Report: Aircraft Carriers May Be Too Vulnerable

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2IDSGT

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A 12-page report issued March 11 by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) spells out the disadvantages of continuing to rely on expensive, capacious vessels like aircraft carriers with the dawn of a new type of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capable of destroying them far out at sea.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130312/DEFREG03/303120015/Report-Costly-USN-Aircraft-Carriers-May-Too-Vulnerable-Keep?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE

Carriers have been *hopelessly vulnerable targets* vs near-peers since the late 1940s, yet they continue to prove their usefulness time and again. Additionally, I don't think this group has really thought out the difficulties faced by the Chinese (mainly targeting) and the advantages held by the USN (mainly being a moving/defended target in a vast ocean). Needless to say, I doubt the DF-21D will be killing any carriers unless they're sitting pierside in Yokosuka.
 
In principle, I see not reason why DF-21 can't hit a carrier at sea provided the Chinese had real-time surveillance assets capable of tracking the ships.

These could be high altitude drones or satellites.

If these were drones, they would need a satellite down link to communicate with the luanchers and the missile.

So either way, to defeat DF-21 means to target chinese satellites.
 
If it's dependent on a sensor, it's vulnerable to EW.
 
chuck4 said:
So either way, to defeat DF-21 means to target chinese satellites.

Or just use your existing BMD capability to knock them off. Supplemented of course by the high volume terminal phase interceptor (SBMSE: PACIII for ships) that the USN could order into production anytime in the past 5-10 years and get into the fleet well before any operational fielding of the DF-21 ASBM.

This report about the threat of ballistic missiles doesn’t even mention ballistic missile defence. Despite the USG having a Missile Defense Agency and the USN having spent tens of billions on the capability. It does mention English longbowman in the battle of Agincourt but. If this report was printed on paper I would recommend using it as toilet paper.
 
2IDSGT said:
Carriers have been *hopelessly vulnerable targets* vs near-peers since the late 1940s, yet they continue to prove their usefulness time and again.

They have proved very useful in relatively limited wars against countries without any ability to hurt them. As far as I know, no-one has made a serious effort to sink a US carrier since WW2. Although more than one NATO navy has grievously embarrassed the USN in exercises by getting a submarine well within torpedo-firing range of a carrier without being detected.

During the Cold War the Soviets had serried ranks of carrier-killers lined up and trailing around after the US fleets: submarines designed to fire a volley of anti-ship missiles, long-range bombers carrying very large, long-range, high-speed anti-ship missiles and so on. Yes, most of them will have failed to hit their targets for one reason or another - but they only had to get through once.

The general lesson of high-tech weapons is that, when first put to the acid test, neither the attacking nor the defensive systems work as well as advertised. Laser-guided weapons have now become reliable, but they certainly weren't at first. Neither were AAMs. So, many of the DF-21 and other anti-carrier systems will fail to lock-on to their targets, most of them may be shot down - but they only have to get through once......so the money has to be that in a serious conventional war against an opponent with high-tech anti-carrier systems, the big carriers will be missile magnets and it will be a matter of when they will be mission killed or sunk, not whether.

Of course, that doesn't stop the carriers remaining very useful in more limited warfare.
 
Tony Williams said:
Although more than one NATO navy has grievously embarrassed the USN in exercises by getting a submarine well within torpedo-firing range of a carrier without being detected.

There is a big difference between getting a periscope photo of a carrier in a peacetime exercise and getting a torpedo into it in war time. It’s a typical submariner trick to sneak up on the carrier coming into and out of port to get their “sink” shot. When it is at sea and maintaining >20 knots and 100 nm from any shoreline the chances of an electric boat getting within range are very low. Especially when the carrier’s air wing can drop a warshot on every transient which tends to seriously cramp the swashbuckling style of any submarine.

Tony Williams said:
During the Cold War the Soviets had serried ranks of carrier-killers lined up and trailing around after the US fleets: submarines designed to fire a volley of anti-ship missiles, long-range bombers carrying very large, long-range, high-speed anti-ship missiles and so on. Yes, most of them will have failed to hit their targets for one reason or another - but they only had to get through once.

This really isn’t any different to WWII. The Soviets only had to get a single shot through if they were using nuclear warheads in which case everyone would have a lot more to worry about than carrier survivability. Otherwise they might cause some damage but this is not much different to a Kamikaze and while they can incapacitate a carrier it can be back in the fight in days or weeks depending on the damage. Plus putting their effort into submarines and aircraft were playing to the two great strengths of the USN. That China is now doing similar with ballistic missiles when the US has the world’s most significant BMD capability does not show very good strategic planning.

Hunting carriers is a very hard game. Because not only do they tend to have a huge amount of defensive capability but they also move. Plus carriers will typically operate in groups of 2-3 in war time to provide 24-7 capability and concentrate defensive and offensive firepower.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Hunting carriers is a very hard game. Because not only do they tend to have a huge amount of defensive capability but they also move. Plus carriers will typically operate in groups of 2-3 in war time to provide 24-7 capability and concentrate defensive and offensive firepower.

As with any military technology, there is a constant see-saw between attack and defence. Carrier battle groups have enjoyed a high level of immunity for a long time, but with more and more nations putting up military recce satellites, their ability to hide is steadily reducing. Add this to capabilities like the DF-21 and it's not surprising that some USN thinkers are getting worried. The USN's BMD experiments have had a patchy record in trials so far, and they are certainly not going to be 100% effective. Even if they get to 90% effectiveness (which would be impressive) that means that the enemy only has to launch ten missiles to score a hit.

To make matters more difficult for the carriers, to be of any use in warfare they are going to have to approach within a few hundred miles of their targets to get within manned fighter range - which is why the author of the paper is keen on developing UCAVs which have several times the effective range and therefore multiply enormously the area of the ocean from which the carriers can operate effectively.
 
Tony Williams said:
Abraham Gubler said:
Hunting carriers is a very hard game. Because not only do they tend to have a huge amount of defensive capability but they also move. Plus carriers will typically operate in groups of 2-3 in war time to provide 24-7 capability and concentrate defensive and offensive firepower.

As with any military technology, there is a constant see-saw between attack and defence. Carrier battle groups have enjoyed a high level of immunity for a long time, but with more and more nations putting up military recce satellites, their ability to hide is steadily reducing. Add this to capabilities like the DF-21 and it's not surprising that some USN thinkers are getting worried. The USN's BMD experiments have had a patchy record in trials so far, and they are certainly not going to be 100% effective. Even if they get to 90% effectiveness (which would be impressive) that means that the enemy only has to launch ten missiles to score a hit.

To make matters more difficult for the carriers, to be of any use in warfare they are going to have to approach within a few hundred miles of their targets to get within manned fighter range - which is why the author of the paper is keen on developing UCAVs which have several times the effective range and therefore multiply enormously the area of the ocean from which the carriers can operate effectively.

China isn't anywhere near the capability of the USSR back in the 80's. Think about it. Regiments of Kh-22 Armed Backfires, P-700 armed Oscars, Bears and RORSATs to look for stuff. And they were still able to hide.
 
sferrin said:
China isn't anywhere near the capability of the USSR back in the 80's. Think about it. Regiments of Kh-22 Armed Backfires, P-700 armed Oscars, Bears and RORSATs to look for stuff. And they were still able to hide.

True - but it's the potential that causes concern. China is developing rapidly, is clearly working on the technology to both find and hit the US carriers. Using a ballistic missile adds a whole new dimension - if that proves feasible, it would obviously be possible for any navy with SLBMs (Russia, for instance) to develop the same technology.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
If this report was printed on paper I would recommend using it as toilet paper.
Agreed. Reading more of the report, the authors seem to be applying Looney Toons physics to how ballistic missiles work.
 
If this report was written in the 1970s, it would have recommended jump jets and through-deck cruisers such as the sea control ship or the larger CVV. Now UCAV-equipped light amphibious carriers and SSGNs are the flavor of the month that will replace the "vulnerable" United States Navy super carriers. This report is yet another salvo in the decades-long debate over the purchase of expensive super carriers since the U.S.S. United States (CVA-58) in the late 1940s. How many decades have we heard about the "death" of the super carrier?
 
Tony Williams said:
As with any military technology, there is a constant see-saw between attack and defence.

No this isn’t a constant. Changes in the back and forth are actually pretty infrequent. Assuming a system of flux is constant is wishy washy one must focus on each change as they come along. In this case a system of offense that already has a defensive system fielded. Not smart thinking from the potential offender.

Tony Williams said:
Carrier battle groups have enjoyed a high level of immunity for a long time, but with more and more nations putting up military recce satellites, their ability to hide is steadily reducing.

Sure but they are still mobile in the world’s largest surface area (the oceans) which makes them much harder to find and fix (which is very different to just find) than an airbase.

Tony Williams said:
Add this to capabilities like the DF-21 and it's not surprising that some USN thinkers are getting worried.

All I hear is a lot of think tank/blogger chatter. Not much of it is science based and in the case of the CNAS report completely worthless.

Tony Williams said:
Add The USN's BMD experiments have had a patchy record in trials so far, and they are certainly not going to be 100% effective. Even if they get to 90% effectiveness (which would be impressive) that means that the enemy only has to launch ten missiles to score a hit.

Nothing in these two sentences is true. The USN does not just experiment in BMD it has a fielded operational system. The record hasn’t been patchy it’s been spectacular. During the actual ‘experimental’ or developmental phase there were of course plenty of failures but that’s what said phase is for.

As for your percentages this defies mathematics. A 90% success rate means for a single shot you will have success 90% of the time. It doesn’t mean that the system will only stop 90% of attacks. So you double up in your engagements (two interceptors for each incoming) and you then get a statistical probability of 99% success. 1% failure too high a margin (as in stoping WMD ballistic missiles fired at Israel) then you fire three interceptors per incoming and you then get 99.9%.

It then becomes a case of who has the deepest magazines (ie Missile Command) in which case the USN wins. China only has about 100 DF-21s in service at the moment (none of them anti-ship DF-21Ds) and each singular carrier battle group has the potential to carry 300 BMD interceptors (mix of SM-3 and SBMSE) by only consuming about 25% of their available Mk 41 VLS cells. That doesn’t include air launched BMD options, combining CSGs to maximise depth in BMD coverage, land based BMD, picket ship based BMD (for mid-course interceptions) and various other options (like the good ole arsenal ship) the USN could field if China ever introduces a viable anti-ship BMD capability.

Triton said:
How many decades have we heard about the "death" of the super carrier?

As seems all too often when it comes to carriers and Mark Twain alike reports of their death are all too premature.
 
What about the rail guns that the Navy has been busy testing? Are those good against a wide variety of targets? Air, sea ships, and ballistic missiles such as the ones the Chinese claim are carrier killers? The Supercarrier is far from dead if they are always updated with new countermeasures etc.
 
In this case, I have to agree with Abraham.

Not one of these "ZOMG DF-21 ZKY IZ FALLING!!!" reports mentions the US Navy's robust BMD capability that follows around each CVN.
Thus, you can write them off as really expensive toilet paper that doesn't even do the job of toilet paper properly, due to being too slick/glossy... :eek:
 
Tony Williams said:
sferrin said:
China isn't anywhere near the capability of the USSR back in the 80's. Think about it. Regiments of Kh-22 Armed Backfires, P-700 armed Oscars, Bears and RORSATs to look for stuff. And they were still able to hide.

True - but it's the potential that causes concern. China is developing rapidly, is clearly working on the technology to both find and hit the US carriers. Using a ballistic missile adds a whole new dimension - if that proves feasible, it would obviously be possible for any navy with SLBMs (Russia, for instance) to develop the same technology.


So i guess its back to that age old question, how many billions of dollars are you willing to spend because you think someone might do something maybe in the future? ;)

I will be the first to say that a Super Carrier isn't invincible, but the point isn't invincibility its to make someone dedicated to sinking them pay through the nose with dollars and dead to actually pull it off. Most countries look at it and say "no thanks" places like the old USSR had to invest heavily in the hopes they could should war break out. Fleet defense is continually improving, the stuff they are capable of now is mind boggling.
 
Tony Williams said:
As with any military technology, there is a constant see-saw between attack and defence. Carrier battle groups have enjoyed a high level of immunity for a long time, but with more and more nations putting up military recce satellites, their ability to hide is steadily reducing.


The rate of deployment of SM-3 capable ships and land based ABM systems able to shoot down satellites is rising much more rapidly then the population of said satellites. Its the satellites, not the carriers which are in truly deep trouble, and for a lot more purposes then recon. IPatents have showed up for satellite infrared countermeasures, but that won't help if the missile is simply command guided to the kill, which is easy enough given how much bigger satellites are then ballistic missile warheads. As it is China still has nothing like the mass Soviet deployment of reconnaissance assets in space, in the air and above and below the waves. China isn't doing a very good job of deploying nuclear attack submarines either, those are the true worst enemy of an aircraft carrier.



Add this to capabilities like the DF-21 and it's not surprising that some USN thinkers are getting worried. The USN's BMD experiments have had a patchy record in trials so far, and they are certainly not going to be 100% effective. Even if they get to 90% effectiveness (which would be impressive) that means that the enemy only has to launch ten missiles to score a hit.


Assuming that such a complex weapon as a precision maneuvering anti ship ballistic missile had 100% reliability and was immune to all electronic countermeasures, sure that might be true, but it wont and isn't. China has never once tested this weapon against a real target and all, it might never work. ESSM block 2 will have an active homing and anti ballistic missile capability too, so CVNs in the future will have an organic terminal defense against ASBM attack. Frankly a weapon so expensive and easily detected as DF-21 should be the least of concerns for the US navy right now. The growing effectiveness of conventional Chinese combat aircraft is a far greater problem.


Single shot ABM test results are not good, who really cares? SAMs of all sorts are typically fired in salvos, they've never been one shot kill weapons. ABM makes life much easier since the warning times and engagement ranges are so long against even an MRBM you have time to shoot-look-shoot and still have time for terminal defense after that.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Tony Williams said:
As with any military technology, there is a constant see-saw between attack and defence.

No this isn’t a constant.

As soon as an improved method of attack emerges, people start work on how to defend against it. That's been a constant throughout history. Some attack systems last longer than others, but it isn't a matter of if an effective defence will emerge, but when. By which time, of course, work will be in progress on a method of attack to overcome the new defence....


Tony Williams said:
Add this to capabilities like the DF-21 and it's not surprising that some USN thinkers are getting worried.

All I hear is a lot of think tank/blogger chatter. Not much of it is science based and in the case of the CNAS report completely worthless.

Hmm - who do I give credence to? A USN Captain who is a career naval flight officer and has "reported to the Pentagon where he has served as a Force Structure Analyst and Strategist in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the OSD Office of Net Assessment, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration and the OPNAV staff" - or some guy on the internet who thinks he knows nothing? ::)

Tony Williams said:
Add The USN's BMD experiments have had a patchy record in trials so far, and they are certainly not going to be 100% effective. Even if they get to 90% effectiveness (which would be impressive) that means that the enemy only has to launch ten missiles to score a hit.

Nothing in these two sentences is true. The USN does not just experiment in BMD it has a fielded operational system. The record hasn’t been patchy it’s been spectacular. During the actual ‘experimental’ or developmental phase there were of course plenty of failures but that’s what said phase is for.

No weapon system is ever 100% effective, and trials only tell you how well they perform on trials. The 1960s AAMs (AIM-7 and AIM-9) achieved 80+% hit probabilities on trial, but for a variety of reasons when used in action in Vietnam the hit probability initially dropped to 10%. On trial, the RN's Sea Wolf ASM system proved capable of intercepting a 4.5 inch shell in flight, but when two planes attacked in the Falklands, the system got confused and switched itself off. The Vulcan Phalanx was specifically designed to counter anti-ship missiles but on the two occasions when Phalanx-armed ships were attacked with AShMs the Phalanx failed. Why? Because it wasn't switched on. Sh*t happens, and nothing ever works perfectly all of the time (unless you believe the official PR people, of course). So just as a lot of DF-21s would fail to reach their target, of the ones that did, some would get through regardless of BMD defence.

It then becomes a case of who has the deepest magazines (ie Missile Command) in which case the USN wins. China only has about 100 DF-21s in service at the moment (none of them anti-ship DF-21Ds) and each singular carrier battle group has the potential to carry 300 BMD interceptors (mix of SM-3 and SBMSE) by only consuming about 25% of their available Mk 41 VLS cells. That doesn’t include air launched BMD options, combining CSGs to maximise depth in BMD coverage, land based BMD, picket ship based BMD (for mid-course interceptions) and various other options (like the good ole arsenal ship) the USN could field if China ever introduces a viable anti-ship BMD capability.

You seem to assume that the USN can ramp up its missile numbers but the Chinese can't. Other things being equal, it is cheaper to mount missiles on land than on ships, and you've got a hell of lot more room to put them in than a ship's hull can offer. So if China decided that it wished to pose a serious threat, they could build as many missiles as they wanted to.

More to the point, the existence of such an anti-carrier system would make the USN a lot more cautious with the deployment of their carriers, which in itself would be a result for the Chinese.
 
Tony Williams said:
Hmm - who do I give credence to? A USN Captain who is a career naval flight officer and has "reported to the Pentagon where he has served as a Force Structure Analyst and Strategist in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the OSD Office of Net Assessment, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration and the OPNAV staff" - or some guy on the internet who thinks he knows nothing?

He wrote a report about ballistic missile attacks without once mentioning ballistic missile defence. He could be the reincarnation of Nimitz himself and that would still make his report worthless.

Tony Williams said:
So just as a lot of DF-21s would fail to reach their target, of the ones that did, some would get through regardless of BMD defence.

By the examples you gave the DF-21s would only get through the defences if they were carried by Skyhawks flying at 10 feet above wave crest.

Tony Williams said:
You seem to assume that the USN can ramp up its missile numbers but the Chinese can't.

And with good reason. PAC III MSEmissile from Lockheed, next block ESSM from Raytheon, both <500 lbs missiles from running production lines that have produced thousands of units. Compared to as yet an unfielded, unproven version of DF-21 that weighes 32,000 lbs and hasn’t even clocked 100 units. Somehow I think there will be more VW Beetles built than R-R Phantoms…

Tony Williams said:
More to the point, the existence of such an anti-carrier system would make the USN a lot more cautious with the deployment of their carriers, which in itself would be a result for the Chinese.

If the Combined Imperial Fleet, the Kamikaze by the thousand, shadows of Styx equipped destroyers for start of war salvos, the Soviet Backfire regiments and mass of nuclear submarines did not make the USN withdraw their carriers a missile that doesn’t exist and is already countered certainly won’t.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Tony Williams said:
So just as a lot of DF-21s would fail to reach their target, of the ones that did, some would get through regardless of BMD defence.

By the examples you gave the DF-21s would only get through the defences if they were carried by Skyhawks flying at 10 feet above wave crest.

A silly remark. You do your argument no good by deliberately avoiding the point I was making - that no advanced weapon systems are 100% effective, and most certainly not when they are first used in combat.

Tony Williams said:
You seem to assume that the USN can ramp up its missile numbers but the Chinese can't.

And with good reason. PAC III MSEmissile from Lockheed, next block ESSM from Raytheon, both <500 lbs missiles from running production lines that have produced thousands of units. Compared to as yet an unfielded, unproven version of DF-21 that weighes 32,000 lbs and hasn’t even clocked 100 units. Somehow I think there will be more VW Beetles built than R-R Phantoms…

Which part of "it's the potential that causes concern" do you not grasp? Both China's GDP and its defence spending are accelerating at something in the region of 10% per year. Their technical sophistication is developing rapidly also; they are already operating a more advanced internet than the west.

If the Combined Imperial Fleet, the Kamikaze by the thousand, shadows of Styx equipped destroyers for start of war salvos, the Soviet Backfire regiments and mass of nuclear submarines did not make the USN withdraw their carriers a missile that doesn’t exist and is already countered certainly won’t.

The west generally is becoming a lot more risk averse. Even the loss of individual soldiers in action causes more heart-searching than it ever used to. With the number of US carriers likely to reduce gradually, there will be little enthusiasm for sending them into harm's way except as a last possible resort.
 
@Abraham Gubler
I wouldn't waste any more time on the guy. It's pretty obvious he knows more about how to prolong an argument than he does about missiles (or military equipment of any kind to judge from his other posts).
 
2IDSGT said:
@Abraham Gubler
I wouldn't waste any more time on the guy. It's pretty obvious he knows more about how to prolong an argument than he does about missiles (or military equipment of any kind to judge from his other posts).

This board really needs an "ignore" function.
 
I never heard of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), but this is what Wikipedia has to say about it:

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is a Washington, D.C.-based think tank established in 2007 by co-founders Michèle Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell which specializes in U.S. national security issues. CNAS's stated mission is to "develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values."[1] CNAS focuses on terrorism and irregular warfare, the future of the U.S. military, the emergence of Asia as a global power center, and the national security implications of natural resource consumption. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg has called CNAS "an indispensable feature on the Washington landscape."[2] Speaking at the CNAS annual conference in June 2009, U.S. Central Command Commander GEN David Petraeus observed that "CNAS has, in a few short years, established itself as a true force in think tank and policy-making circles"[3]

The Obama administration has hired several CNAS employees for key jobs.[4] Founders Michèle Flournoy and Kurt Campbell currently serve as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, respectively. In June 2009 The Washington Post suggested, "In the era of Obama...the Center for a New American Security may emerge as Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs."[4] CNAS scholars include John Nagl,[5] David Kilcullen, Andrew Exum, Thomas E. Ricks, Robert D. Kaplan,[6] and Marc Lynch. The revolving door of the Military–industrial complex continued in 2013, with Robert O. Work becoming CEO of CNAS.[7][8]

CNAS is relatively small, with around 30 employees and a budget under $6 million.[9]
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_a_New_American_Security

The real question is whether this report will influence decision makers? At $13.5 billion a copy, the Gerald R. Ford class is a tempting target for budget slashers or budget re-allocators. Is CNAS trying to shoot down the building of CVN 81 or later examples of the Gerald R. Ford class? Is this report also attempting to get the American public used to the idea of a Sino-American War? The report is fixated on a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, yet ignore all other potential military threats and actions to defend United States interests. Should one possible military conflict dictate the entirety of United States defense policy?
 
Who needs a DF-21D to take out a carrier (or several) when you have Congress doing it already?:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/9883997/BAE-Systems-warns-3500-jobs-at-risk-in-US.html

aircraft-carriers_2478111b.jpg
 
I don't really agree with the last paragraph as much as I used to, but that can be fought-out on a small vs large carrier thread.

Why Aircraft Carriers Sail On
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/09/18/why-aircraft-carriers-sail-on/

Why Aircraft Carriers Sail On
By Dr. Robert Farley
September 18, 2012

Have aircraft carriers become obsolete? Since 1949, analysts have argued that some combination of strategic bombers and cheap anti-shipping weapons have rendered the aircraft carrier a relic. The latest round in the conversation over the continued viability of aircraft carriers was spurred by Robert Haddick’s Foreign Policy column suggesting that improvements in long range strategic airpower and ballistic missile technology could render the carrier irrelevant.

There’s no single answer as to why the carrier persists, but the experience of the last sixty-five years has helped give us a handle on the persistent utility of the flat deck aviation warship. While individual anti-access platforms are inexpensive, developing an anti-access system of systems requires immense investments of time, treasure, and human capital. The PLA has undoubtedly created a formidable set of weapons to defeat U.S. carriers, but it has done so at the expense of other capabilities. Haddick notes “For the price of a single major warship, China can buy hundreds or even thousands of anti-ship missiles.” Indeed, China (and the USSR before it) has foregone the development of offensive, power projection platforms in no small part because of the need to invest heavily in systems to counter U.S. carriers.

Moreover, governments find a way to use aircraft carriers that doesn’t involve high intensity combat against peer opponents. However expensive they may be, U.S. carriers have proven infinitely more fungible than the array of missile boats, short range submarines, and advanced missiles that the PLA has deployed to counter them. A U.S. carrier can show the flag outside the Strait of Hormuz, support relief operations in Haiti, or kinetic military operations in Libya, while an armada of DF-21D ASBMs can do little but sit and wait.

This is why states continue to build (and buy) aircraft carriers even at great trouble and expense. A carrier may never run the risk of an anti-ship missile during its long lifespan, but it will likely contribute to the national interest in some fashion. The prestige offered by a major, modern capital ship may seem an ephemeral goal to spend the national treasury on, but prestige also constitutes influence; the arrival of an aircraft carrier at a regional port of call carries more diplomatic weight than an attack submarine or destroyer (witness the concern over the deployment of Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean). This is particularly true in a crisis, whether natural or manmade; aircraft carriers have the capacity to influence events ashore that neither strategic bombers nor surface ships possess. We should think of the procurement priorities of China, India, and Japan in these terms.

Given that future missions will force flexible demands on aircraft carriers, we may continue to see a shift away from expensive super-carriers and towards multi-purpose warships such as the USN’s amphibious assault vessels. The enormous expense of the largest, most capable aircraft carriers will prove a greater danger to their continued relevance than the anti-access systems designed to destroy them. However, this development is likely only to change the priorities of designers, rather than to eliminate the type altogether.
 
IMHO, ballistic anti-ship missiles are just the beginning of the end. Long endurance, fully autonomous, multi-modal (i.e. submersible/sea-floor/waveborne/airborne) weapons may eventually gain the edge.
Carriers are simply too high value a target (and too hard to defend) in an environment filled with smart weapons. That said - a considerable amount of time may be bough by nuclear powered escorts with direct energy weapons. They won't be effective against rail-guns and smaller hyper-velocity weapons though.

P.S.
Any idea if super-cavitating rounds could be used to take out other super-cavitating projectiles underwater...? What would be the logistics of this?
 
Avimimus said:
IMHO, ballistic anti-ship missiles are just the beginning of the end. Long endurance, fully autonomous, multi-modal (i.e. submersible/sea-floor/waveborne/airborne) weapons may eventually gain the edge.
Carriers are simply too high value a target (and too hard to defend) in an environment filled with smart weapons. That said - a considerable amount of time may be bough by nuclear powered escorts with direct energy weapons. They won't be effective against rail-guns and smaller hyper-velocity weapons though.

P.S.
Any idea if super-cavitating rounds could be used to take out other super-cavitating projectiles underwater...? What would be the logistics of this?
::) Oh dear... Looks like someone's been watching a "seaQuest DSV" marathon.
 
A summary of the arguments which I posted in another place:

Aircraft carriers undoubtedly remain useful in relatively limited warfare. In a more dangerous conventional conflict against a sophisticated enemy, they will become missile and torpedo magnets. And while defensive measures will no doubt deal with the great majority of the attacks, the attackers only have to get lucky once....

This suggests to me that although there are considerable advantages in using big carriers, in terms of the quantities of aircraft, weapons and fuel they can carry and also the extra stability in rough weather making aircraft operations possible more often, a larger number of smaller carriers might be a more prudent way of spending the money. A small carrier can do nearly anything that a large carrier can - only in the event of a need for a very high sortie rate will the big carrier justify its extra cost.

Which then takes us to the break-point question of the size at which the planes it carries should be STOVL (or super-STOL) rather than CATOBAR. The French carrier is probably right on the minimum size for CATOBAR (and I expect it suffers from operational limitations as a result), whereas the new British carriers are clearly unnecessarily large for STOVL. As I have said before, three 30,000 ton STOVL carriers would surely be more generally useful than two 60,000 tonners (the costs presumably being roughly comparable).

One big advantage of STOVL is that the risk of carrier loss can be spread further by designing some of the amphibious warfare ships to handle STOVL planes in an emergency. I think that any task force including carrier planes should have at least two flat-top ships available, even if only one of them normally operates fighters.

A key issue is: what level of warfare are the carriers needed for? What I mean is this:

- in a nuclear war the carriers become irrelevant.

- in a high-intensity war against a sophisticated enemy, the carriers are vulnerable and therefore possibly of little use, as they'd have to be kept out of harm's way.

- in a limited war against a less capable enemy unable to mount any threat to them (e.g. Iraq) big carriers are immensely useful and very much in their element.

- in an even more limited war, the big carriers are arguably overkill - something smaller and cheaper would do.

- drop a bit further down the scale into something more like international policing and amphibious ships carrying some attack helos would do perfectly well.

So each country with a navy needs to look at the range of policy options, decides what it has to do - and can afford - and links the capability of its naval air support to its foreign policy. Unfortunately, there are few public signs of such a logical approach.
 
Tony Williams said:
...the attackers only have to get lucky once....
... and I'd only need to get lucky vs Cain Velasquez once. Arguments based on puncher's-chance are lame beyond belief.
 
2IDSGT said:
Arguments based on puncher's-chance are lame beyond belief.

Not at all - it's a question of statistics. If a defence system has a 90% success rate (which is pretty good), that means on average the attacker will score one hit for every ten missiles successfully fired (i.e. which are heading for the target). No defence system is 100% effective, so overcoming it is simply a matter of firing enough missiles.

The ability of attackers to swamp a defence system through sheer numbers of simultaneous attacks - whether with guided missiles or (if close to shore) suicide speed boats - is a genuine problem to navies with high-value surface ships.
 
Which is why professional defence forces layer multiple systems for defence. As in the case of a USN carrier it currently has three to four layers of active defence against any existing threat each with a very high probability of success (>80%). Plus additional layers of passive defence, defence through mobility and the defensiveness inherent in highly lethal offensive capability. All of this makes it very unlikely that any threat can succeed.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
All of this makes it very unlikely that any threat can succeed.

True if all systems always work to the standard of performance which the manufacturer claims for them. As I have pointed out, combat experience has clearly demonstrated that this doesn't happen - especially when the systems are first tested in battle.
 
Tony Williams said:
...it is simply a matter of...
But they don't and/or they can't. Sounds like racing excuses. Do you even bother reading this stuff to yourself before you post it?
 
Tony Williams said:
Abraham Gubler said:
All of this makes it very unlikely that any threat can succeed.
True if all systems always work to the standard of performance which the manufacturer claims for them. As I have pointed out, combat experience has clearly demonstrated that this doesn't happen - especially when the systems are first tested in battle.
@Gubler
Observe how the creature has simply changed to a completely different thesis in order to prolong the exchange.
 
This argument is really quite pointless.

Carriers aren't invulnerable. They are tough targets though. They also don't have to be invulnerable to be useful. Its like saying "New Russian RPG can penetrate an Abrams in certain circumstances. Onoz, we have to stop using Abrams tanks, they are too vulnerable!"


The question is, is an assymmetric approach able to counter them effectively? Can we build a "wonder system" (e.g. DF-21D) that makes the carrier obsolete? Should the US Navy just pack it in now? I don't believe so.

The Soviets tried, with a proliferation of air launched AShMs, surface launched ones, submarine launched ones, and comprehensive spy satellite networks over a 40 year period. What did they end up doing? Building their own carriers. Seems like they decided they were worth having after all.

Lets look at the Chinese. If the DF-21D approach makes carriers obsolete, why the hell are the Chinese building carriers, and J-15 fighters to go on them? Don't they realise the US can make a Minuteman mod that makes their carriers obsolete?
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
This argument is really quite pointless.

Carriers aren't invulnerable. They are tough targets though. They also don't have to be invulnerable to be useful. Its like saying "New Russian RPG can penetrate an Abrams in certain circumstances. Onoz, we have to stop using Abrams tanks, they are too vulnerable!"


The question is, is an assymmetric approach able to counter them effectively? Can we build a "wonder system" (e.g. DF-21D) that makes the carrier obsolete? Should the US Navy just pack it in now? I don't believe so.

The Soviets tried, with a proliferation of air launched AShMs, surface launched ones, submarine launched ones, and comprehensive spy satellite networks over a 40 year period. What did they end up doing? Building their own carriers. Seems like they decided they were worth having after all.

Lets look at the Chinese. If the DF-21D approach makes carriers obsolete, why the hell are the Chinese building carriers, and J-15 fighters to go on them? Don't they realise the US can make a Minuteman mod that makes their carriers obsolete?

I agree with that, and I've never said that carriers aren't still useful, especially when up against a less capable enemy. I am merely pointing out that the environment is likely to become tougher for them in the future, and that like any other defensive system, theirs is not infallible and can be penetrated.
 
Tony Williams said:
I am merely pointing out that the environment is likely to become tougher for them in the future...
As if battle groups won't become "tougher" targets in the future. ::) I love how people like you always gloss over the fact that the other guy isn't the only one "playing on scholarship."
 
Tony Williams said:
I agree with that, and I've never said that carriers aren't still useful, especially when up against a less capable enemy. I am merely pointing out that the environment is likely to become tougher for them in the future, and that like any other defensive system, theirs is not infallible and can be penetrated.

E-2D, AMDR-X/S, SM-6, SM-3 Block IB onwards, F-35, Virginia, ESSM, RAM Block II, etc.

There is nothing intrinsic in anything that the Chinese are doing, when placed in the context of what the USN is doing, that makes conventional carriers any more vulnerable than they have ever been- indeed that is probably at least in part why the Chinese are developing a large carrier capability themselves. If anything we are slowly exiting a brief period of uncharacteristic near invulnerability for carriers that resulted from the collapse of the USSR and the vanishing with it of most of the serious anti-carrier capabilities in non US-aligned hands. That period of invulnerability is not however the norm as HMS's Hermes, Glorious, Ark Royal, Courageous, and Audacity as well as USS's Wasp, Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet, Princeton and Block Island, as well as the entire IJN carrier fleet perfectly demonstrate. When major powers fight each other at sea lots of ships get sunk- it does not mean those ships are "too vulnerable".

Anyway, this discussion seems more appropriate for somewhere like key publishing forum or defencetalk.
 
Tony Williams said:
True if all systems always work to the standard of performance which the manufacturer claims for them. As I have pointed out, combat experience has clearly demonstrated that this doesn't happen - especially when the systems are first tested in battle.

Well AEGIS is battle proven, of sorts. But it is an incredibly robust system that has had 40 years of development in six or more generations and is deployed in over 100 units. Far more robust than the Type 22 combat system in 1982. Comparing the Royal Navy in 82 to the USN today is a bit out there but can be used to further illustrate the effectiveness of a layered system.

The active air defences of the RN in ’82 included three partial layers: Sea Harrier, Sea Dart and Sea Wolf. Each layer was not complete in its coverage and had considerable problems. For the Sea Harrier one out of two squadrons would not be considered fully operational on the aircraft and certainly the task force command wasn’t. Also in numbers there were about25% of the fighters a similar sized USN force would have and no key enablers like AEW and EW. Sea Dart was effective and available in around 1/3 of surface combatants but compromised by the fact that the other side had it as well so knew intimately how to avoid its engagement zone. Sea Wolf was a new system and though very effective did suffer system failure from time to time. It was also very limited in numbers so not available to most ships.

Yet despite having three flawed and incomplete layers of defence the fleet didn’t lose any aircraft carriers or other principal units and was able to achieve all of its objectives: achieve air and sea control over the Falklands and safely deploy and sustain the land combat force.

The USN carrier strike group on the other hand has far more effective and sizeable layered defences. All of the systems are well established in service and regularly upgraded. There will be some big changes when the F-35 and AMDR enters the fleet but it is highly unlikely that they will suffer the same problems the RN in the early 80s did with introducing the Sea Harrier and Sea Wolf. The unique nature of the fleet air arm at this time, being regenerated from near disbandment, and the early un-robust nature of computerised systems are not replicated now for the USN.
 
2IDSGT said:
Tony Williams said:
Abraham Gubler said:
All of this makes it very unlikely that any threat can succeed.
True if all systems always work to the standard of performance which the manufacturer claims for them. As I have pointed out, combat experience has clearly demonstrated that this doesn't happen - especially when the systems are first tested in battle.
@Gubler
Observe how the creature has simply changed to a completely different thesis in order to prolong the exchange.

Mods?

Tony Williams has been a valueful poster for years on the forum, as the long term regulars know, particularly wrt ammo and cannon, and in particular obscure and interesting designs.
Is it really necessary that he be subjected to this kind of abuse whilst putting his point across lucidly and politely?

Really. :-[
 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/replacing-aircraft-carriers/
 
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