More belligerent attitude from you.
Clearly the navy has never made mistakes and we should not criticize it at all. You of course would never criticize the navy.
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US FF(X) Program
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Clearly the navy has never made mistakes and we should not criticize it at all. You of course would never criticize the navy.
You can’t substantiate the opinion anyway, you reject all the studies that form the basis of the survivability standards and the battle proven experience that keeps men alive and ships afloat, even if mission killed. What’s the point? It’s like you think the navy just summoned them for no reason
Kat Tsun
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More or less, yeah. GWOT and the Peace Dividend double whammy actually just killed the USN.
Bad time to have shipbuilding troubles.
Dilandu
I'm dissatisfied, which means, I exist.
Please. Royal Navy in late 1890s were the guys who theoretically knew all the stuff; but they still trained with boarding sabers and cutlasses.
“Theoretically knew all their stuff” and they were proven to be the most powerful navy on earth in WW1? Idk my Russian friend, sounds like they knew their stuff
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Yet the successes still outnumber the failures..? The amphib programs have gone very well, as have the auxiliaries. Burke Flt III and even the IIA restart went well. Zumwalt failed, not due to standards, but an inability for the government to properly support the program and CG(X) was primarily not pursued as Flt III was more politically tenable and allowed time for technology to develop. What in that is a failing due to survivability standards?
Dilandu
I'm dissatisfied, which means, I exist.
Yeah, because they wisely changed their tactics & strategy under Fisher reforms, getting rid of the obsolete concept, and embracing innovative ones - like dreadnoughts, submarines and naval aviation - that went significantly against previous experience.
P.S. They weren't so lucky by WW2, by the way; most of their knowlegde was found to be obsolete and hardware not optimized.
Kat Tsun
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They don't.
These are useless without a Battle Force for them to support.
Flight III hasn't finished. It's one ship. IIA did okay because it didn't really stop.
Because of GWOT funding.
Because of GWOT funding.
No, it was an emergency program. It's a cheap way to get AMDR at sea while waiting for...whatever will actually carry AMDR.
NAVSEA had far more misses than hits since 1995 for the Battle Force. The reasons are not important because the reasons are symptoms of the cause of failure, which is that NAVSEA and the United States economy in general, have lost the ability to produce ships efficiently and on time since at least 2020. Maybe earlier.
Flight IIA succeeded but then how could it fail? It was 1995. IIA restart didn't really stop either (the delay was like...a year or three?) so that was relatively easy. Flight III seems to be okay but this could change on a whim next week or next month or six or ten or eighteen or whatever.
Zumwalt failed due to GWOT sucking the funding out. LCS-1 and LCS-2 both failed due to lack of support for mission modules because their costs inflated to the point where procurement ate the development budget. No more modules! Oops! FFG(X) failed because it wasn't engineered properly and it had uncontrollable growth increases, and that will continue to grow as the two ordered Connies get built. FF(X) might succeed, but it might also stop at one or two or three hulls, who knows! It's possible HII will get budget to produce a large number of 4923s, nobody really knows yet, but I suspect they won't. Where's the money gonna come from?
The 774s were smoothly designed but their production is bad. The 774s are supposed to be 2.0 hulls per year but they're 1.1 per year, down from 1.4 I believe, since 2022. They might put 7-8 in the water before the war kicks off. They've got orders for about 20 I think. Same with the Columbias. Columbia has slipped by a year. The follow on ships haven't slipped, yet. Same with the Fords. CVN-80 slipped from 2025 to now 2030. It's probably going to miss the party!
This all counts as failure. NAVSEA should be capable of reorganizing the production yards and supply chains promptly when necessary. They're just kind of not. So everything is a year or five behind here and getting worse.
DDG(X) failed. It never even bent metal. Unfortunate. BBG will perhaps fail, it's the safe bet, after all. Extraordinary ships require extraordinary evidence. SSN(X) might also fail, judging by how the surface fleet has gone, but hopefully the Navy isn't going for the option for 30+ SSN(X) and buys 30+ 774s instead out to 2054. They know how to make those.
LX(R) is currently in a state of limbo. It might be functionally canceled, even though it really can't be, because it's not really done anything for several years now. LHA Fallujah has slipped by a year, commensurate with the Columbias, so that's approaching a major failure. They've stopped buying LPD-17s to try to shift most the gator navy money to surface ships and submarines, I think, because there's just tons of backlogs.
It's a rough time for everyone, except one. The only program that seems to be on track is the Flight III production! Maybe?! Who knows! Nobody cares about the oilers or whatever, because they're not going to have much of a surface fleet to back up, but I assume they're on track. NASSCO can't be that bad because, much like the Burke printer, they're constantly working due to being flush with cash.
Also we need a new plane, a new nuclear warhead, and eventually a new SLBM. And Standards. And Tomahawks.
But other than all that, yeah, DON has done a good job.
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Anyone post this one yet?
View: https://youtu.be/qvUbx9TvOwk
It seems to be (to me at least) a very polite "what on Earth are you thinking" kind of a reaction.
It seems to be (to me at least) a very polite "what on Earth are you thinking" kind of a reaction.
Scott Kenny
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5 years. And a total retooling of the shipyard for Zumwalts, then rebuilding the tooling for Flight 2A Restarts.
Kat Tsun
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Yeah that's not too bad.
Scott Kenny
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Well, the storm I'm aware of was Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.
But the stop and retooling was intended to be due to the Zumwalts.
By the numbers they do. There have been more successful US programs than unsuccessful US programs.
Good thing there is a battle force then, it's not like the US surface fleet is utterly useless.
I never said Flt III had finished. Also the IIA restart had to overcome a ton of hurdles, it wasn't at all a smooth process.
I didn't say it wasn't, that isn't Navy's fault
Flt III wasn't an emergency program. It was designed as an alternative to CG(X) which itself was a wide exploration of concepts. To call it an emergency program is very much a falsehood.
Big chunk of text that didn't address the point. It's not like I disagree with a lot of this, I don't at all think NAVSEA is blameless. It's just that so much hate is directed at nonissues that I don't even get to the point of bringing up actual issues. Also LX(R) is just San Antonio Flt II, I'm not sure what you're referring to exactly there.
Retooling takes place every time a production line wraps up. Burke production had wrapped up and hence they retooled for the next production series. The same thing has happened with FF(X), the NSC production line has been entirely retooled and you've gotta start from nothing and work back up to being able to produce hulls. The IIA restart had difficulty doing this and I highly suspect FF(X) will too
1635yankee
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My prediction will be that the USN's required changes will drive up the cost and time to deliver the first unit that we'll go through this exercise again.
Scott Kenny
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Depends on whether someone drags NAVSEA into a come-to-Jesus meeting about THERE SHALT BE NO CHANGES or not.
Drags NAVSEA to completely change their planned fleet architecture and factor in a warship which the Navy had not identified a serious gap for at the moment..? I don't think it's a NAVSEA problem
Scott Kenny
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NAVSEA's changes added over 1000 tons to the Constellation class.
Oh god here we go again. Can you not strawman every single thing??? Constellation had a set place in the fleet architecture at least. This does not. Displacement doesn’t change that. Argue the point, stop creating “NAVSEA bad” strawmans when they don’t make sense. Jesus Christ. Also, they’re totally different directorates? Do you even understand what NAVSEA does???
Also that_person wrote a treatise on how this happened and it’s entirely inaccurate to suggest it was simply “NAVSEA’s changes” that caused the Constellation blowout. To argue as such completely ignores the process through which the contract was awarded and the agreement which FMM agreed to. They saw the requirements and bid on the basis that they could deliver, as did a number of other companies. NAVSEA looked through the designs and saw that FMM’s offer had the most promise. NAVSEA can quite obviously be faulted for either lacking the talent to assess the feasibility of the entry or viewing the promised capabilities as more important than the practical aspects of achieving that capability. NAVSEA cannot be faulted because FMM cannot meet the criteria they were instructed to meet. If you can think critically you can adequately apportion blame and identify weaknesses in procurement, not just create strawmen.
Rear Admiral Goddard strongly disagrees.
He asserts the ship met the "big R" requirements early on but was sunk by the many and continuing "small r" requirements.
He also asserts nobody owned the design. Nobody was accountable.
There are always judgement calls to make when making changes. Cost benefit analysis.
Doesn't not seem that was being done.
There really does need to be an examination of and reconnection of the process.
National strategy > military strategy > maritime/naval strategy > determine volume/types of terminal effects needed to achieve strategies based on enemy future capabilities (not enemy current capabilities) > men-machines-software-consumables needed to achieve effects > optimal/affordable mix of machines > machine designs needed > build/test/redesign plans > shipyards/factories/test facilities needed > fleet & industrial gap & timing analysis > tested system cut-off > detailed design > production & fleet introduction plans > final funding > contracting > purchase long-lead materials > arrange supply chains & subcontracting > fabrication & lay keel > build > christen/launch > complete build > tests & trials > crew & commission > work-up > deploy
I’m sure I’m missing plenty of links & some stuff happens concurrently/iteratively (but be careful with design & build!!), but you get the idea. Everyone in this thread can find ten+ problems in the perceived lack of continuity down this process chain. And this is just honing in on warships. DoD/USN could do the same for fighter planes, munitions, personnel, training, culture, et cetera.
Good news is that they published step 1 (national strategy) in November, so my expectation is that DoD will produce (perhaps not publicly) a national military strategy soon. The faster we work our way down this cascade, the faster we get useful warships. The more we work out of order, the more waste in money, material, talent, and most importantly…time.
National strategy > military strategy > maritime/naval strategy > determine volume/types of terminal effects needed to achieve strategies based on enemy future capabilities (not enemy current capabilities) > men-machines-software-consumables needed to achieve effects > optimal/affordable mix of machines > machine designs needed > build/test/redesign plans > shipyards/factories/test facilities needed > fleet & industrial gap & timing analysis > tested system cut-off > detailed design > production & fleet introduction plans > final funding > contracting > purchase long-lead materials > arrange supply chains & subcontracting > fabrication & lay keel > build > christen/launch > complete build > tests & trials > crew & commission > work-up > deploy
I’m sure I’m missing plenty of links & some stuff happens concurrently/iteratively (but be careful with design & build!!), but you get the idea. Everyone in this thread can find ten+ problems in the perceived lack of continuity down this process chain. And this is just honing in on warships. DoD/USN could do the same for fighter planes, munitions, personnel, training, culture, et cetera.
Good news is that they published step 1 (national strategy) in November, so my expectation is that DoD will produce (perhaps not publicly) a national military strategy soon. The faster we work our way down this cascade, the faster we get useful warships. The more we work out of order, the more waste in money, material, talent, and most importantly…time.
bring_it_on
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Of the two Constellation class ships the Navy apparently plans to take delivery of, what happens if the Navy likes what they have to offer?
The decision appears to have been made at the political level and likely will be unmoved without people leaving their positions or perhaps congressional action. I doubt anything changes during this administration personally, though perhaps 2027 brings a big shift. In any case, I would think two ships potentially enough to keep the yard busy to 2029. The big loss will be long lead subcontractor items should anyone want to revive the program. I have no idea how salvageable that situation may be.
bring_it_on
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It is unlikely they will be in a position to restart the program without facing significant delays and duplicative costs, provided the SecNav has not already prohibited the Navy from pursuing those two ships in the future even if they are well received. It would have almost been better to pay the yard off and not build the two ships then to get them on the Navy books and continue to incur O&S costs for vessels the Navy would not be allowed to buy more of. Not to mention how they envision manning these leave aside actually operating them..
bring_it_on
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But it would be different from the rest of the Frigates the Navy is planning or expected to buy. So a two ship class. So now you'll need to train and man for just two frigates that are different from every other ship in the Navy.
Ah, I see what you mean. An entire training and parts stream for just two ships. If the class does not resume, perhaps best to see if there are interested foreign buyers.
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Many programs have come back from the brink of termination. The F15 comes to mind.
If the people responsible for these ships can right the ship, build them, they actually work and are faster than a river barge, it's not impossible that more will be bought.
By then, there will most likely be a different cast of characters involved both on the civilian and Navy side.
When I read Admiral Goddard's comments though, it sounds like even he doesn't believe the ship is currently viable.
bring_it_on
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Then why are they building them and planning on taking delivery and keeping them around? I understand that they have contractual obligations but if the ships are worthless they should just scrap them altogether. They certainly have the political cover to do so if things are really this bad with the program.
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Reddington777
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Maybe they provide enough capability in the near term, but in the long term it becomes unsustainable either cost wise or engineering wise?
bring_it_on
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One cannot really have it both ways. If these platforms are out-and-out disasters..so beyond salvaging that the Navy is instead pursuing alternatives that lack even SPY-6 and VLS, then what utility can be expected from the first two hulls? One would assume they have to spend years in testing before they can actually go out on an operational cruise. How many months/years has the lead Burke Flight III spend in testing? Zumwalt?
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Not James Stockdale
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The video from SECNAV about the cancellation said the ships are "under review" even as they get built, so that sounds like the Navy is going to try to offload them somehow. My suspicion is that there are intractable problems with the design itself due to the changes from the basic Italian FREMM design eating the entire growth margin and starting to get into the ship's buoyancy and stability margins.
The Ticonderoga class had a lot of issues caused by putting an extra thousand tons (or more) on the Spruance hull. At a very basic level, there were water outlets that were suddenly below the water line because the Ticonderogas had less freeboard, so compartments and plumbing had to be redesigned to move the outlets up a deck. The extra bow weight from the VLS and the big superstructure also causing more driving and slamming, which required the bow strakes and structural reinforcement.
Additionally, I suspect that a CNO who was a fast attack skipper isn't going to think too highly of ASW-focused surface combatants.
The Ticonderoga class had a lot of issues caused by putting an extra thousand tons (or more) on the Spruance hull. At a very basic level, there were water outlets that were suddenly below the water line because the Ticonderogas had less freeboard, so compartments and plumbing had to be redesigned to move the outlets up a deck. The extra bow weight from the VLS and the big superstructure also causing more driving and slamming, which required the bow strakes and structural reinforcement.
Additionally, I suspect that a CNO who was a fast attack skipper isn't going to think too highly of ASW-focused surface combatants.
Dilandu
I'm dissatisfied, which means, I exist.
You know, maybe the USN should learn to work with what it could get, instead of demanding what it wants? Most navies in the world operate under the premise of "working with whatever hardware we could obtain, even if its suboptimal".
And what proof does he have to back that up? that_person’s source was literally a guy who bid on the program and it seems Goddard is a retired RAN rear admiral? What connection does Goddard have to the FFG(X) program?
that’s why every navy on earth can deploy and sustain 11 CVNs? I’m sure China is just “working with whatever hardware they can obtain”.
Once again, NAVSEA isn’t even blameless as I pointed out. It’s just not all NAVSEA’s doing and the evidence supports this.
Chuck Goddard
Now some of his words might be sour grapes, but I'm absolutely willing to bet that the man knows a LOT more about the whole FFG program than you.
Considering he was senior vice president of Fincantieri Marine Group when they bid on and got the tender. Oh, and he was a USN Rear Admiral.
For someone who speaks like he knows a lot you are sorely lacking in your google-fu. Especially since it's the first hit showing up when you google "Chuck Goddard Admiral".
bring_it_on
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It’s hard to see many buyers for $1B+ U.S. Navy frigates, particularly when they are lead ships of a class without a future. Not to mention the lack of detailed industry support and sustainment sharing between classes. I suppose someone will take them if we are throwing them away.
I'm Australian so when I search up the same thing I get Australian hits first, my mistake. Chuck Goddard has an interesting resume though, leaving the Navy under less than glowing circumstances.
That aside, are we shocked that the guy who runs FMM, a yard which has consistently failed to surface combatants, wants to blame anyone else? Who's fault was it that MMSC is several years (4 if memory serves?) behind schedule?
Could it have nothing to do with the fact that the FMM team had never designed a ship that met the standards to which Constellation was meant to hit? aiui many of them had only worked on LCS, not DDG programs. Cursory examination of the evidence suggests that more than some of his words may be sour grapes, as you put it.
It also doesn't aid your point when the only argument that can be made is "NAVSEA mismanaged FFG(X)" instead of an in depth understanding of what FF(X) does (or really doesn't do) for the fleet and how it contributes to the overall shipbuilding plan of the USN. As I have restated, the Constellation class ended really poorly but the inherent need for an ASW focused combatant, able to escort the carrier strike group, hasn't disappeared. FF(X) does not meet this, it does not meet a current identified Navy requirement at all
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