The most memorable one was the restriction barring the TA-4G from arrested landings aboard Melbourne.

In another forum a former RAN Sea Venom & Seahawk pilot commented on that - apparently the CG was further forward than on the single-seat A-4G, and there was concern that the horizontal stabilizers did not have enough control authority to lift the nose fast enough at landing speed for a safe bolter.

Therefore, after the final retirement of the trainer Sea Venoms every new A-4 pilot's first carrier landing was in a single-seat A-4G.


I'm not sure on this one, but I think that there was also a lower max catapult launch weight for the A-4G that was below the A-4F's max catapult launch weight from USN carriers, due to both the lower ship speed (and thus lower wind-over-deck) and the slower catapult end-speed.

The A-4Gs needed a better thrust-weight ratio for safe catapult launches at the combined launch speed Melbourne could generate, thus a lower max weight for the A-4G on the catapult.
Thanks for your reply to my inquiry.

Now that you've mentioned it, some of that is coming back to me......especially the restriction of the TA-4G....
More the reason the likes of the RAN could have/should have considered the Douglas studied and marketed Spey-powered Skyhawk International [CA-4E/F], along with it being able to employ Aim-7 Sparrow III AAM's..

Regards
Pioneer
 
The dude, SpazSinbad I think he calls himself, was adamant the the A4G could launch from the Melbourne at MTOW in nil wind conditions. He was an ex RAN 'birdie' but I can't recall if he was aircrew or not.
Yes, I know his internet handle - and yes, he was a pilot.
I still have the PDF he posted on NavWeaps of his ramp strike on Melbourne that has pics of the ramp and of his A-4G after the resulting landing ashore on the two drop tanks.

Thanks for refreshing my memory, apparently my memory has been corrupted (I wonder how that happened).

But just to play devil's advocate - launch at what weight? The A-4G weighed 9,624 lb empty (22,950 lb max... underwing payload was 8,200 lb.)
So loaded with just internal fuel would be a lot lighter than with a max underwing payload and max internal fuel.
 
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I think it was 24,500lbs, but wouldn't be surprised if it was something else. I'm sure it was heavy as far as A4s go.
 
I think it was 24,500lbs, but wouldn't be surprised if it was something else. I'm sure it was heavy as far as A4s go.
24,500 lb was for the A-4F and A-4M.
Both of those listed a payload weight of 8,245 lb normal and 9,195 lb with roll restrictions (the inner wing pylons were rated for 1,750 lb (2,240 lb with roll restrictions).
The A-4E inner wing pylons were not rated for the higher load at all, and neither were the A-4G's, as both are listed with just the "22,950 lb max... external payload 8,200 lb" numbers.

Both the A-4F & A-4M had this note:
24,500 pounds maximum (limited to 23,500 lb from C-11/C-11-1 catapults).

The A-4M also has this note on max weight:
12,437 kg (27,420 lb) export version only (overload condition not authorised by US Navy).
 
I would really like to see a copy of the The RCN's report on the flight testing of the A4 off Bonneventure.
Both the impressions of the MacDon test pilots and the Navy would be quite illuminating.
In '64 the RCN requested to purchase 21 A4 E's.
The funding was not forthcoming.
Fortunately at least all that work did not go to waste. The RAN were able to take it and use it.
 
I would really like to see a copy of the The RCN's report on the flight testing of the A4 off Bonneventure.
Both the impressions of the MacDon test pilots and the Navy would be quite illuminating.
In '64 the RCN requested to purchase 21 A4 E's.
The funding was not forthcoming.
Fortunately at least all that work did not go to waste. The RAN were able to take it and use it.
My next question is , what happens to the Canadian Navy if it does get it's 20 or so Skyhawks?
 
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I note as time went on the RAN began using Melbourne to conduct air strikes against both surface targets and ground targets.
As opposed to a pure ASW role.
 
I note as time went on the RAN began using Melbourne to conduct air strikes against both surface targets and ground targets.
As opposed to a pure ASW role.

In early 1966 we were told that the RN carriers would be withdrawn by 1975 and in early 1968 we were told that they'd be gone by 1971. We had to do something to address this shortfall.

Additionally the RANs ASW role was structured around SEATO requirements and SEATO was on the way out by the late 60s.
 
Both the RCN and their political masters locked the Navy into an ASW only capability.
There were times that I've wondered if the Navy really understood that airplane's were something more then just a passing fad . If it weren't for the DDHs you'd certainly wonder if that were the case.
One of the reasons for having Carrier's in the first place was to provide aircover for the fleet as well as providing ASW sensor and weapons capability.
One the Banjos went away in 62, they couldn't do that .
On top of that they couldn't manage to provide DDGs for almost thirty years .
At least the Australians seemed to have had a more realistic view of possible threats.
Canadian Defence policy seems to be almost delusional at times.
 
IIUC in WW2 the RCN convoy escorts didn't cross the Atlantic, they met RN escorts at the Mid Ocean Meeting Point ( MOMP) then went back to Canada with the westbound convoy. Presumably a similar practice would have been the plan through the 50s, so the RCN would have been unlikely to encounter any enemy aircraft and the carrier would have been an escort carrier. In the immediate postwar years RN light fleet carriers supplanted heavy cruisers as long distance trade protection and presence on global stations, I don't know if this was similar or different to how the RCN and/or RAN expected to operate.

Certainly later in her career the RANs Melbourne expected to meet enemy aircraft, so retaining her through the 70s was valuable. What was Canada expecting to do?
 
By the mid to late sixties we were becoming well aware of the increasing numbers of air launched anti shipping missiles.
Bears, Badgers,Blinders and Blackjacks.
One of the reason for the RCN'S apparent blindness may have derived from the idea that we ( NATO) would still have Control of Iceland or perhaps more accurately the airspace around Iceland.
As it was one of the reasons the Bonneventure was retired in 1970 was that the waters east of Greenland and Iceland were considered untenable for any task group without some sort of air defence capability. Either fighters or escorts armed with naval SAMS.
 
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IIUC in WW2 the RCN convoy escorts didn't cross the Atlantic, they met RN escorts at the Mid Ocean Meeting Point ( MOMP) then went back to Canada with the westbound convoy.
That was only true in 1941/42 for part of the Battle of the Atlantic. See history of the Newfoundland Escort Force.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_Escort_Force
The policy changed in early 1942 and was implemented from about April. After that escort groups escorted convoys all the way across the Atlantic. This was made easier with more longer ranged escorts, like the River clas frigates, and escort oilers to accompany convoys becoming available.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mid-ocean_escort_force
 
The big question was, would it survive the encounter ?

The RAN bought 8 + 2 A4s from 1965 so the Melbourne could have 4 in the CAG to keep shadowers at bay, as she was the head if an ASW TF in the Sulu Sea.

I'd think the RCN would do something similar, and should have. Especially since during this period the RN kept a strike carrier in the NE Atlantic and the USN would have one or two available during wartime so the RCN doesn't have to worry too much about the AVMF missile bombers.

In fact the RAN role in S.E.A.-STEATO looks like it might be a fair bit like the RCN role in NE Atlantic-NATO.
 
Indeed. Here’s my lengthened Centaur in the 80s with 25x F/A-18s.

I added a long waist catapult (199ft BS5 as on Eagle/Ark Royal) for higher take off weights and a Hermes-like angle deck with a ~6.75 degree angle (wasn’t sure a large Victorious like sponson could be made to work on such a narrow hull)View attachment 744378
So how long is she ?
 
So how long is she ?
I added a 66ft hull plug to lengthen Centaur, right behind the machinery rooms and in front of the rear elevator. See this post for pics: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/the-centaur-carrier-fleet-a-better-fate.34959/post-719291

That's where I expect it would be easiest to modify the design without impacting the machinery, ducting & island arrangement, while staying close to the midships area where the parallel hull lines make it easier to lengthen a ship.
 
I added a 66ft hull plug to lengthen Centaur, right behind the machinery rooms and in front of the rear elevator. See this post for pics: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/the-centaur-carrier-fleet-a-better-fate.34959/post-719291

That's where I expect it would be easiest to modify the design without impacting the machinery, ducting & island arrangement, while staying close to the midships area where the parallel hull lines make it easier to lengthen a ship.
Magnificent
 
With the exception of Centaur were their OTL fates really so bad? With the exception of Centaur weren't there fates really average to good? Those are rhetorical questions.
  • Centaur was only in service for 12 years (1953-65) but she was refitted with steam catapults that enabled her to operate Scimitars and Sea Vixens, which Albion and Bulwark weren't.
  • Albion was in service for 19 years (1954-73).
  • Bulwark was in service for 27 years (1954-81).
  • Hermes was in service for 25 years (1959-84). Then she served for 30 years (1987-2017) with the Indian Navy.
    • And while I'm at it.
  • Eagle was in service for 21 years (1951-72)
  • Ark Royal was in service for 24 years (1955-79)
Before anyone says I know the above doesn't make allowance long refits and periods in reserve. However, when these ships were built aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers were judged to be overage 20 years after their date of completion.
 
With the exception of Centaur were their OTL fates really so bad? With the exception of Centaur weren't there fates really average to good? Those are rhetorical questions.
  • Centaur was only in service for 12 years (1953-65) but she was refitted with steam catapults that enabled her to operate Scimitars and Sea Vixens, which Albion and Bulwark weren't.
  • Albion was in service for 19 years (1954-73).
  • Bulwark was in service for 27 years (1954-81).
  • Hermes was in service for 25 years (1959-84). Then she served for 30 years (1987-2017) with the Indian Navy.
    • And while I'm at it.
  • Eagle was in service for 21 years (1951-72)
  • Ark Royal was in service for 24 years (1955-79)
Before anyone says I know the above doesn't make allowance long refits and periods in reserve. However, when these ships were built aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers were judged to be overage 20 years after their date of completion.
Editions of Jane's from 1962-63 to 1973-74 say Bulwark had a crew of 1,035 plus 900 RM Commandos. Jane's 1974-75 onwards said that Bulwark had a crew of 980 plus 750 RM Commandos. Blake and Tiger each had a crew of 885 after their conversions to helicopter cruisers.

Therefore, ITTL Centaur still serves as a strike carrier at the end of 1965. However, instead of being used as an accommodation ships 1966-70 and scrapped in 1972, she's converted into a dual purpose ASW helicopter/commando carrier at Portsmouth 1966-69. This takes the place of Blake's 1965-69 conversion into a helicopter cruiser. In common with Blake IOTL, Centaur recommissioned on 23.04.69 IOTL and paid off for the last time on 06.12.79. She then formed part of the Standby Squadron at Chatham until being put on the Disposal List in 1981 and sold for £210,000 to Shipbreaking (Queenborough) Ltd on 25.08.82 and towed to Cairnryan, Scotland, to be broken up.

That means Centaur was in service for 26 years (1953-79) instead of 12 years (1953-65) including long refits.

IOTL Albion was paid off on 02.03.73 to provide the crew for Hermes and in July of that year was sold to Wilson Walton Engineering of Middlesbrough for use as a heavy lift crane ship, but the scheme fell through and she was broken up at Faslane from November 1973.

Meanwhile, IOTL Tiger was converted to a helicopter cruiser (at Devonport 1968-72). She recommissioned on 02.07.72 and was paid off for the last time on 20.04.78. She was in reserve at Portsmouth 1978-79, put on the Disposal List in 1980, but wasn't sold for scrapping until mid-1986 and towed from Portsmouth to be broken up in Spain until October 1986.

ITTL Tiger isn't converted into a helicopter cruiser, which allows Albion to remain in service (as an ASW carrier) until paying off on 20.04.78. Then she was in reserve at Portsmouth 1978-79, put on the Disposal List in 1980, but wasn't sold for scrapping until mid-1986 and towed from Portsmouth to be broken up in Spain until October 1986.

That means Albion was in service for 24 years (1954-78) instead of 19 years (1954-73).

Except, IOTL Tiger was paid off was to provide the crew for Bulwark (paid off in April 1976 as part of the Mason Defence Review) which recommissioned on 23.02.79. At the time the intention was that she would remain in service until 1984, but the fires in 1980, the worst economic recession since the 1930s and the infamous Nott Defence Review* meant she paid off in March 1981.

Therefore, Albion might be run on until 1981 instead of being replaced by Bulwark in 1979. In which case Albion would have been in service for 27 years (1954-81) and Bulwark would have been in service for 22 years (1954-76).

* Strictly speaking John Nott can't be blamed for that because Bulwark was paid off 3 months before he made his speech in Parliament on 25th June 1981.
 
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* Strictly speaking John Knott can't be blamed for that because Bulwark was paid off 3 months before he made his speech in Parliament on 25th June 1981.
To be fair it was the fault of both the SBS and who ever was responsible for providing CT protection to the North Seas oil rigs.
During training exercises they got a little over enthusiastic with explosives and apparently among other things took out entire bulkheads.
 
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To be fair it was the fault of both the SBS and who ever was responsible for providing CT protection to the North Seas oil rigs. During g training exercises they got a little over enthusiastic with explosives and apparently among other things took out entire bulkheads.
That would have been the Comacchio Company, Royal Marines.

I'd no idea that the damage was that extensive. I thought the MoD used the fires as a "Victorious Excuse", i.e. the time & money required to repair the ship wasn't worth it, because the ship was due to be paid off in a few years anyway.

ITTL Albion and Centaur were still around when the fires happened so one of them could be recommissioned to take Bulwark's place. It would probably be Centaur because she was the ship in the Standby Squadron at Chatham in 1980 ITTL, and events like this are what the Standby Squadron was for.

Therefore, Bulwark still pays off on 27th March 1981, but her crew transfers to Centaur. Almost exactly 3 months later John Knott makes his infamous speech in Parliament, which ITTL includes having Centaur pay off in the spring of 1982 (instead of remaining in service until 1984) and about 2 weeks before this was due to happen Argentina invades the Falkland Islands.

Thus Centaur becomes the flagship of the amphibious task group of the Falklands task force taking the troop carrying helicopters and commandos to the South Atlantic that were aboard Hermes IOTL. This allows Hermes to carry more Sea Harriers and Harriers.
 
It's a knotty problem ;)
 
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