Small Surface Combatant Task Force concepts

sferrin said:
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BTW, to our old discussion: it was started that Oniks-M is in late dev stage and will start trials in this or next month. Said to have same sizing and weight but aside everything range extended to 800km. As you can imagine that would be a stretch given initial range of 300km.
 
I like Hooper and often agree with his thinking on shipbuilding, but I think his case that HII's secrecy unfairly hinders the other competitors is a bit weak. The only competitors working within handcuffs are the LCS-based design teams, and the companies offering those were free to also pitch non-LCS designs alongside those (which sorta has happened with Fincantieri). HII's secrecy, and the Navy letting it go rather than requiring some basic information be made public (or publishing a basic overview themselves) makes oversight more problematic and impairs the public debate on the frigate program's course and management. But the competitors don't seem to be unduly harmed, indeed the work around town is still that the FREMM team seems to be the favorite or at least in the top-tier.
 
Fincantieri’s design, based on the Italian FREMM, is for a 7,500-ton ship that generates 12 megawatts of power. In comparison, Hunt said the latest Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers have displacements of more than 9,000 tons and generate 12 megawatts of power.

“We’re delivering this thing as it will be delivered to the government, generating 12 [megawatts] of power,” Hunt said. “If you want more power than what the ship has, I can put bigger diesels in there right now and give you another four [megawatts] of power.”

With the 12 megawatts generated by Fincantieri’s current power generation design, Hunt said the Navy would have the option to deploy directed energy weapons – such as lethal and non-lethal laser weapons, microwave and millimeter wave weapons and more – which are part of the Navy’s requirements.

However, powering directed energy weapons means making other adjustments on the ship, including diverting power from propulsion.

The trade-off of speed for directed energy weapon is not significant, Hunt said, as slowing the frigate’s speed from 28 knots to 24 knots doesn’t decrease the ship’s performance but frees up a tremendous amount of energy for weapons. These weapons, he added, are closer to being ready than most people realize.

https://news.usni.org/2020/01/09/fi...qG3VybWubssmr_T4p6t6dFIgVTj0nLDG31XTxZD8uU3KQ
https://www.dacis.com/budget/budget_pdf/FY20/PROC/N/2128_11.pdf 001.JPG 002.JPG 003.JPG 004.JPG
 
Minus some real redesign and reassessment of what seapower/deterence needs to look like in the coming decades contracting anymore of these ships is like being pulled into vortex +vaccum from which one cannot escape.
 
The West's Navies are still basically designed to keep the North Atlantic open for shipping with a mix of destroyers/frigates and submarines.
How much of a threat the only opponent, Putin's Navy, is to this force is untested.
China churns out impressive looking ships but even without the mighty USN, Japan, S Korea and Taiwan have well equipped navies and air forces that can sink them, with Uncle Sam carrying a nuclear stick if China gets that way inclined.
And that for all the enthusiasts for building large numbers of warships in the West is the threat.
Iran has no navy but still causes major headaches with its motley collection of patrol boats. Or did until US cruise missiles reminded it of what real military force can do.
 
uk 75 said:
The West's Navies are still basically designed to keep the North Atlantic open for shipping with a mix of destroyers/frigates and submarines.
How much of a threat the only opponent, Putin's Navy, is to this force is untested.
China churns out impressive looking ships but even without the mighty USN, Japan, S Korea and Taiwan have well equipped navies and air forces that can sink them, with Uncle Sam carrying a nuclear stick if China gets that way inclined.
And that for all the enthusiasts for building large numbers of warships in the West is the threat.
Iran has no navy but still causes major headaches with its motley collection of patrol boats. Or did until US cruise missiles reminded it of what real military force can do.
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The Chinese Global Times newspaper quoting PLA official claiming the need for the PLA to build more nukes.. Even our contributor Josh TN seems to know the defense of Taiwan and Japan w/ a Nuclear deterent is a trap which will leave Taiwan and Japan flying red flags the US shut out of the Pacific. Hopefully, the US never takes that bait and chokes on it. The Chinese know this. For the upteenth then lets discuss precision conventional deterent.

Floating Arsenal to be 21st Century Battleship Jul 1996 pg44-47



.....The Navy and Marine Corp in Regional conflict in the 21st century , the (Naval Studies) Board noted that current weapons for long range fire support are inadequate. The reality is that Bottom Up Review constrained surface warship forces cannot meet the joint warfighting requirements identified in last years Surface Combatant Force Land Study by the USN's Director, Surface warfare, Naval Surface Fiere Support (NSFS) capabilities have long been a shortcoming in the USN's ability to support USMC operation. ...Meanwhile , the proliferation of cruise missiles --40k are expected to be in the worlds armories in 2000. and TBMs....

Using a 1993 Rand study Project Air Force study, The New Calculus , as baseline, the USN argued that any combination of existing in theatre and continental US based rapid reaction forces, with the capability to destroy 2k tanks and armored vehicles on the first day of an assault, would be prohibitively expensive. Given a notional MRC can include 15k mobile targets the Project Air Force study concluded that 5.5k armor kills would be necessary for assured defense. According to the study the 20 B-2s force, along w/ in theatre USAF tacair , and a on station carrier battle group , could destroy only 730 tanks and armored vehicles in the opening 24 hrs another six days of combat would be needed to reach 5.5k kills.

USN analysts assert that 500 cell LCMs w/ BAT munitions could attain 2k armor kills in the first day of a war and another 2k by Day 4. "Assured defense" ...The navy concluded that an in theatre LCM is the obvious choice to provide early firepower to halt an invasion. It exploits freedom of the sea, can hit an enemy hard on Day 1, frees airlift for other needs, and allows USAF and USN manned airpower to focus on traditional roles : CAP, CAS, SEAD. BAI, and strategic strike.

(RAND Pacific Study would add all the hardened TBM , SAM sites and aircraft shelters of the late 2030s)

.....

There are submarines variants being discussed for future Arsenal Ships. By 1997 , the USN will have 18 Ohio class BMSs in operation. The first eight of the class (SSBN 726) carry the C-4 Trident I missiels and the USN plans to retire from strtegic service, or convert the first four Ohio class SSBNs Ohio Michigan Florida and Georgia rather than upgrade them to launch the D-5 trident II missiles. Due to the 1995 BUR decision to reduce the nuclear attack submarines force to 45-55 units and, beginning in 1998, the construction of the new Attack Submarine Class, the USN is continuing to decommission the early units of the Los Angles-nuclear attack submarines many with half their service lives remaining.

There is a possibility of converting the first four Ohio Class C-4 equipped SSBNs into special purpose submarines including a "Large Stealth Combatant". The USN has determined that there are no engineering issues that would preclude extending the service lives of the Ohio Class vessels from 30 to 40 yrs. A program to modify an SSBN-726 submarine for conventional strike/fire support would require about $500m per ship but would provide a platform w approx 25 yrs of operational life, and which would retain all other submarine warfare capabilities (less strategic strike) inherent in the ship. .....
 
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Apart from Vietnam, against which it performed poorly, China has yet to demonstrate how it would use 2k tanks.
Unless it gets air superiority against Japan and Taiwan it is not going to be ferrying them. You dont answer my point about the Chinese Navy.
I am sure US industry would love to add another big ticket new weapon system to its list
 
uk 75 said:
Apart from Vietnam, against which it performed poorly, China has yet to demonstrate how it would use 2k tanks.
Unless it gets air superiority against Japan and Taiwan it is not going to be ferrying them. You dont answer my point about the Chinese Navy.
I am sure US industry would love to add another big ticket new weapon system to its list
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The disaster of the Vietnam adventure led to the professionalisation and modernisation of the PRC military we see today. Untested yes, but very very different to the organisation that was so embarrassed in Vietnam.
 
Volkodav said:
uk 75 said:
Apart from Vietnam, against which it performed poorly, China has yet to demonstrate how it would use 2k tanks.
Unless it gets air superiority against Japan and Taiwan it is not going to be ferrying them. You dont answer my point about the Chinese Navy.
I am sure US industry would love to add another big ticket new weapon system to its list
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The disaster of the Vietnam adventure led to the professionalisation and modernisation of the PRC military we see today. Untested yes, but very very different to the organisation that was so embarrassed in Vietnam.
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Yeah I don’t see the purpose of being anti-tank orientated. Plains of Germany when they are heading your way yes, ocean no.

Plus the idea you can attrit China of all nations into defeat is asinine, doing it on land is stupidity.

Subs vs ships/subs are where the investment should be, just as the US annihalated Japanese commercial shipping and so produced economic ruin and military isolation. Being a continent, China will always survive but cut off from the overseas bases/islands it covets and the trade routes its wealth and technology depend upon.

That and what we’ve known since 1940- control of the air.

Obsessing about plinking tanks or other land targets is like spending WW1 to 2 focussing on better barbed wire.
 
militarized junks etc, as well as tanks a huge number of MTIs, similar to a central european front as emphasized in previous posting by others on the USMC doctrine changes thread. By 2030 the number of armored vehicles available to the PLA is eminence. Taiwan has some areas especially heights, which can be very well defended beside the urban terrain, both of these attributes of the island will requires armor in serious numbers..

The Rand Pac study (for the millionth time) clearly lays out USAF USN lose dominance and potentially the ability to survive in the Pac way before 2050..

Former Google Eric Schmidt even talked today about the latest Integrated Circut manuf moving from Taiwan to the US most likely because folks are starting realize there is no plan to defend Taiwan

...talk about asinine ...again defeatism all over the place..
 
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So what? What is any of that muddle of half-facts, incomplete sentences and gibberish frankly, supposed to mean?

Trying to fight China conventionally on land is lunacy. The are getting on for six times as large as you. The same kind of idiocy pulled the US into now numerous lost wars which cost it a fortune in blood and treasure and diminished it’s standing in the world.

Rand will tell you what they are instructed and paid to tell you. That is their entire purpose.

You talk of defeatism, it’s like you want a war. Yet what you advocate is the quickest way to defeat.
 
On the other hand, no plan survives contact with the enemy. That's why he's the enemy. There may well come a point where you have no choice but commit to major land engagements. And using air power as a get out card in those situations has long been a busted flush, putting it mildly.
 
Seriously? you can envisage taking China on at land?

Throwing land attack missiles at china is like throwing rocks at a mountain.

However many rocks you have, however much scree you rearrange, that mountain is always going to be there.

Want to deter / coerce / defeat China? Work out what they want and look to threaten or deny that.
  • What do they want? Secure trade routes to draw in resources & tech, sustain their economy and growing standard of living which allows their dictatorship to survive. Linked to that is prestige to get their way with neighbours and globally.
  • How is that done? Air and sea traffic. (Ignore land borders, off the scale in terms of size and location, and unsealable as US discovered in numerous conflicts now)
  • How do you affect those routes - airpower and submarines.
So more subs and offensive counter air basically.


History is starkly clear. If you don’t have enough air power, you are just sending your troops to die. That is not command or leadership or strategy or anything, it is just murder.


On topic- is the USN looking at T26/31 style mission bays in this new frigate? How does that concept fit with muted changes to USMC roles?
 
Purpletrouble said:
On topic- is the USN looking at T26/31 style mission bays in this new frigate? How does that concept fit with muted changes to USMC roles?
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No mission bay space on FFG(X). We will have the LCSs (and possibly ships like the fast theater transports) for tasks that require that sort of flexible volume.
 
Purpletrouble said:
Seriously? you can envisage taking China on at land?

Throwing land attack missiles at china is like throwing rocks at a mountain.

However many rocks you have, however much scree you rearrange, that mountain is always going to be there.

Want to deter / coerce / defeat China? Work out what they want and look to threaten or deny that.
  • What do they want? Secure trade routes to draw in resources & tech, sustain their economy and growing standard of living which allows their dictatorship to survive. Linked to that is prestige to get their way with neighbours and globally.
  • How is that done? Air and sea traffic. (Ignore land borders, off the scale in terms of size and location, and unsealable as US discovered in numerous conflicts now)
  • How do you affect those routes - airpower and submarines.
So more subs and offensive counter air basically.


History is starkly clear. If you don’t have enough air power, you are just sending your troops to die. That is not command or leadership or strategy or anything, it is just murder.


On topic- is the USN looking at T26/31 style mission bays in this new frigate? How does that concept fit with muted changes to USMC roles?
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One sentence fighting the PRC is like throwing rocks at a mountain another you can and must defeat.. Your arguments are a muttled mess. There are no half measures you either deter or you dont..

The idea that you know Rand's motivation is absurd. Rand makes it clear current US vs PLA production rates assure subs are too little, minus nukes, and airpower will barely touch their hardened IADS and hardened interceptor airfields let alone the cruise and TBMs.
You will never read the Rand Pac study, and that is a fact. Of course, there is your defeatism as well.

Never said anything about troops so preeeety left field there. Long range strike capability, which no one seems to want to plan for, calls for far less troops. USMC is increasingly SOF like distributed ops mostly for calling in strikes ie Royal Marines style. Nukes or tens of thousands of Marines on Taiwan is exactly what is to be AVOIDED.

These frigates are ducks in pond and even more so as so few will be built...When you know what you are talking about we would be welcome to listen..
 
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WARNING - tone of this topic is getting seriously unacceptable from several posters - please be more polite or face the consequences.
 
Purpletrouble said:
Seriously? you can envisage taking China on at land?z

Throwing land attack missiles at china is like throwing rocks at a mountain.
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The ideal solution is let's you and him fight. China-Russia is reasonably stable right now, but China-India has seen border clashes in just the last week - ironically the heaviest weapons deployed were thrown rocks.

(And for those not up to speed on the size of the Indian Army, with a mobilised strength of about 2 million it's the largest in the world, and that's not counting the c950,000 paramilitary police, a significant proportion of whom are much more military than police).
 
uk 75 said:
China churns out impressive looking ships but even without the mighty USN, Japan, S Korea and Taiwan have well equipped navies and air forces that can sink them, with Uncle Sam carrying a nuclear stick if China gets that way inclined.
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Some numbers to put the situation in context:
JMSDF: 2xCVL (not yet operational with F-35), 2xCVH, 44x escorts (of which 7 Aegis), 20xSS
ROK Navy: 23x escorts (of which 3 Aegis), 18xSS, c80 light combatants, 18xSS
ROC Navy: 26x escorts (most ageing), c43 light combatants, 4xSS (of which 2 WWII, 2 1980s)

PLAN: 2xCV, 1xCG, c80 escorts (of which 12 the Aegis-like Type 52D, with 10 more in trials or fitting out), c170 light combatants, 7xSSBN, 13x SSN, c66 SS (all 1990s or later)

The PLAN outnumbers the combined JMSDF, ROKN and ROCN in all categories. In technological comparison, the ROCN is toast, it just hasn't kept up, and while the JMSDF and ROKN have very impressive modern Aegis combatants, arguably technically better than the Burkes, the bulk of their forces is older, with less of a technological edge over the PLAN. When PLAN completes delivery of all the Type 52Ds currently in the water, it will have as many Aegis-like combatants (VLS+Planar AESA) as either the ROKN or ROCN have escorts in total, and around three times as many as the JMSDF has Aegis vessels. (Edited as I said JMSDF when I meant ROCN in that last sentence).

(I've grouped destroyers and frigates together as escorts, and corvettes and missile craft as light combatants. Other than size, the main distinction is the escorts have a potential open ocean role, while the light combatants are mostly littoral).
 
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https://www.c4isrnet.com/2020/05/06...5.07.20&utm_term=Editorial - Early Bird Brief
Senior Navy officials have talked about the LUSV as a kind of external missile magazine that can autonomously navigate to and integrate with the force, then shoot its missiles and return for reload, keeping the big manned surface combatants in the fight and fielded longer.

Second mention of ..in the literature. The question then is why a ship as small as a FFG w/ the limited VLS cells?
 
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TomS said:
Purpletrouble said:
On topic- is the USN looking at T26/31 style mission bays in this new frigate? How does that concept fit with muted changes to USMC roles?
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No mission bay space on FFG(X). We will have the LCSs (and possibly ships like the fast theater transports) for tasks that require that sort of flexible volume.
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I guess I was thinking of where the FFGs were used and how, i.e. very much in the patrol/anti piracy and so on arena, which currently has DDG51s (mis) allocated to those tasks and which the USN should be trying to pull into its task groups.

Also seems like these bays would enable the MCM tasks to be allocated in a way that the LCS modules haven’t?
 
So, two separate issues, I think.

1) Anti-piracy. I'm not sure that the FFGs would need any mission bay space to be effective in the role. They will have a helo, a drone, and a couple of RHIBs for VBSS. They might want some secondary guns and/or Hellfire if you are extending the mission to active escort roles against small boats. That seems like an easy thing to drop into the SWaP reserved for the second set of 8 NSM.

But honestly, this is sort of a perfect mission for LCS, especially with the SUW module or the full FF upgrade. Their speed actually helps cover a wider area and improves response times to piracy threats. They have the air and drone capacity and RHIB stowage. It makes sense to push them into these and similar missions with a less stressing air threat.

2) On MCM, first they have to get the modules to work. Last I've heard, they don't. And even if/when they do, I'd be happier leaving that mission on the non-FF LCS, so the crews can focus on one mission and actually develop some expertise. We've hopefully learned that MCM isn't a part-time task for non-specialists

I'm a bit out of the loop, but my impression is that the current thinking is to let the Austal LCSs become SUW specialists, let the Lockheed ones become MCM mother ships, and have FFG(X) pick up the serious ASW role.
 
Ok - kind of makes sense, except the frogates have the range and endurance.

Plus, having done it, the antipiracy stuff is a filler really for otherwise 1st rate ships. It gives them something to do and puts them in places where you might want them.

Type 23s East of Suez - their role is US-UK fleet ASW, but the anti piracy varies it a bit and helps justify them being there plus is useful. Their core role is about what they bring ASW wise.

I think we make a mistake building pure GP ships for these roles which vanish at the sound of a larger op - hence the importance of our 1st rate ships having the capability. I guess the USN is perhaps large enough to specialise.
Just seems an omission, that the usually larger and more flexible US ships of any class, could very usefully incorporate.

Ok- to be honest, I just want the US to buy Type 26! :)
 
Yes, LCS endurance is an issue, especially for the LCS-1s, which is one reason to put them on the MCM task where they don't need to sprint around as much. The LCS-2s seem better on endurance.

You may get another chance to sell us Type 26, if they go ahead with a separate competition for a second batch of frigates in a few years as has been suggested.
 
Minor roles are best filled w/ an LCS that has modules that work. A frigate is too large for a modular change out system ever to work. ASW should be fulfilled completely by airborne and now even globally persistent overhead systems. FFGs still have no role moving forward.

The idea the USN specified number of FFGs would ever dent the USN global ASW problem is....

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/detection.pdf
 
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jsport said:
Minor roles are best filled w/ an LCS that has modules that work. A frigate is too large for a modular change out system ever to work. ASW should be fulfilled completely by airborne and now even globally persistent overhead systems. FFGs still have no role moving forward.

The idea the USN specified number of FFGs would ever dent the USN global ASW problem is....

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/detection.pdf
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That makes no sense. “Just make it work” cliche. tick vg.

If it works/fits on a small ship, it’ll work/fit on a bigger one. And as pointed out, modular does work. Plus who said modular? Ultimately it’s all just equipment. The USN is going to be fitting these frigates with a permament fit like the RN and RAN.

Love the airpower confidence. Yet airpower cant be relied upon to repeatedly deliver hordes of stand off missiles and its vital you try and turn everything into an arsenal ship with 20kts relocation speed and days/weeks for reload.
 
TomS said:
Yes, LCS endurance is an issue, especially for the LCS-1s, which is one reason to put them on the MCM task where they don't need to sprint around as much. The LCS-2s seem better on endurance.

You may get another chance to sell us Type 26, if they go ahead with a separate competition for a second batch of frigates in a few years as has been suggested.
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Hopefully - having worked with USN in Centcom, they had as much call for the enhanced GP capabilities as the RN wants it on its 1st rate ships. With UK, Oz and Canada all using it, and it basically reflecting US practice of a larger more flexible and ranged ship - it seems a good fit as a true OHP successor and LCS replacement...

Just don’t look at the T31 though!
 
Purpletrouble said:
jsport said:
Minor roles are best filled w/ an LCS that has modules that work. A frigate is too large for a modular change out system ever to work. ASW should be fulfilled completely by airborne and now even globally persistent overhead systems. FFGs still have no role moving forward.

The idea the USN specified number of FFGs would ever dent the USN global ASW problem is....

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/detection.pdf
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That makes no sense. “Just make it work” cliche. tick vg.

If it works/fits on a small ship, it’ll work/fit on a bigger one. And as pointed out, modular does work. Plus who said modular? Ultimately it’s all just equipment. The USN is going to be fitting these frigates with a permament fit like the RN and RAN.

Love the airpower confidence. Yet airpower cant be relied upon to repeatedly deliver hordes of stand off missiles and its vital you try and turn everything into an arsenal ship with 20kts relocation speed and days/weeks for reload.
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Make what work..again what are we talking about. "cliche. tick vg." ?

USVs of various sizes are the best way not to endanger mariners (by sacrificing a FFG size ship)...while providing close ASW protection for Groups. The old idea of manned smalls sacrificing for the carrier is barbaric.

https://www.naval-technology.com/news/contract-news/us-navy-plans-corvette-sized-unmanned-fleet/
A modular LCS is just fine.
A modular solution is not being purposed for FFG as we have established. The best that could be purposed would be to support somewhere between the new USMC model and NAVSPECWAR. Both SPECWAR and USMC want different transport craft.
 
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Article confirms Esper has essentially shoved the Navy leadership aside from its own force planning, and is pressing ahead with accelerating his Transformationalist vision. Rumsfeld's heir has arrived, it seems.
 
Moose said:
Article confirms Esper has essentially shoved the Navy leadership aside from its own force planning, and is pressing ahead with accelerating his Transformationalist vision. Rumsfeld's heir has arrived, it seems.
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..was a Transformationalist then wasnt but now would have to be on Transformationalist vision side.

IMHO LCS candidates are barely equipped to be useful though the role is still need in the era of great powers.

Where should a National Security cutter expansion occur. Mostly likely a presence where it is too expensive for a Frigate. Is small USN permanent forward harbor presence in Latin America and other third world countries necessary and or worth it.

Whether Frigate, Destroyer, Cruiser applicability in the modern era is far from resolved in my opinion.

Frigates w/ Hellfires. Hellfires on frigate size combatant in the era of great powers is... (Like using a fly swatter to kill a chicken). Counter-swarm can be done by 57mm w/ Alamo ammo.


https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/naval-launchers-and-munitions.html
When one is so outnumbered and the situation ever worsening then Ship defenses have to be so powerful as to be like trying catch a porcupine w/ your bare hands. These ship are too small to afford those type of defenses in lengthy high intensity fights. This has been admitted by Naval thinkers.

A baseline for manned Large combatants should be based on:
1. how many VLS cells ie Hypers, anti-Hypers, Anti-TBM, Anti-Ship missile +missile/torpedo, Anti-Air/Cruise, Anti-Sub, Cruise etc +(yes reintroduced VGAS w/anti-Hypers, Anti-TBM, Anti-Ship, Anti-Air/Cruise, Anti-Sub)
2. how many lg rg UASs are supported
3. how much amphib and basing..including STOVL and helicopters support is provided

Unmanned corvette LUSV should afford support for:
1 Most ASW w/ large combatants only involved self protection ASW not hunting
2 All threat aspect close in protection of Carriers
3 Land atk "mobile magazines"
 
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What I miss in the discussion here is a coherent concept of what US forces are intended to do.
During the Cold War there were clear plans, especially in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, but also in support of Japan and South Korea, against the Soviet Union.
These were aimed at detering Soviet action and confronting it if it occured, so that Western reinforcements could arrive in Europe and the Far East. The Middle East was then included.
Putin's Russia can cause mischief on its borders but its Navy is even more contained by NATO's well equipped navies and geographic choke points than the USSR.
China can only be detered from attacking Taiwan by a clear Article 5 type nuclear guarantee. This is a political rather than a military issue.
A frontal amphibious invasion of Taiwan is still not an easy undertaking, though China clearly intends to have that option.
A naval war against China is difficult to define.
 
Hence why I think only submarine warfare is the option. Don’t try to attack China proper or try to send surface forces near it.

Throttle its global network of resources in and products out. Air surveillance, backed by air superiority and subs operating offensively in an arc will do that. Surface forces in support but behind that sub force and dealing with leakers (Chinese subs/task groups etc. and anything foolish enough to try to be offensive).

Going nearer will lead to nukes. Indeed as was opted for vice conventional attack on Japan, and China is much bigger and with a lot more stuff. No amount of VLS will rearrange China enough to achieve anything.

Attacking Chinese trade wont destroy China as it has land borders and obviously huge internal capacity - but its wealth, the growing of which it depends upon to keep people happy, is predicated on trade, in particular with the larger more developed nations. Hence this offers deter/defeat only - but I think that is all that is possible short of nukes.
 
I'd think the USN's role in a Taiwan scenario would work similar to the Royal Navy's role would have been in if sealion progressed to later stages: Trade the fleet to sink the amphib force. It should be noted that a Taiwan invasion scenario would only proceed only when local superiority is ensured on the Chinese side.

In this case the USN would have to fight "soviet" thinking: with the focus on offensive power as opposed to survivability. Carrier long range low volume standoff attack might not defeat the Chinese, and the "correct" course of action may be to use air power to protect the fleet to enable it to close to shipboard ASM range at which point the mother of all saturation attack gets launched with the war decided on whether the salvo worked.
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That is a very expensive way of doing though. Prepositioned land launchers, float upward missile containers, a working air power strategy (massed hardened bases + dispersed assets in japan and more) and potentially space/starship based attack could render the Chinese fleet indefensible and thus deterred from warring.

The "dull" job for the navy would be a distant blockade which it can do fairly comfortably unless space warfare escalation constraints makes countering space sensors impractical.
 
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