Vickers Red Dean / Red Hebe

B-29s ? in GB and 1961 ? One of the 88 Washingtons that bridged the gap between Lincoln and V-bombers ?
Most of the Washingtons went back to the USA in 1953-54, but a few remained in the UK. I think the last flying Washingtons were those operated by 192 Sqn on Elint duties, retiring in early 1958. The stored and ex-192 aircraft went to Proof & Experimental Establishment, Shoeburyness in 57-58 for ordnance trials.
 
May I, 12 years on, offer a thought on Vickers "friends in Whitehall" (zen, #8,11, but others elsewhere too).

Our CNH, Vertical Empire, 2nd. Ed. P.100, on Orange Herald warhead, Blue Streak has a MoS memo,10/11/55:
"no evidence the Minister knows anything of the project" and CNH is (rightly) horrified that (expensive) "decisions (are) taken quite independently of the (responsible) Minister".

AW was (?is) a distinct fief, where security/need to know, is overwhelming (Yes,I know,, sometimes flawed). For years AWRE/Aldermaston rowed its own boat under remote management by the Minister for Science (not MoS or MoD). That was an outlier to the System. Which was (is) Committees, hierarchies signing off every little thing and taking their time to do so.

Board Chairmen look outward to Customers, Regulators, Investors, whereas MD/CEO/COO run the show.
UK Aero firms have a long record of appointing Chairmen who know their way around the System.
Vickers Ltd Chairmen relevant to Forbat's comments on "friends" were:
1945-6/56: Lt Gen Sir R.Weeks, DSO,MC* (D/CIGS, 1942-45),
6/56-6/62: Lord Knollys, Capt,DFC (Chairman, BOAC, 1943-47).
Forbat,P.78 records that V-A only took on Red Dean under MoS pressure (on Chairman).

Elsewhere...Twigge, Early UK GW Devt. has Morien Morgan, RAE scratching around to find Aero firms willing to take on GW. They knew that in business terms...it made no sense. Must be cost-plus, as no-one had (has) a clue on Project total cost, so endless scrutiny of every penny (Yes they blow any/all budget, but cost-plus gives them Post office Savings Bank yield.)

Vickers' friends did not do them many favours.
 
Most policy decisions in this area, in the 50s and 60s, were taken by senior officials (it's still probably the case).

One of the problems is that ministers are not full-time. They're members of Parliament and have to attend to debates in the House. In addition, they have a constituency which they have to look after, and deal with constituents' issues. They go through their boxes in the evening or the early morning, and most of the papers get a superficial reading and a tick.

There was a lot of internal politics with regard to the UK aircraft industry, and this is just one example. Handley Page fell out of favour with the officials in Whitehall and were forced into liquidation, despite the merits of any of their designs and productions.

PS – that quote about Orange Herald is one of my favourite quotes about how government works. Large sums of money are signed off by ministers simply on the recommendations of their senior officials.
 
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But the higher level profile of the Ministers and Cabinet worked to shield the civil servants who messed up, they never got held fully accountable if they screwed and it was the government that had to take the rap.
The Ferranti scandal is very instructive, I think I have elaborated on that before in other threads.

If the aviation industry was so loathe to take on GW then the MoS should have other willing companies in other sectors, the electronics industry always seemed lukewarm too but they were probably better placed to be the lead contractors.
 

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