The Centaur carrier fleet - a better fate...

The most memorable one was the restriction barring the TA-4G from arrested landings aboard Melbourne.

In another forum a former RAN Sea Venom & Seahawk pilot commented on that - apparently the CG was further forward than on the single-seat A-4G, and there was concern that the horizontal stabilizers did not have enough control authority to lift the nose fast enough at landing speed for a safe bolter.

Therefore, after the final retirement of the trainer Sea Venoms every new A-4 pilot's first carrier landing was in a single-seat A-4G.


I'm not sure on this one, but I think that there was also a lower max catapult launch weight for the A-4G that was below the A-4F's max catapult launch weight from USN carriers, due to both the lower ship speed (and thus lower wind-over-deck) and the slower catapult end-speed.

The A-4Gs needed a better thrust-weight ratio for safe catapult launches at the combined launch speed Melbourne could generate, thus a lower max weight for the A-4G on the catapult.
Thanks for your reply to my inquiry.

Now that you've mentioned it, some of that is coming back to me......especially the restriction of the TA-4G....
More the reason the likes of the RAN could have/should have considered the Douglas studied and marketed Spey-powered Skyhawk International [CA-4E/F], along with it being able to employ Aim-7 Sparrow III AAM's..

Regards
Pioneer
 
The dude, SpazSinbad I think he calls himself, was adamant the the A4G could launch from the Melbourne at MTOW in nil wind conditions. He was an ex RAN 'birdie' but I can't recall if he was aircrew or not.
Yes, I know his internet handle - and yes, he was a pilot.
I still have the PDF he posted on NavWeaps of his ramp strike on Melbourne that has pics of the ramp and of his A-4G after the resulting landing ashore on the two drop tanks.

Thanks for refreshing my memory, apparently my memory has been corrupted (I wonder how that happened).

But just to play devil's advocate - launch at what weight? The A-4G weighed 9,624 lb empty (22,950 lb max... underwing payload was 8,200 lb.)
So loaded with just internal fuel would be a lot lighter than with a max underwing payload and max internal fuel.
 
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I think it was 24,500lbs, but wouldn't be surprised if it was something else. I'm sure it was heavy as far as A4s go.
24,500 lb was for the A-4F and A-4M.
Both of those listed a payload weight of 8,245 lb normal and 9,195 lb with roll restrictions (the inner wing pylons were rated for 1,750 lb (2,240 lb with roll restrictions).
The A-4E inner wing pylons were not rated for the higher load at all, and neither were the A-4G's, as both are listed with just the "22,950 lb max... external payload 8,200 lb" numbers.

Both the A-4F & A-4M had this note:
24,500 pounds maximum (limited to 23,500 lb from C-11/C-11-1 catapults).

The A-4M also has this note on max weight:
12,437 kg (27,420 lb) export version only (overload condition not authorised by US Navy).
 
I would really like to see a copy of the The RCN's report on the flight testing of the A4 off Bonneventure.
Both the impressions of the MacDon test pilots and the Navy would be quite illuminating.
In '64 the RCN requested to purchase 21 A4 E's.
The funding was not forthcoming.
Fortunately at least all that work did not go to waste. The RAN were able to take it and use it.
 
I would really like to see a copy of the The RCN's report on the flight testing of the A4 off Bonneventure.
Both the impressions of the MacDon test pilots and the Navy would be quite illuminating.
In '64 the RCN requested to purchase 21 A4 E's.
The funding was not forthcoming.
Fortunately at least all that work did not go to waste. The RAN were able to take it and use it.
My next question is , what happens to the Canadian Navy if it does get it's 20 or so Skyhawks?
 
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I note as time went on the RAN began using Melbourne to conduct air strikes against both surface targets and ground targets.
As opposed to a pure ASW role.
 
I note as time went on the RAN began using Melbourne to conduct air strikes against both surface targets and ground targets.
As opposed to a pure ASW role.

In early 1966 we were told that the RN carriers would be withdrawn by 1975 and in early 1968 we were told that they'd be gone by 1971. We had to do something to address this shortfall.

Additionally the RANs ASW role was structured around SEATO requirements and SEATO was on the way out by the late 60s.
 
Both the RCN and their political masters locked the Navy into an ASW only capability.
There were times that I've wondered if the Navy really understood that airplane's were something more then just a passing fad . If it weren't for the DDHs you'd certainly wonder if that were the case.
One of the reasons for having Carrier's in the first place was to provide aircover for the fleet as well as providing ASW sensor and weapons capability.
One the Banjos went away in 62, they couldn't do that .
On top of that they couldn't manage to provide DDGs for almost thirty years .
At least the Australians seemed to have had a more realistic view of possible threats.
Canadian Defence policy seems to be almost delusional at times.
 
IIUC in WW2 the RCN convoy escorts didn't cross the Atlantic, they met RN escorts at the Mid Ocean Meeting Point ( MOMP) then went back to Canada with the westbound convoy. Presumably a similar practice would have been the plan through the 50s, so the RCN would have been unlikely to encounter any enemy aircraft and the carrier would have been an escort carrier. In the immediate postwar years RN light fleet carriers supplanted heavy cruisers as long distance trade protection and presence on global stations, I don't know if this was similar or different to how the RCN and/or RAN expected to operate.

Certainly later in her career the RANs Melbourne expected to meet enemy aircraft, so retaining her through the 70s was valuable. What was Canada expecting to do?
 
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