Northrop Grumman B-21A Raider (LRS-B)

[quellish]

Churchill was something else, as its name suggests.

Churchill was started by USAF and DARPA as a direct result of J-UCAS. It started in 2004, and by 2007 was less sensitive and included USN.

A 2009 program description:

"The United States and United Kingdom will jointly create a distributed simulation environment capability using Navy, Air Force, and U.K. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory M&S capabilities. They will then select portions of the U.K. unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) demonstration results of efforts functionality already completed; jointly participate in modeling, simulation, tests, and demonstrations; and conduct additional tests using U.S. J-UCAS and U.K. UCAV assets to gather further information regarding coalition employment and interoperability of UCAV."

The missions that USAF had piled on to J-UCAS before their participation was terminated were transitioned to the LRS/NGB effort. This was not the classified program referred to in the budget documents.

 

[Sundog]

A question for Low Observable, or anyone else with the knowledge to answer this question.

In AWST, it was reported that the LM-Boeing demonstrator that was flown was actually based off of a demonstrator being developed for the NGB program. As a result, is there any indication that their demonstrator may have been supersonic?

 

[Sentinel36k]

Sentinel

 

[LowObservable]

SD - None at all. My own view is that the supersonic thing (in recent years) has been a red herring, possibly intentional. I don't think NGB was supersonic, even in its earliest study years.

My impression of Churchill when I first heard of it (late 05, the UK already involved) was that it was mainly about interoperability and (perhaps) the possibility of using a similar avionics architecture. By that time it must have been dawning on some people how hideously deep in the weeds they had gotten on F-35/F-22/B-2 comms - zero interoperability and too expensive/impractical to put MADL on everything - and they may have realized that you had to start early to get it right.

Y'all do remember that Churchill was Anglo-American and an outstanding communicator?

 

[quellish]

SD - None at all. My own view is that the supersonic thing (in recent years) has been a red herring, possibly intentional. I don't think NGB was supersonic, even in its earliest study years.

Stealth is deception. The Art Of Black Magic. The stealthiest, most critical strategic weapon could only be covered by the largest defense procurement program in history. DoD has been playing us all for years.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ErCZ3Xn_n0&t=54s

 

[marauder2048]

Actually there's much to be said for a strategic truck as a complement to LRS-B. COTS engines and commercial airframe technology. Off-the-shelf sensor suite. Some missions:

- Bulk LRSO/hypersonic missile carrier
- Maritime strike with LRASM
- Launcher for expendable (or even midair recoverable) stand-in AEA vehicles
- Defensive HEL carrier
- Tanker/airlift escort

The biggest problem is that one side of the LRSB debate sees it as an alternative and the other sees it as a competitor.

There's really nothing to be said for it. The Chinese and Russians would go down the same route the US did when faced with the same threat; the targeting assets
and infrastructure required for IRBM class ASBMs aren't too disimilar from what the US was exploring under the Air Defense Initiative which just happened to be managed by one Mr. Frank Kendall.

An airburst from *one* strategic class MaRV kills all "strategic trucks" within a 10km radius so the MarVs miss-distance can be huge but the effects are still lethal.

 

[DrRansom]

Marauder - do you have any links to the Air Defense Initiative?

I agree that Strategic Trucks are possibly not the wisest decision. Other countries are working on long-range anti-air technologies to attack tanker orbits. Those efforts can be turned to targeting orbiting stand-off bombers.

Interesting comment from the AFA discussion, USAF technology superiority has deteriorated markedly over the last few years. So much so that undersecretary Work is very worried about that and that USAF operating concepts have shifted towards localized air superiority. Also, there wasn't a ton of support for the F-35 there.

 

[LowObservable]

Aren't we taking an all-nuclear view of things here?

 

[DrRansom]

Aren't we taking an all-nuclear view of things here?

While airbursting Megaton MARVs is a bit much, hunting down orbiting bombers is the same task as hunting down tankers. That will drive bomber orbits further out, driving up missile / UCAV costs, weaking justification for the system.

 

[Flyaway]

Bomber advocates target USAF’s ‘squishy’ LRS-B requirement

Long-Range Strike Bomber advocates are calling on the US air force to drop its “squishy” requirement for 80 to 100 next-generation heavy combat aircraft to replace the B-1B and B-52 and instead focus on the "bare minimum" number of 100.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/bomber-advocates-target-usafs-squishy-lrs-b-requi-419079/

More like 174 seems to be the number argued for. It also looks for more openness in the program so its economic benefits can be put forward to defend against the F-35 when it comes to political & budgetry decisions.

 

[Triton]

"Opinion: A New Bomber For $550 Million? Not Likely"
Nov 13, 2015 Tom Z. Collina and Will Saetren | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-new-bomber-550-million-not-likely

The Pentagon has chosen Northrop Grumman to build the U.S. Air Force’s next strategic bomber, and Boeing, which led the competition, has filed a protest. But regardless of how that turns out, the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) is part of an unrealistic, $1 trillion plan to rebuild the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Like much of the nuclear strategy, the proposed bomber is out of sync with military needs and budget reality. Instead of rushing headlong into disaster, as the Air Force did with the previous bomber, the B-2, the Obama administration needs to cool its jets.

The first problem is cost. The Air Force plans to build 100 new LRS-B aircraft, unofficially known as the B-3, for $550 million each plus $21 billion for development, for a total production cost of about $100 billion with inflation. Right off the bat, the bomber program will actually cost at least twice the advertised sticker price. This will not inspire public confidence.

We have seen this movie before. Back in the 1980s, the B-2, also built by Northrop, was sold to Congress and taxpayers for about $550 million each, or $860 million in today’s dollars. But the bombers ended up costing what would be $3.4 billion per copy today—a fourfold increase. Initial plans called for 132 aircraft, and then the price rose and the Berlin Wall fell. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush cut production to 21.

The B-2, sold to Congress as costing $836 million per bomber, ended up at $3.4 billion a copy. Credit: U.S. Air Force

Other Air Force programs, including the F-35 and F-22, have also experienced massive cost overruns in recent years. If you believe each B-3 will really cost $550 million, or that Congress will actually buy 100 of them, you are ignoring history.

“How many times are we going to go down this overpriced bomber road?” asks Gordon Adams, who oversaw defense budgeting under President Bill Clinton. “It’s like Lucy with the football. We never get to kick an affordable aircraft through the goalpost.”

And what about the “need” for 100 of the new bombers? Has anyone missed those 111 B-2s the Air Force never built? Yes, we had older aircraft to cover the gap, but this just shows how little we need a high-tech bomber.

The second problem is timing. The B-52H, in service since the 1960s, is expected to keep flying until the 2040s, as is the newer B-1, and the B-2 will fly until 2060, if not longer. So why start the new bomber now?

The B-3 can safely be delayed by 10 years without compromising the integrity of the bomber fleet. Current plans call for the new aircraft to enter service by 2025. By pushing it back, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Air Force could save up to $34 billion over the next decade, just as other parts of the nuclear arsenal—submarines and land-based missiles—will be in development as well. We can’t afford, and don’t need, to do it all at the same time.

The third problem is mission. The new bomber will be designed to evade air defenses so it can enter enemy airspace to deliver precision gravity bombs, such as the B61 nuclear bomb. But current plans also call for the bomber to carry a new $25 billion nuclear-tipped Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to evade air defenses.

Do we need a penetrating cruise missile on a penetrating bomber? No. It’s like bringing a long bow into a boxing ring.

Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, who oversaw development of the current ALCM 35 years ago, recently wrote a Washington Post op-ed with his colleague, former Assistant Defense Secretary Andy Weber, calling on President Barack Obama to cancel plans for a new nuclear cruise missile. Good idea.

As the Air Force rushes into the B-3 and the new cruise missile, it is the next president who will have to deal with the inevitable cost increases and budget crises. Rather than locking his successor into an unsustainable program, President Obama can do the next commander-in-chief a favor by delaying the bomber and canning the cruise missile. For once, Charlie Brown should just say “no” to Lucy and her football.

Tom Z. Collina is the policy director at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation, where Will Saetren is the Roger L. Hale Fellow.

 

[Flyaway]

Going by their articles so far it seems like Flightglobal are more supportive of the project than Aviation Week.

 

[sferrin]

"Opinion: A New Bomber For $550 Million? Not Likely"
Nov 13, 2015 Tom Z. Collina and Will Saetren | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-new-bomber-550-million-not-likely

The Pentagon has chosen Northrop Grumman to build the U.S. Air Force’s next strategic bomber, and Boeing, which led the competition, has filed a protest. But regardless of how that turns out, the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) is part of an unrealistic, $1 trillion plan to rebuild the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Like much of the nuclear strategy, the proposed bomber is out of sync with military needs and budget reality. Instead of rushing headlong into disaster, as the Air Force did with the previous bomber, the B-2, the Obama administration needs to cool its jets.

The first problem is cost. The Air Force plans to build 100 new LRS-B aircraft, unofficially known as the B-3, for $550 million each plus $21 billion for development, for a total production cost of about $100 billion with inflation. Right off the bat, the bomber program will actually cost at least twice the advertised sticker price. This will not inspire public confidence.

We have seen this movie before. Back in the 1980s, the B-2, also built by Northrop, was sold to Congress and taxpayers for about $550 million each, or $860 million in today’s dollars. But the bombers ended up costing what would be $3.4 billion per copy today—a fourfold increase. Initial plans called for 132 aircraft, and then the price rose and the Berlin Wall fell. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush cut production to 21.

The B-2, sold to Congress as costing $836 million per bomber, ended up at $3.4 billion a copy. Credit: U.S. Air Force

Other Air Force programs, including the F-35 and F-22, have also experienced massive cost overruns in recent years. If you believe each B-3 will really cost $550 million, or that Congress will actually buy 100 of them, you are ignoring history.

“How many times are we going to go down this overpriced bomber road?” asks Gordon Adams, who oversaw defense budgeting under President Bill Clinton. “It’s like Lucy with the football. We never get to kick an affordable aircraft through the goalpost.”

And what about the “need” for 100 of the new bombers? Has anyone missed those 111 B-2s the Air Force never built? Yes, we had older aircraft to cover the gap, but this just shows how little we need a high-tech bomber.

The second problem is timing. The B-52H, in service since the 1960s, is expected to keep flying until the 2040s, as is the newer B-1, and the B-2 will fly until 2060, if not longer. So why start the new bomber now?

The B-3 can safely be delayed by 10 years without compromising the integrity of the bomber fleet. Current plans call for the new aircraft to enter service by 2025. By pushing it back, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Air Force could save up to $34 billion over the next decade, just as other parts of the nuclear arsenal—submarines and land-based missiles—will be in development as well. We can’t afford, and don’t need, to do it all at the same time.

The third problem is mission. The new bomber will be designed to evade air defenses so it can enter enemy airspace to deliver precision gravity bombs, such as the B61 nuclear bomb. But current plans also call for the bomber to carry a new $25 billion nuclear-tipped Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to evade air defenses.

Do we need a penetrating cruise missile on a penetrating bomber? No. It’s like bringing a long bow into a boxing ring.

Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, who oversaw development of the current ALCM 35 years ago, recently wrote a Washington Post op-ed with his colleague, former Assistant Defense Secretary Andy Weber, calling on President Barack Obama to cancel plans for a new nuclear cruise missile. Good idea.

As the Air Force rushes into the B-3 and the new cruise missile, it is the next president who will have to deal with the inevitable cost increases and budget crises. Rather than locking his successor into an unsustainable program, President Obama can do the next commander-in-chief a favor by delaying the bomber and canning the cruise missile. For once, Charlie Brown should just say “no” to Lucy and her football.

Tom Z. Collina is the policy director at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation, where Will Saetren is the Roger L. Hale Fellow.

Wait, so "cancel the bomber because we don't need it" (I wonder who he thinks will build it for us) AND "cancel the missile we don't need because we have the new bomber". Brilliant. I'd like to see their justification for thinking a new bomber would be cheaper in 10 years. (Who am I kidding? They don't have any.)

 

[Triton]

"Commentary: LRS-B Is Future Backbone of US Bomber Force"
By retired US Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, a research professor at George Mason University and former commander of USSTRATCOM's global strike component. He has been an adviser to defense contractors, including Boeing and Northrop Grumman. 4:18 p.m. EST November 13, 2015

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/11/13/commentary-lrs-b-future-backbone-us-bomber-force/75595490/

Congratulations to the US Air Force and Department of Defense for their successful award of the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) contract. This is great news for the country: At an average per-unit cost well below the $550 million in fiscal 2010 dollars on which the program was based, the LRS-B will be a great bargain for the taxpayer.

Except for a handful of B-2s, no other capability in the US inventory has the range, payload and survivability to perform a multitude of missions across the spectrum of military operations from peace to conflict. What’s more, previous investments in long-range bombers have proved viable for more than half a century due to the inherent adaptability and flexibility of the bomber.

It would require many other platforms combined to service the same national security missions that the LRS-B will be capable of performing for years to come. While critics of long-range air power will want to challenge the need for the LRS-B, its value speaks for itself.

The new bomber will not only become a key element of the nation’s nuclear deterrence force but also enhance strategic stability by providing the president a range of nuclear and non-nuclear options to manage crises and control escalation during a conflict.

Its credibility as an attack platform will limit the value of competitors developing a revolutionary counter to US ballistic missiles and serve as a hedge against a catastrophic loss of capability in the other triad legs. Additionally, the LRS-B will provide a valuable hedge against a possible nuclear arms treaty weapon breakout by a US competitor.

LRS-B will possess the global force projection capabilities to conduct a show of force anywhere in the world, demonstrate national commitment to our allies even when based in the continental US, and provide lethal effects against dynamic targets.

Long-range strike bombers provide a unique contribution to the success of US military operations abroad. Bombers facilitate use of diplomatic, economic and other non-military instruments of power to achieve national objectives, similar to their use in the Kosovo operations. Long-range strike bombers are unique in their ability to reach targets across the globe without the need for costly and time-consuming expeditionary deployment.

This provides the nation a rapid response capability at the outset of a crisis that can be transformed later into one providing persistence strike capabilities for extended operations. Its ability to trade range for persistence means that the LRS-B will also provide ground forces direct support to include surveillance, air attack, interdiction and theater strike.

The LRS-B will also contribute to regional stability by providing combatant commanders a range of conventional and nuclear options while operating from regional bases. When integrated with other US and partner joint capabilities, the LRS-B can then be used to influence the decision calculus of regional actors.

Unfortunately, the nation does not have enough bombers to meet today’s combatant commander needs. For this reason, initial LRS-B deliveries should be used to fill bomber shortfalls in the 10 air expeditionary forces before the new bombers begin to replace elements of the legacy bomber fleet. One hundred LRS-Bs should be considered the minimum initial procurement.

LRS-B will underpin a variety of alternative approaches to military operations. Working with other US and partner asymmetric capabilities, bombers can be used to empower indigenous forces to defeat otherwise more powerful adversaries. Recent examples include NATO operations in Bosnia, the Taliban takedown in Afghanistan, protection of Kurdish forces in northern Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and more recently, the operations over Libya.

Furthermore, LRS-B can be expected to leverage its range and sensors to support Navy maritime surveillance and interdiction operations.

The LRS-B is not just a modern version of the B-2. Due to its open mission systems architecture, the LRS-B’s ability to integrate external information will give it an advantage over legacy long-range platforms. The LRS-B will serve as a key element in the future networked force, incorporating existing stealth communication technologies equal to, or better than, those on today’s most advanced platforms.

Unlike legacy bombers, these networking capabilities will be fully integrated into the operation of the LRS-B weapon system, rather than implemented as “strapped on” modifications. Through the use of open mission systems, the LRS-B will be able to easily incorporate new networks, links and other sources of data as they become available, and fully integrate new external sensors and other sources of information to remain highly effective throughout its service life.

A long-range strike force primarily centered on a new stealth bomber is the most affordable and effective means to deter adversaries and assure our allies so that even in a stagnant budget environment, the safety and security of US citizens and our allies will never be in doubt.

The LRS-B contract award should be widely celebrated: It demonstrates DoD’s continued commitment to long-range bombers, substantially increases the joint force’s ability to project force in contested environments, and will be acquired at a much lower unit cost than originally projected. The LRS-B will provide US national security decision-makers and combatant commanders expanded options to underpin global security, regional stability and the full range of military operations for years to come.

 

[Steve Pace]

Has anybody added up what the B-52 program has cost US taxpayers since it went into production? The B-52 has undergone umpteen zillion modification and upgrade programs and the total amount of money spent through today would literally stagger us. There's absolutely no doubt about this in my military mind. -SP

 

[bring_it_on]

"Opinion: A New Bomber For $550 Million? Not Likely"

Kudos to AvWeek for getting an alternate argument to the debate but its more likely that those that get to decide wouldnt consider a bomber purchase as a mere check mark or an inventory. You can say whatever about how long the B-52 or B-1 can last in service, and you can keep upgrading them and prolonging their life but that would not make them survivable and will not in any significant shape or form add to the tally of 15-18 or so ready B-2's that are available for penetrating global strike.

 

[DrRansom]

I'm a fan of Aviation Week publishing these opposition articles. The USAF will have it's work cut out to justify the new bomber and, if we look at the rather stale rhetoric of recent articles by retired Generals, the current USAF public affairs office is weak.

In short, using rhetoric better fitted in Second Line of Defense will get the USAF nothing but derision from a public which wants to trust the military, but distrusts professionals. I'd hope to see some better efforts soon.

 

[Triton]

"New Details Emerge On LRS-B Subcontractors"
by Lara Seligman 4:37 p.m. EST November 16, 2015

Source:

New Details Emerge On LRS-B Subcontractors

The GAO’s decision on an industry protest will determine which subcontractors develop building blocks of the next-generation bomber

www.defensenews.com

As the aerospace world anxiously awaits the Government Accountability Office’s verdict on whether to allow Northrop Grumman to begin construction on the Pentagon’s Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), new details help paint a clearer picture of who will build crucial parts and systems.

The GAO’s decision on whether to uphold losing team Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s protest of the Oct. 27 contract award will determine which subcontractors develop the building blocks of the next-generation bomber — contracts worth millions of dollars and years of stable work.

The US Air Force has refused to disclose the names of the second and third-tier LRS-B suppliers for security reasons. But emerging details may help observers piece together the subcontractors involved.

If Northrop builds LRS-B, GE Aviation will manufacture the primary and secondary power distribution systems, not the plane's engine, according to a source with knowledge of the program. GE was partnered with the Boeing-Lockheed Martin team on the power plant, the source said.This reflects a departure from history, as GE builds the F118 engine that powers Northrop's B-2 stealth bomber.

The news that GE is not the winning engine maker fuels speculation that Northrop's bomber will be powered by Pratt & Whitney engines. Although nothing is certain, some have hypothesized that LRS-B will use Pratt's F135 engines, according to a recent analysis by Jim McAleese.

Pratt spokesman Matthew Bates declined to comment.

Just minutes after the award was announced, Pratt sent out a statement congratulating Northrop on the win.

“Pratt & Whitney congratulates Northrop Grumman for their selection on this very important program,” according to the Oct. 27 statement. “P&W declines to comment on any other questions regarding the Long Range Strike-Bomber program.”

Even if GAO rejects Boeing’s protest, the opportunities for GE on LRS-B could be very lucrative. Northrop’s win means GE “gained a valuable foothold in everything else aside from the fuselage,” the source said.

GE already supplies critical components for the F-35 joint strike fighter that could have applications for LRS-B, the source said.

GE builds the weapons control, data management, electrical power management and standby flight display systems for the F-35, which uses Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine. GE also builds the integrated canopy assembly, along with smaller interfaces like the engine rings and remote input/output units, for JSF.

Many of these components are built out of Cheltenham and Southampton, both in the UK, as part of GE’s 2007 purchase of UK-based supplier Smiths Aerospace.

As for LRS-B’s radar and electronic warfare suites, McAleese suggests the new plane will use Northrop’s systems, because Raytheon is presumed to be on the rival Boeing-Lockheed Martin team.

“Northrop is believed to be heavily vertically-integrated from subsystems perspective (e.g., radar, EW, etc.),” McAleese writes.

Raytheon spokesman B.J. Boling declined to comment due to the classified nature of the program.

In an interview last week at the Dubai Airshow, Textron CEO Ellen Lord told Defense News that the company is not involved in LRS-B.

Aaron Mehta contributed reporting.

 

[Flyaway]

Just beat me to it. The F135 is the core of their ADVENT engine is it not.

 

[bring_it_on]

P&W wasn't selected to participate in ADVENT. They are using the core in the AETD program.

The news that GE is not the winning engine maker fuels speculation that Northrop's bomber will be powered by Pratt & Whitney engines. A

:

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Buying-the-B-3.pdf

 

[bring_it_on]

That was posted a few weeks ago..

In other news, Bill LaPlante is leaving the Pentagon for a position at Mitre

The Air Force announced Wednesday that service acquisition executive William LaPlante will leave his post for a senior position at MITRE Corp.

LaPlante took over the service's top acquisition post three years ago after the job had been vacant for more than a year.

In a Nov. 18 press release, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh praised LaPlante for his leadership in managing the service's $43 billion-per-year acquisition portfolio and in pioneering reform initiatives such as "should-cost" savings.

"Dr. LaPlante has been a great partner over the last three years," Welsh said. "His leadership has been a huge strength of our Air Force as he focused acquisition initiatives on increased warfighting capability at an affordable cost."

LaPlante also played a critical role in shaping the service's strategy for the Long-Range Strike Bomber, and the press release indicates he extended his service in order to complete the source-selection process, stating that he intended to leave earlier this year.

"This has been the best job I've ever had," LaPlante states in the release. "It's been an honor, but now I need to honor a long-planned commitment I made to my family before I entered government service."

 

[Triton]

"Advocates Call For 200 Next-Generation Bombers"
by Lara Seligman 5:52 p.m. EST November 18, 2015

Source:

Advocates Call For 200 Next-Generation Bombers

Lawmakers and analysts argued the US Air Force needs 200 advanced bombers to project power in a more dangerous world

www.defensenews.com

WASHINGTON — Lawmakers and analysts renewed calls Wednesday for the Pentagon to build significantly more next-generation bombers than currently planned, arguing that the Air Force needs a fleet of 200 advanced bombers to project power in a more dangerous world.

In study released today by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Moeller made the case for the Pentagon to procure a modernized bomber force of 200 aircraft by 2045.

“America desperately needs to rebuild its bomber force, starting with the [Long Range Strike Bomber] and then moving forward,” Moeller said. “100 new bombers, the analysis finds, is not enough.”

The Air Force plans to buy 80-100 LRS-Bs to replace the service’s aging B-1 and B-52 bombers, a number many advocates have decried as insufficient. The 100 LRS-Bs, plus the 20 existing stealth B-2 bombers, will not be enough to meet future threats, Moeller argued.

“Limiting production of the new bomber, LRS-B, to 100 airframes would severely decrease the options available to national decision-makers during times of crisis or periods of instability,” Moeller wrote in the study. “A modernized bomber force of 200 aircraft will sustain America’s asymmetric advantage in long-range precision strike for decades to come.”

Moeller left open the question of exactly what aircraft would make up the 200-bomber force. The future fleet could be entirely made up of LRS-Bs, or could include some combination of LRS-Bs, upgraded B-2s, and whatever comes after LRS-B, he said.

Retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, former deputy chief of staff for ISR, has said the Air Force needs to build 174 LRS-Bs: Airmen need 12 combat-coded aircraft for each of 10 squadrons, plus another 30 dedicated to training and testing; on top of that, the service needs another 24 aircraft for backup and attrition reserve.

Sens Heidi Heitkamp, D-N.D., and Mike Rounds, R-S.D., as well as Reps. Randy Forbes, R-Va., and Madeleine Bordallo, D-Guam, also spoke at the event.

Rounds expressed concern that the Pentagon is shortchanging its future bomber force because of budgetary challenges.

“Analysis has consistently shown the Air Force needs 150 to 200 combat ready bombers, a figure far beyond the less than 100 bombers currently available for operational missions, and far beyond the 80-100 bombers envisioned by the Defense Department for the future force,” Rounds said. “Is their calculus national security or is it budget driven? I personally am convinced that it is budget driven.”

Forbes stressed the need to build a new fleet of long-range, large-payload bombers in the face of increasingly hardened and mobile targets in the Pacific, as well as Russian aggression.

“In the Pacific, range is going to be a key attribute that we're going to have to look at, but also payload is going to be important because we're going to have a huge amount of aim points that we would need to hit,” Forbes said. “So the question that we are all going to be asking is, how many copies of the bomber do we need? … This report makes a compelling argument that more are needed.”

During a Defense Writers Group breakfast earlier on Wednesday, Gen. Lori Robinson, Pacific Air Forces commander, said the LRS-B is crucial to the Air Force’s ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific.

“The theater is very big, 52 percent of the globe, and so our ability to power project through the theater would be one of the capabilities that we would want it to have,” Robinson said.

She added that flying LRS-Bs in the PACOM will show the US’ commitment to the theater in future decades, just as the Air Force’s “continuous bomber presence” in the region does now.

 

[Triton]

The report:

Executive Summary

Since World War II, joint operational commanders have relied on Air Force bombers as a critical component
in any combat operation involving American airpower. The nation has called on these aircraft—with their
long-range, heavy payloads, and ability to penetrate enemy defenses—to deter adversaries or fly sorties
during the Cold War, the Vietnam conflict, Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom,
and Iraqi Freedom, over the skies of Libya and Syria, and in numerous other operational contingencies.
As it has in the past, America’s bomber force provides far more than just long-range precision strike.
Currently, geographic combatant commanders’ operational plans rely heavily on the bombers to perform a
wide variety of missions in both permissive and heavily defended environments. The aircraft must be capable
of providing precision attack, interdiction, close air support, armed overwatch, defense suppression, shows
of force, anti-ship operations and minelaying, maritime surveillance, and, as always, nuclear deterrence, to
name just some of their mission sets.

Despite this importance, the number of bombers in the Air Force’s inventory has dwindled over time from
thousands in the 1950s and 1960s to less than 100 combat-coded (i.e., available for operational missions)
B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H aircraft in the current force. This decrease is due to a number of factors including
changes in the strategic environment, shifts in operational approach, and resource constraints. Yet, analysis
since the end of the Cold War has been remarkably consistent in establishing or validating the requirement
for the Air Force to maintain 150 to 200 combat-ready bombers.

Today, the demand for bombers from the geographic combatant commanders already exceeds the number
of aircraft in the force. This shortfall will increase the risk to military success, as the world becomes more
dangerous and the threats grow more capable, diverse, and unpredictable. To meet these challenges, the
nation will continue to depend on America’s bomber force to rapidly overcome the tyranny of distance and
fly from the continental United States to any location on the planet and penetrate into enemy airspace—
including areas with the most advanced, integrated, and capable air defenses—to find, fix, and destroy the
assigned targets.

However, it will become more challenging for the current bomber force to accomplish its missions as the
number of potential adversaries grows that possess the capabilities to degrade the United States’ ability to
operate against them and have freedom of action in their airspace. The Defense Department recognizes this
challenge and plans to recapitalize the Air Force’s aging bomber force by investing in 80 to 100 new long-
range strike aircraft. This plan is an important first step, but questions remain about the program. Why is
there a variance of 20 percent in the Air Force’s current Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) force objective?

Is this an available budget-driven number or one based on national security strategy requirements? Are 80
to 100 new bombers enough? Can the nation make do with a smaller number of new bombers, or do we
need to buy more than 80 to 100 aircraft to meet the nuclear and conventional requirements of today and
the future?

This paper asserts that a modernized and capable Air Force bomber force of 150 to 200 aircraft is required
to maintain America’s asymmetric advantage in long-range precision strike over any potential future
adversary. The aging-out of the B-1 and B-52 fleets, combined with the increasingly sophisticated threat
environment, drives the nation to make an immediate investment to procure a minimum of 100 new long-
range strike bombers. In the long-term, to maintain the bomber force’s viability, the Defense Department
should consider funding additional advanced bombers beyond those 100 aircraft before the last B-1s and
B-52s retire by 2045.

URL:

https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/def574d3-a429-454b-a3e8-e5073c93ca6b/UploadedImages/MI_Bomber_Force_Structure_Paper_Final.pdf

 

[sferrin]

IMO 80-100, provided they don't jerk the schedule around and stretch it to death, is enough to get it into serial production and down the Learning Curve enough that they could then reevaluate whether to continue purchases at the better price. (Like I'll bet they are wishing they did with the F-22.)

 

[bobbymike]

Sticker Shock Shouldn’t Factor in Number of LRS-Bs

—Jennifer Hlad11/19/2015

​Congress must not let budgetary concerns stand in the way of an adequate Long-Range Strike Bomber fleet, members of Congress said Wednesday on Capitol Hill. “We have to stand firm with the numbers that the academics are telling us they need, the Pentagon is telling us they need, and, actually, the White House agrees that we need,” Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) said at the release of a Mitchell Institute report. Retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute, said the requirement for the B-2 fleet began at 132, and was gradually whittled down to just 20 aircraft. “We can’t afford to let that happen again,” with the LRS-B, he said. Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) said the LRS-B program is at a critical phase, and Congress “can’t allow sticker shock to set in.” Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), agreed. Congress must “determine the number of bombers required for the future force based upon strategic and not budgetary considerations, and then, Congress needs to fully resource that requirement,” he said. Rep. Madeleine Bordallo (D-Guam) said the US needs the LRS-B in production as soon as possible. “The world is changing, and we need to stay ahead of the threats to keep the peace,” she said. “In short, we need the LRS-B, and we need it very soon.”
_______________________________________________________________________
LRS-B on Guam

—John A. Tirpak11/19/2015

​The Long-Range Strike Bomber is a critical future capability for Pacific Air Forces, PACAF chief Gen. Lori Robinson told defense writers in Washington, D.C., on Wednesday. “The theater is very big,” comprising “52 percent of the world,” Robinson said. It will be essential to “power-project throughout the theater” and “show our commitment” to allies in the region that the US takes its role there seriously and is willing to put its best equipment forward, she added. Robinson expects the LRS-B to take its place in the rotation for the continuous bomber presence deployments to Andersen AFB, Guam, and potentially to Australia, where she said an agreement is near on a routine of deploying USAF bombers and aerial refueling tankers at Royal Australian Air Force Bases Tindal and Darwin. Part of the LRS-B mission will also be “messaging” to US enemies in the region like North Korea, Robinson said, acknowledging that B-2 bombers have been sent to the region to deter North Korea from acting on its belligerent anti-US rhetoric.

 

[bobbymike]

New Bomber Will Be Boon For U.S. Aerospace Industry

New Bomber Will Be Boon For U.S. Aerospace Industry

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

 

[bring_it_on]

IMO 80-100, provided they don't jerk the schedule around and stretch it to death, is enough to get it into serial production and down the Learning Curve enough that they could then reevaluate whether to continue purchases at the better price. (Like I'll bet they are wishing they did with the F-22.)

I haven't read the report or heard the advocates but I feel that the bomber advocates want to (in the future) essentially push for larger acquisition share for the LRS-B throughout the life of the program i.e. more bombers acquired per year compared to simply buying at the same levels and extending production until 150-200 are acquired.

 

[Triton]

"Opinion: LRS-B Protest Rhetoric Masks Fragile Case"
What do we want? Procurement chaos!
Nov 20, 2015 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Source:

Opinion: LRS-B Protest Rhetoric Masks Fragile Case | Aviation Week Network

A formal protest of the Pentagon’s Long-Range Strike Bomber award must based on failure to follow rules, but the challengers’ public case goes much further.

aviationweek.com

When Lockheed Martin and Boeing telegraph their decision to protest the award of the Long-Range Strike Bomber via an op-ed written by consultant Loren Thompson, calling the decision “fundamentally flawed,” it suggests that the Pentagon bid-protest process is becoming toxic. What started as a way to fix government errors is turning into a lever to overturn outcomes that powerful contractors dislike.

Thompson’s comments are important because his position is unique: Neither a lobbyist nor an employee, he is regarded as a de facto spokesman for his clients. Thompson portrayed the Air Force’s evaluation process as amateurish, saying that it would make the bomber more expensive to develop and build. The Air Force, he wrote, “never got to the point where it rigorously analyzed the cost for most of the production program or subsequent life-cycle support.”

Rather than assess engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) costs in detail, Thompson suggested, Pentagon reviewers—Air Force money people and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office—inflated both competitors’ bids by around 100%, based on historic trends alone. This “greatly inflated the price the government will pay to develop the bomber and execute initial production lots,” he wrote.

But much of the EMD argument misses the point. Regardless of the published estimate for EMD costs, the incentives, fees and margins in the contract—including fixed prices for the first 21 airplanes—will be based on Northrop Grumman’s bid. If the company incurs overruns, it will still get paid but not at margins that its shareholders will like. The same would have applied if the other team had won.

Thompson implies that a fixed-price EMD contract would have been a better idea, without adding that his clients most certainly would not have signed one.

Credit: IAI

Did CAPE and Air Force estimators double the bids? “I think Thompson may be exaggerating a bit,” says one budget expert, but it serves the protesters’ public case by making the independent cost estimates sound crude and ill thought through.

But the EMD bids may not be the substantive issue at all. One government defense analyst believes that the protest case revolves around the Boeing manufacturing-technology project known as Black Diamond. Thompson says that the Air Force never evaluated this properly. When Aviation Week asked Boeing about Black Diamond this summer, the company said that it was highly sensitive because it might have a bearing on LRS-B protests.

The claimed breakthrough in Black Diamond appears to involve the precise fabrication of parts and subassemblies, allowing automated assembly. It could be important for a stealth aircraft: Early this month, I toured Israel Aerospace Industries’ F-35 wing assembly line outside Tel Aviv and saw how the composite wing skins were placed in an outer mold line tool and held in place by suction pads (see photo). The spars and ribs were placed against the skin, and mechanics with feeler gauges measured gaps and defined shims that would ensure the outside shape stays within millimeter-tight tolerances.

But a protest based mainly on Black Diamond is problematic. Final assembly represents only a fraction of an airplane’s cost, even for a stealth design. The very low production rates predicted for LRS-B do not resemble Boeing’s experience, but Black Diamond is supposed to be applicable to its commercial business.

Neither do we (nor Boeing and Lockheed Martin) know what Northrop Grumman’s approach has been. Talking about Northrop’s struggles with high-precision assembly on the B-2, Alan Brown, Lockheed’s F-117 chief engineer, commented that his company’s approach was different: Lockheed “couldn’t afford to build anything that required the skills of Swiss watchmakers,” he said.

It is quite conceivable that the RQ-180 stealth unmanned air vehicle embodies a design and fabrication approach, suited to low-rate production, that can be scaled up to the bomber’s size—analogous to the way Northrop’s single-engine, all-metal Alpha mail plane paved the way for the Douglas DC-2 and DC-3 in the 1930s.

If the grounds for a protest are weaker than the rhetoric implies, that suggests the formal protest is just the start of a post-award campaign in Congress and both professional and social media. But making the customer look inept and raising the specter of out-of-control overruns can cause collateral damage that extends beyond any one company’s balance sheet.

As one defense commentator wrote a few years ago, “Leaking exaggerated cost estimates . . . seems calculated to sow doubt and confusion about one of the nation’s most important next-generation weapons programs.” If you guessed that the writer was Loren Thompson, you may take a cookie from my desk.

 

[marauder2048]

"Opinion: LRS-B Protest Rhetoric Masks Fragile Case"
When Lockheed Martin and Boeing telegraph their decision to protest the award of the Long-Range Strike Bomber via an op-ed written by consultant Loren Thompson...

Wow....an op-ed piece about an op-ed piece. Really??! And one which masks a fragile understanding of contracting; in cost-plus-incentive-fee the minimum incentive fee can be a negative number i.e. the contractor can sustain a loss.

 

[Triton]

"Calls for Pentagon to raise combat-coded bomber count to 160"
20 November, 2015 BY: James Drew Washington DC

Source:

Calls for Pentagon to raise combat-coded bomber count to 160

Air power advocates in Washington have called for the Pentagon to consider building to a force of 150 to 160 mission-ready heavy bombers before the Boeing B-1 and B-52 retire in 2045.

www.flightglobal.com

Air power advocates in Washington have called for the Pentagon to consider building to a force of 150 to 160 mission-ready heavy bombers before the Boeing B-1 and B-52 retire in 2045.

According to estimates presented in a new report by the Mitchell Institute, America would need to muster 258 heavy bombers to succeed in a large-scale conflict with Russia if 50% of the targets in 180 days of campaigning were assigned to long-range bombers.

Using the same calculations, 103 bombers would be needed to strike 40% of an estimated 81,925 potential targets in Iran over 60 days. Sixty bombers could be needed to win against North Korea, the report states.

The analysis by former USAF strategic plans and programs chief Michael Moeller comes as the US air force embarks on a major recapitalisation of its outdated bomber inventory through the $80 billion Long-Range Strike Bomber programme – awarded to Northrop Grumman in October.

Moeller, who details his analysis in his report published this week, contends that the quantities of bombers procured should be strategy-driven and not solely influenced by tight budgets.

He believes the service needs to buy “a minimum of 100” LRB-B weapon systems, but the total bomber force should be nearer to 200 to sustain 150 to 160 combat-coded aircraft.

Seven DOD bomber force structure examinations since the Air Force White Paper in 1992 established various optimal inventory numbers, but since 2001 the requirement has been for 157 bombers, sustaining a combat-ready force of 96. A large percentage must always be set aside for depot maintenance, training and testing, Moeller says.

Today, the air force maintains 97 mission-ready B-1s, B-2s and B-52s out of a total inventory of 159. Of those aircraft, by the 2018 there will be 42 nuclear-armed B-52s and 18 B-2A bombers dedicated to the nuclear deterrence mission.

Moeller says based large-scale mission planning from operations like Desert Storm and Allied Force in the 1990s, the DOD must consider acquiring 200 advanced bombers to achieve current US national security strategy objectives.

“The analysis affirms the necessity of maintaining a force of 200 advanced bombers, providing an operational force of 150 to 160 aircraft to give national leaders the nuclear and conventional air-breathing power projection option to deter or defeat any foe,” he writes. “A modernised bomber force of 200 aircraft will sustain America’s asymmetric advantage in long-range precision strike for decades to come.”

 

[flateric]

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N13G01220151125#AFsezSvMA2cbt0pO.97?utm_source=hootsuite

TOP NEWS
Tue Nov 24, 2015 | 8:19 PM EST
US Air Force looking into data breach related to contract protest -sources

By Andrea Shalal

WASHINGTON Nov 24 (Reuters) - The U.S. Air Force is looking into how classified data about a competition for a next-generation U.S. bomber found its way into a report published by Forbes magazine, according to several sources familiar with the issue.

Boeing Co and Lockheed Martin Corp this month filed a formal protest against the Air Force's contract with Northrop Grumman Corp to develop the new long-range strike bomber, a deal worth up to $80 billion.

Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute think tank, published a detailed column on the Forbes website the day the protest was filed, saying the estimate that it would cost $21.4 billion to develop the plane was roughly twice what the competing industry teams had bid.

The level of detail included in the column raised concerns given the classified nature of the bomber program, according to three of the sources.

Thompson said he was aware that his report had caused concerns, but did not know of any specific investigation that had been launched into how he obtained the information.

The Air Force declined comment on whether it was investigating the possible disclosure of classified information in the magazine report.

"The Air Force does not comment on whether or not media articles might contain classified information," said Major Robert Leese, an Air Force spokesman.

Boeing and Northrop had no comment.

U.S. Air Force acquisition chief William LaPlante on Tuesday declined to confirm that the bomber bids came in at about half the estimated value of the development program, which is structured as a cost-plus type contract.

But he said that in any cost-plus contract, the government develops its own estimate of the most probable cost - rather than simply accepting the contractor's estimates - since it would be liable for any potential future cost overruns.

In this case, the Air Force also got two independent cost estimates that came in within 2 percent of each other, he said, noting that neither of the estimates were part of the source selection process.

LaPlante, who is retiring at the end of the week, told reporters he remained confident that the acquisition process had been handled well and included high-level legal reviews.

"I look at what we did and I feel good about it," he said, although he conceded there was always a chance of a mistake.

"I'm confident. I'm not cocky about anything. Whenever you have humans involved, you just always have to be prepared for anything," he said.

LaPlante said he was not concerned about stepping down before the protest was decided since the issue was in the hands of the Government Accountabilty Office, the arm of Congress that decides on such matters, and the Air Force's legal team.

"During a protest period, for the job that I have, there's very little to do," he said. "If I were to be in this job, I'm just as much a spectator as anybody else."

GAO is expected to rule on the Boeing protest by Feb. 16, 2016. (Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Editing by Leslie Adler)

 

[Flyaway]

Boeing's bomber protest is fundamentally flawed.

Boeing’s Bomber Protest Is Fundamentally Flawed - Breaking Defense

Who’s right about the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) program: defense consultant Loren Thompson or the Air Force and senior Defense Department officials? The Air Force awarded the LRSB contract to Northrop Grumman. The competing Boeing-Lockheed Martin team was considered a slim favorite in this...

breakingdefense.com

 

[sferrin]

I think they're operating by the philosophy of "the worst they could do is say "no"".

 

[Steve Pace]

Peat, peat and repeat. I just have to be patient and hope for the decision to be made soon. -SP

 

[BillRo]

It would make sense for the Government to bill any company that loses a protest, the cost of a 100 day schedule slip. That might discourage these nuisance suits.

 

[dark sidius]

So long waiting for the award and now waiting for the protest, very impatient to see a concept picture of the bomber since a lot.

 

[Airplane]

So long waiting for the award and now waiting for the protest, very impatient to see a concept picture of the bomber since a lot.

Why should they telegraph so far in advance the design of the new bomber? It will be a closely guarded secret until a few months to *maybe* a year before rollout when some watered down hand drawn image is released to the press.

 

[Dragon029]

Why should they telegraph so far in advance the design of the new bomber? It will be a closely guarded secret until a few months to *maybe* a year before rollout when some watered down hand drawn image is released to the press.

Stunning new images of the Air Force's new Long Range Strike Bomber have surfaced as the Secretary of Defense gave his address earlier today...



Sorry, I just felt the urge ;D

 

[SpudmanWP]

Silly rabbit, you used the "front" of the napkin