficient resources to operate and provide logistic support. The Army would then update the A-10 combat system to conform to Army standards. This would allow the Army to integrate the A-10 with existing attack helicopter units and provide a more cohesive close air support capability. That process might allow the Army to make reductions to attack helicopter forces. If this sounds familiar, it should. The Marines operate this way now with a combination of fixed and rotary wing aircraft with great success.

However, the 1948 Key West Agreement precludes this change. The policy paper approved by President Harry Truman after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act specifically assigned the Air Force to provide “close combat and logistical support” for the Army. Since the Agreement did not contemplate the existence of major helicopter forces, the Army was allowed to successfully pursue the military development of helicopter.

Now is the time for a bigger change that will allow the Defense Secretary to make a more thoughtful assignment of ground support responsibilities to ensure they are conducted in the most supportive manner for ground units.

Giving the Army the A-10 would allow the service to fulfill the close air support mission with a quality aircraft. Retaining the A-10 fleet would cost $3.7 billion, but it would eliminate the need for those 300 F-35As, saving the Pentagon $37 billion.

Such savings would cut about 10% of the Pentagon’s major system cost growth, estimated at $411 billion by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It would be a first step in managing the issue of cost growth the acquisition system prefers toignore.

Transfer of the A-10 fleet to the Army is a money saving action avoiding early retirement of proven ground support aircraft. The Key West Agreement should not be allowed to prevent a common sense management action.

Everett Pyatt is the Leader of the Project for Defense Management and Acquisition Leadership at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University. He is formerly Assistant Secretary of Navy and Acquisition Executive.
 
"Over the Horizon: The A-10 Battle and Military Turf Wars"
By Robert Farley, Feb. 8, 2012, Column

Source:
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11415/over-the-horizon-the-a-10-battle-and-military-turf-wars

The four-decade-and-counting saga of the A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft continued last week, when the U.S. Air Force announced that it would cut five A-10 squadrons as part of its effort to reduce costs. The 246 remaining A-10s will, according to the Air Force, continue to perform the close air support (CAS) mission until they are eventually replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Defense wonks met the announcement with a storm of criticism, but little real surprise. The long-running fight over the A-10 represents not so much a disagreement over technology, but rather a bureaucratically driven dispute over the nature of warfare.

The Air Force originally developed the A-10 as a pre-emptive strike against the Army’s planned Cheyenne attack helicopter. The Air Force worried that the Army’s use of advanced attack helicopters for CAS would simultaneously deprive the Air Force of a mission and lend the Army a hand in Congressional procurement wars. Insisting that it could do CAS better than the Army, the USAF sponsored development of the A-10, a plane capable of close anti-armor attack. Once the Cheyenne program was cancelled in development, however, the Air Force did little to hide its lack of enthusiasm for the A-10 and all that it represented. It attempted on numerous occasions to strangle the A-10, first during the procurement process, then after the end of the Cold War and finally in the early part of last decade. Army influence, Congressional pressure and popular enthusiasm for “the Warthog” repeatedly saved the fleet.

For whatever reason, the A-10 has become a people’s favorite. It graces the cover of such popular texts as Charles Gross' “American Military Aviation.” In the 1980s, it served as the inspiration for toys such as the Cobra Rattler and the Transformer Powerglide. Hollywood has also featured its anti-robot capabilities prominently, in “Transformers” and “Terminator: Salvation.”

But the Air Force comes by its contempt for the A-10 honestly, and not just for aesthetic reasons. The Air Force conceives of itself as a strategic institution dedicated to shaping the entirety of a campaign, rather than as an organization that plinks away at enemy tanks in support of ground troops. Not only does the A-10 stand outside of that self-image, it draws resources away from the Air Force’s preferred strategic mission. By contrast, the F-35 allows the Air Force to redistribute resources from what it considers the antiquated mission of close air support to the much more important, from the USAF’s point of view, strategic mission. What’s more, for the Air Force, a successful strategic campaign makes the A-10’s contribution largely irrelevant.

It’s also true that fans of the A-10 can be reluctant to acknowledge its limits. Any plane that flies low and slow over the battlefield will suffer badly against opponents with even mildly sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. Sure enough, in spite of its heavy armor, the A-10 is extremely vulnerable to ground fire. In the Gulf War, Iraqi fire quickly pushed the A-10 to medium altitudes, at which the differences in capabilities between the A-10 and the F-35 disappear. In a future that may see smaller, ever-more-deadly anti-aircraft weapons, flying at low altitude will pose ever greater risks. As for permissive environments at lower altitudes, such as those often experienced during counterinsurgency campaigns, an Embraer Super Tucano can perform many of the missions currently delegated to the A-10 at a lower cost .

However, the chances that the Air Force would ever spend money for anything other than training purposes on a platform resembling the Super Tucano approach zero. Similarly, the Air Force seems radically unlikely to risk its tremendously expensive F-35s in close air support missions that might result in them getting shot down by enemy infantry. So while proponents of the A-10 recognize that it is a limited platform, they maintain that it is the best CAS aircraft they are going to get. And in all likelihood, they are correct.

The key issue, though, is not with the benefits or drawbacks of a particular technology, but rather with long-term doctrinal disagreements between the Army and the Air Force. The serial battles over the A-10 are the consequence of a basic conflict over the nature of war: The Army believes in the destruction of the fielded forces of the enemy, while the Air Force believes in conducting strategic operations to shape, disrupt and collapse the political and organizational sinews of a target state.

However popular the A-10 might be with the rank and file in the Army, and however much it might be in accord with the Army’s vision of war, there is little if any chance that the fleet could be transferred to Army control. The Army has little interest in developing the capabilities necessary to support a fleet of A-10s, which would involve developing significant basing and maintenance requirements. The Army would also worry about accepting the expense of maintaining and operating the A-10 during a period of defense austerity. Finally, transferring the plane would mean refighting the turf battles between the Army and the Air Force that help define which platforms belong where, a prospect that no one finds appealing.

The fundamental problem exemplified by the A-10 is this: The Warthog performs a mission that sits on the boundary between two services, and boundary conflicts inevitably result in pain for one service or the other. Precisely the same kind of turf war has played out over the course of nearly 90 years in British naval aviation, where the responsibility for carrier aircraft resides with both the navy and the air force. That the A-10 has managed to survive for as long as it has while straddling this boundary is a testament to the effectiveness and quirky beauty of the aircraft. But as long as the United States maintains the current structure of its national security bureaucracy, conflicts like the A-10 battle will recur over future weapons systems, long after the last Warthog is a memory.

Dr. Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His interests include national security, military doctrine and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination. His weekly WPR column, Over the Horizon, appears every Wednesday.
 
Some interesting thoughts here...

Pilots Plan Tomorrow’s A-10
What would a next-generation replacement for the legendary attack jet look like?
Dave Majumdar in War is Boring

Short on cash and determined to prioritize new stealth warplanes, the U.S. Air Force is busily trying to rid itself of all 350 of its slow- and low-flying A-10 Warthog attack planes—this despite the heavily-armed twin-engine jet’s impressive combat record stretching back to the 1991 Gulf War.

But the flying branch still needs to support American troops on the ground—the Warthog’s raison d’etre. With that in mind, around 20 highly experienced A-10 pilots and engineers are working on unofficial specifications for a successor to the Warthog.

The group started off with using the original A-X program requirements that resulted in the Warthog starting nearly 50 years ago. Even though technology has advanced since the 1960s, the fundamentals of what is required for the close air support mission have not changed.

“There is a lot that can be made better than the A-10,” says Pierre Sprey, a former Pentagon official and aerospace engineer who originated the Warthog concept. “There is simply no question that we can make it better. The airplane was in a lot of ways a disappointment to me because of where it came out.”

That said, the A-10 is by far the most survivable aircraft for the low-altitude, low speed CAS mission. But almost every aspect of the A-10 can be vastly improved using modern materials and construction techniques, Sprey says.

But be careful! The key to producing a new warplane quickly, on time and to budget is to use the best existing tech rather than trying to invent entirely new hardware and software.


A-10 releasing decoy flares. Air Force photo
Matching the Warthog
The basic requirements for a “Warthog 2.0" are that it retains the Warthog’s current capabilities. “These are the things we hold as the minimum requirements going forward in kind of a follow-on CAS platform,” says one of the two A-10 pilots leading the group behind the prospective Warthog replacement project. “The slow speed and tight turn radius is what allows us to get below the weather and have a rapid rate of re-attack especially with the flexibility of the gun.”

As such, in a next-generation CAS aircraft, the pilot must have good visibility—which is why a round, expansive “bubble” canopy is crucial. “In an air-to-ground mode, being able to look out over your shoulder and behind you—not at threats, but the ground you just attacked or to keep an eye on the friendlies is a critical capability,” the A-10 pilot says.

Because CAS missions often take place at very low altitudes and low airspeeds—anywhere from 150 knots to 300 knots—the aircraft must be able to perform a two-G sustained turn at a rate of five degrees per second with a turn radius of no more than 2,000 feet.

The instantaneous turn rate—that is, how quickly a plane can wheel around in the first few seconds of a maneuver—would have to be better than 20 degrees per second while pulling six Gs. The aircraft must also be able to remain less than one mile from a target between attacks while pulling no more than two Gs—except for the roll-in to the attack and the time its leaving the area.

“The tight turn is important so that we can not only operate in a narrow valley if we need to, but lets says it’s reduced visibility, and we’re kinda poking our way through that visibility, the ability to do that slowly and being able to turn when you see a big hill coming is important,” the pilot says.

But one of the A-10’s major shortcomings is its anemic twin General Electric TF-34 turbofan engines. A follow-on aircraft must have a lot more thrust.

“The number-one problem with the A-10 is that we’re underpowered,” according to the pilot. “We need a way to get our airspeed back quicker and we need the ability to take-off at max gross weight at high-density altitudes.”

The A-10 cannot take off at its maximum weight in Afghanistan and must either off-load weapons or fuel. The next-generation aircraft must be able climb out of a runway at maximum gross weight at a rate of the 4,000 feet per minute at a density altitude of 20,000 feet.

Further, it must be able to operate out of a 3,000-foot runway at sea-level with a full fuel load and an internal gun. Ideally, it should be able to operate out of austere 1,500-foot runways.

A cruise speed of at least 360 knots is desirable, a pilot says. Initially, the group believed that it would be best for a next-gen aircraft to cruise at 480 knots with a dash speed of 540 knots. However, with Sprey’s input, the team came to the conclusion that such a requirement would be aerodynamically incompatible with a tight turn radius at low airspeed.

“What we need and don’t have is the capability to rapidly get airspeed back after an attack,” the pilot says. “Also, while airspeed can help response time, it’s loiter time that really makes response faster because it allows you to be at the battlefield, ready to attack.”

Thus, the prospective aircraft needs to have a minimum combat radius of 150 nautical miles with at least four hours on station time with internal fuel, the pilot explains.


An A-10 fires its gun. Air Force photo
Arming the new plane
The new aircraft would have to be able to make a minimum of 20 attacks on infantry targets or 11 attacks on tanks during a single sortie. With precision-guided rockets, the new aircraft could potentially increase those numbers by an order of magnitude.

Additionally, the Warthog 2.0 would also need to be able to track and kill moving targets from ranges greater than eight nautical miles while flying at altitudes above 20,000 feet.

To accomplish this the new aircraft would need to carry 15,000 pounds of weapons ranging from general purpose unguided bombs to cluster munitions, laser-guided bombs and GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions.

It would also have to be able to fire 2.75-inch rockets—ideally something like the laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System—plus at least six anti-tank missiles similar to today’s Maverick.

The aircraft would also need to be able to carry both versions of the 250-pound Small Diameter Bomb and potentially the AIM-9X air-to-air missile for self-defense. Ideally, it could be fitted with the AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missile, as well—but that’s not necessarily crucial.

But it is imperative that the aircraft carry a gun similar to the General Electric GAU-8 30-millimeter cannon installed on the A-10.

In terms of avionics, a next-generation aircraft would have to have all of the capabilities found on the modernized A-10C. The upgraded Warthog already has advanced data-links including the Situation Awareness Data Link and Variable Message Format link. It also has a direction finder to zero in on and interrogate pilot survival radios.

The new aircraft should have better terrain avoidance systems and improved displays in the cockpit. It should also be equipped with a better targeting pod, such as a Litening Gen IV or another such system with a video data-link.

The new aircraft would also need to retain a helmet-mounted display capability similar or better than the Thales Genetex Scorpion that is currently mounted on the A-10.

In a perfect world, the Warthog 2.0 would also have a 360-degree infrared sensor capability and a terrain following radar. It would be fitted with a next-gen data-link, the pilot says.

In terms of survivability, any next-generation CAS aircraft must have two engines and multiple redundant systems that can take a number of hits, the pilot points out. The aircraft must be able to withstand impacts from small arms such as 7.62-millimeter and 14.5-millimeter machine guns and even 23-millimeter cannon fire.

It should also be able survive a hit from a man-portable air-defense missile like the SA-18.

The Warthog 2.0 should be equipped with advanced missile warning sensors and the latest digital radio frequency memory jammers to elude the larger and more capable surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-19. “We want to be able to defeat the latest, greatest, common SAMs we might encounter on the battlefield,” the pilot says.

The A-10 pilot cautions that many of the items on the wish list are placeholders. Some of the capabilities might not be compatible with an affordable and effective aircraft design—though the goal would be to field a plane with a unit price of less than $20 million and costing less than $15,000 per flight hour to operate.

Of course, instead of developing a new plane to succeed the A-10, the Air Force could simply keep the Warthogs it’s got.

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/833a05de6fae
 
I don't foresee the United States Air Force rushing out and buying the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano to replace the remaining Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft in inventory. I wonder if the retirement of the A-10 by the United States Air Force could be good news for the United States Army Aviation Branch and their efforts to acquire compound rotorcraft? Could the Sikorsky S-97 Raider light tactical helicopter also perform the close air support (CAS) missions asked of the A-10 without the Key West Agreement turf battles with the United States Air Force? Compound rotorcraft working in concert with United States Air Force multi-role fighters?
 
cluttonfred said:
Some interesting thoughts here...
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/833a05de6fae

I am just not sure if the Attack Experimental (A-X) program that gave us the A-10 Thunderbolt II was intended by the United States Air Force to kill the United State Army's Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS) program that developed the cancelled AH-56 Cheyenne. It's very difficult to remove the A-10 from the politics of the Key West Agreement of 1948, the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, and the turf battle between the United States Air Force and the United States Army Aviation Branch. I've also read that the A-X program was in response to criticism that the United States Air Force did not take the Close Air Support (CAS) mission seriously. It just makes you wonder if sequestration is just being used as an excuse for the service to rid itself of an aircraft it never really wanted for a mission it doesn't want to perform.
 
Does the United States Marine Corps also call on the Air Force A-10 for close air support (CAS)? Or do the Marines rely on the AV-8B Harrier II, the AH-1 Cobra, and the other air assets of Marine Corps Aviation?
 
Triton said:
Does the United States Marine Corps also call on the Air Force A-10 for close air support (CAS)? Or do the Marines rely on the AV-8B Harrier II, the AH-1 Cobra, and the other air assets of Marine Corps Aviation?


Marines (and US Army) will call upon what ever is available at the time - be that a helicopter, an artillery round, an A-10, a Harrier or even a B-1B.
 
Triton said:
I am just not sure if the Attack Experimental (A-X) program that gave us the A-10 Thunderbolt II was intended by the United States Air Force to kill the United State Army's Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS) program that developed the cancelled AH-56 Cheyenne.

Actually, part of the reason the A-10 (A-X) was developed is that the USAF saw how much money the Cheyenne was going to take out of the defense budget and they didn't like that much of the defense budget going to the Army, because it meant less money for them (The USAF). At least according to the books I have on the Cheyenne. By the same token, the USAF has never really liked the A-10 (AX), because it came from the same group that gave us the F-16 (LWF), because the USAF tends to have the "Not invented here" syndrome, in terms of the brass at the Pentagon.
 
GTX said:
Triton said:
Does the United States Marine Corps also call on the Air Force A-10 for close air support (CAS)? Or do the Marines rely on the AV-8B Harrier II, the AH-1 Cobra, and the other air assets of Marine Corps Aviation?


Marines (and US Army) will call upon what ever is available at the time - be that a helicopter, an artillery round, an A-10, a Harrier or even a B-1B.

I wanted to verify considering that we don't seem to hear from the Marine Corps concerning the A-10 debate.
 
Sundog said:
Triton said:
I am just not sure if the Attack Experimental (A-X) program that gave us the A-10 Thunderbolt II was intended by the United States Air Force to kill the United State Army's Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS) program that developed the cancelled AH-56 Cheyenne.

Actually, part of the reason the A-10 (A-X) was developed is that the USAF saw how much money the Cheyenne was going to take out of the defense budget and they didn't like that much of the defense budget going to the Army, because it meant less money for them (The USAF). At least according to the books I have on the Cheyenne. By the same token, the USAF has never really liked the A-10 (AX), because it came from the same group that gave us the F-16 (LWF), because the USAF tends to have the "Not invented here" syndrome, in terms of the brass at the Pentagon.

While money is part of it, the big reason USAF pushed the A-10 vigorously was the ol' "roles and missions" bugaboo. In their view, the proper roles for armed helos were primarily as escorts for other helicopters and limited engagement of enemy troops. You'll find that initially USAF treated Cheyenne with profound indifference, as long as it was to operate in its "proper" place. However, when Army started talking abut how they could use AH-56A for organic CAS, and especially when it was mooted that with the pusher prop in Beta the Cheyenne could dive bomb, AF went ballistic and started lobbying against the craft, saying that that role belonged to USAF and with the upcoming A-10 they had everything the Army should need and so there was no need for Cheyenne and it should be killed.

They were caught flatfooted when Army canceled Cheyenne on its own
 
To my opinion, armies today are more managed like commercial enterprises and to a certain extent
they actually have to be. And looking at the A-10 from a commercial standpoint probably shows
only very few capabilites, that cannot be found with other aircraft and those few may hardly be
worth the additional expenditures ! According to a Time magazine article the prices for a flight hour
of an A-10 are around 18,000,- $, compared to around 23,000,- $ for an F-16C ( http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/ ) .
Quite a difference on first glance, but not that much if looking at other combat aircraft. It's mentioned,
that those are costs for "ownership, including modifications", so costs for the special infrastructure
needed for a type probably are included. Such infrastructure has its price, even if that type of aircraft
wouldn't fly for a single hour ! And if tasks are taken over by another type, those costs could be shared
by a larger number of aircraft. It's not new, that the "Armed forces managers" dream would be the
"transport fighter", multi-role capable and if possible based on off-the-shelf types.
And to preempt that argument: Nowadays soldier is just another cost factor in the calculations of
those in charge !
About replacing the A-10 by helicopters : AFAIK the costs per flight hour for helicopters were always
much beyond those of fixed wing aircraft, their purchase price higher and their performance lower,
than that of comparable (mainly with regards to payload) aircraft. The only point they naturally
excel is the ability to hover, not really needed for CAS. So replacing the A-10 with, say the S-97
Raider would just mean replacing one exotic species by another, quite probably even more expensive
one, I'm afraid !
 
An issue with the A-10 debate is that there is no consensus among decision makers and the United States military over what the "real" Close Air Support mission is. Further, there is still disagreement over whether the F-35 can adequately replace the A-10 and if the retirement of the A-10 creates a gap in capability. Does this capability gap increase the burden on other elements in the United States military? With the retirement of the A-10 is the United States Air Force shifting some of the responsibility for the BOT CAS mission to the United States Army Aviation Branch and United States Marine Corps Aviation? Increasing the burden on existing rotary-wing assets? Proponents of the F-35, and the previous A-16 and F/A-16, argue that the A-10 is an obsolete and highly vulnerable aircraft. No gap in capability will exist with the types retirement when the F-35 enters service. The efforts to save the A-10 are sentimental attachment to the aircraft and represent old-fashioned, or incorrect, thinking concerning the CAS mission and a need for the aircraft does not exist? Which is correct?

If the United States Air Force does send the entire A-10 fleet to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, will the aircraft be placed in long-term storage for possible re-activation or will they be dismantled and sold for scrap? Since the entire fleet of A-10 aircraft will be sent to the "Boneyard", I presume the latter will be the fate of the A-10.
 
Jemiba said:
To my opinion, armies today are more managed like commercial enterprises and to a certain extent
they actually have to be. And looking at the A-10 from a commercial standpoint probably shows
only very few capabilites, that cannot be found with other aircraft and those few may hardly be
worth the additional expenditures ! According to a Time magazine article the prices for a flight hour
of an A-10 are around 18,000,- $, compared to around 23,000,- $ for an F-16C ( http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/ ) .
Quite a difference on first glance, but not that much if looking at other combat aircraft. It's mentioned,
that those are costs for "ownership, including modifications", so costs for the special infrastructure
needed for a type probably are included. Such infrastructure has its price, even if that type of aircraft
wouldn't fly for a single hour ! And if tasks are taken over by another type, those costs could be shared
by a larger number of aircraft. It's not new, that the "Armed forces managers" dream would be the
"transport fighter", multi-role capable and if possible based on off-the-shelf types.
And to preempt that argument: Nowadays soldier is just another cost factor in the calculations of
those in charge !
About replacing the A-10 by helicopters : AFAIK the costs per flight hour for helicopters were always
much beyond those of fixed wing aircraft, their purchase price higher and their performance lower,
than that of comparable (mainly with regards to payload) aircraft. The only point they naturally
excel is the ability to hover, not really needed for CAS. So replacing the A-10 with, say the S-97
Raider would just mean replacing one exotic species by another, quite probably even more expensive
one, I'm afraid !

It doesn't seem like losses of personnel and equipment are being factored into these cost per flight hour calculations when comparing the A-10 to the F-16C. By reducing the discussion to cost per flight hour presumes that the A-10 and the F-16C are identical in capability and survivability. Costs of "ownership, including modifications" calculations presume that missions were completed successfully with the return of aircraft and personnel.
 
Even if just sent to "long-term storage", this would mean losing the proficiency of the pilots and
mechanics and the job would be done by other aircraft in the meantime. For dropping smart
weapons on demand other aircraft would be more suitable either (no real fighter type aircraft
needed !), and for standard strafing attacks the GAU-8/A quite probably is oversized anyway
and without doubt much more expensive, than the Vulcan or 12.7 mm gun, which in most cases
will be absolutely sufficient. If there really is a wall to shatter, use an SDB instead.
There will be no real "capability gap" due to the retirement of the A-10, as otherwise other aircraft
would have to be decommissioned. It's a decision as recommended to many companies facing financial
difficulties by management consultants. And there's rarely room for nostalgia !
Are there numbers about losses of F-16 and A-10 in the CAS role ?
 
I keep going back to what quelish said in the other A-10 discussion topic:

quellish said:
The A-16 was intended to operate as a direct replacement for the A-10 for BOT attacks under a variety of controls, and as a FAC(A) replacing the OA-10. During low altitude combat the greatest threat to aircraft surviviability is the terrain. That threat increases with speed. More speed means more room is needed to maneuver, and there is less time for a pilot to react. It also means less time to observe a target and less time to conduct a pass on a target. These factors affected the performance of the Falcon as a direct replacement for the Hog.

The Falcon had a number of techical issues with the gun, avonics, and software - mostly issues that probably could have been resolved within a few years. The aircrews flying them had previous CAS and FAC experience and provided detailed feedback. The Falcon was not a good fit for this role even if the technical problems were resolved. For this and other reasons, DoD dropped the A-16 project.

Today there are again efforts to "replace" the A-10 with another platform similar to the F-16. It seems that daylight BOT and type 1 JTAC/FAC control will be relegated to rotary wing assets, with the "replacement" platform performing BOC at high altitude (in CAS terms, 8k and above is "high") - making it just another bomb truck rather than a replacement for the A-10 or OA-10 in terms of capability. The F/A-16 would have been similar as it was not intended as a *direct* replacement for the A-10.

As far as CAS in contested enviroments, current DoD joint doctrine does specify air superiority (including SEAD) as a condition for effective CAS as well as recommendations for CAS operations in nonpermissive environments (including "don't" and ). Low altitude threats from MANPADs and AAA are discussed separately as post-DESERT STORM these are generally assumed to always be present.
In general CAS is rarely conducted without control of the air, and low level is always presumed to be a high threat environment (though not from radar guided threats).

and this:

quellish said:
Triton said:
Is the current rotary wing fleet capable of adequately performing most BOT CAS missions if the A-10 is retired? Or does this mission require the speed of a fixed wing aircraft?


Depends on who you ask.
When the Army shifted to AirLand Battle doctrine, the Army decided to use rotary wing aircraft for CAS with the Air Force's role being diminished. Instead, the Air Force was going to focus more on "battlefield interdiction" and the more traditional air interdiction.
Air interdiction is the application of air power against enemy military potential before it can be used against friendly ground forces. This can be things like enemy supply depots, other fixed targets, etc.
Battlefield air interdiction is applying air power against enemy forces before they can close with an engage friendly ground forces. For example, hitting the Republican Guard before they find friendly forces.
So the Army would have been using rotary wing forces in the CAS role, while the Air Force would have a more limited CAS role and focus on AI and BAI to hit the enemy before they moved forward to the ground fight.


Today CAS is a mixed bag of different assets across different services. Rotary wing aircraft certainly do a lot of CAS, but they are extremely vulnerable to ground fire ranging from small arms on up. They have limited range, can't in flight refuel, and have limited speed. Removing a CAS asset like the A-10 creates a gap. To fill that gap more rotary wing assets and support would be needed to cover the same battlefield. More helicopters, more FARPs. The BOT mission doesn't *require* speed, but speed gets the asset to the fight faster and lets it cover more ground.
 
"Senate Panel Dodges A-10 Retirement Decision"
By Brendan McGarry Tuesday, May 20th, 2014 2:16 pm

Source:
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/05/20/senate-panel-dodges-a-10-retirement-decision/

A U.S. Senate subcommittee approved its part of the annual defense bill without deciding on the fate of the A-10 attack plane.

The Air Force in its fiscal 2015 budget request proposed retiring its fleet of the Cold War-era planes, known officially as the Thunderbolt II and unofficially as the Warthog. The service estimates it will save about $4.2 billion over five years by divesting the almost 300 A-10s that remain in the inventory.

A bipartisan group of lawmakers, including Sens. Carl Levin, D-Michigan, Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, and Kelly Ayotte, R-New Hampshire, oppose the idea because, they say, other aircraft as the F-35 fighter jet can’t provide ground troops with the same kind of close air support.

Levin disagrees with counterparts in the House who proposed raiding the Pentagon’s war budget to keep the gunships from being sent to the bone yard. Thus, it’s likely the A-10 will stay in the fleet, at least for now, once lawmakers settle on an appropriate offset in the budget.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Connecticut, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Airland Subcommittee, on Tuesday led a vote in approving the panel’s amended version of the Fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act without specifying plans for the Warthog.

The closest he came was when he said the bill would “place temporary restrictions on the disposition of Air Force aircraft.” A spokesman for the subcommittee referred questions about the aircraft to a spokeswoman for the senator, who didn’t immediately respond to an e-mail and telephone call requesting comment.

The full Senate Armed Services Committee is expected to begin amending, or marking up, the defense legislation in a closed session on Wednesday.

The panel’s senior Republican, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Mississippi, said of the process, “There’s still a ways to go to produce a defense budget that is based on our national security interests and the threats to those interests. We face no shortages of challenges with this budget.”

Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh have repeatedly pressed the lawmakers to let the service retire the aircraft to better cope with automatic budget cuts known as sequestration.

The service considered other options to scale back fleets of other aircraft, including the F-15 and F-16 fighter jets and the B-1 bomber, Welsh said in a speech last month at the National Press Club. But ultimately, it determined that scrapping the almost 300 A-10s would be the least harmful to military operations, he said.

“We came very clearly with the conclusion that of all those horrible options, the least operationally impactful was to divest the A-10,” said Welsh, who previously piloted the aircraft. “That how we got there. It’s not emotional. It’s logical. It’s analytical. It makes imminent sense from a military perspective.”
 
"Retiring the A-10 Early Puts Troops' Lives at Risk"
By Senators Kelly Ayotte, John McCain & Saxby Chambliss
April 9, 2014

Source:
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/04/09/the_air_forces_early_retirement_plan_for_the_a-10_puts_troops_lives_at_risk_107180.html

When we send our troops into harm’s way, we have a solemn obligation to ensure they have the very best support possible so they can accomplish their missions and return home safely.

This is certainly true when it comes to close air support (CAS) aircraft, which provide ground troops with the decisive firepower they need when they are engaged in close contact with the enemy.

Ask any soldier which aircraft provides the best CAS, and they’ll tell you it’s the combat-proven A-10.

Last week, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno, reiterated his belief that the A-10 is “the best close air support aircraft” and confirmed that the Army did not recommend that the Air Force retire the A-10. He said, “our soldiers are very confident in the system.”

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Campbell, calls the A-10 a “game changer.”

The A-10 was certainly a game changer last July in Afghanistan when enemy forces ambushed a convoy. Enemy forces had injured three soldiers and the rest were pinned down behind vehicles as they received a large amount of fire from nearby trees and surrounding terrain.

At one point during the two hour fire fight, enemy forces were close enough to engage the soldiers with grenades and helicopters could not be called in to evacuate the injured. When the A-10 arrived on the scene, it flew 75 feet above the enemy position, conducted 15 gun passes within 50 meters of friendly ground forces, and used its famous 30 millimeter nose cannon to fire 2,300 rounds.

The performance of the A-10 that day saved the lives of 60 Americans.

There is no doubt that the Air Force confronts difficult budget decisions. But cutting the Air Force’s most combat-effective and cost-efficient CAS aircraft is an odd way to save money.

The A-10 is the most cost efficient CAS aircraft in the Air Force inventory. According to the Air Force, the operational cost per flying hour for the A-10—which takes into account sustainment costs—is well below the F-15E, F-16, B-1, AC-130, or the B-52.

The Air Force’s response is that it can’t afford to maintain the single mission aircraft.

While the A-10 has other primary missions, it is true that the A-10 and its pilots focus on the CAS mission and this mission may not be as glamorous to some as the air superiority mission. But, as the 60 soldiers from the engagement in Afghanistan last summer undoubtedly would attest, CAS is a particularly important mission.

The Air Force responds that other aircraft (such as the F-15, F-16, or B-1) can cover the CAS mission for the A-10—emphasizing that these aircraft conduct the majority of CAS missions.

There is no doubt that other aircraft have a role to play.

But as most soldiers will tell you, there are different kinds of CAS. Dropping a precision munition from thousands of feet in the air on a stationary target looking at a video display is not the same as conducting strafing runs at 75 feet in bad weather or rough terrain against a moving target that is within a few dozen meters of friendly troops.

The ability to operate low within eyesight of the ground engagement is part of the reason the A-10 has a faster re-attack time compared to other aircraft. It is also part of the reason why the A-10 is especially good at avoiding fratricide and civilian casualties.

If policymakers confuse these two types of CAS missions, we do so at the peril of our ground troops in future conflicts.

It is important to recognize that the proposal to retire the A-10 fleet is, like the plan to dramatically decrease Army end strength, based upon broader assumptions regarding the types of conflicts the nation may face in the future – namely, that we will no longer be engaged in protracted land wars.

While we certainly hope that assumption is accurate, as former Defense Secretary Gates warned, “In the 40 years since Vietnam, we have a perfect record in predicting where we will use military force next: We’ve never once gotten it right. If you think about it, from Grenada to Haiti to Somalia to Panama to Iraq twice to Afghanistan to Libya twice, the Balkans and so on – in not one of those cases did we have any hint six months ahead of the start of hostilities that we were going to have military forces in those places.”

In a world that is more unstable and less predictable, the proposal to eliminate the A-10 before an adequate replacement achieves full operational capability is dangerously short-sighted.

Students of history understand that. Perhaps that is one reason why General Odierno has said “Obviously we prefer the A-10” and that multi-role aircraft are “not quite the same as the A-10 with…ground forces.”

We have a responsibility to ensure our ground troops in the next conflict receive the best possible CAS so they can accomplish their missions and return home to their families.

When we fail to fulfill that responsibility, the cost is measured in the lives of our troops.

That is why we will continue to oppose the Air Force’s proposed premature divestment of the A-10 until an equally effective replacement reaches full operational capability.

With the lives of our brave soldiers on the line, we owe them nothing less.

Senators Ayotte, McCain, and Chambliss serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
 
"Critics accuse Air Force of manipulating data to support A-10 retirement"
by Dan Sagalyn May 22, 2014 at 2:50 PM EDT

Source:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/critics-accuse-air-force-manipulating-data-support-10-retirement/

Over the past five months, Air Force leaders have pointed to one key fact while advocating for their controversial decision to retire the A-10 Warthog, an aircraft specifically designed to provide support to ground troops. The service’s top leaders say the vast majority of so-called “close air support” missions conducted in Afghanistan since 2006 have been flown by a variety of aircraft that are not A-10s. Specifically, the leaders say that the 80 percent of these missions conducted by aircraft other than the Warthog shows that a variety of aircraft can do the critical mission of reinforcing ground forces with firepower from the air.

However, a number of observers challenge the Air Force’s claim that 80 percent of close air support missions are really conducted by non-A-10 planes. These observers assert that the service has deliberately manipulated the data to support its case.

The plan to retire the A-10 has sparked a firestorm of criticism from members of Congress, A-10 pilots and airmen whose job is to embed with ground forces and call in air strikes.

In fact, Congress is well on the way to rejecting the Air Force’s plans. The House of Representatives passed legislation Thursday, rejecting sending the A-10s to the boneyard. The Senate is expected to do the same.

The Air Force says it can save $4.2 billion over the next five years by retiring the fleet of 350 A-10s. The savings would be plowed into other aircraft that can perform a variety of missions, including close air support.

And, in making the case to retire the A-10, the one number that comes up time and again at congressional hearings is this: 80 percent.

“Eighty percent of what we have done in close air support in Afghanistan has been by aircraft other than A-10,” Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James told the House Armed Services Committee in March.

Building on this statement, Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh has said, “We’ve flown a number of close air support missions with multiple airplanes,” including the B-1 bomber, F-15E, and F-16.

Also included in the 80 percent are FA-18s, Reaper and Predator drones, along with AC-130s gun ships and AV-8Bs.

The PBS NewsHour asked the Air Force about the basis for the 80 percent figure. The NewsHour shared the Air Force answers with A-10 supporters and those who advocate retiring the aircraft. The complete exchange can be viewed in the document linked here.
“This is a classic case of using numbers as propaganda for some bureaucratic position.” “This 80 percent number is a total fabrication,” said Pierre Sprey, one of the key designers of the A-10 in the 1960s and 1970s. Sprey has recently been lobbying Congress to save the aircraft. “This is a classic case of using numbers as propaganda for some bureaucratic position.”

Among the data the Air Force provided was a breakdown of the number close air support sorties flown between 2010 to 1014: 121,653. Also included was the number of sorties with at least one weapon released: 8,691.

Sprey notes that of the 121,653 close air support missions conducted, “93 percent of them never drop a weapon.” Sprey says the Air Force is “counting a whole lot of fluff.”

“The Air Force is counting these missions or these activities in a way that biases strongly against the A-10,” said Winslow Wheeler, a former congressional staffer with more than three decades of experience working for both Democrats and Republicans. Wheeler is now with the Project On Government Oversight, a non-profit watchdog organization.

The Air Force is “not counting sorties where actual munitions delivery actually occurs,” he said. And they are “not distinguishing” between bombing fixed points on the ground from 20,000 feet and supporting troops that are moving while under fire from an enemy in close proximity. Wheeler said it is in situations like this “that really count” and where the A-10 outperforms all other aircraft.
A photo composite shows an A-10 Warthog executing a roll. Photo by Wally Argus/Flickr.

A photo composite shows an A-10 Warthog executing a roll. Photo by Wally Argus/Flickr.

The 80 percent figure was generated by the Air Force’s headquarters in the Middle East, called Air Force Central Command or “AFCENT” for short. The director of public affairs at the command, Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis, wrote in an email to the NewsHour that “AFCENT hasn’t made statements against the A-10, and we aren’t collecting data to make an argument against the A-10.”

The information about the number of missions flown is gathered by Air Force officers in order to help plan operations, the public affairs official wrote.

“The data is collected and used over time to determine how many of what type of aircraft are needed at any given time or place to support the requirements established by joint commanders. AFCENT does not collect or use its data to propose or make changes to the Air Force’s force structure; that is the Air Force’s job,” Sholtis wrote. “If we were selectively collecting or providing data to make an operational case against the A-10, there’s other data (such as response time, loiter time, and total munitions available) that could better make that case. Our collection of data on CAS [close air support] missions flown predates Air Force proposals to divest the A-10 fleet.”

The Air Force spokesman defended his service’s counting of close air support missions flown that did not result in bombs being dropped. Sholtis stressed that having aircraft fly overhead and be available to ground commanders when they were needed was important.

“The purpose of most CAS missions is to have capable forces ready when coalition forces on the ground need airpower,” Sholtis said.

The spokesman also emphasized the positive psychological impact of close air support missions in which no bombs are dropped.

“Measures of kinetic activity alone don’t capture events where aircraft presence was sufficient to deter attackers — which can be the better outcome in COIN [counterinsurgency] operations,” Sholtis explained in an email. “Actions like shows of force or armed overwatch of ground forces are legitimate and effective forms of CAS.” Shows of force are when aircraft fly overhead, making their presence known and signaling to the enemy — sometimes by dropping flares — that they might get bombed.

But counting shows of force is stretching the definition of close air support, according to retired Chief Master Sergeant Russell Carpenter, a 30-year veteran and specialist in leading troops who call in air strikes. When you “look up the definition of close air support, shows of force doesn’t fit in there.” Carpenter said what the Air Force has “done is said there are a variety of ways we achieve air-to-ground effects. But guess what, call that something else. But it is not close air support.”

Another controversial aspect in the way the 80 percent number was generated is the time frame of when close air support missions are counted. According to Air Force data released to the NewsHour, the service counted missions flown between 2006 and October 2013.

The Air Force told the NewsHour “unfortunately we do not have information prior to 2006 available in our AFCENT Combined Air Operations Center database.” Other Air Force officers who asked that their names not be used in this article, because they were not authorized to speak publicly, also told the NewsHour that the Air Force has not maintained records from before 2006.

But critics are skeptical.

“The date 2006 was not picked by accident,” said Sprey, the A-10 aircraft designer.

From March 2002 to December 2006, the only fixed-wing aircraft that could operate from the austere and dilapidated runways in Afghanistan were A-10s, according to the Air Force. Sprey believes counting close air support missions beginning in 2006 is suspect because that time period marks the point when different types of aircraft were beginning to operate out of the newly improved runways in Afghanistan.

“Before 2006, they couldn’t even get fighters into Afghanistan, they couldn’t land anywhere,” Sprey said. “They were totally dependent on the A-10 before and they don’t want to admit that, so they don’t tell you about it before 2006.”

Another basis for the 80 percent number that has come under fire is the manner in which actual missions are counted. Fighter and attack aircraft such as F-15s, F-16s and A-10s take off in pairs, but the two aircraft are only counted as one mission. Oftentimes, A-10s and other planes split up and conduct operations independently of one another.

Meanwhile, B-1 bombers, and Predator and Reaper drones, which always fly by themselves, are also counted as one mission.

Several observers say this methodology undervalues the “double-duty” contributions of A-10s, and overvalues the B-1 bombers and drones when they fly CAS missions.

Defending the counting methodology, the Air Force says if it “counted each aircraft in a two-ship A-10 formation as one CAS mission, you also would be increasing the numbers associated with other fighters that fly as two ships,” such as F-15, F-16 and FA-18s, according to Lt. Col. Sholtis. “So the increase in A-10 numbers as a ratio of total missions flown would not be as dramatic as some might expect.”

“There is no perfect metric for comparing the combat effectiveness of different aircraft,” said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow for Defense Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “This is not ideal, but on the whole I think it is fair because it treats all fighters the same. Moreover, B-1s should be treated differently because they carry a much larger payload, can stay on station longer, and thus can do the job of more than one fighter. So while missions flown is not a perfect metric, I think it is a relatively fair metric.”

Harrison agreed with the Air Force’s overall argument: that many different types of aircraft can do the close air support missions and that the A-10 should be retired because of budget constraints.

“The supporters of the A-10 have the burden of proof to show what unique CAS capabilities the A-10 has that cannot be provided by any of these other platforms,” he said in an email response to questions. “Moreover, they need to make the case that these unique capabilities are important enough to justify the cost.”
 
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/e93d0a33f4a6

Winslow Wheeler - look how he makes these 'definitive' statements about the F-35. It can't do this, it will cost to much, can't be maintained, etc. I wonder what he is basing this on the 20 years of combat operations of the F-35?
 
Well it looks like the A-10 has been spared, along with the U-2. There is apparently some intelligence left in Washington.
 
circle-5 said:
There is apparently some intelligence left in Washington.

Such comments aren't helpful in this discussion. It just succeeds in raising the hackles of proponents of the retirement of the A-10 and U-2, name calling, and locked topics.
 
It is very hard not to let angst creep into the discussion. If Congress were to ask the people that CAS is suppose to support, there would be an 80 % number. They would tell you the A-10 is THE aircraft for the mission. Not surprisingly the USAF is not asking them. Frankly it frost me that they would have the audacity to consider a flyby a CAS sortie. In fairness using questionable statistics is not the exclusive purview of the USAF in answering to Congress.

I think it is time for the entire mission to be reviewed. Army Aviation executed FAR more close combat attack missions in the same period no matter what missions you count toward USAF CAS. If you count 'fly by' as CAS then every Apache and Kiowa Warrior sortie meets the criterion. They at least spend their mission close in to the fight (< 1000 vice >20,000). Why use a Mk 82 in close proximity to troops when all you need is 2.75 inch rocket or 30mm cannon. There are of course times when a large bomb is called for however any soldier can control close combat attack missions. Not so with CAS. Close Combat Attack is THE primary mission of Army attack aviation rotorcraft, not a multipurpose component.

So while I hate to see the A-10 go, I see it (as most do in the Army) as an an acknowledgement that it USAF again sees CAS as a secondary mission against other missions. Maybe it should be. Just don't rail against someone else trying to fill the gap.
 
Not an expert, which probably disqualifies my opinion, but...


The A-10 type platform has inherent advantages from its lack of speed and big wings in providing CAS that sticks around and owns the sky. Psychologically I think even if the F-35 does the same job of delivering ordnance on the enemy but from an invisible whizz-bang flyby at 30K, it won't have the same benefit.


What's more comforting in a fight, your buddy on your shoulder or a mobile phone and the same friend in a nearby bar on speed dial?


However, doing CAS the A-10 way in inherently more risky, especially if the enemy has modern air defence equipment. In a real fighting war of equals, the benefits of the A-10 approach may outway the risks. In limited wars, every pilot lost is a potential PR disaster.


If I was in charge, I'd look at a big wing loitering UCAV approach to CAS, able own the sky over a battlefield without risking a pilot. The right balance of low cost and survivability would be key. Not an easy balance to make.
 
I've said it before, the past ten years have done us the disservice of thinking that a visible slow loitering platform over the battlefield is OK and survivable. "Stay around and scare the bad guys" is a poor design strategy to use when looking at force structure for the next twenty years.


The USAF got way more value out of the A-10 than they probably ever expected to.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
Not an expert, which probably disqualifies my opinion, but...


However, doing CAS the A-10 way in inherently more risky, especially if the enemy has modern air defence equipment. In a real fighting war of equals, the benefits of the A-10 approach may outway the risks. In limited wars, every pilot lost is a potential PR disaster.


If I was in charge, I'd look at a big wing loitering UCAV approach to CAS, able own the sky over a battlefield without risking a pilot. The right balance of low cost and survivability would be key. Not an easy balance to make.


I agree Overscan, big wing UCAV might work but...
When UCAV vulnerabilities are exploited (jamming, microwaves, etc) it seems that you still end up needing something like the A-10. It's dangerous and dirty and that's exactly the contingencies it was made for. But for the sake of funding and progress rest assured all A-10 haters you'll get exactly what you want and the consequences that will follow. I see an A-10 follow on in my crystal ball, Pilot optional, Depending on how good the F-35 turns out.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
What's more comforting in a fight, your buddy on your shoulder or a mobile phone and the same friend in a nearby bar on speed dial?

If I was in charge, I'd look at a big wing loitering UCAV approach to CAS, able own the sky over a battlefield without risking a pilot. The right balance of low cost and survivability would be key. Not an easy balance to make.

There's that dichotomy between close enough to scary and close enough to touch. If laser/DEW self defense becomes feasible (as proposed for Predator C?), it might allow an A-10 style platform to reenter the game in a MANPADS/SAM environment, but it won't protect you from AAA/ground fire unless you really up the wattage and heatsink. Which hails back to overlapping mission issues as well. Do infantry want/need something that provides near constant overwatch and tags along, like a UCAV helicopter gunship pet, something more like CAS now with SHTF button on their cellphones to call up some sort of taxi rank UCAV swarm that is generally patrolling near infantry like an aerial netfires, or something way up that's a bigger platform on call like a B-1 stuffed with SDB's.

That AIAA student design called Firefox, with 40mm CTA guns and a guided round 155mm cannon as an optionally manned concept sounds like a possible "show the flag" contender, the cannon rounds trying to be equivalent to bombs. More so now that Sandia has demoed .50 cal laser guided rounds using a chip seeker and MEMS fins, so those 40mm CTA rounds can also become guided. Smaller would be something like an OV-10 bronco with optionally manned gear, SDB's, and the trainable gun turret, preferably with those Sandia rounds. Though by that argument, resurrecting A-10B with SDB's, laser designators and sensors stuffed on the landing gear sponson tips, and using those laser guided rounds might be cheaper in terms of upfront costs if treated as a retrofit.


My pet idea is basically Firefox++, an optionally manned B-1R variant, with a removable high energy laser module in one bay, some sort of trainable flush turret gun that can fit into a bay as a removable module using that Sandia laser guided small round tech in something like 30-40mm, and stuff the last bay with a high density glider SDB rack and hang bigger bombs on outside pylons. This can transit to needed areas quickly, then loiter while waiting for SHTF calls from infantry. Depending on the call, lase the target, or speed up and raise the nose before flinging an SDB or firing a guided round. I'm not so sure about the removable module bits though. Certainly not field removable aside from the internal SDB rack, as the laser and turret would need to remove the bomb bay doors outright to be properly flush and have clear lines of sight. One could make the argument that the laser/gun combo could be a big monolithic module to fit the forward/middle bays. One could also change from a flush turreted gun to a fixed large caliber cannon like the original Firefox concept, as the barrel could intrude into the laser's space if the laser was occupying the forward bay, and you could line up recoil force paths better with the wing spar. One additional recoil mechanism is to emulate the RAVEN semi-recoilless cannon's recoil mitigation vent.
 

Similar threads

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom