Ural Bomber

http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Secret-Projects-Strategic-1935-1945/dp/1857800923/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1252017734&sr=1-1
;)
 
The two known contenders were the Do 19 and the Ju 89. They got to hardware stage, and flew for some time, not being much appreciated. References were made ( Manfred Griehl in "Luftwaffe Over America") that other companies applied to the "Ural Bomber" program, including Rohrbach. Herr Griehl, unfortunatelly, never answered my questions on this topic, leaving me quite puzzled.
The death of General Walter Wever killed the project in 1936. Germany would lack a strategic air force for the entire lenght of WW2. Big mistake, luckily for us.
 
Wurger said:
The two known contenders were the Do 19 and the Ju 89. They got to hardware stage, and flew for some time, not being much appreciated. References were made ( Manfred Griehl in "Luftwaffe Over America") that other companies applied to the "Ural Bomber" program, including Rohrbach. Herr Griehl, unfortunatelly, never answered my questions on this topic, leaving me quite puzzled.
The death of General Walter Wever killed the project in 1936. Germany would lack a strategic air force for the entire lenght of WW2. Big mistake, luckily for us.

Yes, good point.

Any photos or specs?
 
What say wikipedia about it :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ural_bomber

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_19
 
Yes , the Bf 165 isn't included in this sources. The only source I know, triggered by lark,
is "Willy Messerschmitt, Pionier der Luftfahrt und des Leichtbaues" by H.J. Ebert, J.B. Kaiser
and K.Peters.
As said before, only a mockup was built and some windtunnel testing was done, as said
in the mentioned book.
 
Hi,

I do have that same source. Very good book, actually. Jens, your "highly speculative" try to portray the Bf 165 is most probably the best there is. But weren`t the Bf 165 posterior to the "Ural Bomber" programme?
It`s incredible how no photos/drawings weren`t preserved of this mock-up. Even Hitler visited it, and was most impressed.
 
"weren`t the Bf 165 posterior to the "Ural Bomber" programme? "

The Do 19 and Ju 89 were ordered in 1935, because these two companies were
regarded as the most experienced in the field of such heavy aircraft. The Ju 89
made its maiden flight in December 1936, the Do during summer 1936, whereas
the Bf 165 project is said to be "from 1937" in the mentioned book. But as the
start of the program was surely known to Messerschmitt, too, I could imagine,
that even earlier some thoughts were spent on a heavy bomber and that the
year 1937 only marks the official order for development.
In the pdf-file I just tried to summarise my thoughts about the Bf 165.
 

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Jemiba said:
"weren`t the Bf 165 posterior to the "Ural Bomber" programme? "

The Do 19 and Ju 89 were ordered in 1935, because these two companies were
regarded as the most experienced in the field of such heavy aircraft. The Ju 89
made its maiden flight in December 1936, the Do during summer 1936, whereas
the Bf 165 project is said to be "from 1937" in the mentioned book. But as the
start of the program was surely known to Messerschmitt, too, I could imagine,
that even earlier some thoughts were spent on a heavy bomber and that the
year 1937 only marks the official order for development.
In the pdf-file I just tried to summarise my thoughts about the Bf 165.

Thanks Jemiba ! ::) ;)
 
The timing of the Bf 165 might be more in line with the "Bomber A" program. Does anyone have a complete list of the entries (8-numbers or projects) in this competition? I have read a RLM comparative evaluation in the time frame of the Bf 165. BFW was heavily criticised because of the poor quality of engineering drawings and documentation, as well as the inability to meet schedule committments. At this time of very rapid expansion, it may be that BFW was overextended and unable to translate either concepts or protoypes into the the next stage efficiently.

Artie Bob
 
Hi,

I too think that these are from different programmes, but I`m not sure if the Bf 165 relates to the "Bomber A" one. The sources I have rule out any BFW tender.
I have read a RLM comparative evaluation in the time frame of the Bf 165. BFW was heavily criticised because of the poor quality of engineering drawings and documentation, as well as the inability to meet schedule committments
interesting statement. Anything more on this "Bomber A" programme? I recall something on the Junkers Ju 85 ;)

About other tenders on the "Bomber A", please take a look here:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,4795.0/highlight,bomber%20a.html
 
I have a doubt : but there was projects of Do-19 with different engines from BMW Bramo ? ???
 
I can't match the third pic to any He-277 variant. Anybody can?.

Vietcong, I deleted two of the drawings you posted to avoid copyright issues. Could you please identify your sources?.

Many thanks,

Antonio
 
pometablava said:
I can't match the third pic to any He-277 variant. Anybody can?.

Vietcong, I deleted two of the drawings you posted to avoid copyright issues. Could you please identify your sources?.

Many thanks,

Antonio


The third variant of the he 277 , I think was He 277 B-5
Sources
Luftwaffe Secret Projects:Stragetic Bombers
Book can be purchased in Amazon.com
 

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pometablava said:
I can't match the third pic to any He-277 variant. Anybody can?.

Vietcong, I deleted two of the drawings you posted to avoid copyright issues. Could you please identify your sources?.

Many thanks,

Antonio

The He-277 had two variants the B and the V series. V series were obviously prototypes with BMW801E engines. Those flown included V9, V10, V26, V18. Others in the V series were built and allotted stkz, but apparently not flown.

Yes the second prototype He-277 flown had the "H" tail and it's Stamkeinzeichen was GA+QQ former He177 A-08 W.Nr.23. It was in fact designated the He-277B-5. It's powerplant would have been the Jumo 213-F with 2,060 hp each, giving a range of 4,500m.

Worth noting however that the Stamkeinzeichen in the image differs with that which I have provided. I have never been able to identify the stkz for the eighth He-277 flown and i wonder if this is a clue perhaps?

References
Hitler’s Last Weapons, Josef Garlinski, Magnum Books 1979
German Secret Weapons of the Second World War, Ian V Hogg, Stackpole Books 1999
Secret Weapons of World War II, William Breuer, John Wiley and Sons 2000
 
Dear Vietcong and Fellow WW II Aviation MYSTERY Fans:

Bader's Briar here...a first-time poster, as I just joined up over this past weekend.

I noticed that "Airman" here in this three-year-old thread mentioned asking Wikipedia about the Ural Bomber program, which pretty much died out after the June 3, 1936 death of General Walther Wever, the chief proponent for the Luftwaffe to have a solid strategic bombing capability. And ironically, that very same day in Berlin - where General Wever was headed for when his He 70 staff plane took off without its aileron gust locks disengaged, causing the fatal accident in the first place - the "Bomber A" design competition that resulted in the He 177A was first initiated by the RLM.

We've known about the He 177's problems before, and from what I've read about from the various books that were available up until the last decade's worth of time, there's continued to be a notable range of "facts" about the entire history of the "gruesome Griffin" as I've dubbed it, that seem to not truly have the "smell of truth" to pass this enthusiast's "sniff test".

The first book ever published that apparently DOES seem to have a serious degree of research behind it, into just about every detail about the bits and pieces of the He 177's entire history, is the Manfred Griehl and Joachim Dressel-authored volume that I've got a copy of in my personal aviation history library, and I am VERY glad to have my own copy of it.

Other replies in this forum that have mentioned the very same book that I'm speaking of are from "FightingIrish" at http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,11198.msg105880.html#msg105880 as post number 6 there from October 2010, and from "Blackkite" at http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,5803.msg59062.html#msg59062 as post no. 17 in the second forum thread, apparently showing the cover of the original German language version of the book.

To go back to Airman's staement of "why not ask Wikipedia", heading for http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_277 might be worth a serious look...as a WHOLE LOT of what is in chapter five of the English-language book by Griehl and Dressel is the basis of what is in the Wikipedia article.

And about the most "enlightening" passage in chapter 5 from that book comes near the end, in describing what ACTUALLY happened to both the He 274 high-altitude variant of the Griffin, and to what Pometablava and yourself were writing about the Heinkel firm's Amerika Bomber candidate, the He 277...I quote from page 203 of the Griehl-Dressel book...

"Suddenly, on 20 April 1944, three of the six He 274 prototypes as well as the option for the planned He 274A-0 pre-production series were cancelled. Only the He 274 V1-V3 and a static test airframe were now authorized to be built. Another victim of the red pencil was the safety cockpit with ejection seats. Shortly before this decision was announced, Heinkel was instructed by the RLM to suspend all work on the He 277. All components and parts in the process of manufacture were to be scrapped."

And when combined with what is also stated elsewhere in the book, and from Heinkel factory drawings reprinted (in a VERY nicely scannable format) in the book, it appears that what has been an "oft-told story" in practically every OTHER volume in the He 177's history...that a so-called "He 177B" was actually a "cover designation" for the never-completed He 277 - one of the ongoing parts of the He 177's history that I've always felt that stank like a month-old lobster regarding its veracity...is very firmly DISPELLED from an illustration on the bottom half of page 166 in the book, when the Heinkel "Typenblatt" 3-view general arrangement factory drawing for the "He 177B-5" as its title block states, clearly shows that IT IS the correct designation for the first and only "truly four-engined" variant airframe of the He 177A to fly on four inverted V-12 powerplants, each with its own propeller and annual radiator, and that on December 20, 1943, the He 177 V102 - the second of what would be three completed He 177B series prototypes (V101-V103) and one never-finished example (V104) - was the first-ever example of a "four-engined He 177 variant" to go aloft on four separately-nacelled "individual" powerplants.

Recorded "Stammkennzeichen" four-letter radio codes and airframe serial numbers for the four ordered He 177B prototype airframes go like this, according to Appendix 4 in the book, on the books' page 226...with my additions for clarity in [brackets]...

"V101 (NN+QQ/Wk.Nr. 535550)
A-3 rebuilt fo B-5 standard. Four separate engines. lateral paddles [drag rudders to simulate engine-out conditions, shown on book's pg.166 factory Typenblatt drawing]; used for performance determinations. On hand as trials aircraft August 1944, scrapped.

V102 (GA+QQ/Wk.Nr. 00 0023)
A-08/V9 rebuilt to B-5 standard and redesignated V102. Four separate engines,twin-fin/rudder assembly. Used for stability tests. Handed over to E-Stelle Rechlin August 1944, scrapped.

V103 (KM+TL/Wk.Nr. 550036)
A-5 rebuilt to B-5 standard. Four separate engines, quadruple-barreled [Hecklafette HL 131 V] tail turret. On hand as test aircraft (June 1944)., destroyed in air raid July [8,] 1944.

V104 (KM+TE/Wk.Nr. 550005)
A-5 rebuilt to B-5 standard. Pattern aircraft for He 177B-5 series. Believed destroyed in air raid before completion July [8,] 1944."


Add to that the apparent disapproval in late August 1942 by Goering himself of the DB 606 "coupled" powerplants, as recorded on pages 52 and 53 of the book as "welded-together engines", and one can see HOW I started disbelieving the oft-told story of a so-named He 177B" as ONLY being a "cover story" for an otherwise-shadowy, independently four-engined "He 277"...the fifth chapter relates how the He 277 actually became Heinkel's entry in the Amerika Bomber competition, and from the Heinkel factory's bombload chart on page 184, the He 277...in its definitive "He 219 family" fuselage appearance, complete with a nose gear...could have headed across the Atlantic to the USA with a three metric ton bombload, estimated to be capable of an 11,100 km (6,900 mile) complete flight distance from base to the target and back.

If one either has or has access to that fine volume, please get a good look at its pages...either from one's own or a friend's book collection, or from a big-enough local library that could have it on its shelves...and learn some never-before readable details on World War II's most enigmatic combat aircraft.

Yours Sincerely,

Bader's Briar.. ;)..!!
 

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As a side note, if I may, I'm wondering if anyone knows of the specifications for the four-individual engine He177B-0, which I think was proposed by Heinkel himself in 1938?

Regards
Pioneer
 
Kenneth Macksey's book "Why the Germans Lose at War" confirms that the Ural bomber program collapsed after General Wever's death. Besides, long-range, 4-engined bombers were bleeding edge technology back during the 1930s.
Back then Germany was more interested in building short-range dive-bombers to support Panzers in their new blitzkrieg style of warfare.
 
Back then Germany was more interested in building short-range dive-bombers to support Panzers in their new blitzkrieg style of warfare.

I believe there was also an economic element - i.e. smaller aircraft translates into more of...

I think so. I suspect that Germany's economy was much weaker than is commonly assumed. Note the reliance on animal power for military transport and agriculture, on captured vehicles (trucks, tanks, etc.) and aircraft (transports, trainers), and general shortages of materials and resources.

That said, the results of the post-war Allied bombing surveys would, at a minimum, challenge the idea that strategic aviation did much to win the war. A focus on tactical air support might just have been rational.
 
I did read in the biography of Erhard Milch that the thinking was that engines were very expensive and it was better to build 4 fighters that one slow bomber that could be shot down quite fast.
 
Luftwaffe never did half the airplanes they wanted.
The General Staff were shocked that Hitler wanted to launch a major war anytime before 1942. Even with Speer's re-organization, the Luftwaffe never had enough airplanes. By 1943, production was shifted to the single-engined interceptors so desperately needed to defend the Reich. Bu 1944, those single-engined interceptors were hopelessly out-numbered by American and British-built bombers, escort fighters, etc.
During WW2, only Britain and America could afford to build large fleets of 4-engined bombers. Even those proved vulnerable to flack and interceptors.
 
Italy, Russia, Germany and Japan all built handfuls of 4-engined, heavy bombers, but they could not afford to build them in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome of the war.

PIaggio built only 39 to 44 108 heavy bombers. These four-engined airplanes could carry 7,000 pounds of bombs 700 miles, but only cruised at 19,000 feet. Their theoretical ceiling may have been 26,000' but they rarely climbed that high. Italian pilots dutifully launched bombing raids against Gibraltar, North Africa, etc. but suffered heavy losses due to their inexperience and unreliable airplanes that were pushed into service before they were fully de-bugged.

Russia built about 99 Petyakov Pe.8 heavy bombers. Slow development of super-chargers limited altitude to 30,000.' They could carry up to 11,000 pounds of bombs. They bombed Berlin, Helsinki, etc. focusing on railyards and similar strategic targets. After suffering heavy losses in combat, they were replaced by American-built B-25 Mitchel medium bombers.
Pe.8 proved reliable and some served well into the 1950s flying research scientists over the Arctic Ocean and even as far as the North Pole.

Nakajima only built a handful of six G5M and four G8M heavy bombers, but production was hampered by shortages of aluminum.
 
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Italy, Russia, Germany and Japan all built handfuls of 4-engined, heavy bombers, but they could not afford to build them in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome of the war.
<snip>
Russia built about 99 Petyakov Pe.8 heavy bombers. Slow development of super-chargers limited altitude to 30,000.' They could carry up to 11,000 pounds of bombs. They bombed Berlin, Helsinki, etc. focusing on railyards and similar strategic targets. After suffering heavy losses in combat, they were replaced by American-built B-25 Mitchel medium bombers.
<snip>

The Soviets in fact built a large fleet of 4-engined Tupolev TB-3 heavy bombers in the 1930s. They used them as heavy tactical bombers, paratroop transports, and freight transports throughout WW2. The Pe-8 arose directly from the TB-3 experience, but volume production couldn't be justified once Germany had invaded the Soviet Union.

There is a lesson it this: timing and economic capacity are more significant than anything else in technological history.

The USSR led the world in military thought and technology in the '30s. In addition to fleets of monoplane heavy bombers, they pioneered monoplane fighters with enclosed cockpits and retractable landing gear, similar twin-engined tactical bombers, high-speed machine guns, automatic cannon, rockets, large armored formations with modern tanks, large airborne forces, etc. They quickly adopted the best available Western technology and often improved on it. Much the same can be said of their tanks and infantry weapons. Unfortunately, by starting earlier than anyone else, they also peaked just as rival countries (except Italy) were starting their own periods of technological advance and just as WW2 began. The Red army and air force were thus able to decisively defeat the Japanese on the Khalkin Gol, so much so that Japan stayed out of the Axis attack on the USSR until the end of the war. But the USSR nonetheless proved all but powerless in the face of the German invasion. The I-16s, SBs, TB-3s, and BT tanks were entering obsolescence just as superior German counterparts were coming into service. In 1940-41, the Soviet economy was still recovering from this massive investment in early '30s technology, and the sheer abundance of obsolete materiel available made new investment all but impossible and the expense of innovation hard to justify.

Italy, Poland, France, and, to a lesser degree, Japan also fit this model. They started their military buildups earlier and more comprehensively than others, and then found themselves faced with the need to redesign everything at once just when it was hardest to do so. Even Japan proved largely unequal to the task.

The US and UK, on the other hand, were slower to reinvest in military capability after WW1. When they finally did, they did so at the critical moment, just before each entered WW2. The US is generally said to have been unprepared for WW2. But it had huge, untapped economic capacity as it emerged from the Great Depression, almost inexhaustible supplies of under-utilized raw materials within its own territory, and the world's widest oceans between itself and its enemies, which bought it time. It had the particular advantage of large, under-utilized civilian aircraft and automobile industries focused on mass production. The UK had a smaller, less modern internal economy but had suffered less during the Depression. The Empire and the alliance with the US made up for any lack of home-grown resources and industrial capacity, and its powerful navy was able to keepits supply lines to the outside open.

So the US and UK built large, four-engined bomber fleets for no better reason than that they could. Neither faced any serious or unavoidable shortages of industrial capacity and resources during the war, so they were able to build up critical supplies of fighters, tactical bombers, and ASW aircraft while at the same time paying homage to the strategic bomber and the Douhetian ideology that justified the independence of their respective air forces. Theory and the politics of inter-service rivalry did not have to contest with dire necessity for resources. But had the US and UK faced the same constraints as the other combatant powers, I suspect that either or both might likewise have abandoned the heavies for tactical aircraft. The war-winning advantages of the strategic bomber were and remain theoretical (and suspect, as post-war, USAAF strategic bombing surveys showed). But the advantages of tactical fighter, reconnaissance, interdiction, and close-support aircraft were immediately obvious at the front.
 
The war-winning advantages of the strategic bomber were and remain theoretical (and suspect, as post-war, USAAF strategic bombing surveys showed).

Interesting. I've just been reading Albert Speer's 'Inside the Third Reich', where he mentions the evaluation and want of attacking Russia's powerplants, with the realisation of its strategic importance to Russia's heavy industry, as well as its vulnerability. But alas, by this stage Speer, in his capacity as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, knew better than anyone, that Germany/Luftwaffe had lost the opertunity for it had failed to develop and field a heavy long-range bomber....

One of the reasons Id asked earlier for the specifications for the Heinkel He 177B-0, was that I was going to try and ascertain 'in theory' how many actual independent four-engine He 177B-0's German aircraft industry might have been able to have fielded, for that of the contemporary and troublesome coupled-engine He 177....
Saying this and appreciating Nazi Germany's methodical adherence to documentation, does anyone know of any production figures, in terms of man-hours taken to build a He 177??

Regards
Pioneer
 
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Dear iverson,
You presented an excellent macro-economic explanation of why so few nations built 4-engined bombers in significant numbers during WW2.
 
The war-winning advantages of the strategic bomber were and remain theoretical (and suspect, as post-war, USAAF strategic bombing surveys showed).

Interesting. I've just been reading Albert Speer's 'Inside the Third Reich', where he mentions the evaluation and want of attacking Russia's powerplants, with the realisation of its strategic importance to Russia's heavy industry, as well as its vulnerability. But alas, by this stage Speer, in his capacity as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, knew better than anyone, that Germany/Luftwaffe had lost the opertunity for it had failed to develop and field a heavy long-range bomber....

One of the reasons Id asked earlier for the specifications for the Heinkel He 177B-0, was that I was going to try and ascertain 'in theory' how many actual independent four-engine He 177B-0's German aircraft industry might have been able to have fielded, for that of the contemporary and troublesome coupled-engine He 177....
Saying this and appreciating Nazi Germany's methodical adherence to documentation, does anyone know of any production figures, in terms of man-hours taken to build a He 177??

Regards
Pioneer

I've heard that story too. I have to suspect that, by the 1960s, when the book appeared, Speer's views may have been shaped by the expectations of his airpower-enthused US and UK audiences. Given his wartime position, he would have been all too aware of what Germany's economic capabilities and wartime needs were.

In the USSR, Germany faced an enemy with seemingly endless numbers of tanks, guns, and soldiers already in the field, backed by an boundless Lend-Lease supply lines across the Bering Straits and though Iran to America. In the aftermath of Barbarossa, the Russians had already shown themselves capable of manufacturing aircraft and tanks in roofless buildings in the Siberian winter. So a war-winning power plant strike seems like a particularly unlikely theoretical gambit. Why should the destruction of power plants make any material difference, even if we were to assume that German heavy bombers would for some reason be better at permanently destroying heavy industrial facilities than their USAAF and RAF counterparts ever were?

Moreover, if power plants really were that important, bombers were not the way to go. Britain is said to have had some major successes against German electrical plants using cheap balloons trailing wires---Project Outward. The wires shorted high-tension powerlines, overloading transformers and generation facilities, something that demolition bombs simply could not do.
 
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The war-winning advantages of the strategic bomber were and remain theoretical (and suspect, as post-war, USAAF strategic bombing surveys showed).

Interesting. I've just been reading Albert Speer's 'Inside the Third Reich', where he mentions the evaluation and want of attacking Russia's powerplants, with the realisation of its strategic importance to Russia's heavy industry, as well as its vulnerability. But alas, by this stage Speer, in his capacity as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, knew better than anyone, that Germany/Luftwaffe had lost the opertunity for it had failed to develop and field a heavy long-range bomber....

One of the reasons Id asked earlier for the specifications for the Heinkel He 177B-0, was that I was going to try and ascertain 'in theory' how many actual independent four-engine He 177B-0's German aircraft industry might have been able to have fielded, for that of the contemporary and troublesome coupled-engine He 177....
Saying this and appreciating Nazi Germany's methodical adherence to documentation, does anyone know of any production figures, in terms of man-hours taken to build a He 177??

Regards
Pioneer

~24,000 manhours in 1944.

The war-winning advantages of the strategic bomber were and remain theoretical (and suspect, as post-war, USAAF strategic bombing surveys showed).

Interesting. I've just been reading Albert Speer's 'Inside the Third Reich', where he mentions the evaluation and want of attacking Russia's powerplants, with the realisation of its strategic importance to Russia's heavy industry, as well as its vulnerability. But alas, by this stage Speer, in his capacity as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, knew better than anyone, that Germany/Luftwaffe had lost the opertunity for it had failed to develop and field a heavy long-range bomber....

One of the reasons Id asked earlier for the specifications for the Heinkel He 177B-0, was that I was going to try and ascertain 'in theory' how many actual independent four-engine He 177B-0's German aircraft industry might have been able to have fielded, for that of the contemporary and troublesome coupled-engine He 177....
Saying this and appreciating Nazi Germany's methodical adherence to documentation, does anyone know of any production figures, in terms of man-hours taken to build a He 177??

Regards
Pioneer
Moreover, if power plants really were that important, bombers were not the way to go. Britain is said to have had some major successes against German electrical plants using cheap balloons trailing wires---Project Outward. The wires shorted high-tension powerlines, overloading transformers and generation facilities, something that demolition bombs simply could not do.

Bombers could have taken out power plants quite well. Transformers were/are very vulnerable to shrapnel damage so near misses by 500lb GP bombs would have done a pretty good job of knocking them out. Making hypothetical matters worse for Germany it that those transformers required skilled labor to make, and the companies that made them did not have a high production capacity. As it was Germany had problems with adequate transformer supply just for the expansion that was done during war time. Compounding the issue is the raw material for transformers included metals that were in short supply.

This is one of the things that pops up again and again in USSBS interrogations - the Germans just couldn't understand why the US/Britain never tried that hard to hit the electrical grid. It may have stemmed from the Americans and Britons thinking that Germany was similar to their own countries when in reality it was much more centralized. Conversely the Germans may have assumed that the USSR was much like their own hence the preoccupation with hitting power facilities.
 
I'm not sure how important electricity production would have been as a target in reality. The fact the Soviets were able to move their important factories to the middle of nowhere behind the Urals suggests that power infrastructure must have been built pretty rapidly alongside the factories and of such a scale to provide sufficient power. Most of the major sources of power in the western USSR were lost, including coal and hydro and yet this loss must have been pretty quickly replaced. So the idea that even a modest force of German bombers could have done much to interrupt power supplies seems highly optimistic.

Even if a 1,000 He 177s had been built they would have been frittered away, probably against Britain's aerial defences in the main and as the Eastern Front rolled back, Soviet targets would be getting further and further away out of range. Plus you need fuel in large quantities for such operations, something the Luftwaffe didn't have.

Was Wever right or wrong? One could argue that the USA and Britain were outliers and that resources sucked up by bombers might have been better used in other classes of aircraft.
 
I'm not sure how important electricity production would have been as a target in reality. The fact the Soviets were able to move their important factories to the middle of nowhere behind the Urals suggests that power infrastructure must have been built pretty rapidly alongside the factories and of such a scale to provide sufficient power. Most of the major sources of power in the western USSR were lost, including coal and hydro and yet this loss must have been pretty quickly replaced. So the idea that even a modest force of German bombers could have done much to interrupt power supplies seems highly optimistic.

Even if a 1,000 He 177s had been built they would have been frittered away, probably against Britain's aerial defences in the main and as the Eastern Front rolled back, Soviet targets would be getting further and further away out of range. Plus you need fuel in large quantities for such operations, something the Luftwaffe didn't have.

Was Wever right or wrong? One could argue that the USA and Britain were outliers and that resources sucked up by bombers might have been better used in other classes of aircraft.
I'm guessing on top of its heavy long-range bomber role, the He 177B-0 would have been far more effective than the ad-hoc Fw 200 in the anti-shipping role...

Regards
Pioneer
 
I'm not sure how important electricity production would have been as a target in reality. The fact the Soviets were able to move their important factories to the middle of nowhere behind the Urals suggests that power infrastructure must have been built pretty rapidly alongside the factories and of such a scale to provide sufficient power. Most of the major sources of power in the western USSR were lost, including coal and hydro and yet this loss must have been pretty quickly replaced. So the idea that even a modest force of German bombers could have done much to interrupt power supplies seems highly optimistic.

Even if a 1,000 He 177s had been built they would have been frittered away, probably against Britain's aerial defences in the main and as the Eastern Front rolled back, Soviet targets would be getting further and further away out of range. Plus you need fuel in large quantities for such operations, something the Luftwaffe didn't have.

Was Wever right or wrong? One could argue that the USA and Britain were outliers and that resources sucked up by bombers might have been better used in other classes of aircraft.

Just a quick clarification - per Wikipedia (potentialy not 100 percent reliable but tallies with my recollection of other sources) more than eleven hundred He177s were actually built.
And (allowing for the impact of their notorious unreliability) they appear to have actually been primarily used up in missions other than strategic bombing deep into the USSR, by choice.
And claims of some kind of USSR secret weakness especially vulnerable to relatively limited strategic bombing appear far-fetched.
 
Hi,

I too think that these are from different programmes, but I`m not sure if the Bf 165 relates to the "Bomber A" one. The sources I have rule out any BFW tender.
I have read a RLM comparative evaluation in the time frame of the Bf 165. BFW was heavily criticised because of the poor quality of engineering drawings and documentation, as well as the inability to meet schedule committments
interesting statement. Anything more on this "Bomber A" programme? I recall something on the Junkers Ju 85 ;)

About other tenders on the "Bomber A", please take a look here:

Given that page 9 the bookazine Luftwaffe: Secret Bombers of the Third Reich lists Messerschmitt as one of the companies bidding for the Fernbomber/Bomber A contract, the Bf 165 was almost certainly submitted to the Fernbomber competition given the timeframe in which it was designed (1936/1937). Remember that the BFW company that designed the Bf 109 did not change its name to Messerschmitt AG until 1938, two years after the Fernbomber requirement was issued.
 
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