The effect of RAN 1964 Carrier Replacement Plan going Ahead?

[GK. Dundas]

Ironically we probably could have run Hermes with a little creative thinking and tweaking manpower requirements.

 

[H_K]

In 1972-73 Oriskany was operating an attack carrier air wing of 86 aircraft. It consisted of 28 F-8J, 42 A-7A/E, 4 RF-8G, 4 EKA-3B, 4 E-1B, 1 C-1A and 3 SH-3G. That's 83 fixed-wing plus 3 helicopters for SAR and Vertrep. She had a crew of 3,500 men, which IIRC was about 2,000 for the ship and 1,500 for the air wing.

I'd be careful with those air group numbers. There simply isn't enough space on an Essex to operate that kind of huge air wing effectively.

There are other sources that quote slightly smaller numbers for Essex carriers, e.g. 18-22 F-8J, 30-39 A-4/A-7, 2-3 RF-8, 3 EKA-3B, 3 E-1B... typically 50-60 fighters plus 6 big support aircraft and 3 small helos... never more than 70 aircraft total.

So I suspect the larger #s represent the number of aircraft assigned to the air wing, while the smaller #s represent the number of aircraft actually embarked on deployment, with each squadron or detachment leaving at least 1 aircraft at home (and sometimes 2-3 aircraft for the larger fighter/attack squadrons). There's a similar practice in place with the large CVN airwings.

Finally, IIRC there was also a practice during Vietnam to drop off a few aircraft in the Philippines were they would act as a reserve, so we don't know what was the actual # embarked was during operational periods.

 

[orlovsky]

Oriskany 1970 https://www.history.navy.mil/conten...d-operation-reports/vietnam/Oriskany 1969.pdf





So 42 A-4, 24 F-8, 3 EKA-3B, 3 E-1B, 4 Recce F-8 and 3 Helos = 76 fixed wing + 3 Helos

But that was a lot...



.. and some were indeed shore based.

 

[Rule of cool]

@orlovsky , how common is the practice of having less aircraft than a carrier can handle because it's beneficial from an operational standpoint? It has come up in discussion about refitting HMAS Melbourne to Karel Doorman/Minas Gerais standard and came up in my 70 British fleet carrier thread, how CVA01 could carry 42 jets but 36 was 'normal'.

People love these numbers, but back in the day I was taught 'airpower' is a 'product' and that product is measured by sorties flown, not on aircraft owned. If a carrier has a couple less aircraft but flies more sorties, it's producing more airpower.

 

[Pioneer]

The main question seems to always be "why did Australia need a strike-capable carrier at all"? It make sence while there was hostile Indonesia to worry aboout. But after collapse of Sukarno regime, the value of the carrier diminished greatly. Its main value was basically "the alliance value", i.e. making Australia more valuable ally for USA through the capability to project power.

For the defense of Australia, strike-capable carrier was a dubious proposal. It waxn't exactly likely that Soviet armada would venture down under to protect indigenious population of Australia from capitalistic oppression (and in case THIS would happens and USN would NOT be able to stop it, the lone Australin carrier would hardly be anything more than a target for MRA). Australia wasn't important target in Cold War terms; it was too far away from major theaters for anyone to care much about it.

So buying Essex with Phantoms without any clear understanding what exactly they are supposed to do - besides "sailing with USN to fight American wars somewhere far away" - doesn't looks particularly good proposal. A variation of "Invincible"-class, equipped with helicopters & some Harriers would be much more reasonable.

You know Dilandu, in the last couple of years, I've been thinking along similar lines. In essence, it's a similar issue that the British/RN has never been willing to come to terms with IMO.
Australia has seemingly had a complexity of wanting to be one of the 'big boys', when in fact it can't be.

At the end of the day, it's my opinion that the F-4 Phantom II was overly ambitious for the RAN - period. The F-4 Phantom II almost being the tail wagging the dog, if you know what I mean.

The experience in operating, let alone keeping it relevant would be a significant strain on RAN finances. If it could operate from an Essex-clasd, I cant help wondervat what restrictions - fuel, weapons load, range/endirance.....

So, my thought has swayed to the conclusion that if Australia deems it requires a carrier, it has to be within its means - both in terms if purchasing and maintaining such a carrier with relevance. As such, I think the Essex/F-4 Phantom II was always a want to be one of the 'big boys'. As such, I envisage the purchase of Hermes before HMAS Melbourne has its expensive refit to support Skyhawk's and Tracker's. As a consequence, the Australian government/RAN purchases either:

Standard production -
8 x Vought F-8 Crusader (fighter-interceptor),
12 x Douglas A-4E Skyhawk (strike),
6 x Grumman S-2 Tracker (ASW/MP),
3 x Grumman E-1B Tracer (AEW),
4 x Westland Wessex (ASW/Plane Guard).
The most cost effective, but short terminism.

Or

More pragmatically
Tailored production -
8 x Avon-powered Vought F-8 Crusader (fighter-interceptor),
12 x Avon-powered Douglas A-4E Skyhawk (strike),
6 x turboprop-powered Grumman S-2 Tracker (ASW/MP) (S2T Turbo Tracker),
3 x turboprop-powered Grumman E-1B Tracer (AEW) (E-1T Turbo Tracer);
4 x Westland Wessex (ASW/Plane Guard).

Yes, the Tailored production proposal will irrufutably cost more, but in doing so, will ensure superior performance and longevity of the given aircraft, as well as the carrier versatility as a whole, up until at least the mid 1990's. After all, there's no reason the F-8, A-4, S-2 and E-1B can't be proactively updated and kept modern.

Ideally, if Australia was pragmatic enough to retain its aerospace industry, come the 1970-80's, they might consider incorporating Rolls-Royce turbofan in place of the Avon's.... After all, by 1964, Vought/Short had studied and proposed a RB.168-25R Spey-powered derivative of the F-8 Crusader.
Douglas had studied [~1966], proposed and promoted the RB.168-20
Spey-powered CA-4E/F Skyhawk, at At $764,000 (£272,000) complete with all-weather navigation equipment.
While Grumman had studied and proposed the turboprop-powered Grumman S-2F-4 (Design 215) to the USN.
So neither of the design I propose were overly radical, they just need a launch customer for given designs that were for all intentions and purposes long proven.

If Australia was smart its pragmatism could pay off with other navies with small carriers seeing benifits/relevance in Avon-powered F-8, A-4, and turboprop S-2, E-1B.

Naturally, the Wessex's will be replaced by Westland Sea Kings, as the design and its capabilities mature.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Pioneer]

Canada looked at Hermes at least twice once while we were in discussion with the British over replacing Magnificent. It was favored over Bonaventure because of her larger size and growth potential.
And secondly just before Bonnie's refit in 64.
And if the reports are true An Essex two or three times .
The deal killer with both carriers was quite simple manpower. We couldn't manage to provide enough personal in both cases of Hermes and an Essex to man them .
Bonaventure required 1200-1300 men and officers.

Thanks GK. Dundas. In truth, I was oblivious to Canada's offer of Hermes!

Seems, only India was the wise ones.....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Rule of cool]

When the CN wanted a strike carrier both CA and CAF were against it leading C-COSC (a RAAFie) to issue his own decision, and he was also disagreed that the RAN needed a strike carrier.

I'm getting a handle on the prolonged RAN carrier replacement story starting as far back as 1959. A lot of too-ing and fro-ing.

 

[Dilandu]

Standard production -
8 x Vought F-8 Crusader (fighter-interceptor),
12 x Douglas A-4E Skyhawk (strike),
6 x Grumman S-2 Tracker (ASW/MP),
3 x Grumman E-1B Tracer (AEW),
4 x Westland Wessex (ASW/Plane Guard).
The most cost effective, but short terminism.

Or

More pragmatically
Tailored production -
8 x Avon-powered Vought F-8 Crusader (fighter-interceptor),
12 x Avon-powered Douglas A-4E Skyhawk (strike),
6 x turboprop-powered Grumman S-2 Tracker (ASW/MP) (S2T Turbo Tracker),
3 x turboprop-powered Grumman E-1B Tracer (AEW) (E-1T Turbo Tracer);
4 x Westland Wessex (ASW/Plane Guard).

Fully agree, it would be significantly better as cost-efficient solution.

 

[Rule of cool]

I found this footnote in this old document.

The changes of mind over the Fleet Air Arm, ........., represent a ....... straightforward case of the revision of policy in the light of a loosening up of budgetary restrictions, reassessment of life of existing aircraft, and reassessment of the practicability of flying the next generation of aircraft (Tracker and Skyhawk) from the carrier Melbourne.

If there was good procurement policy back in 1959 it should be possible to give Melbourne a Karel Doorman/Minas Garais refit in about 1963 and get a decent air wing for a reasonable amount of money.

 

[Rule of cool]

In the 60s the RAN spent (in AUD converted from Aus pounds)

$16m for 27 Wessex ASW helicopters
$16m for 14 S2E Trackers (& 2 S2As for training)
$18m for 8 A4G and 2 TA4G
$8m for Melbourne refit that added 9' to the catapult

The position of the RAN in 1959 was the current aircraft would be at end if life in 1963, and the Melbourne would need a major refit. The RAN also believed the Melbourne couldn't operate the next generation of aircraft. On these assumptions, the RAN ordered the Wessex in 1961.

 

[Caryina2642]

In the 60s the RAN spent (in AUD converted from Aus pounds)

$16m for 27 Wessex ASW helicopters
$16m for 14 S2E Trackers (& 2 S2As for training)
$18m for 8 A4G and 2 TA4G
$8m for Melbourne refit that added 9' to the catapult

The position of the RAN in 1959 was the current aircraft would be at end if life in 1963, and the Melbourne would need a major refit. The RAN also believed the Melbourne couldn't operate the next generation of aircraft. On these assumptions, the RAN ordered the Wessex in 1963.

i thought the wessex entered service in 63?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'd be careful with those air group numbers. There simply isn't enough space on an Essex to operate that kind of huge air wing effectively.

There are other sources that quote slightly smaller numbers for Essex carriers, e.g. 18-22 F-8J, 30-39 A-4/A-7, 2-3 RF-8, 3 EKA-3B, 3 E-1B... typically 50-60 fighters plus 6 big support aircraft and 3 small helos... never more than 70 aircraft total.

So I suspect the larger #s represent the number of aircraft assigned to the air wing, while the smaller #s represent the number of aircraft actually embarked on deployment, with each squadron or detachment leaving at least 1 aircraft at home (and sometimes 2-3 aircraft for the larger fighter/attack squadrons). There's a similar practice in place with the large CVN airwings.

Finally, IIRC there was also a practice during Vietnam to drop off a few aircraft in the Philippines were they would act as a reserve, so we don't know what was the actual # embarked was during operational periods.

Which may or may not be true, but is definitely missing the point, which is that she had a crew of 3,500 and I had remembered correctly because my copy of Jane's 1968-69 says the complement of a CVA Essex was.

2,000 (100 officers, approx 1,900 enlisted men) plus approx 1,500 assigned to the attack air wing for a total of 3,500 per ship.

Furthermore, I put the Essex CVA in for completeness.

My main point was that @Caryina2642 proposed an air group of 32 fixed-wing and 18 helicopters for a total of 50 aircraft for an Essex in RAN service and in Message 28 he wrote.

I can't remember what the crew numbers where in the document but I think they believed in peace time the could operate a crew of around 2,000 maybe 2,100 I believe.

That was less than the 45 aircraft carried by a 1960s Essex CVS and if I'd remembered correctly the crew was about 1,600 for the ship itself and 800 for the air group for a total of 2,400 per ship. Therefore, an Essex in RAN service with air group of the size that he'd proposed would require a crew of at least 2,400.

However, I hadn't remembered correctly because my copy of Jane's 1968-69 says.

1,517 (87 officers, approx 1,430 enlisted men) plus approx 800 assigned to ASW air group for a total of 2,300 per ship.

It also said that the air group of 40 to 47 aircraft including 16 to 18 helicopters. The 45 aircraft that I wrote included 16 helicopters, so my guess is that the difference of 2 helicopters is a pair of machines for SAR and Vetrep.

Although that's 100 less than I misremembered the actual figure of 2,300 is 200 to 300 more than his estimate of 2,000 to 2,100 for an Essex in RAN service with an air group of 50 aircraft. The 200 to 300 more men is the equivalent to a destroyer or a frigate, because according to Jane's 1968-69.

• 333 Adams class in RAN service
• 327 Daring class in RAN service
• 290 Battle class in RAN service
• 250 Type 12 in RAN service
• 220 Type 15 in RAN service

I was wrong about something else, because when @Caryina2642 wrote.

I can't remember what the crew numbers where in the document but I think they believed in peace time the could operate a crew of around 2,000 maybe 2,100 I believe.

In Message 28, my reply in Message 33 was.

I don't recall what they said when I read them on-line, but it's about the same as Melbourne plus Sydney in the 1960s so one Essex could replace the two of them without having to increase the personnel establishment of the RAN.

According to Jane's 1968-69.

• Melbourne: 1,209 to 1,250 - 109 officers (120 to 130 with squadrons) and 1,100 to 1,120 ratings. That's with an air group of 4 Sea Venoms, 6 Gannets and 10 Wessexes - Total 20.
  • Although Jane's 1969-70 onwards say that Melbourne had a crew of 1,335 to 1,354.
  • And have different air groups.
    • Skyhawks replacing the Sea Venoms, Trackers replacing the Gannets and Sea Kings replacing the Wessex helicopters.
    • Although the number of aircraft remained the same at 20 despite the Skyhawk, Tracker and Sea King all being larger than the aircraft they replaced.
    • And from Jane's 1973-74 the number of Skyhawks was doubled from 4 to 8 with the total number of aircraft increasing from 20 to 24.
  • See Message 31.
• Sydney: 544 (34 officers and 510 ratings) was her nucleus crew as a fast transport. Naval reservists would provide the balance of the ship's company in an emergency.
  • Although Jane's 1969-70 onwards say that Sydney had a crew of 550 as a training ship and 607 or 608 as a fast transport.
  • See Message 32.
• And for what it's worth the RAN's Personnel strength from 1960 to 1968 was.
  • 10,594 officers and sailors at 01.01.60
  • 10,547 officers and sailors at 01.01.61
  • 10,832 officers and sailors at 01.01.62
    • When it began to increase and reached.
  • 16,125 officers and sailors at 01.01.68
    • An increase of about 50% over 6 years.

Using the figures from Jane's 1968-69 that's a total of about 1,800 for Melbourne and Sydney, which is 200 to 300 short of @Caryina2642's estimate. It's also 300 short of the crew of Hermes in the late 1960s, which in Jane's 1968-69 was 1,834 (190 officers and 1,644 men) and 2,100 with her air squadrons.

However, I have to admit that if you use the maximum crew figures for those ships in later editions the total increases to 1,950 which is 50 to 150 short of @Caryina2642's estimate for a RAN manned Essex and 150 short of the crew of Hermes in the late 1960s.

Except, that I maintain that an Essex in RAN service with the air group he proposes will require a crew of at least 2,300 rather than 2,000 to 2,100 and am sticking to that until someone can provide the evidence that proves me wrong.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've read that Albion before she sailed home from the far east to be converted to a commando carrier she was offered to Australia to replace Melbourne.

FWIW Albion could operate Gannets, Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms in her existing condition which included BH.V hydraulic catapults.

At one point in the late 1950s she, Centaur or Bulwark had an air group of 38 aircraft consisting of 16 Sea Hawks, 8 Sea Venoms, 8 Gannets or Avengers for ASW, 4 Skyraiders for AEW and 2 SAR helicopters. Meanwhile, in the late 1950s Melbourne had 8 Venoms, 12 Gannets for ASW and 2 SAR helicopters for a total of 22 aircraft.

However, the more powerful machinery and extra aircraft mean a larger crew which others say is a no no. Although the RAN had about 14,000 personnel in the middle 1950s IIRC, which declined to 10,000 by 1960 and was back up to nearly 14,000 at the beginning of 1966.

Obviously she would need a modernization something along the lines off Hermes.

FWIW I think it would be along the lines of Centaur's 1956-58 refit when a pair of BS.4 steam catapults replaced the BH.V hydraulic catapults.

They might increase the angle of the angled flight deck from 5 and a bit degrees to 8 and a bit degrees. However, I doubt that they'd move the forward lift to allow longer steam catapults, due to the time & cost and because it would interfere with the angled flight deck. I also think they wouldn't want the advanced (and expensive electronics) like the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT.

 

[Rule of cool]

i thought the wessex entered service in 63?

Oooops, fixed to 1961.

 

[Volkodav]

The talk of crewing issues misses one point, having a strike carrier with state-of-the-art aircraft would make naval service very exciting and aid recruitment. Also, having a carrier with a reasonable strike capability would permit Australia to wind back conscription and reduce the size of the army as the deployment of the carrier in support of the US would support our alliances without the need for a full ground deployment.

A dramatically reduced involvement in Vietnam would also reduce pressure on the defence budget, as well as de-escalate the social issues inspired by that conflict and maybe remove the use of conscripted personnel in deployments.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Albion and Bulwark were converted to Commando carriers somewhere around 1960.

FWIW according to Jane's 1962-63.

Albion entered H.M. Dockyard, Portsmouth, in Dec., 1960, and was taken in hand in Feb. 1961 for conversion which was completed in July 1962. She commissioned on 1 Aug. 1962 for sea trials and work-up preparatory for leaving for the Far East in Nov. to relieve Bulwark.

And Jane's 1967-68.

Converted into commando carriers at Portsmouth Dockyard, Feb 61 to 1 Aug 62 (Albion) and Jan 1959 to 19 Jan 1960 (Bulwark).

Centaur was used as a small 'strike' carrier until 1965 when she was retired and used as an accommodation ship. She was the only one of the 4 ships finished with an axial deck and then converted to steam cats and angled deck.

According to Marriott's "Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945-1990" and her Wikipedia entry.

She commissioned on 1st September 1953, but as soon as she completed her trials, the ship was taken in hand so that an angled flight deck could be installed. She arrived at Portsmouth in February 1954 and it looks like she returned to service in July 1954. The deck was angled at 5½ degrees and the arrester gear and barriers were realigned to conform.

She paid off at Devonport in June 1956 to have a pair of 139ft stroke BS.4 steam catapults fitted, but the refit didn't begin until September and recommissioned 2 years later on 3rd September 1958. She had another refit at Portsmouth from August 1960 to March 1961 which saw her arrester gear to strengthened to handle 35,000lb aircraft.

She paid off for the last time on 27th September 1965. As you wrote she spent the rest of the 1960s as an accommodation ship before being put on the Disposal List in 1970 and scrapped in 1972.

 

[orlovsky]

@orlovsky , how common is the practice of having less aircraft than a carrier can handle because it's beneficial from an operational standpoint? It has come up in discussion about refitting HMAS Melbourne to Karel Doorman/Minas Gerais standard and came up in my 70 British fleet carrier thread, how CVA01 could carry 42 jets but 36 was 'normal'.

People love these numbers, but back in the day I was taught 'airpower' is a 'product' and that product is measured by sorties flown, not on aircraft owned. If a carrier has a couple less aircraft but flies more sorties, it's producing more airpower.

I can only rely on sources, too, so what I make of those:
About 75% allows for the best operating conditions. In a war setting, this can go to 90%. Implied is probably a loss factor; Oriskany lost half its attributed airwing, 39 aircraft, in 1967/68: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA451820.pdf p 130. Not as bad but somewhat similar RN in the Falklands. So a ~15% loss if you plan to attack the Kola peninsula in the cold war gone hot will happen pretty fast. So it makes sense to load your carrier to the max if you can. Whether and how you can reinforce your carrier will depend on the overall situation.

Seems this was no issue for the french navy which would employ its carriers more as sea control ships in WW3.

As for sorties, that also features in the thesis I linked: make it the yardstick, and you ill get a lot of sorties. Many of them useless. Sortie generation capacity may be a good measurement, but they still need to be translated into effective missions.

 

[Rule of cool]

The talk of crewing issues misses one point, having a strike carrier with state-of-the-art aircraft would make naval service very exciting and aid recruitment. Also, having a carrier with a reasonable strike capability would permit Australia to wind back conscription and reduce the size of the army as the deployment of the carrier in support of the US would support our alliances without the need for a full ground deployment.

A dramatically reduced involvement in Vietnam would also reduce pressure on the defence budget, as well as de-escalate the social issues inspired by that conflict and maybe remove the use of conscripted personnel in deployments.

You're going down a very interesting rabbit hole that I've given thought to in the past, and I believe that is possible for Australia to both contribute to the Vietnam War in a significant way and avoid conscription and its attendant problems. However, it does involve significant mental gymnastics that would likely be frowned upon in a technical forum and not provide enough men to crew a large attack carrier.

 

[Rule of cool]

I can only rely on sources, too, so what I make of those:
About 75% allows for the best operating conditions. In a war setting, this can go to 90%. Implied is probably a loss factor; Oriskany lost half its attributed airwing, 39 aircraft, in 1967/68: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA451820.pdf p 130. Not as bad but somewhat similar RN in the Falklands. So a ~15% loss if you plan to attack the Kola peninsula in the cold war gone hot will happen pretty fast. So it makes sense to load your carrier to the max if you can. Whether and how you can reinforce your carrier will depend on the overall situation.

Seems this was no issue for the french navy which would employ its carriers more as sea control ships in WW3.

As for sorties, that also features in the thesis I linked: make it the yardstick, and you ill get a lot of sorties. Many of them useless. Sortie generation capacity may be a good measurement, but they still need to be translated into effective missions.

The ineffective missions despite good sortie generation is not uncommon. IIRC Harrier GR3s in the Falklands conducted a lot of Armed Recce missions looking for targets of opportunity that didn't appear when they would have been better off mounting planned strikes against known targets. However, it's better to generate a lot of sorties and have a percentage of them be wasted then generate fewer sorties with the same percentage of wasted missions.

In any case, loading a carrier to the max is fine for a 2- or 3-day battle, WW2 style. If you have to hang around for weeks like the Falklands and PGW1 or months like Korea and Vietnam, then taking a few aircraft off in order to maintain a number of sorties over a week or more looks like a good idea.

 

[orlovsky]

Recce missions make sense. What happened in Vietnam was the perfect bastard child of politics and bureaucracy:

 

[Caryina2642]

This is what the RAN thought on manning the Essex Carrier

 

[Volkodav]

You're going down a very interesting rabbit hole that I've given thought to in the past, and I believe that is possible for Australia to both contribute to the Vietnam War in a significant way and avoid conscription and its attendant problems. However, it does involve significant mental gymnastics that would likely be frowned upon in a technical forum and not provide enough men to crew a large attack carrier.

Call it Human Factors and it will fit perfectly

 

[Rule of cool]

This is what the RAN thought on manning the Essex Carrier

Even if the RAN could cover the manpower in theory, that still leaves that 150m pound cost compared to the actual spend on Melbourne, Wessex, S2s and A4s of less than 30m pounds 1961-69.

Then there's the CN's inability to justify the requirement to his colleagues, CA, CAF and C-COSC let alone Cabinet.

 

[Caryina2642]

Even if the RAN could cover the manpower in theory, that still leaves that 150m pound cost compared to the actual spend on Melbourne, Wessex, S2s and A4s of less than 30m pounds 1961-69.

Then there's the CN's inability to justify the requirement to his colleagues, CA, CAF and C-COSC let alone Cabinet.

Agreed there coast is huge, but that is the case in a gestational buys such as aircraft carriers.
I do get it through I think the Indonesian threat needs to be a bit bigger. Like all the Tu16s are AShM capable, 20 subs like the document predicts but in 64 and the 2nd sverdlov cruiser

 

[Volkodav]

Even if the RAN could cover the manpower in theory, that still leaves that 150m pound cost compared to the actual spend on Melbourne, Wessex, S2s and A4s of less than 30m pounds 1961-69.

Then there's the CN's inability to justify the requirement to his colleagues, CA, CAF and C-COSC let alone Cabinet.

The irony being just over a decade later one of the key reasons given for not replacing the carrier was it was not worth having a carrier if it couldn't operate supersonic fighters and fixed-wing ASW aircraft.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I've been deliberately using man, men and manning instead of crew and crewing, because the decision on what ship to buy would be taken shortly before the start of Women's Lib which would be in full swing when the ship entered service, so supplement the inadequate supply of men with women and allow them to serve at sea decades earlier than IOTL.

The berthing in Essex-class would make mixed crews challenging, to say the least. It's all large open bays!

Also, have you seen the heads/toilets? Just rows of seats, no stalls, no doors.

At the end of the day, it's my opinion that the F-4 Phantom II was overly ambitious for the RAN - period. The F-4 Phantom II almost being the tail wagging the dog, if you know what I mean.

What else is available with BVR AAMs?

Crusader doesn't have them, but might be able to be fitted for Sparrows.

 

[orlovsky]

What else is available with BVR AAMs?

Crusader doesn't have them, but might be able to be fitted for Sparrows.

F-8E(FN) carried R530. Integration is paid for by 1964 by French navy, and you have commonality with RAAF Mirage IIIs.

A BVR F-8 is no Phantom, but I wonder how significant the gap is with proper AEW, especially for Australia...

 

[Pioneer]

What else is available with BVR AAMs?

Crusader doesn't have them, but might be able to be fitted for Sparrows.

Scott Kenny, you are correct in what you insinuate - there isn't really anything in the size/weight catagory of carrier-based supersonic air superiority, after the F-8 Crusader.
The fact is, Vought did study and propose to the USN an all-weather derivative of the F-8, armed with Aim-7 Sparrow III missiles (I think at the cost of two of it's 20mm cannons?). Unfortunatly, I can't recall it's designation....(It's in Bill Spidle's excellent book Vought F-8 Crusader: Development of the Navy's first supersonic jet fighter)

So, if the RAN was both serious and smart about continuing to keep itself equipped with a proven supersonic air superiority carrier-based fighter/interceptor, it could be done via Vought.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Caryina2642]

Scott Kenny, you are correct in what you insinuate - there isn't really anything in the size/weight catagory of carrier-based supersonic air superiority, after the F-8 Crusader.
The fact is, Vought did study and propose to the USN an all-weather derivative of the F-8, armed with Aim-7 Sparrow III missiles (I think at the cost of two of it's 20mm cannons?). Unfortunatly, I can't recall it's designation....(It's in Bill Spidle's excellent book Vought F-8 Crusader: Development of the Navy's first supersonic jet fighter)

So, if the RAN was both serious and smart about continuing to keep itself equipped with a proven supersonic air superiority carrier-based fighter/interceptor, it could be done via Vought.

Regards
Pioneer

THe only problem i see with that is, dont think the RAN would be very keen on being the only operator of the Crusader III. It is much better to jump on the F-4 with the USN for spares and logistics

 

[orlovsky]

THe only problem i see with that is, dont think the RAN would be very keen on being the only operator of the Crusader III. It is much better to jump on the F-4 with the USN for spares and logistics

Not Crusader III. A version of the F-8.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vought-f-8-projects.548/page-2#post-810369

 

[Caryina2642]

Not Crusader III. A version of the F-8.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vought-f-8-projects.548/page-2#post-810369

I was wrong still, during this time period you really need a Weapons Systems Officer to not overload the pilot with the AIM-7.
Really anyway you look at in 1964 there is only one option for the RAN for a supersonic jet with BVRM capability and its the F-4

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is what the RAN thought on manning the Essex Carrier

This may be easier to read.

. . . the strength by 1968 is now expected to be over 15,000, all of which would be required to complete full peace compliments of the present approved projects."

73. The manpower required to man the force (on full peace compliment) shown in para. 71, all shore establishments and training commitments and allowing for increased shore personnel required to support for the new carriers, is calculated at 1,727 officers and 15,892 ratings – total 17,619.

It is estimated that 1,743 officers and 15,876 ratings (Total 17,619) could be borne on 30th June, 1969 assuming:

(a) An adult male rating recruiting rate of 1,150 in 1965 rising to 1,300 in 1968 and remaining there thereafter. (1964 recruiting rate to be about 1,150.)

(b) A continued re-engagement rate of about 30%.

(c) Increases in Junior Recruits, Naval Apprentices and WRANs as shown in the next paragraph.

74. The increase of 2,319 personnel from the previously projected strength of 15,300 for the present approved programme to 17,619 results from the following:

(a) Difference between MELBOURNE and replacement carrier – including squadrons. 1,067

(b) Additional personnel at RAN Air Station Nowra owing to new types of aircraft. 200

(c) Increase to 900 the annual intake of Junior Recruits in order to overcome manpower deficiencies. 300

(d) Increase to 780 in total number of Naval Artificer Apprentices under training in order to overcome Artificer shortage. 200

(e) Extra numbers required to man two Type 12 Frigates beyond those required for DUCHESS (vide Cabinet Submission No. 157, para. 23). 243

(f) Provisional estimate of ratings required for Submarine Base for 4 Oberon submarines. 110

(g) Increase to 600 in W.R.A.N.S., to enable more personnel to be available for seagoing billets. 50

(h) Increase in ineffectives, i.e. sick leave etc. 149

The total of the above is 2,319.​

NOTE: Concerning these numbers the increase shown in (c) and (d) would be reduced as manpower deficiencies decreased.

75. The estimated overall state in June 1969 based on Full Peace Compliments could therefore be a surplus of 16 officers and a deficiency of 16 men. Although there could be a small overall officer surplus it is estimated that there will be a deficiency in E and L specialisations totalling approximately 42 (15% deficient; present deficiency 19%). Avenues are being explored to overcome this deficiency. In the artificer branches which are currently suffering the most serious rating manning shortages in the Navy, it is calculated that the situation will be as follows:

​

Various measures are being investigated to improve this situation. The effect of the recent pay increases had not been taken into consideration since the time factor is insufficient to permit of a re-assessment, however, it is logical to assume that the result will improve the personnel situation.

Conclusion

76. The carrier could be manned as in para. 70 if an early decision is made.

Do you have the page that includes Paragraph 70?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Message 72.

According to that report from 1964, an Essex was expected to require 1,067 more persons than Melbourne, Unfortunately, it didn't say what the crews of the two ships were. The nearest Jane's that I have the figures for is 1965-66 which said Melbourne's complement was 1,209 to 1,250 in peace and 1,450 in war. Based on that the peacetime complement of an Essex would have been 2,276 to 2,317 which is nearly the same as the 2,300 for an Essex CVA in the USN according to Jane's 1968-69.

It also says.

It is estimated that 1,743 officers and 15,876 ratings (Total 17,619) could be borne on 30th June, 1969 assuming:

This is the actual personnel strength (officers and sailors) of the RAN at 1st January from 1964 to 1973 according to various editions of Jane's.

• 1964 - 11,908
• 1965 - 12,822
• 1966 - 13,960
• 1967 - 15,247
• 1968 - 16,125
• 1969 - 16,638
• 1970 - 17,030
• 1971 - 17,000
• 1972 - 17,090
• 1973 - 17,128

So they were about 1,000 short at the start of 1969 and 500-600 short from the beginning of 1970 to the beginning of 1972.

 

[orlovsky]

I was wrong still, during this time period you really need a Weapons Systems Officer to not overload the pilot with the AIM-7.
Really anyway you look at in 1964 there is only one option for the RAN for a supersonic jet with BVRM capability and its the F-4

If you insist on a twoseater, the only OTS aircraft is the F-4, yes.
It is not an absolute necessity as the F-8E(FN) shows.
So, what kind of threat would the RAN face that requires Phantoms?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Paragraphs 69 and 70


​

In paragraph 69 it says 218 officers and 2,073 men and Melbourne's crew would provide 58% of that. 218 + 2,073 = 2,291 which is so close to the 2,300 for an Essex CVS according to Jane's 1969-70 as makes no difference.

58% of 2,291 is 1,329 which happens to be close to the 1,334 or 1,335 that Jane's 1972-73 onwards said was Melbourne's complement. On the other hand later in the document it said that the new carrier's crew was 1,067 more than Melbourne's and 2,291 - 1,067 = 1,224.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

 

[Rule of cool]

The following is what the Navy spent on Aircraft, armament, ships, electronics, electrical stores, in AUD, and what the total defence spend was.

• 1960-61 - 30.6m of 401.3m
• 1961-62 - 30.8m of 409.4m
• 1962-63 - 34.8m of 423.3m
• 1963-64 - 42.0m of 518.7m
• 1964-65 - 52.4m of 598.1m
• 1965-66 - 73.0m of 741.9m
• 1966-67 - 93.4m of 950.1m
• 1967-68 - 105.5m of 1,109.5m
• 1968-69 - 95.1m of 1,164.7m

1961-69 the RAN spent a total of about $58m on 27 Wessex, 14+2 S2, 8+2 A4 and a refit on Melbourne that lengthened the catapult from 103' to 112'. It also bought 3 DDGs are a cost of about $50m each.

The cost of a rebuilt Essex, ~24 F4Bs, ~16 S2Es and 8 E1Bs was estimated to be about 150m Australian pounds which equates to AUD $300m after Feb 1966.

Even if the Essex could operate Phantoms (which it couldn't) and the RAN could find the manpower (which it couldn't) and he Chief of Army, Chief of Air Force and the Chairman-Chief Of Staffs Committee agreed the requirement was valid (which they didn't) $300m equates to the entire RAN procurement budget 1964-68. Then of course is the fact that 24 F4Bs and 16 S2Es is way too few aircraft to maintain a CAG of 16 F4s and 12 S2s, the RAN will need 32 F4s and 24 S2s, bumping that unaffordable price up even more.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The table in Message 76 says the estimated cost of the RN Carrier (CVA.01) was £72.5 million Australian. In 1964 £1 Sterling was worth £1.25 Australian. Which, if I've got it the right way around, means the estimated cost of CVA.01 in 1964 was £58 million Sterling, because 72.5 ÷ 1.25 = 58. Or it's 72.5 x 1.25 = 90.625 for £90.625 million Sterling. I think it's the former.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think it was ~72m Australian pounds, just for the carrier, the CAG would cost the same again.

As much as I love that NAA Document, it's a pain to search through.

 

[Caryina2642]

The following is what the Navy spent on Aircraft, armament, ships, electronics, electrical stores, in AUD, and what the total defence spend was.

• 1960-61 - 30.6m of 401.3m
• 1961-62 - 30.8m of 409.4m
• 1962-63 - 34.8m of 423.3m
• 1963-64 - 42.0m of 518.7m
• 1964-65 - 52.4m of 598.1m
• 1965-66 - 73.0m of 741.9m
• 1966-67 - 93.4m of 950.1m
• 1967-68 - 105.5m of 1,109.5m
• 1968-69 - 95.1m of 1,164.7m

1961-69 the RAN spent a total of about $58m on 27 Wessex, 14+2 S2, 8+2 A4 and a refit on Melbourne that lengthened the catapult from 103' to 112'. It also bought 3 DDGs are a cost of about $50m each.

The cost of a rebuilt Essex, ~24 F4Bs, ~16 S2Es and 8 E1Bs was estimated to be about 150m Australian pounds which equates to AUD $300m after Feb 1966.

Even if the Essex could operate Phantoms (which it couldn't) and the RAN could find the manpower (which it couldn't) and he Chief of Army, Chief of Air Force and the Chairman-Chief Of Staffs Committee agreed the requirement was valid (which they didn't) $300m equates to the entire RAN procurement budget 1964-68. Then of course is the fact that 24 F4Bs and 16 S2Es is way too few aircraft to maintain a CAG of 16 F4s and 12 S2s, the RAN will need 32 F4s and 24 S2s, bumping that unaffordable price up even more.

I agree with you on the cost grounds unless there is a massive increase in the budget the RAN cant afford her and the amount of aircraft stated is to low. Really you probably need numbers like the original sea venom and Gannet order. Along the Lines of 46 F4s & 40 S2s.
The numbers shown @NOMISYRRUC shown that the RAN was almost there in terms of required personal, that we could have manned her, if we made the decision to get an Essex in 64. (I would say recruitment would increase with an essex an the table). Also the document states if in rember correctly that the F4s were to get longer nose gear like the F-4K to help them operate of the Carrier