No one is doubting that it takes years to build components or claiming that instead it takes months or weeks. Certainly not me. But that is not why we only have 8 batteries sanctioned right now instead of 10-12 which is closer to need. The reason why we don't have more than 8 is because there is presently no support to add force structure and to consider things like putting THAAD batteries in the Guard etc. If there had been, battery #9 and beyond would have been ordered in the 2023-2025 time period or alongside battery #8 around 2022. Subsequent administrations have skipped properly sizing the PATRIOT and THAAD force and as I mentioned, while the stresses on the former can be somewhat relieved or shared with upcoming IFPC force structure (and through allied investment in PATRIOT and short-medium range ADS), there is really nothing like that in the works for THAAD where 3-4 forward deployed batteries in peacetime is the new norm and depending on how world events shape up could rise to even higher levels.

On the interceptors, again a decision was made and endorsed by the political forces that they will maintain the MSR for the interceptor and reduce US orders during the time period that it takes to fulfill orders to UAE, KSA etc. This is why we only ordered 12 interceptor AUR's in FY25. Unlike MSE, SM-6 and other interceptor programs, they did not decide to invest to increase THAAD production - and why would they, they only had one additional battery funded and could easily avoid the capital investment and just wait for AUR deliveries to catch up. I don't think anyone is arguing with those facts. What I'm saying is that these are extremely shortsighted decisions that need to be reconsidered before we embark on the pursuit of some whizbang golden dome technologies like space based missiles or lasers.
 
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Think before I speak? I'm not following. What exactly are you insinuating? I honestly don't know how to take that.

It's an ad campaign tagline from the 2000s. The original was about saying phrases like "That's gay [i.e. lame]" and how you never know if someone is gay who is sitting next to you and might be offended.

The amount of people personally associated with the THAAD program on this forum, and in my own immediate social circle, is unusually high. The insinuation is that a random person might sit down at a restaurant or a bar within earshot a THAAD engineer, and never know it while saying things like "I'm surprised the THAAD shot down all those missiles over Qatar I thought it couldn't stop failing tests" while scrolling the news.
 
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It's an ad campaign tagline from the 2000s. The original was about saying phrases like "That's gay [i.e. lame]" and how you never know if someone is gay who is sitting next to you and might be offended.

The amount of people personally associated with the THAAD program on this forum, and in my own immediate social circle, is unusually high. The insinuation is that a random person might sit down at a restaurant or a bar within earshot a THAAD engineer, and never know it while saying things like "I'm surprised the THAAD shot down all those missiles over Qatar I thought it couldn't stop failing tests" while scrolling the news.
Copy that.
 
It's an ad campaign tagline from the 2000s. The original was about saying phrases like "That's gay [i.e. lame]" and how you never know if someone is gay who is sitting next to you and might be offended.

The amount of people personally associated with the THAAD program on this forum, and in my own immediate social circle, is unusually high. The insinuation is that a random person might sit down at a restaurant or a bar within earshot a THAAD engineer, and never know it while saying things like "I'm surprised the THAAD shot down all those missiles over Qatar I thought it couldn't stop failing tests" while scrolling the news.
THAAD had a ton of failures in the very beginning, then they seemed to take a vacation for a couple years while they fixed things. After that's it's been dramatically improved. I'm surprised they haven't tested it against an ICBM target like they did with SM-3 Block II.
 
Once the Sentinels are in place, could Minutemen be bodged into interceptors?
Maybe?

MM3s are 50% heavier than GBIs.

The real problem is location. MM3s are in the wrong part of the US to be really useful as interceptors, IMO. Unless you're talking about trying for head-on shots at incoming ICBMs at a ~16kps closing rate.

Now, if we're relocating the missiles, then they'd be a lot more viable as interceptor-launchers. Pack some off to Alaska, Hawaii, California, Maine, and Alabama or Georgia (Florida is all sand and high water table, you can't sink a silo there).

You'd need to replace the whole bus and possibly 3rd Stage, though.
 
Now, if we're relocating the missiles, then they'd be a lot more viable as interceptor-launchers. Pa
I was thinking about having them shipped overseas

You'd need to replace the whole bus and possibly 3rd Stage, though.
True. Israel could do that...and/or use some fitted with conventional warheads.
 

The U.S. THAAD system accounted for almost half of all interceptions, perhaps because of Israel’s insufficient Arrow interceptor capacity. As a result, the United States used up about 14 percent of all its THAAD interceptors, which would take three to eight years to replenish at current production rates. Iran’s large-scale missile campaign may have revealed vulnerabilities in Israeli and U.S. air defense systems, providing lessons that Iran or other U.S. adversaries could exploit in the future. During the periods where THAAD represented over 60 percent of interceptors used, Iran increased its successful hit rate by one to four percent.
 

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The US seriously needs to spend some money to then establish second and third production source so that its' stocks of ABMs can be quickly replenished.
 
It also then needs to order enough missiles to keep those production sources open.

In addition to that also mass-producing extra rocket-motor casings (Including their linings) to be put into climate-controlled secure storage so they're on hand to be quickly loaded with freshly made solid-propellant (Keeping in mind that once it's cast it has a finite shelf-life).
 
In addition to that also mass-producing extra rocket-motor casings (Including their linings) to be put into climate-controlled secure storage so they're on hand to be quickly loaded with freshly made solid-propellant (Keeping in mind that once it's cast it has a finite shelf-life).
Properly stored solid propellant can last for 20-50 years, witness Trident and MM3.
 
Production rate increase already in progress.
Yes, because right now there's at least one active draw (not sure if there's a THAAD in Ukraine, but Israel sure is using them) on missiles, not just building missiles for stockpile.

But if each factory needs to produce at least 100 a year to stay open, the US needs to buy at least 300 missiles a year whether or not we are actively using any missiles at all.
 
Yes, because right now there's at least one active draw (not sure if there's a THAAD in Ukraine, but Israel sure is using them) on missiles, not just building missiles for stockpile.

But if each factory needs to produce at least 100 a year to stay open, the US needs to buy at least 300 missiles a year whether or not we are actively using any missiles a
I'm well aware of why and how many THÀAD and PAC-3 interceptors were used in Israel and Qatar.
 

Using 14% of the stockpile in a couple days against a neutered Iran is quite literally hilarious.

The Western Pacific is a whole different ball game, how are US war planners hoping to address that issue long term?
 
Using 14% of the stockpile in a couple days against a neutered Iran is quite literally hilarious.

The Western Pacific is a whole different ball game, how are US war planners hoping to address that issue long term?
Probably hit the supply chain when things kick off, whereas Iran was intended to be a limited conflict. Same deal with Ukraine, it's very different when offence is working in both directions.
 
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Using 14% of the stockpile in a couple days against a neutered Iran is quite literally hilarious.

The Western Pacific is a whole different ball game, how are US war planners hoping to address that issue long term?

Increasing production rates of THAAD over the next 5-10 years. Procure adjuncts to increase attack range and deplete IRBM raids over distance.

Probably hit the supply chain when things kick off, whereas Iran was a intended to be a limited conflict. Same deal with Ukraine, it's very different when offence is working in both directions.

Iran didn't have a manufacturing base worth attacking and they drained about a sixth of the stockpile of THAADs. I wonder what China, who makes some of the largest numbers of IRBMs and IRBM launchers in the world, would do. Things are not looking good for Guam!
 
Iran didn't have a manufacturing base worth attacking and they drained about a sixth of the stockpile of THAADs. I wonder what China, who makes some of the largest numbers of IRBMs and IRBM launchers in the world, would do. Things are not looking good for Guam!
Iran's missiles didn't materialise out of fresh air, they need parts, chemicals, materials, workers and electrical power to build. In a proper conflict you remove all that straight off.
 
Iran's missiles didn't materialise out of fresh air, they need parts, chemicals, materials, workers and electrical power to build. In a proper conflict you remove all that straight off.

That's cool.

In a "proper conflict" (what???) the first thing that happens is Guam receives a few dozen to a hundred or so IRBMs from within the A2AD zone.

DF-26 can carry three warheads, or one warhead and some penetration aids, so that means about 100-300 incoming targets and penetration aids or decoys. THAAD has a rough 80-90% probability of kill. With about 100 incoming warheads needing to be hit it's unlikely Guam survives unscathed and the THAAD battery itself would be the primary target. If the warheads are nuclear, it simply won't survive, and if you're trying to suppress an aero-naval offensive that would be a really good OCA. The Soviets thought so, anyway.

The main problem is that the PLARF has sufficient firepower, between the greater accuracy of their missiles and likely greater reliability, that the THAAD battery is saturated once it depletes the initial available rounds of about 72 interceptors and has to reload. Follow up with additional volleys to deplete the HASs and operating infrastructure of the base. They have the launcher capacity to do this.

China has about 200-300 DF-26 launchers and another 100-200 DF-21s. While it took Iran about 20 years to build up to that level, it takes China about 6, so there's a bit of a difference. Noteworthy is that China barely spends anything on their military (it's about as much as Italy proportionately and less than the average NATO member), though, and if they felt the need they could ramp up launcher and missile magazine depth faster and farther than the U.S. can do for THAAD. Their defense budget increases have only matched inflation and GDP growth year over year.

Add an extra zero for the missile numbers. And triple the ranges needed for Air Force strike packages to attack the launch sites. It's not like Iran where you can just rove over Southern China without trouble with endless tanker trains. You need to operate from Guam offensively. If the PLA has anything like the United States did in the 1980s, it might have radar guided hypergliders able to intercept aircraft, and likely it can use a combination of infrared tracking satellites and radar command guidance to swat B-2s over the ocean as they approach Henan and Yunnan province. That would be well within the capability demonstrated by USAF and U.S. Army using DSP and SWERVE as a potential slow-walker killer.

Submarines are probably the only effective ballistic missile suppression weapon immediately available to INDOPACCOM (if CENTCOM would stop eating all the Tomahawks) given they can move but that would require . B-2s potentially but they're vulnerable to the very same OCA they're trying to blunt. That said the only reasonably important thing Guam has is SUBRON 15 and the tenders. That still requires moving from Guam to near the Paracels, and firing on launch sites in Yunnan, which takes...a while.

It's quite a tricky problem! One that can't be easily solved by waiting for the PLARF to strike. Thankfully, Diego Garcia is far out of range of most Chinese launchers, so it is a safe haven for B-2 disregarding the threat of PLAN cruise missiles from nuclear submarine (095B).
 
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That's cool.

In a "proper conflict" (what???) the first thing that happens is Guam receives a few dozen to a hundred or so IRBMs from within the A2AD zone.

DF-26 can carry three warheads, or one warhead and some penetration aids, so that means about 100-300 incoming targets and penetration aids or decoys. THAAD has a rough 80-90% probability of kill. With about 100 incoming warheads needing to be hit it's unlikely Guam survives unscathed and the THAAD battery itself would be the primary target. If the warheads are nuclear, it simply won't survive, and if you're trying to suppress an aero-naval offensive that would be a really good OCA. The Soviets thought so, anyway.

The main problem is that the PLARF has sufficient firepower, between the greater accuracy of their missiles and likely greater reliability, that the THAAD battery is saturated once it depletes the initial available rounds of about 72 interceptors and has to reload. Follow up with additional volleys to deplete the HASs and operating infrastructure of the base. They have the launcher capacity to do this.

China has about 200-300 DF-26 launchers and another 100-200 DF-21s. While it took Iran about 20 years to build up to that level, it takes China about 6, so there's a bit of a difference. Noteworthy is that China barely spends anything on their military (it's about as much as Italy proportionately and less than the average NATO member), though, and if they felt the need they could ramp up launcher and missile magazine depth faster and farther than the U.S. can do for THAAD. Their defense budget increases have only matched inflation and GDP growth year over year.

Add an extra zero for the missile numbers. And triple the ranges needed for Air Force strike packages to attack the launch sites. It's not like Iran where you can just rove over Southern China without trouble with endless tanker trains. You need to operate from Guam offensively. If the PLA has anything like the United States did in the 1980s, it might have radar guided hypergliders able to intercept aircraft, and likely it can use a combination of infrared tracking satellites and radar command guidance to swat B-2s over the ocean as they approach Henan and Yunnan province. That would be well within the capability demonstrated by USAF and U.S. Army using DSP and SWERVE as a potential slow-walker killer.

Submarines are probably the only effective ballistic missile suppression weapon immediately available to INDOPACCOM (if CENTCOM would stop eating all the Tomahawks) given they can move but that would require . B-2s potentially but they're vulnerable to the very same OCA they're trying to blunt. That said the only reasonably important thing Guam has is SUBRON 15 and the tenders. That still requires moving from Guam to near the Paracels, and firing on launch sites in Yunnan, which takes...a while.

It's quite a tricky problem! One that can't be easily solved by waiting for the PLARF to strike. Thankfully, Diego Garcia is far out of range of most Chinese launchers, so it is a safe haven for B-2 disregarding the threat of PLAN cruise missiles from nuclear submarine (095B).
And the next thing that happens is that Dark Eagles, Tomahawks and JASSMs start hitting all Chinese defence factories, power stations, chemical and steel works, maybe even government buildings as well. There was a nice image showing the various missile sites around China. It would be really expensive for PLAN too, with all their ports being around that area. You don't defeat offence with defence, you defeat it with offence.

Of course THAAD can discriminate and not all missiles that get through actually hit anything besides the ground. Accuracy in tests != accuracy in a conflict - jamming etc. even removal of satellites. Far as I know, there are also SM-3s out there to, plus Patriots, so 3 layers. Space-based interceptors soon to be added too.
 
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And the next thing that happens is that Dark Eagles, Tomahawks and JASSMs start hitting all Chinese defence factories, power stations, chemical and steel works, maybe even government buildings as well.

The US flat out wouldn't have enough missiles for that, especially given the presence of air defenses and the PLAAF buzzing around.

Point remains, the US supply chain for the THAAD is laughably inadequate for the rhetoric the US is spouting. When even sanctioned and weakened Iran managed to use up 14% of the stockpile in just a few days. The PLA would exceed the numbers of missiles (and drones) by magnitudes and would be able to sustain production without even the slightest of issues. What robust supply chains and being the manufacturing hub of the entire world do to an industrial capability.
 
I doubt Guam has a single THAAD battery. In fact, I suspect it has at least one reinforced battery with at least 1/3 extra launchers, so more like a minimum of 96 THAAD missiles ready. Plus Patriots. Plus SM3/SM6 in either Aegis Ashore mounts or in plain Mk70 containers (pretty sure Guam got an Aegis Ashore installation, and even without SPY radars the Army systems can tell the missiles where to go).

If any warhead making it through the defenses is a nuke, the gloves are off and nukes start flying. Three Gorges Dam becomes Three Craters.
 
And the next thing that happens is that Dark Eagles, Tomahawks and JASSMs start hitting all Chinese defence factories, power stations, chemical and steel works, maybe even government buildings as well.

This wouldn't actually happen because Guam isn't that important and the U.S. wouldn't escalate like that.

There was a nice image showing the various missile sites around China. It would be really expensive for PLAN too, with all their ports being around that area. You don't defeat offence with defence, you defeat it with offence.

China has three major urban zones to defend. America has about 20.

Of course THAAD can discriminate

Not against an IRBM. The time of flight is too short to properly discriminate like an ICBM. Nuclear detonations would further deteriorate the radar horizon and decrease reaction time but well designed decoys would require interceptors as well. You'd need a functional hyperglider detection system or SBIRS-LO to properly discriminate and track decoys from warheads. That may not be available due to the limited coverage of the SBIRS-LO and the hyperglider detection system won't be in place until next decade.

DOD expects a war in about 25 months...

and not all missiles that get through actually hit anything besides the ground.

Iranian missiles got through and hit a strategic military asset: Soroka Military Center. Intercept rates were about 85% against identified threats. Chinese missiles are more accurate than Iranian ones though, likely about as accurate as American ones in the 1980s, so they're as accurate as is practical.

Accuracy in tests != accuracy in a conflict - jamming etc. even removal of satellites.

THAAD's combat accuracy has been demonstrated. It's very good against small saturation attacks like Doha, which was about 20 IRBMs, but the Chinese will likely fire about 5-10x this number.

Far as I know, there are also SM-3s out there to, plus Patriots, so 3 layers. Space-based interceptors soon to be added too.

"Soon". War is sooner. Compared to the timeline of a potential Taiwan war and the deployment of space based systems, it might as well be an eternity, and mostly isn't worth discussing. What is worth discussing is how many more JASSMs/LRASMs, or handful more THAADs, the U.S. might have and lose in combat until then.

The PRC, unlike the U.S., has the immense luxury of being able to stockpile large quantities of munitions for an initial massive strike to defang U.S. forces in the Pacific. More likely they'll simply attempt to take the island and avoid hitting U.S. assets, since the U.S. tends to pause and chew on things for the initial 96 hours so, and likely wouldn't go to bat for Taiwan immediately.

If any warhead making it through the defenses is a nuke, the gloves are off and nukes start flying. Three Gorges Dam becomes Three Craters.

That's possible. We'll find out about 24-360 hours in when the nukes start flying. If the U.S. escalates to strategic homeland attacks over an airbase, it would be best served doing that immediately today because it would start off at an advantage, gaining an initiative before the invasion begins. Since it isn't doing that, it's unlikely to escalate so quickly even in wartime, because it hasn't in the past. More likely it will hit Lingshui in response to losing Guam.

III MEF and DON ran their wargame a couple years ago, which led to the increase in LRASM/JASSM production and slow ramp up of THAAD etc., and came to the conclusion such a war would be a limited nuclear conflict lasting several years. Tit for tat nuclear strikes on theater military assets, requiring hundreds of conventional missiles as decoys, based on Ukraine experience. There would be avoidance of strikes on the respective homeland to avoid strategic escalation because if Three Gorges is done then so is the Hoover Dam.
 
That's possible. We'll find out about 24-360 hours in when the nukes start flying. If the U.S. escalates to strategic homeland attacks over an airbase, it would be best served doing that immediately today because it would start off at an advantage, gaining an initiative before the invasion begins. Since it isn't doing that, it's unlikely to escalate so quickly even in wartime, because it hasn't in the past. More likely it will hit Lingshui in response to losing Guam.

III MEF and DON ran their wargame a couple years ago, which led to the increase in LRASM/JASSM production and slow ramp up of THAAD etc., and came to the conclusion such a war would be a limited nuclear conflict lasting several years. Tit for tat nuclear strikes on theater military assets, requiring hundreds of conventional missiles as decoys, based on Ukraine experience. There would be avoidance of strikes on the respective homeland to avoid strategic escalation because if Three Gorges is done then so is the Hoover Dam.
Does China have a missile with the legs to reach Hoover?

(Also, I think that the dams on the Columbia river would be more damaging)
 
Does China have a missile with the legs to reach Hoover?



DF-41 is what is being installed in Xinjiang's missile fields. Probably 3 warheads and 5 decoys each.

But the point is that both sides have too much to lose to escalate beyond striking tactical-operational targets, so nuclear weapon use will be limited to the theater, which is the general conclusion of DOD. Taiwan, Japan, and Korea might be caught in the crossfire, similar to how Poland, Germany, and Britain would be caught in the crossfire of a US-USSR Europe war, but the U.S. and China proper would probably stay off limits.

(Also, I think that the dams on the Columbia river would be more damaging)

Good news, they can hit Miami and D.C. too!
 
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DF-41 is what is being installed in Xinjiang's missile fields. Probably 3 warheads and 5 decoys each.
Huh, how'd I miss those entering service? *facepalm*


But the point is that both sides have too much to lose to escalate beyond striking tactical-operational targets, so nuclear weapon use will be limited to the theater, which is the general conclusion of DOD. Taiwan, Japan, and Korea might be caught in the crossfire, similar to how Poland, Germany, and Britain would be caught in the crossfire of a US-USSR Europe war, but the U.S. and China proper would probably stay off limits.
I'd really hope that's true, but I'm not willing to believe it.



Good news, they can hit Miami and D.C. too!
As long as they hit DC with a Neutron bomb to save the buildings and museums, they're welcome to irradiate that swampy cesspit.
 
This wouldn't actually happen because Guam isn't that important and the U.S. wouldn't escalate like that.



China has three major urban zones to defend. America has about 20.



Not against an IRBM. The time of flight is too short to properly discriminate like an ICBM. Nuclear detonations would further deteriorate the radar horizon and decrease reaction time but well designed decoys would require interceptors as well. You'd need a functional hyperglider detection system or SBIRS-LO to properly discriminate and track decoys from warheads. That may not be available due to the limited coverage of the SBIRS-LO and the hyperglider detection system won't be in place until next decade.

DOD expects a war in about 25 months...



Iranian missiles got through and hit a strategic military asset: Soroka Military Center. Intercept rates were about 85% against identified threats. Chinese missiles are more accurate than Iranian ones though, likely about as accurate as American ones in the 1980s, so they're as accurate as is practical.



THAAD's combat accuracy has been demonstrated. It's very good against small saturation attacks like Doha, which was about 20 IRBMs, but the Chinese will likely fire about 5-10x this number.



"Soon". War is sooner. Compared to the timeline of a potential Taiwan war and the deployment of space based systems, it might as well be an eternity, and mostly isn't worth discussing. What is worth discussing is how many more JASSMs/LRASMs, or handful more THAADs, the U.S. might have and lose in combat until then.

The PRC, unlike the U.S., has the immense luxury of being able to stockpile large quantities of munitions for an initial massive strike to defang U.S. forces in the Pacific. More likely they'll simply attempt to take the island and avoid hitting U.S. assets, since the U.S. tends to pause and chew on things for the initial 96 hours so, and likely wouldn't go to bat for Taiwan immediately.



That's possible. We'll find out about 24-360 hours in when the nukes start flying. If the U.S. escalates to strategic homeland attacks over an airbase, it would be best served doing that immediately today because it would start off at an advantage, gaining an initiative before the invasion begins. Since it isn't doing that, it's unlikely to escalate so quickly even in wartime, because it hasn't in the past. More likely it will hit Lingshui in response to losing Guam.

III MEF and DON ran their wargame a couple years ago, which led to the increase in LRASM/JASSM production and slow ramp up of THAAD etc., and came to the conclusion such a war would be a limited nuclear conflict lasting several years. Tit for tat nuclear strikes on theater military assets, requiring hundreds of conventional missiles as decoys, based on Ukraine experience. There would be avoidance of strikes on the respective homeland to avoid strategic escalation because if Three Gorges is done then so is the Hoover Dam.
Lot of wrong assumptions. The US wouldn't escalate like that, in your opinion, but China would escalate like that in the first place? China fires several hundred missiles at a US base in your scenario but the US would be escalating by striking back? LOL.:D

The US has local bases and way more ability to hit Chinese urban/industrial zones.

Assumption again.

Ditto.

Ditto on accuracy, combat scenario vs testing again.

There is no way of defending against several hundred BMs reliably, you defeat them with offence not defence, hence Chinese manufacturing/production/utilities would be targeting. A THAAD destroys one warhead, taking out production/stockpiles destroys hundreds.

Is it? Assumptions.

Russia thought the same with Ukraine and here they are 3.5 years later in a giggity. Ukraine has a land border with Russia, Taiwan has 100+ miles of sea between it and China. What's also been ignored is sanctions and before you make comparisons with Russia and the Ukraine War, China is very different, its economy relies hugely on exports and Russia has 22% of the entire planet's natural resources, so resource imports were never a problem for it, not so for China.

US has more bases than Guam too.
 
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The US flat out wouldn't have enough missiles for that, especially given the presence of air defenses and the PLAAF buzzing around.
Russia had impenetrable air defences until it did't. There are thousands of JASSMs and Tomahawk.
Point remains, the US supply chain for the THAAD is laughably inadequate for the rhetoric the US is spouting. When even sanctioned and weakened Iran managed to use up 14% of the stockpile in just a few days. The PLA would exceed the numbers of missiles (and drones) by magnitudes and would be able to sustain production without even the slightest of issues. What robust supply chains and being the manufacturing hub of the entire world do to an industrial capability.
What % of its own stockpile did Iran use? What damage did they do? What damage did the US do in a single strike? What damage did Israel do? Houthis have done more damage than Iran, albeit againt commercial shipping.
 
Russia had impenetrable air defences until it did't. There are thousands of JASSMs and Tomahawk.

What % of its own stockpile did Iran use? What damage did they do? What damage did the US do in a single strike? What damage did Israel do? Houthis have done more damage than Iran, albeit againt commercial shipping.

It's not about being impenetrable, it's about degrading the density of incoming missiles. When you fire 10 AGM-158s at a target and only 3 make it through, the effects on target are minimal. And the US would have to throw significant amounts of missiles at all the targets you described, which number in the several thousands across all of China. That is if US platforms could even deliver the ordnance before being engaged themselves by Chinese assets.

So you planned a strike of 10 against a target, 6 launch platforms were previously destroyed, 3 intercepted and one made it through causing little damage. Meh.

Houthis caused the US to expent interceptors over a larger period of time, Iran caused the US to expent a significant portion of their interceptors in a few days. China would quite possibly deplete large portions of the US interceptor stockpile in hours.
 
It's not about being impenetrable, it's about degrading the density of incoming missiles. When you fire 10 AGM-158s at a target and only 3 make it through, the effects on target are minimal. And the US would have to throw significant amounts of missiles at all the targets you described, which number in the several thousands across all of China. That is if US platforms could even deliver the ordnance before being engaged themselves by Chinese assets.

So you planned a strike of 10 against a target, 6 launch platforms were previously destroyed, 3 intercepted and one made it through causing little damage. Meh.

Houthis caused the US to expent interceptors over a larger period of time, Iran caused the US to expent a significant portion of their interceptors in a few days. China would quite possibly deplete large portions of the US interceptor stockpile in hours.
Depends on the target. One missile would happily destroy a ballistic missile factory or stockpile, or the idiot in charge of things. The offence is there to deter, the interceptors are only there to prevent limited strikes while the offence takes effect. Iran fired 574 BMs if you check out the figures. At Russia's war time production rate, which is >10x their pre-2022 rate, it takes them >6 months to produce that many Iskander-M SRBMs, never mind MRBMs. 574 is a large number. Is that many really going to be expended on one island when there are so many US bases over there?

 
Depends on the target. One missile would happily destroy a ballistic missile factory or stockpile, or the idiot in charge of things. The offence is there to deter, the interceptors are only there to prevent limited strikes while the offence takes effect. Iran fired 574 BMs if you check out the figures. At Russia's war time production rate, which is >10x their pre-2022 rate, it takes them >6 months to produce that many Iskander-M SRBMs, never mind MRBMs. 574 is a large number. Is that many really going to be expended on one island when there are so many US bases over there?
If they must have the bases destroyed, they must first expend enough missiles to swamp the defenses, or at least exhaust their ready missile supply.

Which means a couple hundred incoming to exhaust defensive missiles, then however many missiles are required to destroy the base. That's likely another couple hundred missiles, in order to smash the radar sites, crater the runways and taxiways, and trash any/all HAS. Plus whatever damage you want to do to the harbor.

So yeah, we're probably talking 400+ missiles going into Guam, and I wouldn't be surprised if the total reached 600 once the harbor was included.
 

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