TSR2 - Britain's Lost Bomber - Damien Burke

I got a copy of this recently as a bit of a birthday present to myself. I must admit very little knowledge about the TSR2, so this book should certain put that right. I havn't dove in to it much yet, but it looks amazing. Cheers and thanks to Mr. Burke!
 
Wasn't the Low Altitude Bomber supposed to be the first integrated weapons system? [Not that it got very far!]
 
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"First weapons system" is always going to be a contentious claim, however I will put forward the WW2 Loch Class Frigates.

These were the first RN ships to be designed around the integrationof the Asdic (sonar), main anti-submarine weapon (double squid), command and controle systems (the Plot, asdic shack, radar shack, radio room, AIO) plus the auxiliary weapons. For instance, as a secondary ability, the radar could feed its data into the Squid fire control system to allow it to be used as a "surface" weapon against E-Boats (!)

Of course, previous ships had such systems which worked in conjunction with each other but the Lochs were designed around the requirements of their Asdic and Squid AND the integration of their sensors into a proper control system.

Whether one thinks the Lochs were totally different from, say, a hugely complex battleship which had all the bells and whistles of electronics and command and control systems added on is a matter of degree, but the Lochs were specifically designed around the integration of the weapons, sensors and Command/Control.

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How is that any different to a battleship fitted from the ouset with rangefinders being fed into Dreyer fire control tables (later Admiralty fire control tables) before fire solutions are passed to the guns? On top of that battleships were fitted with HACS being added into new build designs from the 1930s onwards?

The Loch class were innovative but were only really an evolution of the trend that had been underway ever since the RN moved to director fire.

The whole weapons system thing, in my opinion, is a bit of a distraction from a historical perspective. It was really just a new collection of ministry language being used to describe something that had been occuring for decades anyway. They go though these periodic phases of experiment with new language and slightly different contracting models.
 
sealordlawrence said:
The whole weapons system thing, in my opinion, is a bit of a distraction from a historical perspective. It was really just a new collection of ministry language being used to describe something that had been occuring for decades anyway.
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Certainly from the viewpoint of the actual technology that appears in the harbour/on the flight line when all the money has been paid, it's been going on for years. The broader picture includes the training, the tech support, etc. etc. etc., in short, the whole package that goes into keeping that warship at sea or that airplane on two-minute QRA, and that DOES seem to be a new(er) concept.

Of course if those magnificent Fairey Deltas, ADV TSR-2s etc. ever been built and had to scramble for the real deal, the ongoing funding would have stopped right then... because there wouldn't have been much left of Britain (or anything else) to worry about funding them afterwards! Under the tripwire policy, they - like the V-force - were a one-shot deal.
 
path, #119: DH's baby: that is the issue that US/UK air procurers were trying to address, by the (they thought:) novel concept of a "system". Separate teams each handling a "baby", no-one pulling together into one capability. Output was needed, input (platform, kit) was what we were getting. Neither Firestreak nor Javelin (say) was what was wanted: warhead-on-target. Salesmen shift seller's product; marketeers fulfil buyer's needs. Whereas:

In 1955 MoS chose to buy Sea Vixen+Firestreak, for FAA, and Javelin+Firestreak for RAF. Clearly, DH Props would take greater interest in helping DH Aircraft Co. hang it on Vixen, than to help the team that beat DH.110 for the RAF order. MoS separately managed guidance, engine, ground kit...cost and time gently effluxed. It took a new generation of project managers to bury "me" and to create "us". Don't hang kit on a platform: work backwards from the desired outcome. A factor in MoS' 1949 award of (to be) Thunderbird SAM to little newcomer EE was that platform, motor (Napier) and guidance (Marconi) would be co-ordinated by one parent Group Board, focussed on "the project", not any one product.

So: when UK Govt. decided to sell off BAe. in 1983 UK electronics firm GEC lobbied for a Trade Sale to themselves, as airframe tin merely conveyed the important, difficult stuff...made by GEC. That logic led to the eventual absorption by airframers of their black box suppliers. EADS, BAE, LMAC, Boeing, Northrop-Grumman all now own Systems Houses, and define themselves as solutions-providers. So: the Spec. that is now being fulfilled by UK's A330 tanker-transport was simply: "quantity X ready hose-hours p.a dangling in the sky". Don't care a fig for 2 or 4 engines, or any techno-nerd stuff. So: one man is responsible, technically and financially.
 
To Sea Lord Lawrence - yes, I agree, but the aircraft I nominated were mostly designed and (in the dreams of us dreamers) would have begun (and possibly even completed) their service in the tripwire world.

To Alertken: I see what you're saying. Personally I'm hoping that someone will write the sort of in-depth account of Firestreak/Red Top and Fireflash that John Forbat provided for Red Dean (and if something's already been written in that vein, can someone please point me to it?).

At the end of the day, both kit and platform were cutting-edge, and failure of one would lead to massive delays in the other (remember the US's horrible woes with a certain dodgy jet engine), so hanging kit on an airplane was still probably the best way to do it - especially since Firestreak was (and essentially remained) the only AAM worth speaking of, once Red Dean got axed... and fitting Sparrow to a British fighter never happened (unless you count ADV Tornado).
 
Most of the archive material for Firestreak/Red Top has been destroyed. Any account will therefore be at best partial, cobbled together from surviving scraps.
 
overscan said:
Most of the archive material for Firestreak/Red Top has been destroyed. Any account will therefore be at best partial, cobbled together from surviving scraps.
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Oh DAMMIT. :( :'(
 
Onto more relevant things - got my hands on the book today and it is brilliant.

It really gets into the nitty-gritty not just of the technical development side but just how political requirements (and dictates!) affected the process. In hindsight, given the political overlay detailed right at the start, it seems the whole project was never going to end well for anybody (whether it ended in a service aircraft or not). What ought IMO to have happened was to issue the GOR and then select the aircraft that came closest, with industry co-operation to build it, but the whole thing seems to have turned into a brutally clear demonstration of 'best is the enemy of good enough'.
 
A very good and well researched book.

At long last a definitive account that bins the myth of the HMG deliberately using the TSR2 cancellation to do further damage to the UK aero industry by the rapid & comprehensive disposal of asset & data.

Damien, during your research did you come across the contract(s) placed by the Ministry of Aviation techincal committees to record the significant technical lesson learnt on the TSR2 so they could be incorporated into new programs.

I have a copy of one of these reports issued in Feb 66 (61 pages) and quite enlightening it is too.

I'm pretty sure the rapid disposal of TSR2 assets, post cancellation was a policy set by G Edwards.
 
Thanks PD & Zootycoon!

Zootycoon said:
Damien, during your research did you come across the contract(s) placed by the Ministry of Aviation techincal committees to record the significant technical lesson learnt on the TSR2 so they could be incorporated into new programs.

I have a copy of one of these reports issued in Feb 66 (61 pages) and quite enlightening it is too.
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I have a few 'lessons learned' bits and pieces but a report of that size doesn't ring a bell - would be interested in seeing it.

Zootycoon said:
I'm pretty sure the rapid disposal of TSR2 assets, post cancellation was a policy set by G Edwards.
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I am pretty convinced of this too.
 
Standard procedure upon implementation of Standard Condition of Govt. Contracts No.43 (Break) is that a rundown is agreed with (here, Ministry of Aviation, Director of Contracts) analogous to orderly liquidation if a firm elects to cease trading. Any agreed fixed prices lapse, replaced by audited actual costs, to which a profit number is negotiated. Termination asap of labour bookings-to-job; disposal of materials soonest, either by auction sale, or to highest tender from scrappies. Airframe, chunks yet to be offered up to the assembly line, lumps and chunks down the supply line; engines in BSEL; boxes in Ferranti et al; jigs, tools...all: same. No distinction between swarf and near-complete airframe. All...junk. All termination-administration labour bookings are severely scrutined by (here, MoA) to avoid Ministers (and MPs and Press) yelping about "good money after bad": the intent is to have swept all clutter away within 90 days, to clearaway any claim for overhead expenses on blocked productive shop space.

During that 90 day rundown, BAC presented a Case for continued "Research" flying, which, IIRC, included Olympus 22R relevance to Olympus 593/Concorde. (It is possbly that little wander that caused 2 airframes to remain intact, now preserved). France had already declined to admit HP.115 or BAC221 as Project charges ("counting" towards agreed workshare) because they had nothing comparable, so they declined any TSR.2 expense.

BAC, like most firms upon Cancellation at Customer Convenience, submitted a "Loss of Profits" Try-On. The published nugatory Project Cost, £195Mn., will have dealt with that Claim. If I had been MoA Director of Contracts, I would have told GRE to wind in his neck, be grateful I was not implementing Termination for Cause; that the only reason I was being so lenient was that his firm, BAC, had been set up by its owners (arsenal Vickers, wide-interests Bristol, and solid engineer EE) as insulated from their assets, such that he was, financially, a man of straw, to be blown down by any such Claim; and kindly be grateful that Ministers nominated you as UK partner in AFVG, without competition.

No conspiracy to remove evidence, or to stifle any resurrection. Who would have paid to hold all that stuff in a state, even of paperwork, as fit-to-fly?
 
For more detail see pp279-290 of my book but broadly speaking Ken's post is on the money. Only quibble is that airframes and sub-assemblies weren't treated as worthless scrap and were offered up for research and training purposes at various establishments, hence the survival of various bits and pieces until the 1990s in many cases.

XR219 went off to be shot to bits, the original plan being to do so while the engines were running, hence its selection (if there was some element of spite then no documentary evidence exists).

XR220 went for ground tests at A&AEE and once finished in 1966, the Ministry offered it up to various establishments, the only takers being the nascent RAF Museum; they later asked to swap it for XR219 but RAE, on whose charge XR219 lay, didn't fancy footing the bill for dismantling, transportation etc. and said no.

XR221 actually had the nav/attack system installed so was never likely to be offered up to anybody else and went off to be shot to bits.

XR222 onwards offered to various establishments. Only Cranfield responded, and asked for XR222 as the most complete airframe going. Later donated to IWM.

Remaining airframes of no interest to anybody and disposed of accordingly.
 
Hi,

Browsing through the book again last night, I have to wonder whether if English Electric and Vickers had just been LEFT ALONE to do what they knew best, they could each have built their own contender to the GOR and had a flyoff for about the same money as was spent in the end. Sure, at the end of the day TSR2 had become unaffordable, but how much of that was due to Ministry interference in the aircraft's design?

Overall, I wonder whether anyone knew what they really wanted. TPTB wanted a 1000mi nuclear strike capability, which was about as far from "tactical" as it's possible to get and yet, in the setting of a general European war against the USSR and its allies, wasn't really strategic either. What got turned out in the end, briefly, was a beautiful airplane which was tremendously fast and a delight to fly, but which ultimately had every possible obstacle thrown in its path to the point where it's a miracle it even got off the ground.

It's little wonder that people compare TSR.2 with the CF-105 Arrow - the two aircraft are very much of a type (big, brutish delta types with very high speed), albeit to a different specification, and at least the Arrow was proven to nearly Mach 2 (with every indication of being able to go well beyond it) and was still a going concern when the OR for TSR.2 was framed. I must admit - if I were making the decisions, with the benefit of hindsight, I'd have gove for a deal with the Canadians that would have made the aircraft affordable to the RCAF (through economy of scale) and adapted it appropriately for the strike role with the RAF (with the option of buying the Canadian interceptor version once Duncan Sandys' influence had waned). At the very least, the British had a GWS they could drop into the airplane, even if it was only AI23 and Firestreak (with Red Top to follow), and money saved on aircraft development on the British side of the pond could have been put into perfecting Radar Red Top, VSW or the Fairey SARH missile for the Canadians (and for Sea Vixens and Javelins in the RAF).

TSR2's other big weakness, from what Damien makes clear, is its conventional capability (iron bombs, rockets and Bullpup). However, by the time the aircraft was in service, that could have been sorted out by the availability of US laser-guided bombs, Walleye, and such. I'm trying to imagine a nice, fat LGB or EOGB in the bomb bay, a pair of Shrikes on the inner hardpoints and chaff/flare and AGM guidance pods on the outers. In THAT respect, it's a shame the aircraft didn't go ahead because even a degraded TSR.2 was a damn good airframe (once they got the engine sorted out, if ever :( ) and was in a position to benefit from the guided weapon revolution and transistor-driven miniaturisation.
 
pathology_doc said:
Browsing through the book again last night, I have to wonder whether if English Electric and Vickers had just been LEFT ALONE to do what they knew best, they could each have built their own contender to the GOR and had a flyoff for about the same money as was spent in the end. Sure, at the end of the day TSR2 had become unaffordable, but how much of that was due to Ministry interference in the aircraft's design?
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Well the biggest interference there was engine selection, and the now well known troubles of the Olympus 320 led to massive cost inflation. Remove all the political decisions on which bits of kit to bolt to the airframe and leave the manufacturers to do it... yeah, that might have worked. Might. BAC were probably about as competent overall as any other British manufacturer (of anything, not just aircraft) so they'd have still been subject to management cockups and supply problems so the costs would still have been more than predicted.

pathology_doc said:
Overall, I wonder whether anyone knew what they really wanted.
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The RAF wanted a shiny new tactical bomber, and just loaded capabilities on to it as it became clear that it could be their last new jet for a while - and loaded more on to make sure the NA.39 wouldn't be foisted upon them instead. That's why in my conclusion I apportion some of the blame for the project's failure on inter-service rivalries.

pathology_doc said:
It's little wonder that people compare TSR.2 with the CF-105 Arrow - the two aircraft are very much of a type (big, brutish delta types with very high speed)
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...that were costing too much, falling short of their spec and basically beyond the grasp of their respective countries. Arrow would not have been suitable for low level strike (particularly with its miserly range) or operation from short runways (specced for 6000ft minimum wasn't it?). The only real similarities between the two are that they followed very similar paths into history.
 
DamienB said:
The RAF wanted a shiny new tactical bomber, and just loaded capabilities on to it as it became clear that it could be their last new jet for a while - and loaded more on to make sure the NA.39 wouldn't be foisted upon them instead. That's why in my conclusion I apportion some of the blame for the project's failure on inter-service rivalries.
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The really sad thing here was the Mach 2 requirement that the RAF insisted upon for an attack A/C. Mach 2+ was a driving requirement which shaped firstly TSR 2, then F111, and then Tornado and this requirement alone really stopped the development of the NA39 beyond the S2.

But what did the RAF do almost immediately upon getting their shinny new Mach 2.2 Tornado's GR1's? they inhibited the upper door intake ramp actuators which limited the Tornado to just over Mach1 because they saw no real operational tactical requirement. The fighter versions, Tornado F2/F3 were not inhibited, nor were RSAF GR1's and I understand the ramp inhibiting was maintained by the RAF for both GW1 & 2. In the later part of the Tornado's GR1/4 RAF service life these actuators were even replaced by fixed struts.

Just suppose the RAF had embraced Mountbattan views and adopted the relatively low development cost Buccaneer S3 with TFR, now that would be an alternate history for UK military A/C development
 
It's almost like a counterpoint to the Phantom/Crusader III story, isn't it? The USN wanted both and were told they had to choose. Given the war they got themselves into, they appear to have chosen well. The British services were NOT told to choose and TRIED to have both (or at least the navy wanted the Buccaneer and the RAF wanted TSR2/anything but Buccanneer). Given the war which (thankfully for us all) they did NOT get into, they appear to have "chosen" poorly!!

Ultimately, what's the difference between what they wanted in TSR.2 and what they got in Tornado GR.1?
 
pathology_doc said:
Ultimately, what's the difference between what they wanted in TSR.2 and what they got in Tornado GR.1?
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Range, rough field performance and recce capability (the latter sorted out in the GR.1A and GR.4A).

Zootycoon - agree totally about the M2 spec.
 
And it just gets worse on a re-read. Interesting to note Treasury's concerns, once Vickers and EE had actually been tapped to do the job, not just about the rising costs but about the entire process, particularly the upward march of the performance specification - half the reason the aircraft couldn't meet its goals is that they were either unrealistic or constantly changing or both. Fairey and Handley-Page were absolutely right in hindsight, but why Handley-Page got involved at all is a mystery - their expertise in military aircraft was in the next size or two up.

The whole miserable affair is proof that you can wipe out three hundred examples of the finest supersonic strike bomber in the world if only you throw enough bureaucracy at them!
 
Talk on the TSR2 by Damien Burke Monday 25th February

I'm doing a talk on the TSR2 on Monday 25th February (yes, tomorrow) at 7:30 at the Cirrus Room of the Aviator Hotel in Sywell, Northamptonshire -http://www.aviatorhotel.co.uk/ . Tickets £4 on the door. I did a little bit on the radio on Friday, if you'd like to hear it, go here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0148l84 Fast forward to 1:16:43, it's about 15 mins worth.
 

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