US Army - Lockheed Martin Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)

TomS said:
Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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Pretty sure that was already violated with NK getting nukes. It's just like the monk says on Golden Child, "you must know when to break the rules."

TomS said:
Yes, but we can't "do the same" with countries like South Korea, Japan, or Australia (even if they wanted us to) because they were not nuclear weapon states when NPT was signed, and in fact are signatories of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
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Australia would be fairly easy to solve politically. They officially have the same head of state as the UK, so declare an official 'United Commonwealth' state, with nothing changing as regards governance and ruling etc., except official political status.
 
Forest Green said:
Pretty sure that was already violated with NK getting nukes.
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If the NorKs didn't get anything from the USSR it's a sure bet that the PRC supplied them with the needed data, IIRC the PRC allowed Pakistan to test several devices at Lop Nor in the 1980s.
 
Forest Green said:
Pretty sure that was already violated with NK getting nukes. It's just like the monk says on Golden Child, "you must know when to break the rules."
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Nope, that's not how NPT works. The relevant treaty text is very clear and doesn't have a "but someone else did it first" clause.

Article I
Edit
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
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So, sure we could openly break it, but that would be the end of the NPT as a whole. And probably of the whole regime of international norms against nuclear weapons. Right now, there are a very few states that violate those norms, and they are mostly the targets of sanctions and efforts to limit their nuclear programs.

Overturn those norms and nuclear weapon programs will show up much more widely, with ever increasing chance that they will be used or lost to non-state actors.
 
TomS said:
Forest Green said:
Pretty sure that was already violated with NK getting nukes. It's just like the monk says on Golden Child, "you must know when to break the rules."
Click to expand...

Nope, that's not how NPT works. The relevant treaty text is very clear and doesn't have a "but someone else did it first" clause.

Article I
Edit
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Click to expand...

So, sure we could openly break it, but that would be the end of the NPT as a whole. And probably of the whole regime of international norms against nuclear weapons. Right now, there are a very few states that violate those norms, and they are mostly the targets of sanctions and efforts to limit their nuclear programs.

Overturn those norms and nuclear weapon programs will show up much more widely, with ever increasing chance that they will be used or lost to non-state actors.
Click to expand...
If China can hack in and get the entire F-35 download surely Japan and South Korea are capable of doing the same? *wink*, *wink*
 
sferrin said:
If China can hack in and get the entire F-35 download surely Japan and South Korea are capable of doing the same? *wink*, *wink*
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Because who cares about laws and obligations, right? And so what if we make nuclear war more and more likely?

No, global norms against nuclear proliferation are important, even if they are imperfect. Because we should strive for a world where mass murder of innocent people by atomic bomb is less likely, not more likely.
 
TomS said:
sferrin said:
If China can hack in and get the entire F-35 download surely Japan and South Korea are capable of doing the same? *wink*, *wink*
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Because who cares about laws and obligations, right? And so what if we make nuclear war more and more likely?

No, global norms against nuclear proliferation are important, even if they are imperfect. Because we should strive for a world where mass murder of innocent people by atomic bomb is less likely, not more likely.
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Well as long as it's only us getting killed and not the other guy. We couldn't have that.
 
sferrin said:
TomS said:
sferrin said:
If China can hack in and get the entire F-35 download surely Japan and South Korea are capable of doing the same? *wink*, *wink*
Click to expand...

Because who cares about laws and obligations, right? And so what if we make nuclear war more and more likely?

No, global norms against nuclear proliferation are important, even if they are imperfect. Because we should strive for a world where mass murder of innocent people by atomic bomb is less likely, not more likely.
Click to expand...
Well as long as it's only us getting killed and not the other guy. We couldn't have that.
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You know I never said anything like that.

And on that note, I'm going to save my blood pressure by simply ignoring you. Which frankly I should have done years ago.
 
TomS said:
Because who cares about laws and obligations, right?
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Steady there.
Which laws/treaties do you want to enforce?
Can of worms here!
Because we should strive for a world where mass murder of innocent people by atomic bomb is less likely, not more likely.
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So mass murder by other means is ok?
 
TomS said:
bobbymike said:
The US partnered with France early in their nuke development and still work closely with the UK - in fact due to congressional budgetary restrictions on new warhead R&D in the US (although this might have been overturned recently) the UK nuke labs host a lot of “partnerships” with LLNL & LANL. We could do the same with our Eastern allies.
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Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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I think if we are at this point a piece of paper won’t be an issue - see ABM, New START, INF.
 
bobbymike said:
I think if we are at this point a piece of paper won’t be an issue - see ABM, New START, INF.
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All of those were bilateral agreements. NPT is a rather big deal across a very large number of nations, and the US breaking it would kill it overnight.

In any case, neither Japan nor South Korea would require US help to produce a nuclear weapon if they were so inclined. Lets get back on topic.
 
TomS said:
Nope, that's not how NPT works. The relevant treaty text is very clear and doesn't have a "but someone else did it first" clause.
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Nor does it specify what should happen in such an event, so I think it must want the reader to use their imagination.

TomS said:
So, sure we could openly break it, but that would be the end of the NPT as a whole. And probably of the whole regime of international norms against nuclear weapons. Right now, there are a very few states that violate those norms, and they are mostly the targets of sanctions and efforts to limit their nuclear programs.

Overturn those norms and nuclear weapon programs will show up much more widely, with ever increasing chance that they will be used or lost to non-state actors.
Click to expand...
I wasn't suggesting breaking it openly, more that it be done in a DPRK kind of way to re-balance things back to the way they were before someone didn't break it openly last time.
 
jsport said:
thehill.com

US guided rockets in Ukraine are being jammed by Russia

U.S.-made smart bombs provided to Ukraine are being jammed by Russia and are missing their targets, according to a Politico review of a leaked Pentagon document. Russia is electronically jamming th…
thehill.com thehill.com
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They are?

www.armyrecognition.com

R-330ZH Zhitel jamming cellular satellite communication station technical data | Russia Russian missile system vehicle UK | Russia Russian army military equipment vehicles UK

R-330ZH Zhitel truck-mounted jamming cellular satellite communication station Russia technical data fact sheet pictures video
www.armyrecognition.com www.armyrecognition.com
The R-330ZH Zhitel can be deployed in less than 40 min. It can operate in autonomously thanks to Diesel electric generators for a period of 1.600 hours. The station is designed to solve the following tasks: detection, direction finding and jamming wearable mobile stations of mobile satellite communications Inmarsat and Iridium, detection, direction finding and jamming base stations of cellular communication standard GSM 1900 consumer navigation equipment jamming of satellite communications systems NAVSTAR (GPS)
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https://twitter.com/x/status/1646381945293512704
View: https://twitter.com/UkraineNewsLive/status/1646381945293512704?s=20
 
jsport said:
thehill.com

US guided rockets in Ukraine are being jammed by Russia

U.S.-made smart bombs provided to Ukraine are being jammed by Russia and are missing their targets, according to a Politico review of a leaked Pentagon document. Russia is electronically jamming th…
thehill.com thehill.com
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Even if the Russians are able to successfully jam the local GPS signals the GMLRS still has its' autopilot and it can still do a lot of damage with its' 200Lb unitary warhead if the miss distance isn't too great.
 
Forest Green said:
Josh_TN said:
Two few in number to have mass of fire and likely no anti ship capacity.
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There's no reason it couldn't have anti-ship capacity, just a matter of a mid-course update and terminal homing.
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We don’t know one way or the other but the flight envelope and glider size would make a terminal seeker very challenging, IMO. In any case, they will likely exist in small numbers - likely dozens, as opposed to hundreds or even thousands for other munition types. EDIT: specifically munitions with an anti ship mode.
 
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Josh_TN said:
We don’t know one way or the other but the flight envelope and glider size would make a terminal seeker very challenging, IMO. In any case, they will likely exist in small numbers - likely dozens, as opposed to hundreds or even thousands for other munition types. EDIT: specifically munitions with an anti ship mode.
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Errmmm.... The weapon is 34.5 inches in diameter, the RV is likely a significant portion of that. Not much smaller than a Pershing II really, and that had a terminal seeker in 1983. In fact the warhead section on the Pershing II is only 27.7 inches.

en.wikipedia.org

Pershing II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
 
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www.spacewar.com

Multi-domain operations: Helping militaries make better decisions faster

Los Angeles CA (SPX) Apr 28, 2023 - For years, Paul Meyer's job in the U.S. Air Force was to suppress enemy air defenses. To do that, he had to know where they were and what they were doing. And to do that, he and the pilot of his F-4
www.spacewar.com
One example of such a system is the Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node, or TITAN - a forward-deployed ground station that ingests and combines large and diverse data sets to find, track and render detailed 3-D visualizations of potential threats quickly.

"Before, it took hours to get targeting-quality accuracy for an entire image," Meyer said. "Now we're looking at real-time targeting-quality accuracy for every pixel."
"Today, there are several people per asset. We're developing systems to invert that," Meyer said. "In the future, there will be many assets per person. This increases the scale for operators to complete not just one, two or three courses of actions, but hundreds simultaneously."
Meyer said. "In the future, there will be many assets per person. This increases the scale for operators to complete not just one, two or three courses of actions, but hundreds simultaneously."


Act
Everything up to here - the sensing, the connecting, the data analysis, leads to one question: What are you going to do about it?

The answer often includes effectors, a military term that encompasses missiles and mortars, lasers and high-powered microwaves, jammers, decoys and cyber responses - essentially, anything a military can deploy to cause a change in the target.

Multi-domain operations would allow forces to use those systems much more effectively and efficiently, said Thad Smith, director of customer requirements and capabilities for Raytheon Missiles and Defense.

"Effectors are the last element of that network - the last thing you want to use," said Smith, a former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. "That's the purpose of the network - to be able to use as minimal number of effects downrange as possible against targets, so we can achieve the desired effect we want in that moment."

One example, he said, is the potential for precision weapons to feed battle-damage assessments into the network. If a network-enabled weapon such as the StormBreaker smart weapon can report that it has destroyed an adversary airfield, he said, there's no need to launch a second, or to deploy intelligence aircraft to confirm.

Networking sensors and effectors can also have a deterrent effect, he said, particularly the more the U.S. and its allies talk about how they're developing capabilities in that area. If adversaries know forward-deployed aircraft can share information seamlessly with surface ships and ground forces, he said, "that's a deterrent in itself."

"Now they have to do the calculus," he said. "They were going to operate in this region of the ocean. Now they can't - that's a keep-out region."

Network-enabled effectors could even be used to gather intelligence on how adversaries operate, Smith said. If a naval force were planning an operation to the west, he said, they could first launch a volley of decoys to the east to study the adversary's response.

"It's this chess match you're always playing. Every time an enemy makes a maneuver, it just moves pieces on that chessboard. It exposes their thought process and their response rate, and it helps me construct my decision timeline," he said. "It either accelerates our response or gives us more time to think through options other than effects on target, which, frankly, is the goal. Nobody wants to use effects until they have to."
 
bobbymike said:

Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict | CSBA

CSBA is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options.
csbaonline.org csbaonline.org
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Iraqi SCUD launchers during Desert Storm presented a similar problem, despite being in the same flat and uniform terrain as fixed IADS sites. Because of their mobility, coalition air strikes were unable to destroy a single launcher, despite SCUD hunting consuming “as much as 25 percent of F-15E and LANTIRN equipped F-16 sorties in the war.”49
pg 20
 
bobbymike said:

Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict | CSBA

CSBA is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options.
csbaonline.org csbaonline.org
Click to expand...
The most apparent inadequacy revealed by U.S. munitions expenditures over the past three decades and our analysis of potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is that the United States does not currently maintain stocks of PGMs sufficient to sustain a protracted great power conflict (see figures 13 and 16 in the proceeding pages). How long U.S. PGM stocks would last in an Indo-Pacific contingency is dependent on the variables identified in Chapter Three, namely conflict objectives, intensity, and the effectiveness of Chinese defenses. Although exact munitions inventory quantities are classified, it is clear that if the U.S. military endangered its PGM stocks during low-intensity campaigns like those in Iraq and Syria, it would struggle to sustain a prolonged precision-strike campaign against a great power. Scenarios that target enemy bases could demand tens of thousands of PGMs for an initial salvo of strikes alone. These expenditures would compound rapidly as the conflict continues and adversary basing and infrastructure is repaired or replaced. Expanding the conflict beyond eastern and southern China or the widespread targeting of mobile forces would only further increase the need for immense quantities of PGMs.Even if the United States procures sufficient weapons to sustain a rapid high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, it must ensure it has the capacity to maintain reserves of PGMs for other contingencies that may arise simultaneously. This requirement is set in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which states, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor.”107 Expending conventional munition reserves in one theater risks leaving nuclear weapons as the only remaining deterrent against other adversaries. Moreover, munitions stocks and the U.S. industrial base must also sustain the needs of many allies and partners that are likely to participate in these conflicts. Therefore, the U.S. weapons industrial base must be robust enough to support U.S. needs in multiple theaters as well as the needs of U.S. allies and partners in these theaters. This PGM capacity gap has two dimensions. First, the United States must have sufficient inventories on-hand to support (or deter) a rapid, intense conflict or to sustain the opening acts of a prolonged conflict. Of course, should a rapid contingency not lead to conflict termination, American stocks must support the transition to a prolonged conflict, whether that be a matter of weeks or, more likely, months. Weapons must not only be bought, maintained, and upgraded, but must also be stored or prepositioned in locations that enable their rapid employment.
 
https://twitter.com/x/status/1673747418687365120
View: https://twitter.com/usarmyrccto/status/1673747418687365120?t=fgaGXDOfsGQ9CKoTK0BFGA&s=19
www.army.mil

RCCTO successfully demonstrates launch from Mid-Range Capability system.

On June 27, 2023, the Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office's Mid-Range Capability Project Office, in conjunction with Soldiers fro...
www.army.mil www.army.mil
Soldiers assigned to 1st Multi-Domain Task Force conducted this live-fire event in which successful communications from the Battery Operations Center to the Launcher resulted in the launch of a Tomahawk missile. This test follows the successful launch of an SM-6 missile from the Mid-Range Capability system earlier this year, confirming the full operational capability of the system.
Click to expand...
 
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