Report: Aircraft Carriers May Be Too Vulnerable

[2IDSGT]

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/replacing-aircraft-carriers/

Flattop Lite: Ok then, all you need now is a long-range STOVL drone and bugger-all extra surface combatants to escort the things.

Everything’s a Carrier: See above.

Underwater Arsenal: Not bad, but what happens after you've shot your wad (of missiles)?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Flattop Lite: Ok then, all you need now is a long-range STOVL drone and bugger-all extra surface combatants to escort the things.

Everything’s a Carrier: See above.

Underwater Arsenal: Not bad, but what happens after you've shot your wad (of missiles)?

Its wired.com… nothing more than fan boy musing.

 

[2IDSGT]

Flattop Lite: Ok then, all you need now is a long-range STOVL drone and bugger-all extra surface combatants to escort the things.

Everything’s a Carrier: See above.

Underwater Arsenal: Not bad, but what happens after you've shot your wad (of missiles)?

Its wired.com… nothing more than fan boy musing.

Oh no, those writers aren't fanboys (unless you're talking about "the Fett"), just hipsters who happen to like gadgets. If it's not an RC toy, it's a cold-war dinosaur to them. The funniest thing about that article was their obvious inner turmoil over the small carriers (which they like because smaller anything is good to them) and the fact that said carriers would require the F-35B (which they hate because it and its program are big).

 

[Abraham Gubler]

just hipsters who happen to like gadgets.

Which from a military perspective is fanboydom. I'm yet to see anything from wired.com about defence that is remotely relevant. Might as well get your defence capability understanding from Hollywood or Japanese Anime.

 

[2IDSGT]

just hipsters who happen to like gadgets.

Which from a military perspective is fanboydom. I'm yet to see anything from wired.com about defence that is remotely relevant. Might as well get your defence capability understanding from Hollywood or Japanese Anime.

I can see it that way.

 

[lastdingo]

A 90% success rate means for a single shot you will have success 90% of the time. It doesn’t mean that the system will only stop 90% of attacks. So you double up in your engagements (two interceptors for each incoming) and you then get a statistical probability of 99% success. 1% failure too high a margin (as in stoping WMD ballistic missiles fired at Israel) then you fire three interceptors per incoming and you then get 99.9%.

This is what statistics profs tell us, but this is not reality.

A 90% system failing twice in the very same challenge means there's rather likely some systemic problem that means the "90%" system doesn't come close to a "90%" performance under these conditions and derives its "90%" average a lot from more friendly conditions.


Besides, some "90%" missiles of SAM or AAM category have combat track records below 50%.
A real target - even if it's unaware of the threat as were Yugoslav MiG-29s which were missed by some AMRAAMs - is still a more alien and troublesome target than a QF-4 drone or a ballistic missile simulator built by the very same company as the ABM that's meant to intercept it (or by a company that's no at all economically independent from the same).

There is also the problem of combined arms - the quantity of VLS is rather moderate as long as the USN doesn't embrace more improvised means such as auxiliary battery ships / container ships with VLS cargo. Those VLS slots need to be used for ESSM, SM-2/-6, SM-3, possibly ASROC VL, possibly cruise missiles...
A CG or DDG may have less than a dozen high performance ABMs, one or two of them probably non-operational or malfunctioning. You may increase the qty of ABMs, but that opens up possibilities for saturation attacks with Yakhont-style munitions. And most likely only one or two escorts will be correctly positioned for a good probability of intercept.


CVBG defence is quite an unknown, for there was never a missile-based assault on a CVBG (not counting Ohkas). ABM is even more saturated with unknowns.

 

[2IDSGT]

... as long as the USN doesn't embrace more improvised means...

Frankly, I'm rather glad the USN isn't springing for your large scale chewing-gum-'n-bailing-wire approach. Jefferson's gunboat idea all over again. Such numerous, cheap, fragile assets have personnel and protection requirements outsized to what they actually have to contribute, increasing costs relative to capability instead of reducing them. Improvisation is just that... short term solutions to short term problems.

BTW, I believe there's an "arsenal ship" thread elsewhere on the forum.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

This is what statistics profs tell us, but this is not reality.

If your contribution to this discussion is to refute the very notion, the applicability, of statistics to the real world then you’re not off to a good start.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Aforementioned thread: http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,689.0.html

 

[lastdingo]

This is what statistics profs tell us, but this is not reality.

If your contribution to this discussion is to refute the very notion, the applicability, of statistics to the real world then you’re not off to a good start.

You don't seem to get it. The case is more complicated than your apparently simple understanding of statistics.

Let's make it really simple:
Suppose it's day 50% of the time and night 50% of the time.
Now if a buddy tells you the last two times he ate a hot meal it was daytime, then there's a much better chance that it's daytime the next time he eats hot chow than not.
For likely he tends to eat hot chow for dinner, and dinner is always in daytime.


Now if two missiles have already missed despite a 90% ph (according to specs), you better not bet on an actual 90% ph for the third missile fired under the same circumstances.


Besides, there may also be electromagnetic interference issues with dozens of missiles intercepting multiple incoming objects at the same time, probably degrading missile performance simply by the concurrent firing (90% ph would be about a single missile).


Or in other words; you apparently misunderstand the 90% ph munition specification for an actual ph in a specific event.
You're apparently misunderstanding a statistical average as representative of all situations when it's really the aggregations of results from dissimilar situations with dissimilar results (and it's not necessarily a correct aggregation).

 

[Void]

This argument is really quite pointless.

Carriers aren't invulnerable. They are tough targets though. They also don't have to be invulnerable to be useful. Its like saying "New Russian RPG can penetrate an Abrams in certain circumstances. Onoz, we have to stop using Abrams tanks, they are too vulnerable!"


The question is, is an assymmetric approach able to counter them effectively? Can we build a "wonder system" (e.g. DF-21D) that makes the carrier obsolete? Should the US Navy just pack it in now? I don't believe so.

The Soviets tried, with a proliferation of air launched AShMs, surface launched ones, submarine launched ones, and comprehensive spy satellite networks over a 40 year period. What did they end up doing? Building their own carriers. Seems like they decided they were worth having after all.

Lets look at the Chinese. If the DF-21D approach makes carriers obsolete, why the hell are the Chinese building carriers, and J-15 fighters to go on them? Don't they realise the US can make a Minuteman mod that makes their carriers obsolete?

There is still something important going on here. The DF-21D is not the end of carriers as we know it, but it is only the first of its kind.

Ballistic missiles are potentially an even longer arm than carrier aviation, on the one hand. While on the other aircraft do not play a central role in defending against them. In a world with many anti-ship ballistic missiles Carriers would no longer be the prime anti-surface weapon or the prime defender of the fleet. That would be quite a big change.

 

[Grey Havoc]

In a world with many anti-ship ballistic missiles Carriers would no longer be the prime anti-surface weapon or the prime defender of the fleet. That would be quite a big change.

Time for the (long overdue) return of the Battleship.

 

[sferrin]

This argument is really quite pointless.

Carriers aren't invulnerable. They are tough targets though. They also don't have to be invulnerable to be useful. Its like saying "New Russian RPG can penetrate an Abrams in certain circumstances. Onoz, we have to stop using Abrams tanks, they are too vulnerable!"


The question is, is an assymmetric approach able to counter them effectively? Can we build a "wonder system" (e.g. DF-21D) that makes the carrier obsolete? Should the US Navy just pack it in now? I don't believe so.

The Soviets tried, with a proliferation of air launched AShMs, surface launched ones, submarine launched ones, and comprehensive spy satellite networks over a 40 year period. What did they end up doing? Building their own carriers. Seems like they decided they were worth having after all.

Lets look at the Chinese. If the DF-21D approach makes carriers obsolete, why the hell are the Chinese building carriers, and J-15 fighters to go on them? Don't they realise the US can make a Minuteman mod that makes their carriers obsolete?

There is still something important going on here. The DF-21D is not the end of carriers as we know it, but it is only the first of its kind.

Ballistic missiles are potentially an even longer arm than carrier aviation, on the one hand. While on the other aircraft do not play a central role in defending against them. In a world with many anti-ship ballistic missiles Carriers would no longer be the prime anti-surface weapon or the prime defender of the fleet. That would be quite a big change.

I wouldn't bet on it happening. A terminally guided IRBM is a hell of a lot more expensive than a JDAM.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

You're apparently misunderstanding a statistical average as representative of all situations when it's really the aggregations of results from dissimilar situations with dissimilar results (and it's not necessarily a correct aggregation).

Not at all. You have just introduced a range of assumptions to support an argument that these defence systems have low probabilities of kills. How do you not know that when I wrote 90% probability of a kill this was an aggregation of success rates for weapons use in multiple engagement environments? You don’t. You’re just throwing a lot of scat into the argument to try and make your point. Which relies on the assumption that the people designing these weapon systems have no idea what they are doing.

 

[Void]

I wouldn't bet on it happening. A terminally guided IRBM is a hell of a lot more expensive than a JDAM.

But a warship is more expensive still...

I would not seriously argue that ballistic missiles will ever be used to destroy machine gun nests or the like, but they have real potential to become the premier anti-ship weapon. This does not mean carriers will be obsolete either, but it would dethrone them.

 

[aam641]

For the uninitiated here, could somebody go over why ballistic missile are so much more difficult to shoot down than supersonic cruise missiles?

 

[TomS]

Speed, for starters. A ballistic missile RV can be coming down at something like Mach 10 or better. Which means the interceptor generally needs to be very fast as well. That means the missile and target will pass by each other very quickly. That, in turn, usually rules out bursting warheads because even tiny errors in fuze timing mean the burst happens too early or too late. So now you have to do a hit-to-kill solution. That in turn ups complexity, becuase the seeker and steering have to be more precise.

 

[lastdingo]

There is still something important going on here. The DF-21D is not the end of carriers as we know it, but it is only the first of its kind.

The INF treaty and confidence in air power partially kept the great powers from developing modern ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, but ballistic missiles with terminal guidance have indeed staked out some claims in air-land warfare as well.

ATACMS with unitary warhead, the Israeli LORA missile and the Russian Iskander are impressive.
Iskander is according to published claims accurate enough to target specific sections of a bridge, for example.

This opens a whole world of partial substitutions for conventional airpower: Low fixed costs (launcher system procurement, training, maintenance), high variable (per round) costs. Air power for air superiority underdogs. The effect on underdogs in regard to air power could be as profound as it was for underdogs in regard to naval power when the submarines arrived.

Ballistic anti-ship missiles do look more useful for defence than for offence though. They don't change much your need for a launcher / carrier system, after all. An underdog would still be hard-pressed to deploy them (and feed them with targeting data) far away from friendly ground.

 

[sferrin]

Speed, for starters. A ballistic missile RV can be coming down at something like Mach 10 or better. Which means the interceptor generally needs to be very fast as well. That means the missile and target will pass by each other very quickly. That, in turn, usually rules out bursting warheads because even tiny errors in fuze timing mean the burst happens too early or too late. So now you have to do a hit-to-kill solution. That in turn ups complexity, becuase the seeker and steering have to be more precise.

On the plus side we've pretty much mastered hit-to-kill. (Don't confuse quality issues with the capability of a *working* system.) Both THAAD and SM-3 (and probably GBI and PAC-3) have aimpoint selecting capabilities. According to an AvWeek article years ago THAAD is accurate enough they can reliable hit an area the size of an 8-1/2 x 11 sheet of paper, anywhere on the target. SM-2 Block IV would have a more difficult time.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

THAAD and PAC-3 still do have expanding warheads, in the form of bundles of fairly large tungsten rods that dispense in a tight cluster just before impact. That gives them a couple missile diameters worth of error margin and in the case of PAC-3 helps it bring down aircraft targets when the rods can be released earlier and allowed to spread more. This also makes them more effective against missiles which have cluster warheads, be they conventional or bio-chemical, that could partly survive a direct hit at least in theory. No idea if SM-3 uses this technology or not, GBI does not.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The effect on underdogs in regard to air power could be as profound as it was for underdogs in regard to naval power when the submarines arrived.

The effect of which was… nothing. Naval power was not transformed by the acquisition of submarines. Naval minnows were not able to buy a few submarines and suddenly see off the Royal Navy. Submarines found their place as highly effective anti-commerce weapons in the two world wars. Subsequently with nuclear power – something not available to any underdog – submarines are powerful anti-fleet and anti-submarine weapons. It remains to be seen if non-nuclear submarines could replicate their anti-commerce success form the world wars but chances are they couldn’t thanks to significant improvements in speed and communications for commercial shipping. But thanks to their low mobility remain a point defence weapon against fleets and therefore easily contained or destroyed.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Indeed and submarines ton for ton did and still do cost more then other types of warships which is very linked to why they were effective, and why they were no revolution. The latest SSKs are going on 600 million USD apiece. Meanwhile even nuclear powered aircraft carriers cost less then high capability conventionally powered destroyers and frigates. Higher technology, higher cost weapons seldom benefit the underdog.

 

[sferrin]

THAAD and PAC-3 still do have expanding warheads, in the form of bundles of fairly large tungsten rods that dispense in a tight cluster just before impact.

PAC-3 does, THAAD does not. It doesn't need them. Neither does SM-3 or GBI.

 

[TomS]

On the plus side we've pretty much mastered hit-to-kill. (Don't confuse quality issues with the capability of a *working* system.)

We don't really have any good idea what the success rate of a working hit-to-kill system will be in a real-world environment.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

We don't really have any good idea what the success rate of a working hit-to-kill system will be in a real-world environment.

In what way will the interception of a hostile ballistic missile differ from the advanced replication test articles?

 

[TomS]

Seriously? You're suggesting that the ABM test environmment we've seen is functionally identical to a real-world engagement? If it were, it would be the first time ever; no other weapon system I can think of has ever performed as well live as in testing, even after complex and realistic operational tests.

Off the top of my head:

1) Target signatures will be different. How different depends on how good the threat intelligence has been, which is anyone's guess, really. Might be better, might be worse.

2) Countermeasures (if used) will be different. Again, how different depends on how good the intell is.

3) The overall EM environment will be more dense and complex. You don't see a lot of ABM tests where other AEGIS ships around the SM-3 shooter are simultaneously trying to engage complex air raids with heavy jamming, for example.

4) It's likely that there will be more targets to handle (even the best tests I've seen are pairs, not four or five inbounds at once).

5) Warning times will likely be shorter (in testing, you know the general window, at least; an operational attack might occur with little warning at all).

6) Related to that, the system will have been running at sea for days or weeks without constant tweaking by a swarm of Tech Reps. It may not be working at the peak of efficiency.

7) Also, stress levels among operators will be radically higher, which can lead to operator error. Again, the fact that other things will likely be happening at the same time can be a huge factor -- if the CIC has been busy wrangling an ASW threat (for example), it take time and effort to shift gears.

All of these factors make a live engagement different from a test. They don't mean the system won't or can't work, but to pretend that there's no difference just flies in the face of decades of experience.

 

[Arjen]

So when the 5.56mm SS109 bullet was tested and it penetrate a steel helmet at 600m range and then it first hit a steel helmet in combat at the same range are you suggesting it didn't penetrate and impact the head of the poor sod inside?

I don't think penetrating the helmet at 600m is the correct comparison here, it's *hitting* the helmet at 600m.

Plus you seem to be confusing actual testing results with operational use outside tested parameters.

So: weeks at sea, shorter warning times, no Tech Reps on board, multiple targets, operators working under stressful circumstances, different countermeasures, different target signatures, different EM environment - these have not been taken into account when setting up the tests' specifications.

This diminishes the degree to which these tests are representative of what can be encountered in reality.

"There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable." Thomas Schelling

 

[TomS]

Every one of those factors is a real possibility and has been seen in real-world events. Radars that are supposed to be deconflicted interfere with each other, operators who are supposed to trigger engagements get confused and designate the wrong targets or fail to engage at all, jamming is unexpectedly effective, etc.

It's called friction, and anyone who tells me that it doesn't happen or that simulations and testing capture it completely are deluding themselves.

So when the 5.56mm SS109 bullet was tested and it penetrate a steel helmet at 600m range and then it first hit a steel helmet in combat at the same range are you suggesting it didn’t penetrate and impact the head of the poor sod inside?

Don't confuse terminal effects with overall system performance. If an SM-3 kill vehicle hits its target, I have no doubt that it will destroy that target--the physics of that are clear. But the proper analogy is to look at how often a rifleman hits a target in combat compared to hitting in training. Even in realistic training scenarios, people hit targets far more often than they do in combat.

Missiles have less variance, since the human factor is less prominent in the whole kill chain, but it's still there and it can't be ignored.

I'm going to clarrify something I've said before that that I think you are ignoring. I'm not saying these systems are ineffective. On the contrary, I think they work very well, considering what's being asked of them. However, I believe that assuming they work as well in actual combat as they do in testing is dangerous and stupid. In particular, assuming success rates as high as 90% for an ABM interceptor is simply unsupportable based on everything we know about complex combat systems in real-world situations.

 

[Arjen]

There are limits to what we can reasonably expect to test.

These test limits do not always coincide with a test meaningfully representative of reality.

If a test represents reality to a diminished degree, this reduces the test's predictive value in proportion to the degree that the test is not representative of reality - uncertainty is increased.

In this case, an ABM is less likely to hit its target in operational conditions than an ABM is likely to hit its target in a test with a, to some extent, uncertain degree of predictive value.

Which therein lies the wiggle room for the know nothings to declare everything is invalid.

I don't see TomS calling tests invalid. He quite clearly states: 'I think they work very well, considering what's being asked of them'. But, in operational use, not with the 90 % PK seen in the tests - and he explains why.

 

[Antonio]

Dear gentlemen,

Avoid personal attacks

Thank you very much

 

[minna1922]

The end of all discussions: U 24 sank USS Enterprise during an excercise in the Caribean


http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/ausland/article483581/Das-Zielfoto-das-einen-US-Admiral-wuetend-machte.html

 

[lastdingo]

The effect on underdogs in regard to air power could be as profound as it was for underdogs in regard to naval power when the submarines arrived.

The effect of which was… nothing. Naval power was not transformed by the acquisition of submarines. Naval minnows were not able to buy a few submarines and suddenly see off the Royal Navy. Submarines found their place as highly effective anti-commerce weapons in the two world wars. Subsequently with nuclear power – something not available to any underdog – submarines are powerful anti-fleet and anti-submarine weapons. It remains to be seen if non-nuclear submarines could replicate their anti-commerce success form the world wars but chances are they couldn’t thanks to significant improvements in speed and communications for commercial shipping. But thanks to their low mobility remain a point defence weapon against fleets and therefore easily contained or destroyed.

Actually, the effect was huge.
Not only did subs challenge the commercial use of the seas and helped blockades, they also restricted naval operations a lot and provoked the use of more than 10,000 anti-sub boats and ships in WW1 (including armed trawlers) and also more than a thousand anti-sub ships as well as thousands of anti-sub aircraft in WW2.
The diversion effect was huge - more than half a million British men were occupied in or for the ASW effort in 1917.
Submarines also sank multiple battleships and carriers in situations where more classic means did not yield success.

Your idea of SSKs as PD weapons is bullocks. Modern SSKs have weapon ranges in excess of their horizon and cruise ranges exceeding the cruise range of medium WW2 subs.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Off the top of my head:

1) Target signatures will be different. How different depends on how good the threat intelligence has been, which is anyone's guess, really. Might be better, might be worse.

2) Countermeasures (if used) will be different. Again, how different depends on how good the intell is.

3) The overall EM environment will be more dense and complex. You don't see a lot of ABM tests where other AEGIS ships around the SM-3 shooter are simultaneously trying to engage complex air raids with heavy jamming, for example.

4) It's likely that there will be more targets to handle (even the best tests I've seen are pairs, not four or five inbounds at once).

5) Warning times will likely be shorter (in testing, you know the general window, at least; an operational attack might occur with little warning at all).

6) Related to that, the system will have been running at sea for days or weeks without constant tweaking by a swarm of Tech Reps. It may not be working at the peak of efficiency.

7) Also, stress levels among operators will be radically higher, which can lead to operator error. Again, the fact that other things will likely be happening at the same time can be a huge factor -- if the CIC has been busy wrangling an ASW threat (for example), it take time and effort to shift gears.

All of these factors make a live engagement different from a test. They don't mean the system won't or can't work, but to pretend that there's no difference just flies in the face of decades of experience.

All of these are entirely valid considerations. The current USN ABM capability is orientated (and largely tested against) relatively simple ballistic missile threats emanating from the likes of North Korea under equally relatively simple engagement scenarios. Intercepting multiple AShBMs from an advanced engineering country (again, relative) that are likely to be using multiple forms of counter-measures is a very different prospect. Not to mention that such missiles are only part of the threat, the important thing about AShBMs is that they are yet another layer of an-surface capability that includes conventional anti-ship missiles and submarines thus creating a complicated threat environment.

 

[Arjen]

Interesting to see you tying in commerce-raiding submarines with point defence.

The point raised here is that submarines led to a fundamental change in sea-warfare, where a comparatively small WW II German fleet tied down much of the much larger Royal and US navies. The German navy actually *was* the underdog in WW 2. What submarine operations can do to shipping was also shown by US submarines' actions against Imperial Japan, starving Japan's industry of raw materials.

Actually, the effect was huge.
Not only did subs challenge the commercial use of the seas and helped blockades, they also restricted naval operations a lot and provoked the use of more than 10,000 anti-sub boats and ships in WW1 (including armed trawlers) and also more than a thousand anti-sub ships as well as thousands of anti-sub aircraft in WW2.
The diversion effect was huge - more than half a million British men were occupied in or for the ASW effort in 1917.
Submarines also sank multiple battleships and carriers in situations where more classic means did not yield success.

I fully agree.

 

[sferrin]

Off the top of my head:

1) Target signatures will be different. How different depends on how good the threat intelligence has been, which is anyone's guess, really. Might be better, might be worse.

2) Countermeasures (if used) will be different. Again, how different depends on how good the intell is.

3) The overall EM environment will be more dense and complex. You don't see a lot of ABM tests where other AEGIS ships around the SM-3 shooter are simultaneously trying to engage complex air raids with heavy jamming, for example.

4) It's likely that there will be more targets to handle (even the best tests I've seen are pairs, not four or five inbounds at once).

5) Warning times will likely be shorter (in testing, you know the general window, at least; an operational attack might occur with little warning at all).

6) Related to that, the system will have been running at sea for days or weeks without constant tweaking by a swarm of Tech Reps. It may not be working at the peak of efficiency.

7) Also, stress levels among operators will be radically higher, which can lead to operator error. Again, the fact that other things will likely be happening at the same time can be a huge factor -- if the CIC has been busy wrangling an ASW threat (for example), it take time and effort to shift gears.

All of these factors make a live engagement different from a test. They don't mean the system won't or can't work, but to pretend that there's no difference just flies in the face of decades of experience.

All of these are entirely valid considerations. The current USN ABM capability is orientated (and largely tested against) relatively simple ballistic missile threats emanating from the likes of North Korea under equally relatively simple engagement scenarios. Intercepting multiple AShBMs from an advanced engineering country (again, relative) that are likely to be using multiple forms of counter-measures is a very different prospect. Not to mention that such missiles are only part of the threat, the important thing about AShBMs is that they are yet another layer of an-surface capability that includes conventional anti-ship missiles and submarines thus creating a complicated threat environment.

I trust you realize they've yet to demonstrate they can even hit a ship? At the moment it's nothing more than a paper tiger.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I trust you realize they've yet to demonstrate they can even hit a ship? At the moment it's nothing more than a paper tiger.

Of course. We have no publicly documented evidence of any test, successful or otherwise, of a Chinese AShBM- but given what the US was achieving in terms of accuracy with MGM-31C three decades ago, China's considerable investment in ballistic missiles as a form of deep strike capability and its plundering of foreign technology I would certainly not rule out China possessing such a capability.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Interesting to see you tying in commerce-raiding submarines with point defence.

The point raised here is that submarines led to a fundamental change in sea-warfare, where a comparatively small WW II German fleet tied down much of the much larger Royal and US navies. The German navy actually *was* the underdog in WW 2. What submarine operations can do to shipping was also shown by US submarines' actions against Imperial Japan, starving Japan's industry of raw materials.

Yes, I was puzzled by that as well, considering that SSKs were used in both World Wars to mount very aggressive transoceanic offensives against SLOCs it seems somewhat odd to consider them a "point defence" weapon. Certainly midget submarines such as the type beloved of North Korea and Iran fall into such categories but long range boats such as the Type 214, Collins, Scorpene and Soryu class can hardly be claimed to.

I would also point out that having the second or fifth (or sixish) largest navy in the world still makes you underdog to the largest and in terms of surface fleets that was the case for Germany in both world wars, especially the second- hence its resort to diesel electric submarines. The ARA San Luis is also instructive here, once the absolute underdog status of the Argentine surface fleet was recognised and it fled to port the San Luis was Argentina's most effective counter-surface system (after Argentine aircraft) tying up considerable RN ASW assets and only being denied a kill against an RN surface ship by poor weapons handling and performance.

 

[JFC Fuller]

You didn’t read the previous page of discussion.

For the record and for Arjen, JFC (aka Sealordlawrence) and TomS who didn’t bother to read the initial statement made by Lastdingo which Sea Skimmer and Myself and commented on, here it is:

The effect on underdogs in regard to air power could be as profound as it was for underdogs in regard to naval power when the submarines arrived.

Actually I did, and I referenced the underdog element directly in my previous post by pointing out that irrespective of the size of the German surface fleet in both world wars it was still the underdog by virtue of its opponent's fleet being even bigger. To expand that point even further, TomS is absolutely correct and has been proven so on multiple occasions over the last 65+ years. The V1/V2 were a direct consequence of the underdog status of the Luftwaffe, multiple "rogue" regimes use them to offset their lack of airpower (most notably Iraq, Iran and North Korea) and even China does the same. So much so that one of the main drivers behind the current US deployable ABM programme is to ensure that ballistic missiles do not provide disproportionate power to smaller countries. MTCR has similar motivations.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The only SSKs produced during the World Wars were a handful of RN R-class boats in 1918. There were plenty of diesel electric fleet submarines and coastal defence submarines but none of these are hunter killer submarines (SSK). Certainly Collins and Soryu are not considered SSKs by anyone professionally associated with them. But while a contemporary SSK boat like the Type 214 can make a longish deployment it can’t operate indiscreetly over the same ranges as fleet submarines so is constrained to a small patrol box like all other SSKs. There is a big difference between transit and patrol operation for contemporary diesel electric submarines.

That diesel-electric submarines have less flexibility than a nuclear powered submarines is not being disputed by anybody, but that does not make them "point defence" weapons. They are and have been used as offensive long range sea denial assets. I can also assure you that the Japanese do consider the Soryu class (and the rest of their submarine fleet for that matter) as ASW assets (and thus SSKs), I have been told so by multiple Japanese naval officers.

 

[Arjen]

You didn’t read the previous page of discussion.

I did, actually. I thought lastdingo's comment was closer to reality than yours. It's what I still think.

The effect on underdogs in regard to air power could be as profound as it was for underdogs in regard to naval power when the submarines arrived.

I've been mulling the role of the WW 1 German Navy. As JFC Fuller has already pointed out, the German Navy was the underdog to the Royal Navy in that war too. In that war, submarines were wreaking havoc on shipping as well. I simply thought to point at WW 2 where the German Navy was even more of an underdog, thus better too show the utility of submarine warfare to an underdog sea power.

Mmmm… It is a very long bow to turn this into the WWII U Boat campaign. Particularly the use of the word “arrived”. Said WWII U Boat campaign BTW required the production of around 1,000,000 tonnes of submarines.

So consider WW 1, just after the introduction of submarines, where the Germans waging submarine warfare had to be countered with great effort. Also consider the choices made by the Germans in WW 2, they might have produced more surface combatants but there was no way they could ever catch up with the Allies. They very nearly strangled Britain with their submarine campaign - something which would have been out of the question with the number of surface combatants they might have produced.