No German V-2

[publiusr]

No, that is Goddard technology that the Germans followed. Goddard used the first turbopump.

V-2 used as its pump--something out of a fire engine also used on fireboats?

I have no art skills--but I would like to see a sketch of Goddard 's largest rocket, and one of Von Braun's flown designs before V-2.

There may not be much of a size difference to be fair.

That said, V-2 may have been something of a standard.

Each of R-7's five big engines...each nozzle has about the same thrust as V-2....Scud a hypergolic V-2 of sorts?

RL-10/J-2 a hydrogen engine V-2, strength wise?

 

[Justo Miranda]

It most certainly had in solid fuel rocket engines as well as in ramjet technology. The US had a very solid lead in both, and these were critical to a number of US programs. The only place the Germans really led in 1945 was in large ballistic missiles, a technology that was relatively worthless unless you could deploy it with a nuclear warhead.

In solid fuel rockets the US was better than a decade ahead of Germany where the standard was still pre-war Diglycol, a 1930's double base nitrocellulose propellant. They had nothing to match stuff like GALCIT 53 or 61, or the even better Thiokol polysulfide solid fuels. These were a generation ahead of what Germany was using.

https://www.k-makris.gr/composite-solid-propelants/
In ramjets, the USN under Project Bumblebee had Johns Hopkins designs being fired to Mach 1.5 to 1.75 at ranges up to 10 NM and 30,000 feet by May 1945 as the basis for a SAM.

A Cobra test ramjet missile.

What you have to do is stop thinking that the V-2 was the be-all, end-all of missile development at the time. The US and British view of the V-2 was, as it was as a weapon system, little more than a nuisance weapon of mostly psychological value and with little military impact. It obviously needed a nuclear warhead to be truly effective.
They also knew there was no practical way to stop one and that any such system was at least a decade or more away from being developed.


The Germans contributed nothing or next to nothing to US AAM systems, SAM systems, tactical rockets and missiles. The only area they had some contribution to was in large ballistic missiles. But that was just one of many areas the US was developing missile systems in.

In 1945 large liquid fuel rocket engines propelling a ballistic missile were next to worthless as a military weapon. Without a nuclear bomb--hence why MX 774 HIROC was focused on delivering a nuke--such missiles had little military value.

Solid propellants comparative

 

[Scott Kenny]

Pardon me, catching up.

So why didn't they send te Germans back?

ze Germans were given the option to go back.

However, like many of the POWs kept in the US till war's end, they chose to stay.

So did the Americans use German technology? If they used, it means they needed German technology.

US V-2s were not about using the technology, but using the free flight-rated hardware for testing the US own technology.

"We know the rest of this works, so let's replace this bit with a US-made one to see if the whole thing still works."

Nuclear weapons already existed at that time [late 1940s up to 1950], didn't they?

Yes, but the warheads weighed 10,000+lbs. For a yield of about 20kt. That's not enough boom to make up for the V-2's lack of accuracy.

It was not until the mid 1950s that a nuclear weapon was made that could be carried by a V-2. That was the Mark 7 "Thor" warhead, and at maximum yield was only ~61kt.

Even the B-61 is not powerful enough to make up for the abysmal accuracy of the V-2. You would need at least a megaton-class warhead to make up for a 10mile/17km CEP. Maybe even a 10-megaton class warhead. Megaton-class weapons were not available before 1955, and the B28/W49 weighs in at about 2300lbs. 10MT-class warheads like the B41 were not available until 1959 and weighed in at some 10,000lbs.

 

[TwoTribes]

What "backwardness" would that be? The US was ahead or on par with Germany in guidance systems. The US was producing artillery rockets equal to anything the Germans had. The US was well ahead of Germany in AAM development. Since the US had access to the V-1, they were on par there and with systems like Gorgon and LBD Gargoyle, or the JB series, were again on par or ahead of German practice.

The one area Germany led in was design and production of a large ballistic missile. That's it, one system that wasn't very militarily viable.

First, the Americans lagged behind in propulsion systems. Without a propulsion system, even the best guidance system is useless. Don't tell me the Americans didn’t want their rockets or missiles to fly farther or carry heavier payloads. What was the most mature rocket engine the U.S. had at the time? The Tiny Tim? Perhaps they could use pressure-fed rocket engines, a relatively mature technology, but this approach was inherently inferior to the Germans' pump-fed systems.

In 1945, non-rocket missile projects in the U.S. were also far from mature. Their propulsion systems—turbojets and ramjets—had no operational engine models. Meanwhile, the Germans already had operational pulsejet engines, which is why the Americans copied the V1’s engine and produced over a thousand JB-2s.

It just occurred to me that we shouldn’t even be discussing non-rocket missiles (or guided bombs), but this doesn’t change my view: in 1945, American rocket technology lagged behind Germany’s, and none of the U.S. missile projects (whether rocket-powered or not) had reached the level of the V2 (in terms of payload and range).

Second, the Americans were behind in progress. Forget operational deployment—when did they conduct flight tests? Sure, they initiated many AAM and SAM projects, but when were their first flight tests?

The Bumblebee program’s PTV-N-4 Cobra/BTV first flight in 1945, as did the Little Joe. And the Germans? The Rheintochter, Enzian, and Wasserfall all had their first flights no later than 1944.

The JB-3 (MX-570) first flew in 1944, and the Gorgon IIA in 1945. Meanwhile, the Germans’ X-4 was already flying in 1944.

You keep making the V-2 out to be the be-all, end-all of missile development at the time as if everything else in that field didn't matter. That's not the case.

The V2 was indeed the pinnacle of missile and rocket technology in 1945. It was already combat-deployed, its payload and range far surpassed those of any other missile or rocket—and it was unstoppable.

The US derived NOTHING from German technology towards US AAM systems. The same is true of SAM systems. Tactical rockets and missiles? Same thing. German technology was examined then ignored as already behind the curve. Let me reemphasize that. The US derived NOTHING from German technology in those fields. But do try and give specific examples of technology the US adopted from Germany in those fields.

Irrelevant appeal to quantity. The US deployed missile systems that fit their needs militarily. What the US needed and wanted in terms of missile systems was different from what Germany needed and wanted.

What missiles did the U.S. deploy in 1945?

For example, the USN was using Bat and Pelican in the Pacific successfully from late 1944 on. The paucity of suitable targets meant that these got less used than otherwise might have occurred. A short-range cruise missile, like the V-1, was of limited to no utility in the Pacific, and by late 1944 worthless against a virtually defeated Germany.

The Bat and Pelican were guided bombs.

Both the USN and RN recognized the need for a SAM to defend their ships against standoff weapons dropped from high altitude bombers (like Fritz X or Hs 293) and were developing such weapons. In the US, there were three programs: Little Joe, a quick and dirty, 'get something in service now' system, Lark, an interim design that postwar proved viable as it was the first SAM system to actually shoot down aerial targets, and Bumblebee, the long-term solution that became Talos, Terrier, and Tartar in the mid 1950's.

The US Army saw a need for a SAM and started a program to develop one in August 1944. This became Nike. The USAAF started MX 606 GAPA in early 1945 with the intention, initially, to develop an ABM system for use against a V-2-like missile. German SAM technology played no useful role in any of that.

So, were the Talos, Terrier, Tartar, or Nike deployed in 1945? If you want to prove that American rocket (or missile) technology was superior to Germany’s, you’ll need to provide projects that actually existed in 1945.

Only in the US and that's why the USAAF started MX 774 HIROC. They recognized that a ballistic missile could be a viable and cost-effective delivery system. At the same time, they started several programs for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles for the same purpose. All of that didn't rely on German technology in the least.

So,

In 1945 large liquid fuel rocket engines propelling a ballistic missile were next to worthless as a military weapon.

High-thrust rocket engines were valuable to the United States, correct?

Because ballistic missiles were effectively unstoppable (at least at that time), they were a safer option than bombers for delivering any type of payload. They also offered much greater speed. I believe this held significant military value—for any nation back then.

 

[Scott Kenny]

First, the Americans lagged behind in propulsion systems.

Wrong.

Germans were ~20 years, at least one generation, behind the US in solid fuels. Which are a lot safer to handle and easier to use as weapons.

 

[TwoTribes]

Wrong.

Germans were ~20 years, at least one generation, behind the US in solid fuels. Which are a lot safer to handle and easier to use as weapons.

So, does the United States have any solid rocket motors with greater and more sustained thrust than the V2 engine?

 

[TwoTribes]

US V-2s were not about using the technology, but using the free flight-rated hardware for testing the US own technology.

"We know the rest of this works, so let's replace this bit with a US-made one to see if the whole thing still works."

Did U.S. rockets use the gas generator-driven turbopump technology from the V2 rocket?

Yes, but the warheads weighed 10,000+lbs. For a yield of about 20kt. That's not enough boom to make up for the V-2's lack of accuracy.

It was not until the mid 1950s that a nuclear weapon was made that could be carried by a V-2. That was the Mark 7 "Thor" warhead, and at maximum yield was only ~61kt.

Even the B-61 is not powerful enough to make up for the abysmal accuracy of the V-2. You would need at least a megaton-class warhead to make up for a 10mile/17km CEP. Maybe even a 10-megaton class warhead. Megaton-class weapons were not available before 1955, and the B28/W49 weighs in at about 2300lbs. 10MT-class warheads like the B41 were not available until 1959 and weighed in at some 10,000lbs.

Good. Even without nuclear warheads, you could still deploy chemical warheads, biological warheads, or even incendiary warheads. Rockets are safer than bombers, as they wouldn’t face interception by fighter jets.

 

[TwoTribes]

Once the war ended, the no nation had to continue on a wartime footing and budget. So, postwar, development of new systems was longer and more spread out.

Right, just like I said.

They foresaw the value of a ballistic missile and recognized that it wasn't worth developing if all you had was a conventional warhead for delivery. Look at it this way: A V-2 cost about the same as building a piston engine aircraft. It delivered a 1000 kg payload with excretable accuracy--the CEP in service was about 5 km--to a range of about 200 NM max. It did this one time. If you used an aircraft to deliver the same payload, the accuracy was as good or likely much better than the V-2, and better yet, you could use the airplane repeatedly to deliver that payload.

The V-2 wasn't worth developing so the Allies didn't develop anything like it. It wasn't a "failure." It was a conscious decision based on rational thinking.

This was true for any long-range missile at the time—their CEP would be measured in kilometers. If the V-2's accuracy was unsatisfactory, would the Gorgon program or the JB-series cruise missiles have been any better? The JB-2 also carried conventional warheads and had poor precision, yet the U.S. produced around a thousand of them. Had Operation Downfall proceeded, even more would have been manufactured. "A conscious decision based on rational thinking" ?

In the Soviet Union, the S-25 Berkut SAM system got developed at an insane cost of about 10% of the GDP.

Source？

No, during WW 2, the US didn't have anything comparable to the V-2 and didn't want anything comparable because there was no clear military need for such a weapon at the time.

If you have no need for something, you won’t prioritize the technology. And if you don’t prioritize it, you won’t develop it—meaning progress in that field will be slow. As a result, your technical capabilities will not surpass those of someone who invests more and takes it more seriously.

 

[Hood]

The Rheintochter, Enzian, and Wasserfall all had their first flights no later than 1944.

Brakemine first flew in September 1944 and Fairey Stooge in early 1945, so by that reasoning the UK was just as advanced as Germany despite not actually fielding an operational SAM until 1958 (Bloodhound).

They existed for 37 days of 1945 but no longer than that.
Enzian was cancelled in January 1945; Wasserfall, Rheintochter and Schmetterling the following month on 6 Feb (despite the Schmetterling allegedly being production ready even though half the trial rounds had failed) despite the serious need for anti-aircraft defences. So none of these projects got out of the initial trials stage and there were serious development problems with the engines and/or guidance systems for all of these projects.

Rheintochter - first flew 08/1943, 82 test firings by 02/1945, only 6 liquid-fuelled R3 test fired by 02/1945.
Wasserfall - first flew 29/02/44, 35 test firings by 02/1945
Schmetterling - first flew 05/1944, 59+ test firings by 02/1945, production prototype completed 01/1945
Enzian - first flew 08/1944, 38 test firings by 01/1945 (E1-E3), E4 with Rheintochter R3 engine completed design 01/1945, Madrid IR-homing only bench tested

Brakemine - first flew 09/1944, 20 test firings
Stooge - first flew early 1945, 12 test firings
PTV-N-4 Cobra - first flew 10/1945
SAM-A-1 GAPA - first flew 01/1946, 100+ test firings 1946-49
KAQ-1 & KAY-1 (Lark) - first flew 06/1946, 200 built
SAM-A-7/Project Nike - first flew (unguided) 17/09/1946, further tests 1947-50, becoming Nike Ajax
RTV-N-6 Bumblebee - first flew 1949, tests flown until 1952
SAM-N-7 Terrier - first flew 1951, first shipboard test 28/01/1953
S-25/V-300 - first flew 25/06/1951, 81 test firings

What do we conclude? Germany did make a lot of test firings in a short time in the drive to reach a "production" weapon that could at least hope to have some meaningful capability. In reality those first-gen systems were rapidly superseded, Brakemine and Stooge being ditched in favour of LOPGAP very quickly. US SAM efforts from early 1945 took a little longer to mature, but had much more sophisticated propulsion and guidance systems, which took 2-3 years to really debug to reach sufficient maturity for frontline use.

 

[TwoTribes]

Brakemine first flew in September 1944 and Fairey Stooge in early 1945, so by that reasoning the UK was just as advanced as Germany despite not actually fielding an operational SAM until 1958 (Bloodhound).

They existed for 37 days of 1945 but no longer than that.
Enzian was cancelled in January 1945; Wasserfall, Rheintochter and Schmetterling the following month on 6 Feb (despite the Schmetterling allegedly being production ready even though half the trial rounds had failed) despite the serious need for anti-aircraft defences. So none of these projects got out of the initial trials stage and there were serious development problems with the engines and/or guidance systems for all of these projects.

Rheintochter - first flew 08/1943, 82 test firings by 02/1945, only 6 liquid-fuelled R3 test fired by 02/1945.
Wasserfall - first flew 29/02/44, 35 test firings by 02/1945
Schmetterling - first flew 05/1944, 59+ test firings by 02/1945, production prototype completed 01/1945
Enzian - first flew 08/1944, 38 test firings by 01/1945 (E1-E3), E4 with Rheintochter R3 engine completed design 01/1945, Madrid IR-homing only bench tested

Brakemine - first flew 09/1944, 20 test firings
Stooge - first flew early 1945, 12 test firings
PTV-N-4 Cobra - first flew 10/1945
SAM-A-1 GAPA - first flew 01/1946, 100+ test firings 1946-49
KAQ-1 & KAY-1 (Lark) - first flew 06/1946, 200 built
SAM-A-7/Project Nike - first flew (unguided) 17/09/1946, further tests 1947-50, becoming Nike Ajax
RTV-N-6 Bumblebee - first flew 1949, tests flown until 1952
SAM-N-7 Terrier - first flew 1951, first shipboard test 28/01/1953
S-25/V-300 - first flew 25/06/1951, 81 test firings

What do we conclude? Germany did make a lot of test firings in a short time in the drive to reach a "production" weapon that could at least hope to have some meaningful capability. In reality those first-gen systems were rapidly superseded, Brakemine and Stooge being ditched in favour of LOPGAP very quickly. US SAM efforts from early 1945 took a little longer to mature, but had much more sophisticated propulsion and guidance systems, which took 2-3 years to really debug to reach sufficient maturity for frontline use.

I do not deny the complexity and sophistication of projects like Talos, Terrier, and Nike—they were certainly far more advanced than any German surface-to-air missiles during World War II.

However, by 1945, these projects were still in their very early stages. If you want to prove the superiority of American rocket (or missile) technology in 1945, please name a U.S. missile project from that time that was more successful than the V2.

What I mean to say is that before 1945, both Germany and the U.S. were pioneers in rocket (or missile) technology, but Germany was slightly ahead, achieving somewhat greater results. Of course, after the war, American technology far surpassed that of wartime Germany—this I do not deny.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Solid propellants comparative

Note: Thiokol is a synthetic rubber sealant of the polysulfide family.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Pardon me, catching up.

Yes, but the warheads weighed 10,000+lbs. For a yield of about 20kt. That's not enough boom to make up for the V-2's lack of accuracy.

It was not until the mid 1950s that a nuclear weapon was made that could be carried by a V-2. That was the Mark 7 "Thor" warhead, and at maximum yield was only ~61kt.

Even the B-61 is not powerful enough to make up for the abysmal accuracy of the V-2. You would need at least a megaton-class warhead to make up for a 10mile/17km CEP. Maybe even a 10-megaton class warhead. Megaton-class weapons were not available before 1955, and the B28/W49 weighs in at about 2300lbs. 10MT-class warheads like the B41 were not available until 1959 and weighed in at some 10,000lbs.

Remember, just over half the weight of early US nuclear bombs was a "flak proof" armored casing. The bomb itself weighed in at about 4,500 lbs. You'd still need a lifting capacity of about 6,000 lbs. (spected originally with MX 774) for delivery. So, early US ballistic missile development was aware of what was necessary to deliver a nuclear warhead and looking at missiles that could do that in 1945.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Right, just like I said.


This was true for any long-range missile at the time—their CEP would be measured in kilometers. If the V-2's accuracy was unsatisfactory, would the Gorgon program or the JB-series cruise missiles have been any better? The JB-2 also carried conventional warheads and had poor precision, yet the U.S. produced around a thousand of them. Had Operation Downfall proceeded, even more would have been manufactured. "A conscious decision based on rational thinking" ?

You are presenting a false dilemma fallacy here. What you need to show is that the US couldn't produce such a system rather than rely on that they didn't produce such a system. It's clear the US had the means at hand to develop a large ballistic missile even in 1942 but chose not to because they rationally saw no valid justification or reason to do so.

In Germany, v. Braun's rocket development languished until well into 1942 when the Germans began to lose. He was funded first because he was a great salesman, and second because German leadership wanted a means to get back at their enemies for the strategic bombing campaign. The army was offered such a means in the V-2.

Source？

Intercept 1961: The Birth of Soviet Missile Defense, Mike Gruntman

If you have no need for something, you won’t prioritize the technology. And if you don’t prioritize it, you won’t develop it—meaning progress in that field will be slow. As a result, your technical capabilities will not surpass those of someone who invests more and takes it more seriously.

Not true. Just because you don't develop something to an operational or end product doesn't mean that research lags behind in that field. The US was doing the research, and that was ongoing. They simply didn't put the funds into developing a final product. MX-774 went from basic research and extant products to a launchable missile in about a year.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Brakemine first flew in September 1944 and Fairey Stooge in early 1945, so by that reasoning the UK was just as advanced as Germany despite not actually fielding an operational SAM until 1958 (Bloodhound).

They existed for 37 days of 1945 but no longer than that.
Enzian was cancelled in January 1945; Wasserfall, Rheintochter and Schmetterling the following month on 6 Feb (despite the Schmetterling allegedly being production ready even though half the trial rounds had failed) despite the serious need for anti-aircraft defences. So none of these projects got out of the initial trials stage and there were serious development problems with the engines and/or guidance systems for all of these projects.

Rheintochter - first flew 08/1943, 82 test firings by 02/1945, only 6 liquid-fuelled R3 test fired by 02/1945.
Wasserfall - first flew 29/02/44, 35 test firings by 02/1945
Schmetterling - first flew 05/1944, 59+ test firings by 02/1945, production prototype completed 01/1945
Enzian - first flew 08/1944, 38 test firings by 01/1945 (E1-E3), E4 with Rheintochter R3 engine completed design 01/1945, Madrid IR-homing only bench tested

Brakemine - first flew 09/1944, 20 test firings
Stooge - first flew early 1945, 12 test firings
PTV-N-4 Cobra - first flew 10/1945
SAM-A-1 GAPA - first flew 01/1946, 100+ test firings 1946-49
KAQ-1 & KAY-1 (Lark) - first flew 06/1946, 200 built
SAM-A-7/Project Nike - first flew (unguided) 17/09/1946, further tests 1947-50, becoming Nike Ajax
RTV-N-6 Bumblebee - first flew 1949, tests flown until 1952
SAM-N-7 Terrier - first flew 1951, first shipboard test 28/01/1953
S-25/V-300 - first flew 25/06/1951, 81 test firings

What do we conclude? Germany did make a lot of test firings in a short time in the drive to reach a "production" weapon that could at least hope to have some meaningful capability. In reality those first-gen systems were rapidly superseded, Brakemine and Stooge being ditched in favour of LOPGAP very quickly. US SAM efforts from early 1945 took a little longer to mature, but had much more sophisticated propulsion and guidance systems, which took 2-3 years to really debug to reach sufficient maturity for frontline use.

Don't forget, that the Germans by the time of the surrender, didn't have a viable, working guidance system for any of those missiles in place let alone in serial manufacture. Having a perfected missile without a perfected guidance system is nearly useless.

 

[Byeman]

The historical records shows that is not true. The Germans did important work for the U.S. Army and NASA. They and their families were brought over at taxpayer expense and housed. They were screened by U.S. military intelligence.

Wrong. The records show the opposite. Their initial contract (noticed contract meaning they did not have to come to the US in the first place) was only 6 months. They had the option to go back after their contracts ended and instead many chose to stay and bring over their families. WVB almost resigned in 1948, due slow progress and Army red tape. He became a US citizen in 1955. Many were thinking of going to US industry when ABMA was in flux during 1959/1960. They chose to stay as civil servants when the Marshall Space Flight Center was formed from the ABMA Operations Division.

 

[Justo Miranda]

German rockets comparative

Solid-propellants rockets

​

All three German manufacturers of RATO rockets used the same solid propellant produced by Westfählische-Anhalt Spengstoff (WASAG): Diglycoldinitrat formed by a mixture, by weight, of nitrocellulose (63%), diethylene glycol nitrate (35%), carbamite (0.5%), wax (0.2%) and graphite (1.2%).

Schmidding 109-513, 1,000 kg peak thrust, 2,220-mm length and 350-mm diameter, used in the Henschel Hs 293H and Hs 298 gliding bombs.

Schmidding 109-533, 1,000-1,200 kg peak thrust, 1,540-mm length and 255-mm diameter, used in the Bachem Natter, the Heinkel He 162 A-10/A-11, Heinkel P. 1077 Romeo I & II, Heinkel P.1077 Julia, Junkers EF 126 Elli, DFS Eber II and DVL Jagdsegler II rammers, in the Zeppelin Fliegende Panzerfaust and in the Zeppelin Rammer.

Schmidding 109-543, 150 kg peak thrust, 810-mm length and 178-mm diameter, used in the air-to-air missile Henschel Hs 298.

Schmidding 109-553, 1,750 kg peak thrust, 2,370-mm length and 168-mm diameter, used in the anti-aircraft missile Henschel Hs 117.

Schmidding 109-563, 500 kg peak thrust, 990-mm length, 168-mm diameter, used in the Messerschmitt P. 1103 rammer.

Schmidding 109-573, underwater launch tests.

Schmidding 109-593, 750 kg peak thrust, 990-mm length, 168-mm diameter, RATO.

Schmidding 109-603, 150 kg peak thrust, designed for the Ruhrstahl-Kramer X-4 air-to-air missile, project only.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-502, 600-900 kg peak thrust, 1,270-mm length, 178-mm diameter, RATO.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-505, 500 kg peak thrust, 1,270-mm length, 178-mm diameter, used in the anti-aircraft missile Rheinmetall-Borsig Feuerlilie 25.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-515, 4,000 kg peak thrust, 1,470-mm length, 324-mm diameter, used in the anti-aircraft missile Rheinmetall-Borsig Feuerlilie 55.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-525, 7,500 kg peak thrust, 1,300-mm length, 510-mm diameter, used in the anti-aircraft missile Rheinmetall-Borsig Rheintochter R1.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-535, 16,000 kg peak thrust, used in the anti-aircraft missile Rheinmetall-Borsig Rheintochter R1.

Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-545, 14,000 kg peak thrust, used in the anti-aircraft missile Rheinmetall-Borsig Rheintochter R3.

WASAG 109-506, 69 kg peak trust, used in the Ruhrstahl-Kramer X-7 anti-tank missile.

WASAG 109-512, 1,200 kg peak trust, used in the Hs 293 gliding bomb.

WASAG 109-522, RATO.

WASAG 109-532, 69 kg peak trust, RATO used in the Messerschmitt P 1104.

Bi-propellant rocket engines

​

-Walter RI-203 (June 1939), T-Stoff + M-Stoff, 400 kg thrust, used in the Heinkel He 176 experimental airplane and in the Messerschmitt Enzian E-1 anti-aircraft missile.

-Walter RII-203 (October 1941), T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 750 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 V4 prototype.

-Walter HWK 109-500 (summer 1937), T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 500 kg thrust, used in DFS 194 prototype.

-Walter HWK 109-501, T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 1,000 kg thrust, used in Junkers 287 prototype.

-Walter HWK 109-502, T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 1,500 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Enzian E-2 and E-3 anti-aircraft missiles.

-Walter HWK 109-507, T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 590 kg thrust, used in the Henschel 293 V3-V5 gliding bomb.

-Walter HWK 109-509 A-0, (May 1943), T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 1,500 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 B-0.

-Walter HWK 109-509 A-1, (August 1944), T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, 1,600 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 B-1.

-Walter HWK 109-509 A-2, T-Stoff + Z-Stoff, two combustion chambers with 1,700 and 200 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 B-1a, Messerschmitt Me 262 C-1a, Messerschmitt P. 1104, Junkers EF 127 and Heinkel P. 1077 Julia.

-Walter HWK 109-509 B-1, (March 1944), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, two combustion chambers with 2,000 and 300 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 V18 and Bachem Ba 349 B Natter.

-Walter HWK 109-509 C-1, (August 1944), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, two combustion chambers with 2,000 and 400 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 C and Messerschmitt Me 263.

-Walter HWK 109-509 C-3, (August 1944), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, two combustion chambers with 2,000 and 400 kg thrust, used in the Junkers 248.

-Walter HWK 109-509 D-1, (January1945), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, 1,700 kg thrust, used in DFS 346.

-Walter HWK 109-509 E, (January1945), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, 1,700 kg thrust, used in the Ba 349 C Natter.

-Walter HWK 109-509 S-1, (January1945), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, 1,700 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 262 C-1.

-Walter HWK 109-509 S-2, (January1945), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, 1,993 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Me 262 C-3 and Messerschmitt P. 1106 R.

-Walter HWK 109-509 S-3, (January1945), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, 1,993 kg thrust, used in DFS 229.

-Walter HWK 109-559, (August 1944), T-Stoff + C-Stoff, two combustion chambers with 1,700 and 150 kg thrust, used in the Ba 349 A Natter.

-Walter HWK 109-739, 1,500 kg thrust, SV-Stoff + Ergin-Benzene, used in the Messerschmitt Enzian E-3 anti-aircraft missile.

-BMW 109-510 A, M-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 1,500 kg thrust used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 B-0.

-BMW 109-510 B, M-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 1,500 kg thrust used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 B-1.

-BMW 109-510 C, M-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 1,500 kg thrust used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 C.

-BMW 109-511, M-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 600 kg thrust used in the Henschel Hs 298 air-to-air missile.

-BMW 109-548, R-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 140 kg thrust used in the Ruhrstahl-Kramer X-4 air-to-air missile.

-BMW 109-558, R-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 380 kg thrust used in the Henschel Hs 117 Schmetterling anti-aircraft missile.

-BMW 109-708, (November 1944), R-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 2,500 kg thrust used in the Messerschmitt Me 163 C.

-BMW 109-718, (1943), R-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 1,800 kg thrust mounted in the mixed power plant BMW 003 R, used in the Messerschmitt Me 262 Heimatschützer II, the Heinkel He 162.01-42 and the Horten Ho XIIIb.

-DVK Konrad VfK Zg.613-A01, (February 1945), SV-Stoff + Visol, 1,000 to 2,000 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Enzian E-4 anti-aircraft missile.

-DVK Konrad VfK Zg.613-A02, (February 1945), SV-Stoff + Visol, 1,800 to 2,180 kg thrust, used in the Rheinmetall-Borsig Rheintochter III (R-3f) anti-aircraft missile.

-DVK Konrad VfK Zg.613-A03, (February 1945), Br-Stoff + SV-Stoff, 1,500 to 2,500 kg thrust, used in the Messerschmitt Enzian E-5 anti-aircraft missile.

FUELS AND FLUIDS​

Between October 1935 and February 1939, Germany imported large quantities of petroleum through the companies IG Farben and Wifo, but the country was not prepared for a long war and in the end its accumulated fuel reserves were not enough.

The oil extracted from the German subsoil was only usable as a lubricant because of its high wax content but coal was abundant and could be transformed into low-quality fuel using the FT (Fisher Tropsh) process.

Huge hydrogenation plants were built next to coal mines to manufacture synthetic fuel, lubricants and rubber using the Bergius system.

These strategic substances were stored in seven gigantic reservoirs with a capacity of 1,250,000 cubic meters.

Large quantities of aviation fuel, petroleum essences, chemical additives and the manufacturing patent for the anti-knock agent tetraethyl lead (TEL) were also imported from the United States.

Thanks to these imported additives, LAEDA Grade A3 (80-octane) standard gasoline could be enriched to obtain the LAEDB Grade B4 (87-91-octane) fuel used by bombers.

The LAEC Grade C3 (92-97-octane) fuel used by fighters was obtained by mixing B4 with high-octane U.S. fuel, hydro-gasoline (synthetic fuel butyl-isooctane), alcohol, butane, benzol or toluol.

With the addition of TEL at a rate greater than 4.75 cc per gallon, a special variety of 110-125-octane fuel used by elite fighter units could be obtained, but its use destroyed the engines within 42 hours.

The production of C3 never exceeded 10 per cent of the production of B4.

In 1943 the war was not over, and German industry began to suffer from the shortage of rare metals used in alloys: copper, chromium, cobalt, iridium, nickel, silver and tungsten.

The shortage of raw materials in Germany meant it was not possible to produce a suitably heat-resistant alloy before the war ended. The turbo-superchargers experimented failures at 16,500 rpm and the pipes of engine-exhaust gases proved to be unable to withstand the high temperatures of 980º C. At this time, the average lifespan of these turbo-superchargers did not exceed 20 hours.



The turbo-supercharger was a product of enormous technical and manufacturing resources that was not available in Germany. The 1,500 ºC temperatures reached by exhaust gas and the high rotation speeds of turbines (26,000 rpm) required the use of austenitic stainless-steel chrome-molybdenum alloys, ‘17 W’ chrome-nickel alloys and the development of work-hardening techniques that enabled the turbocharger to withstand stresses for centrifugal forces. The precision machining of turbines and impellers was made possible by sophisticated machine tools and surplus of raw materials.



After the failures obtained with the TK and HMZ turbo-superchargers, the OKL decided to use high-altitude supercharged engines (Jumo 213 E-1, BMW 323 R, DB 603 G, DB 603 LA, DB 603 U, DB 605 AS, DB 627 B and DB 632) fitted with GM 1 (Göring Mischung 1) power boost system.

The Nitrous oxide (Ha-ha gas) was retained under pressure in liquid form and injected, at a rate of 60 kg/min, into the supercharger air intake by means of compressed air, providing the engine with additional oxygen for 50 minutes.

At emergency boost pressure, the GM 1 increasing power above 10,000 m altitude, but it could not be used below 7,000 m to avoid engine damage.

When the Luftwaffe discovered that American bombers were flying at altitudes between 6,000 and 8,000 meters, the system fell into disuse.



The risk of pre-ignition/knocking increases with higher ambient air temperature and higher boost levels.

Availability of 100/130-octane fuel let the Allied engines run hotter without suffering premature explosions, but the 87-octane used by the Luftwaffe should use forced-air cooling fans and water-injection to avoid the overheating of their supercharged engines.

At low altitude the low-pressure stage of Allied engines would be used to prevent excessive boost levels. At higher altitudes the high-pressure stage would be normally engaged or disengaged by the pilot.

Pure water injection was used by the Germans (only with temperatures over 0º C) in the Jumo 213A and BMW 323R engines. A greater increase in power was obtained when the boost pressure was also increased. This system produced internal corrosion in the engines and was dropped by the RLM.

In the BMW Zborowski Verfahren injection system the water was replaced by the MW 30 mixture consist of 69.5 parts (by volume) of water, 30 parts of Methanol (Methyl alcohol) and 0.5 parts of anti-corrosion fluid Schutzöl 39.

MW30 was carried in a tank pressurized by the supercharger and injected into the compressor air intake at a rate of 2.2 lt/min.

The flow rate was controlled automatically by means of a solenoid valve.

The MW 50 mixture consist of 49.5 parts (by volume) of water, 50 parts of Methanol (Methyl alcohol) and 0.5 parts of anti-corrosion fluid Schutzöl 39.

The EW 50 mixture consist of 49.5 parts (by volume) of water, 50 parts of Ethanol (Ethyl alcohol) and 0.5 parts of anti-corrosion fluid Schutzöl 39.

These emergency power boost systems disrupted normal combustion, the mixture air-fuel did not burn completely, and the exhaust contained black smoke.

The water-injection could be used only for brief periods of time (ten minutes at a time) such as take-off or emergency combat boost below 10,000 meters altitude.

In May 1944 the Allies began a massive bombing campaign against the Reich's chemical industry.

Between May and September 1944, the US Eighth Air Force made eleven attacks on Leuna-Merseburg, the main production plant for petrol ersatz (synthetic hydrocarbons), stopping its activity. In November the Allies launched a bombing offensive against the hydrogenation plants of Nordstern-Gelsenkirchen, Nordstern-Wesserling, Scholven, Homberg, Wanne-Eickel, Sternkrade, Gastrop, Kamen, Bottrop, Dortmund, Hannover, Hamburg, Misburg, Bohlen, Zeitz and Lützendorf. The RAF Bomber Command launched 13,000 tons of bombs and the Eighth Air Force 14,000 tons. The US Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy attacked the plants located south of the Reich in Florisdorf, Moosbierbaum, Blechhammer South, Korneuberg, Vienna-Lubau and Linz.



By December, German fuel production fell to 151,000 tons of first grade gasoline (Grade C3, 96-octane), aviation base gasoline (Grade B4, 87-octane), gasoline-middle oil (B4 + motor oil) and J2 heavy kerosene for turbojets. Mostly affected production was that of the C3 and B4, that was used in piston engines of the fighters, with 25,000 tons only, compared to the anticipated 107,000 tons. Many small plants, also dedicated to the production of Benzol, were destroyed during the bombing attacks by zone, randomly made by the Bomber Command over industrial areas. During the last year of war in Europe, the RAF attacked 42 hydrogenation plants with 63,000 tons of bombs and the Eighth with 45,000 tons, finally achieving the collapse of the production system.



There was also a shortage of special metals platinum, palladium, and rhodium used in the manufacture of high-temperature spark plugs for aircraft engines.

The piston engine fighters were most affected.

This situation affected specially to conventional piston engines. Poor ratings of the 87- octane B4 fuel and poor quality of Schmiertoff lubricant, that obliged to run at high revolutions to deliver the required horsepower, were the cause of all the problems suffered. Rather deficient Kühlsotff (50% glycol, 50% water) cooling, vibration fractures and disintegration of bearings, due to shortage of tin during its manufacturing, caused corrosion and piston seizure.

Another factor that negatively affected the performance of the engines was the low quality of rubber and synthetic lubricants, whose composition varied frequently, causing all kinds of breakdowns, especially in arctic climates.

To avoid these deficiencies, some engines were redesigned with bigger cylinders and twin (three speed) superchargers, due to the poor performance (just 30 minutes) of the one stage superchargers of first generation.

The lack of oil suffered by Germany, during the last year of the war, induced scientists and engineers to experiment with alternative fuels.

The BMW 003, Jumo 004 and Heinkel HeS 011 turbojets worked with J2 and K1 heavy kerosene.

The Argus pulsejet of the V-1 worked with crude oil.

The Peenemünde engineers designed a V-2 that worked with diesel oil and S-Stoff.

The Dr. Pabst, from the Gas Dynamics section of the Focke-Wulf Company, suggested that the ramjets of the future Triebflügel fighter burned even less volatile fuels at pitch oil or lignite tar.

To that purpose, they had to design a compact evaporating plant that could be installed onboard.

The German industrial capacity had been irreversibly eroded by the long naval blockade and continued bombardment.

The shortage induced aircraft manufacturers to compete for available turbojets and rocket engines but only two firms had access to the scarce number of ‘Class I’ turbojets Jumo 004. One of them was Messerschmitt to power the Me 262 jet fighter and the other was Arado, for the Ar 234 jet bomber.

Despite of all these issues, the reliability of the new BMW 003 and Jumo 004 turbojets and the HWK 109 rocket engine was so low that the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe allowed the development of some piston engines to continue until February 1945!

FUELS AND FLUIDS



​

B4 + motor oil Benzin	Substitute for J2 Br-Stoff
Braunkohle (Coal dust)	For Lippisch ramjets
Br-Stoff (E-1) Glykol	Non-refined petrol for Argus As 014 pulsejet Triethylene for cooling systems
Glykol-Wasser 50/50	Glycol-Water mixture for cooling (50% glycol, 50% water)
GM 1	Nitrous oxide (liquid) for power boosting
J2	Heavy kerosene for Jumo 004 turbojet
K1	Heavy kerosene for HeS 011 turbojet
Kühlstoff	Glycol
LAEDA Grade A3	Gasoline, Rated at 80-octane (Light blue color)
LAEDB Grade B4 LAEDC Grade C3 Lignitteeren (Lignite tar) MW 50 Öl Optol Rohöl Schaumkohle + J2 Schmiertoff Schutzöl 39 Schweröl (Diesel oil) S3 Flugöl Teertuchöl (Pitch oil)	Gasoline, Rated at 87-91-octane (Dark blue color) Gasoline, Rated at 92-97-octane (Dark green color) For Pabst ramjets Methanol-Water mixture for power boosting (50% methanol, 49.5% water, 0.5% anticorrosion fluid). Oil Lignite tar Crude oil Coal dust + J2 for Sänger ramjets Lubricant Anti-corrosion fluid for MW 50 For Jumo 205 and EMW A10/II Lubricant for BMW 018 turbojet For Pabst ramjets

ROCKET PROPELLANTS​

The German chemical industry produced four basic liquid fuel systems:

-Katergol, mono-propellant Class: Hydrogen peroxide (82-83 % concentration) + catalyst permanganate or Nitrous oxide + catalyst cobalt.

-Hypergol, self-igniting mixtures Class: Hydrogen peroxide + B-Stoff (hydrazin hydrate) or Hydrogen peroxide + M-Stoff (Methanol) or Nitric acid + aniline, triethylamine or m-xylidines.

-Monergol, mono-propellant Class: liquid DEGN, Myrol or Methyl nitrate.

-Non-self-igniting mixtures Class: Oxygen + hydrocarbons (oil, benzol or methanol).

(Sonderkraftstoff)



​

A-Stoff	Liquid oxygen (Heyland method LOX) at -183º C, also called “Sauerstoff”
B-Stoff	Hydrazinhydrat (Hydrazyne hydrate), a catalyst for the T-Stoff and the M-Stoff
Br-Stoff	Non-refined petrol (benzine)
C-Stoff	Mixture of M-Stoff (57%), B-Stoff (30%), a watery solution (100 cc/lt) of potasium cupro-cyanide (13%)
F-Stoff	(non-propellant) titanium tetrachloride for smoke generators
M-Stoff	Methanol (Methyl alcohol)
R-Stoff	(see “Tonka”)
S-Stoff	Mixture of nitric acid (96%) and ferrous chloride (4%), also called “Salbei”
SV-Stoff (Salbei)	Mixture of nitric acid (94%) and nitrogen dioxide (6%), also called “Red fuming nitric acid” or 90-98% nitric acid and 2-10% sulfuric acid.
T-Stoff TN-Stoff TS-Stoff	Hydrogen peroxide (80%), oxyquinoline or phosphoric acid (20%) as stabilizer Aurol Ingolin
X-Stoff	(non-propellant) tetranitromethane, experimental explosive
Z-Stoff Z-Stoff-N Z-Stoff-C SK-Stoff	Watery solution of sodium or calcium as a catalyst for the T-Stoff Sodium permanganate catalyst for warm climates Calcium permanganate catalyst for cold climates HNO3 catalyst (Salbei K)
Z-Salz	Calcium or sodium permanganates for Z-Stoff
Tonka	Generic name for a range of propellant mixtures based on vinyl ethers
Tonka 93	Mixture, by weight, of xylidine (20%), aniline (20%), ethylaniline (20%), isquexylamine (20%), sulphate benzine (10%) and a watery solution of benzol (10%)
Tonka 250	Mixture, by weight, of xylidine (50%) and triethylamine (50%)
Tonka 500	Mixture, by weight, of xylidine (12%), aniline (15%), monomethylamiline (22%), triethylamine (21%), sulfate benzine (16%) and a watery solution of benzol (14%)
Aurol	Kriegsmarine codename for TN-Stoff
Dekalin	Dekahydronapthalene mixture of 83% hydrogen peroxide and 17% of “Helman”
Diglycol	Diglycol nitrate, a solid propellant mostly used for auxiliary rockets, formed by a mixture, by weight, of nitrocellulose (63%), di-ethylene glicol dinitrate (35%), carbamite (0.5%), wax (0.2%) and graphite (1.2%)
Ergin	Brown coal benzene as additive for the SV-Stoff
Fantol	Furfuril alcohol, self-igniting fluid for the mixture of SV-Stoff and Br-Stoff
Feststoff	Solid propellant
Flammöl	Range of self-igniting fluids (mixtures of petrol, kerosene, diesel oil and phosphorus)
Giessling Pulver	see Diglycol
Helman	Mixture of 20% ethyl alcohol and 80% hydrazine hydrate
Ingolin Kühlstoff Lignitteeren	Name used for Walter company for concentrated hydrogen peroxide, see TS-Stoff 50% glycol + 50% water Lignite tar
Myrol	Mixture of methanol and methyl nitrate
Optolin Teertuchöl	see R-Stoff Pitch oil
Tetran	see X-Stoff
Visol	Generic name for another range of propellants based on a mixture of vinyl ethers (isobutyl-vinyl compounds)

 

[Byeman]

1

A. The V2 was indeed based on Goddard's technology. Goddard was the first to use a turbopump in a rocket, but his turbopump cycle was not suitable for high-thrust rocket engines. It was the turbopump cycle invented by the Germans that ushered us into the era of high-thrust rocket engines.

Define this turbopump "cycle" and show how it is different than Goddard's in other ways than size.

 

[Byeman]

Good. Even without nuclear warheads, you could still deploy chemical warheads, biological warheads, or even incendiary warheads.

those require more accuracy than nuclear warheads.

 

[Byeman]

Did U.S. rockets use the gas generator-driven turbopump technology from the V2 rocket?

they used the same gas generator-driven turbopump technology as what Goddard developed.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

First, the Americans lagged behind in propulsion systems. Without a propulsion system, even the best guidance system is useless. Don't tell me the Americans didn’t want their rockets or missiles to fly farther or carry heavier payloads. What was the most mature rocket engine the U.S. had at the time? The Tiny Tim? Perhaps they could use pressure-fed rocket engines, a relatively mature technology, but this approach was inherently inferior to the Germans' pump-fed systems.

Not true. The Germans had one solid fuel available, Diglykol, a 1920's - 30's double base nitrocellulose propellant. The US had a selection of much better fuels like GALCIT 53, 61, Thiokol, and the like to use. In liquid fuels, the US had knowledge of virtually all of the same ones the Germans had access to except possibly ones based on hydrogen peroxide.

What the US wanted out of their missiles was a weapon that met specific requirements and was sufficiently accurate enough to perform the task it was meant to do.

The US had no need for a ballistic missile, so they didn't develop one. Again, you keep making a false dilemma here by arguing that because the US didn't do something they couldn't do that thing.

In 1945, non-rocket missile projects in the U.S. were also far from mature. Their propulsion systems—turbojets and ramjets—had no operational engine models. Meanwhile, the Germans already had operational pulsejet engines, which is why the Americans copied the V1’s engine and produced over a thousand JB-2s.

Yes, they did have them. The J32 was an operational jet engine by 1945, the problem was Westinghouse botched the series production of it. It first flew in a TD2N Gorgon IIB in June 1945 with development starting in November 1944.

This is all part of Bumblebee:
In ramjets, the first Cobra ramjet missile test occurred near NAS Cape May NJ, on June 13th 1944 with a missile running on carbon disulfide at Island Beach NJ. By February 1945, telemetered Cobra shots were occuring there, the first on 16 Feb 1945. These used 4 5" HVAR rocket motors to drive the ramjet to supersonic speed where it ignited.
By June 1945, the larger 12" Burner Test Vehicle (BTV) was being tested at Topsail Is. N. Carolina flying at Mach 2 to 20,000 feet and over 10 NM ranges.

The US copied the V-1 because it was so simplistic that it was easy to do so. It took the US just 60 days from capturing wreckage to duplicate the V-1 as the JB-2. Hardly some massive feat there.

In December 1944, the US Army started the Private series of test shots at Camp Irwin in California and then moving to the Hurco range at Ft. Bliss TX.

It just occurred to me that we shouldn’t even be discussing non-rocket missiles (or guided bombs), but this doesn’t change my view: in 1945, American rocket technology lagged behind Germany’s, and none of the U.S. missile projects (whether rocket-powered or not) had reached the level of the V2 (in terms of payload and range).

Second, the Americans were behind in progress. Forget operational deployment—when did they conduct flight tests? Sure, they initiated many AAM and SAM projects, but when were their first flight tests?

Testing was occurring at these locations, and there might be more I've missed:

NAS Cape May NJ / Island Beach NJ
Topsail Island NC
Pt. Mugu CA
Fort Irwin CA
Hurco range, FT Bliss TX
Dangerfield TX (First large supersonic wind tunnel built for missile testing specifically)
Wallops Island VA
Inyokern CA
Salton Sea CA
Wendover Field UT

The Bumblebee program’s PTV-N-4 Cobra/BTV first flight in 1945, as did the Little Joe. And the Germans? The Rheintochter, Enzian, and Wasserfall all had their first flights no later than 1944.

The first shot for a test vehicle in Bumblebee occurred on 13 June 1944 as described above. The first Little Joe was fired in June 1945 at Pt. Mugu CA.

Rheintochter suffered from having nothing in the way of a sufficiently energetic solid fuel resulting in the range and altitude being so poor that the Luftwaffe rejected the missile initially. Enzian's specificized engine the HWK 109-739 wasn't available, and Walther never got it working right, so initially, an HWK 109-500 JATO rocket motor was substituted for airframe testing.
Wasserfall had all sorts of issues in early testing too such that by January 1945 of 16 shots only 4 were considered successes and none had been made with any form of guidance.
You left out Schmetterling that wasn't doing much better...

Thus, by January 1945, yes the Germans were testing SAM missiles with poor success and underwhelming performance while having no viable guidance system in place or close to being ready for testing as a system.

The JB-3 (MX-570) first flew in 1944, and the Gorgon IIA in 1945. Meanwhile, the Germans’ X-4 was already flying in 1944.

The X-4 was a pathetic joke as an AAM. The JB-3 started development in February 1944 by Huges Aircraft. It was intended to have, variously as the guidance systems weren't fully tested yet, either a semi-active radar homing, active radar homing, beam riding radar, or television MCLOS guidance system used. The guidance systems were streets ahead of anything the Germans had at the time.

The V2 was indeed the pinnacle of missile and rocket technology in 1945. It was already combat-deployed, its payload and range far surpassed those of any other missile or rocket—and it was unstoppable.


View attachment 781617

And, it was cost ineffective, ineffective as anything but a terror weapon, and not worth the cost to produce and fire it.

What missiles did the U.S. deploy in 1945?

The US didn't particularly need missiles as they were winning the war with the weapons they had. You keep trying to ignore that fact.

The Bat and Pelican were guided bombs.

And in terms of their guidance system years ahead of Hs 293 and Fritz X. The Douglas LBD Gargoyle guided AShM was under test at the Salton Sea in California by the beginning of 1945. 400 were ordered in the summer of 1944 for testing. It used the proven guidance system that Pelican and Bat used.

So, were the Talos, Terrier, Tartar, or Nike deployed in 1945? If you want to prove that American rocket (or missile) technology was superior to Germany’s, you’ll need to provide projects that actually existed in 1945.

Trivial objections fallacy on your part. The US was being more thorough in their programs, not trying to rush some half assed, incomplete system into service like the Germans were. None of the German SAM systems were anywhere close to being really viable operationally. So, even as they rushed ahead with missile development, they didn't have something that would work in service and were years from getting one.

The Germans, also, weren't even trying a ramjet SAM design out by the end of the war.

So,

High-thrust rocket engines were valuable to the United States, correct?

When they had an application.

Because ballistic missiles were effectively unstoppable (at least at that time), they were a safer option than bombers for delivering any type of payload. They also offered much greater speed. I believe this held significant military value—for any nation back then.

The problem was, in 1946 the state of the art in ballistic missiles was a SRBM with 200 to 300 miles range. This was nearly worthless as a military weapon. Even projected IRBMs that were ten years out didn't offer a suitable range for many applications. It would take nearly two decades of steady development to get to a point where a viable ICBM was in service with any nation.

By comparison, the B-36 was going into production by the beginning of 1947 and more intercontinental bombers were in the works. Even the B-29/50 (B-29D) could hit targets deep inside the Soviet Union from bases in the UK, Middle East, or Japan. Bombers made more sense than missiles in 1946 to 1950. Yes, the US and others could see the potential value of ballistic missiles for nuclear bomb delivery and worked to develop such a delivery system. They also recognized it wasn't going to be a year or two to getting to something viable.

In 1947, a B-36 flying at 35,000 feet and 350 mph was all but immune to AA gun fire and un-interceptable by anything the Red Air Force had flying with the possible exception of a handful of jets. To make matters worse for the defense, the Soviet Union lacked a viable air defense early warning and control system to put defending aircraft in a position to intercept. On top of that, they lacked a viable nightfighter force and the necessary radar and control system to vector the planes--that barely existed--to an intercept.

So, the Soviet Union was all but defenseless while they had no means to retaliate against the US. Bombers made sense, missiles didn't.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Wrong. The records show the opposite. Their initial contract (noticed contract meaning they did not have to come to the US in the first place) was only 6 months. They had the option to go back after their contracts ended and instead many chose to stay and bring over their families. WVB almost resigned in 1948, due slow progress and Army red tape. He became a US citizen in 1955. Many were thinking of going to US industry when ABMA was in flux during 1959/1960. They chose to stay as civil servants when the Marshall Space Flight Center was formed from the ABMA Operations Division.

Initially, they were put to work assembling V-2's from parts brought over from Germany, so they were just doing technician work.

 

[edwest4]

Wrong. The records show the opposite. Their initial contract (noticed contract meaning they did not have to come to the US in the first place) was only 6 months. They had the option to go back after their contracts ended and instead many chose to stay and bring over their families. WVB almost resigned in 1948, due slow progress and Army red tape. He became a US citizen in 1955. Many were thinking of going to US industry when ABMA was in flux during 1959/1960. They chose to stay as civil servants when the Marshall Space Flight Center was formed from the ABMA Operations Division.

These men were carefully vetted by U.S. military intelligence. Their background information was sanitized so as to be acceptable to the President. Some were accused of or participated in war crimes.Your comment lacks logic. It is not reasonable. If T.A. Gardner is right, they should have NEVER been brought over. They just copied Goddard's work, right? The U.S. had already developed everything of value, right? They only needed to fund further development.

 

[Byeman]

Initially, they were put to work assembling V-2's from parts brought over from Germany, so they were just doing technician work.

Actually no real hands on, just parts identification and advising.

"By November 1945, troopers from the 1st Guided Missile Battalion were guarding captured German materiel at railway sidings near Las Cruces, and at WSPG, General Electric employees had begun to identify, sort, and reassemble V–2 components in the re-erected hangar (Building 1538), designated as Assembly Building 1."

 

[Scott Kenny]

So, does the United States have any solid rocket motors with greater and more sustained thrust than the V2 engine?

Starting from Polaris in the late 1950s, I think.

Did U.S. rockets use the gas generator-driven turbopump technology from the V2 rocket?

Civilian ones, maybe.

The US has been using solids for military systems since the 1960s.

Good. Even without nuclear warheads, you could still deploy chemical warheads, biological warheads, or even incendiary warheads. Rockets are safer than bombers, as they wouldn’t face interception by fighter jets.

So, you mean to commit war crimes.

Noted.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Remember, just over half the weight of early US nuclear bombs was a "flak proof" armored casing. The bomb itself weighed in at about 4,500 lbs. You'd still need a lifting capacity of about 6,000 lbs. (spected originally with MX 774) for delivery. So, early US ballistic missile development was aware of what was necessary to deliver a nuclear warhead and looking at missiles that could do that in 1945.

Huh, how'd I miss that detail?

But the big issue is still the absolutely craptastic accuracy of the V-2 as designed. Again, you'd need at least a 1-megaton warhead if not a 10MT to make up for the (lack of) accuracy. And a V-2 can barely lift a megaton-class warhead, nevermind being unable to lift a 10MT.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Actually no real hands on, just parts identification and advising.

"By November 1945, troopers from the 1st Guided Missile Battalion were guarding captured German materiel at railway sidings near Las Cruces, and at WSPG, General Electric employees had begun to identify, sort, and reassemble V–2 components in the re-erected hangar (Building 1538), designated as Assembly Building 1."

That just reinforces my point. They weren't indispensable to the Americans. They were gravy and spoils of war, if you will, that were best kept out of the hands of rivals. v. Braun and his team, like most Germans at the end of the war recognized that the US was their best bet to get decent treatment when captured or after surrender. So, they were cooperative.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

So, does the United States have any solid rocket motors with greater and more sustained thrust than the V2 engine?

That compares apples to automobiles. The US in 1945 had many solid fuel motors more powerful than any solid fuel engine the Germans had.

As for the V-2 engine, it produced between 50,000 and 60,000 lbf of thrust. Early Nike missile boosters in the 46-program produced 88,000 lbf of thrust on solid fuel. So, yes, the US had solid fuel rocket engines that had more thrust than a V-2 engine.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Huh, how'd I miss that detail?

But the big issue is still the absolutely craptastic accuracy of the V-2 as designed. Again, you'd need at least a 1-megaton warhead if not a 10MT to make up for the (lack of) accuracy. And a V-2 can barely lift a megaton-class warhead, nevermind being unable to lift a 10MT.

Quantity makes up for quality. If you dropped say, half-a-dozen Nagasaki-size bombs on a city it'd mess that city up pretty badly. Volume makes up for lack of accuracy...

 

[Scott Kenny]

Quantity makes up for quality. If you dropped say, half-a-dozen Nagasaki-size bombs on a city it'd mess that city up pretty badly. Volume makes up for lack of accuracy...

You'd need a hell of a lot of 10MT nukes to make up for a 17km CEP.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

You'd need a hell of a lot of 10MT nukes to make up for a 17km CEP.

Theoretically, theoretically, the V-2 had a CEP of about 5 km. I'm sure that was possible with ones not made in a cave by slaves using recycled scrap metal...

 

[Scott Kenny]

Theoretically, theoretically, the V-2 had a CEP of about 5 km. I'm sure that was possible with ones not made in a cave by slaves using recycled scrap metal...

Okay, a single 10MT would probably suffice if you could actually achieve a 5km CEP, based on the old "put the airfield inside the crater" mission brief.

 

[TwoTribes]

Civilian ones, maybe.

The US has been using solids for military systems since the 1960s.

Titan? Atlas?

So, you mean to commit war crimes.

OMG, "war crimes."

Bombing others with nuclear weapons is a war crime, and the same goes for using chemical weapons or biological weapons. During the early Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were testing, producing, and stockpiling chemical and biological weapons. Do you really think they wouldn’t use them? Do you believe the main reason they refrained was to avoid committing war crimes?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Titan? Atlas?

Both are long retired from service as ICBMs.

OMG, "war crimes."

Bombing others with nuclear weapons is a war crime, and the same goes for using chemical weapons or biological weapons. During the early Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were testing, producing, and stockpiling chemical and biological weapons. Do you really think they wouldn’t use them? Do you believe the main reason they refrained was to avoid committing war crimes?

The only true war crime is losing. Chemical and biological weapons aren't all that effective unless you are using them on totally unprepared populations in very dense cities. US cities are not dense by world standards.

 

[TwoTribes]

Define this turbopump "cycle" and show how it is different than Goddard's in other ways than size.

The pump, Goddard did use a pump to deliver fuel, but the driving force for his pump came from the expansion of gases produced by fuel vaporization through heat absorption. Compared to the Germans' approach, this was indeed less "strong." (If you know of a better pump cycle developed in the U.S. before 1943, please let me know.)

As for the Germans, their pumps were driven by high-temperature, high-pressure gas generated from the violent chemical reaction between hydrogen peroxide and potassium permanganate—almost identical to how later liquid rocket engines used combustion (oxidizer + fuel) to power the pump. (After all, combustion is also a form of "violent chemical reaction.")

The Germans' pump cycle design was better suited for high-thrust liquid rocket engines.

those require more accuracy than nuclear warheads.

If your target is a large city or an urban area, then a few kilometers of accuracy would be passable.

they used the same gas generator-driven turbopump technology as what Goddard developed.

Well, The gas generator-driven turbopump technology was not developed by Goddard.

 

[Byeman]

The pump, Goddard did use a pump to deliver fuel, but the driving force for his pump came from the expansion of gases produced by fuel vaporization through heat absorption.

Sorce please?

 

[TwoTribes]

Both are long retired from service as ICBMs.

Are they American rockets (missiles)?

The only true war crime is losing. Chemical and biological weapons aren't all that effective unless you are using them on totally unprepared populations in very dense cities. US cities are not dense by world standards.

During the early Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were testing, producing, and stockpiling them—so I assume they must have been effective.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Are they American rockets (missiles)?

Totally.

During the early Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were testing, producing, and stockpiling them—so I assume they must have been effective.

They were more like a "just in case." Since the other side had them, the other side wanted to have them too. I'd say neither side wanted to go there. After all, if you could hit a city with a nuke, why bother with something far less effective?

 

[TwoTribes]

Sorce please?

https://spacedge.nss.org/course/view.php?id=326
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1061837.pdf

 

[TwoTribes]

You are presenting a false dilemma fallacy here. What you need to show is that the US couldn't produce such a system rather than rely on that they didn't produce such a system.

Haha, I’ve never put forward any fallacies—and even if I did, I certainly wasn’t the first. Defining whether a country "needs" a certain technology based solely on its ability to independently develop it is, in itself, absurd.

Without German technology, could the Soviets not have developed their own ballistic missiles or SAM? The Soviets were no less intelligent than anyone else; they had the talent and sufficient resources, so I believe they could have. But does that mean they didn’t "need" German technology? I don’t think so either. German technology helped them progress faster.

I think this applies to the vast majority of technologies in the world—some advance faster, some slower, but with enough resources and talent, they will eventually be developed. However, if they "need" the achievements of others, they will gladly accept them.

The Americans adopted German turbopump technology, and the fact that they could have independently developed similar or equivalent turbopumps doesn’t change the reality that they "needed" German technology. They accepted it and used it to achieve many great things.

It's clear the US had the means at hand to develop a large ballistic missile even in 1942 but chose not to because they rationally saw no valid justification or reason to do so.

I don't deny America's capabilities.

But starting ballistic missile development in 1942 was too late for the Americans. By that time, the Germans already had the A4 rocket—all they needed was more testing to refine it. If the Americans were to begin development in 1942, they would essentially be starting from scratch. Did they have a proven aerodynamic design? A verified propulsion system? A tested thrust-vector control system? No. The Americans would have to complete all of this first just to reach the level the Germans had achieved by 1942.

The Americans weren’t smarter than the Germans, nor did they necessarily have more resources (bomber forces would compete for those). The time the Germans had spent on their path of development, the Americans would also have to spend. Perhaps American progress would be faster, but from the outset, they were already behind in time. Had the U.S. begun ballistic missile research in 1939, they might have outpaced Germany. But in 1942? For America, it was simply too late.

In Germany, v. Braun's rocket development languished until well into 1942 when the Germans began to lose. He was funded first because he was a great salesman, and second because German leadership wanted a means to get back at their enemies for the strategic bombing campaign. The army was offered such a means in the V-2.

First, he received funding from the German military very early, before the war broke out.

Second, while the German army did begin to show signs of defeat in 1942, by the time of the A4 rocket's first flight, the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad had not yet begun, and neither the Second Battle of El Alamein nor Operation Torch had commenced.

Intercept 1961: The Birth of Soviet Missile Defense, Mike Gruntman

Could you send me a screenshot? Please.

Not true. Just because you don't develop something to an operational or end product doesn't mean that research lags behind in that field. The US was doing the research, and that was ongoing. They simply didn't put the funds into developing a final product. MX-774 went from basic research and extant products to a launchable missile in about a year.

Yes, based on the achievements of the Germans, it was naturally very rapid.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

https://www.amazon.com/Intercept-19...phy=78600&hvtargid=pla-4584345016209494&psc=1