Truth to The Pentagon Wars and the Bradley IFV??

[GTX]

even if K21 goes to Australia it won't be more than a couple hundred hulls at most.

Land 400 Ph3, under which the KF41 and AS21 are in contention, is for 450 - 500 hulls across multiple configurations.

The only tracked vehicles really superior to Bradley in terms of performance are Ajax/ASCOD 2, T-15 Armata, Warrior, Marder 2, and SPz Puma.

Err...go check out KF41 Lynx and AS21 Redback being considered under Land 400 Ph3

Yeah, K21 skipped my mind. It's definitely better protected (30mm) baseline and has comparable mobility to -A0.

AS21, not K21. The AS21 is a big step up from the K21:

AS21 Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), South Korea

AS21 Redback is modern infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) being proposed by South Korean firm Hanwha Defense for the Australian Army.

www.army-technology.com

BTW, Land 400Ph3 will be a good precursor to OMFV given both the KF41 and AS21 will be the basis of contenders. The General Dynamics Ajax based offering and the BAE Systems CV90 based offering were both eliminated in the first round of Land 400 Ph3 too.

 

[Pioneer]

Found this RAND report interesting, as a consequence of the compromise that became the Bradley IFV:

".....To support fully enabled mechanized infantry squads, the Army has, for the last fifty years, tried to develop and field survivable, lethal infantry fighting vehicles that are also capable of carrying a full nine to eleven man squad that can dismount to fight on foot. The Army has not been able to do this for a variety of reasons, and its current infantry fighting vehicle, the M2 Bradley, cannot carry enough soldiers to enable squad-level fire and maneuver from a single vehicle. As a result, today's mechanized infantry are more at risk when transitioning from mounted to dismounted operations, and squad-level dismounted fire and maneuver is compromised in some situations.......

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) compromised infantry doctrine for the sake of mounted lethality and cost savings.

• Reorganization of the Bradley platoon led to squads being broken apart for transport and affected squad operations.
• The ability to conduct fire and maneuver immediately upon dismount became more difficult."

(Source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR184.html)

Regards
Pioneer

 

[DWG]

Found this RAND report interesting, as a consequence of the compromise that became the Bradley IFV:
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) compromised infantry doctrine for the sake of mounted lethality and cost savings.

It's perfectly valid to compromise existing doctrine if you have a good reason for it. A MICV able to carry a complete squad (and everyone has different opinions on correct squad size) would necessarily be larger than the Bradley, therefore more vulnerable, and also putting more men at risk to a single penetration. It would also have less firepower than a pair of Bradleys. Or alternatively it would be less capable (take out the turret), and have still less firepower.

And if you're debussing the squad in the face of enemy fire you're doing it wrong!

That analysis seems to make the mistake of assuming doctrine should remain identical across APC (M-113) and MICV (M-2) equipped units and that's just not the case, the entire way infantry operates changes because the squad now has a much more heavily equipped organic base of fire and can potentially concentrate everyone on the assault, rather than splitting into a gun-group and and an assault-group as it's typically been required to do since pre-WWII.

 

[shin_getter]

- with it's original one-man turret, cannon and most sadly it's troop carry number rearanged to facilitate yet another Army change of specifications and wants

Not quite as simple as that but basically yes. The reduction in troops was to fit in the two man turret and TOW missiles. Which was a brilliant move. The effectiveness of an infantry battalion to resist a Soviet tank attack was significantly increased by the Bradley’s turret at the loss of a not so significant 100 or so bayonets.

It is possible to fit an ATGM with one man turret, see bmp-1

The IFV concept really took a dramatic turn with two man turret with turret baskets, gun stabilization and advanced sensors that reduced infantry capability and significantly increased the price.

In some sense the IFV debate is a long one with many variables poorly pinned down to allow continued arguments around. A example would be lastdingos pitch:

Challenging the IFV concept - Part 2

This is blog about the defence against external threats and about the defence of civil liberties.

defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com

------------------

With the use case of IFVs spanning maneuver under nuclear exchanges to door knock raid on militants across five decades of technology it is unlikely a single generalization can sum up optimal design.

The question of IFV is really a proxy debate on infantry in combined arms, whose roles has both been changing and hard to understand especially to amateur weapon watchers.

Secondly is that the Bradley was designed without enough armour. This is the most ridiculous of arguments and also the one with the most mileage. The Bradley was designed to be resistant to splinters from nearby bursts of 152mm high explosive shells and hits from 14.5mm armour piercing bullets fired by Soviet heavy machineguns.,,. It is this closing with the enemy on the battlefield that exposes an APC to the fires of anti-tank weapons like the RPG or BMP’s 73mm gun. Weapons that are not effective at long range. Also the APC didn’t have to worry about long range anti-tank weapons like guided missiles or enemy tank guns because it was never to remain stationary while exposed to enemy direct fires like a tank does. However the type of suppressive fires they would face are artillery barrages and long range machinegun fires.

That is merely one conceptualization of the IFV. Other thinkers wanted the IFV to do different things, even in a linear battle.

There is dismount out of small arms range: the slowest method that exposes infantry to small arms and artillery the most but demands the least on the transport vehicle. This is the typical concept for APCs.

Then there is dismount out of RPG range, which speeds up the assault and protects the infantry from artillery and small arms all but the last 300m. ATGM is to be suppressed by fire and smoke. This is the typical concept for IFVs.

Then there is those that propose closing to near hand grenade range before dismount, exposing the infantry the least amount of time to small arms and artillery and maintaining the fastest tempo of attack with greatest shock effect but demand near MBT levels of protection.

There are also thinkers that believe ATGM-like weapons can not be adequately negated with high density of light ATGMs like Eryx or NLAW, AT7 possible, demanding again, MBT like protection for infantry assault carriers. Of course, whether to protect "Tanks" against ATGM was not set in stone either, with vehicles like Leo1 and AMX30. Composite armor means it is somewhat more feasible but it is unclear whether the offense-defense arms race favor the tank builders (against opponent that have a missile industry that can respond to new armor).

Then there is soviets that simply do not attempt to armor against heavier weapons and focus on maximizing mobility, firepower and volume. The BMP-1 actually attempted to make the IFV an anti-tank vehicle with ATGM/Grom (with only HEAT and no HE ammo in early iterations) in the belief in massed armored clash in Germany, with infantry tasks being a sideshow.

Then there are people that want symmetric overmatch and demand armor overmatch on opponent IFVs.

Then there is the assumption of linearity in a Germanic clash with historically unparalleled mobility on all sides with a potential dash of nuclear weapons. It is also questionable how much importance is infantry in open field defense lines (as to demand sophisticate equipment to counter) when fully mechanized armies with historically unparalleled firepower is fighting.

The original cold war mission was never validated and there is much speculation on what would have happened but not sufficient proof.
---
In the post cold war environment, infantry do not assault anyways, but instead pin and kill the opponent with fires. This with shifting expectation on infantry losses means a completely different set of requirements.

 

[Cjc]

- with it's original one-man turret, cannon and most sadly it's troop carry number rearanged to facilitate yet another Army change of specifications and wants

Not quite as simple as that but basically yes. The reduction in troops was to fit in the two man turret and TOW missiles. Which was a brilliant move. The effectiveness of an infantry battalion to resist a Soviet tank attack was significantly increased by the Bradley’s turret at the loss of a not so significant 100 or so bayonets.

It is possible to fit an ATGM with one man turret, see bmp-1

The IFV concept really took a dramatic turn with two man turret with turret baskets, gun stabilization and advanced sensors that reduced infantry capability and significantly increased the price.

In some sense the IFV debate is a long one with many variables poorly pinned down to allow continued arguments around. A example would be lastdingos pitch:

Challenging the IFV concept - Part 2

This is blog about the defence against external threats and about the defence of civil liberties.

defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com

------------------

With the use case of IFVs spanning maneuver under nuclear exchanges to door knock raid on militants across five decades of technology it is unlikely a single generalization can sum up optimal design.

The question of IFV is really a proxy debate on infantry in combined arms, whose roles has both been changing and hard to understand especially to amateur weapon watchers.

Secondly is that the Bradley was designed without enough armour. This is the most ridiculous of arguments and also the one with the most mileage. The Bradley was designed to be resistant to splinters from nearby bursts of 152mm high explosive shells and hits from 14.5mm armour piercing bullets fired by Soviet heavy machineguns.,,. It is this closing with the enemy on the battlefield that exposes an APC to the fires of anti-tank weapons like the RPG or BMP’s 73mm gun. Weapons that are not effective at long range. Also the APC didn’t have to worry about long range anti-tank weapons like guided missiles or enemy tank guns because it was never to remain stationary while exposed to enemy direct fires like a tank does. However the type of suppressive fires they would face are artillery barrages and long range machinegun fires.

That is merely one conceptualization of the IFV. Other thinkers wanted the IFV to do different things, even in a linear battle.

There is dismount out of small arms range: the slowest method that exposes infantry to small arms and artillery the most but demands the least on the transport vehicle. This is the typical concept for APCs.

Then there is dismount out of RPG range, which speeds up the assault and protects the infantry from artillery and small arms all but the last 300m. ATGM is to be suppressed by fire and smoke. This is the typical concept for IFVs.

Then there is those that propose closing to near hand grenade range before dismount, exposing the infantry the least amount of time to small arms and artillery and maintaining the fastest tempo of attack with greatest shock effect but demand near MBT levels of protection.

There are also thinkers that believe ATGM-like weapons can not be adequately negated with high density of light ATGMs like Eryx or NLAW, AT7 possible, demanding again, MBT like protection for infantry assault carriers. Of course, whether to protect "Tanks" against ATGM was not set in stone either, with vehicles like Leo1 and AMX30. Composite armor means it is somewhat more feasible but it is unclear whether the offense-defense arms race favor the tank builders (against opponent that have a missile industry that can respond to new armor).

Then there is soviets that simply do not attempt to armor against heavier weapons and focus on maximizing mobility, firepower and volume. The BMP-1 actually attempted to make the IFV an anti-tank vehicle with ATGM/Grom (with only HEAT and no HE ammo in early iterations) in the belief in massed armored clash in Germany, with infantry tasks being a sideshow.

Then there are people that want symmetric overmatch and demand armor overmatch on opponent IFVs.

Then there is the assumption of linearity in a Germanic clash with historically unparalleled mobility on all sides with a potential dash of nuclear weapons. It is also questionable how much importance is infantry in open field defense lines (as to demand sophisticate equipment to counter) when fully mechanized armies with historically unparalleled firepower is fighting.

The original cold war mission was never validated and there is much speculation on what would have happened but not sufficient proof.
---
In the post cold war environment, infantry do not assault anyways, but instead pin and kill the opponent with fires. This with shifting expectation on infantry losses means a completely different set of requirements.

It sould be noted the only time anybody outside of Israel (who have never really believed in ifvs) and its enemies to use assaults like that, aka desert storm did that last one, hell for most of the breach 1st infantry didn't even leave there vehicles, which makes sense of all the Bradley replacements during the late 80's and early 90's beaing biult on the same chases as the abrams replacement.

 

[Foo Fighter]

From my admittedly imperfect memory, the Soviet Union developed the first true MICV and the rest just joined the race. M2 and M3 variants follow slightly different roles which recce and infantry bus accents differentiate but not much else. Mission creep and a desire to overmatch the logical opponent lend their hand to increasing tech fitted and the rest follows an increased use of IED ambush in Asymmetric warfare. Do they all need everything fitted? No idea, rather like the tank the MICV or whatever it will be called, is in line for a change. Armour balance etc and possibly a blend of light and heavier MICV/APC/RECCE vehicle. There has been a huge amount of data from Ukraine and not all of it is even relevant due to missing defensive kit but change there will likely be.