New USN CVL

Surprised the amphibs only 12% cheaper per ton than the CVNs built at NNS with its high overheads driven by nuclear costs, tends to confirm the impression that both BIW and Ingalls yards expensive,
But those overhead cost wouldn't be reflected in the NAVSEA cost/ton metric. Those costs tend to show up in plan costs and ECO.

Of interest In the Navy briefing on Bonhomme Richard in December prior to the scrapping quoted $4.1 billion as the replacement cost, which will include the shipyard overheads. At at first look makes it look very expensive ship if built in US, compared to the QNLZ, a 60% larger ship cost the same, would inflation account for the difference?

the CBO and CRS both expressed incredulity at the Fincantieri costs for the new Constellation frigates
The believed drivers for non-CV/amphib surface combatant costs are outfit density and power density; Constellation is bad on both counts.
So some skepticism there is warranted. But that has nothing to do with CVs.
CBO base estimates on lightweight displacement cost per ton, using actuals of current surface combatants, Burkes and LCS, costs driven partly by density, Constellation is a lower density ship than a Burke who have over the years been burdened with more equipment eg with Flight III have had to resort to relocating an accommodation block on the rear weapons deck so as to make more room for the additional hardware needed below weapons deck to support the new SPY-6 radar.

CBO estimate 40% above Fincantieri/Navy Constellation contract price using their metrics, when challenged CBO claim their justification for the 40% uplift was the addition of 300t of steel to the FREMM for Constellation which would make it more complicated to build, but 40%? The 2015 Italian contract for 9th and 10th FREMMs was 764 million euros ~$930 million, ~$470 milion each, Navy contract for Constellation $870 million each if all ten contracted.
Fincantieri contested the CBO and CRS figures, it has a long history in building cruise ships on time and cost
Their cost overruns on LCS notwithstanding apparently.

Freedom class prime contractor was Lockheed and the naval architects Gibbs and Cox, with Constellation Fincantieri are both the prime contractor and naval architect for ship giving them control.
If using the newer HSLA steel which saying is a very labor intensive to weld and if not be suitable for robotic welding would not it be a better trade off to use thicker commercial weldable steels eg DH36/EH36 controlled rolled and normalized, heat treated to stress relive the steel to give necessary toughness as used in the UK carriers) understand Far Eastern and European shipyards now able to weld hull with robotic production lines and even mention of spider automatic robots for assembly and welding.
I don't see anything preventing the automation of HSLA welding beyond the fixed-costs of automation.
IIRC, toughness scales at the square root of thickness so achieving the much higher toughness of HSLA requires
a much greater than linear amount of material. Not sure that really saves any money.

Of interest found some comments on Google by Ray D

HSLA is comparatively much worse as an armor material than the entire HY-series, possessing a relatively low hardness, lower UTS, and inability to be produced in thickness - in addition to costing more than HY-80 to begin with. Practically the only advantage of HSLA is its weldability.

The HY series of USN metal standards actually derives their names from their respective Yield Strengths. HY-80 steel is High Yield 80 ksi (thousand lbs/in^2) Steel, whereas HY-100 steel is High Yield 100 ksi Steel, meaning HY-100 has a 25% higher yield strength. This is actually slightly misleading when it comes to a material's protective value. Yield Strength is the capability of a material to withstand compressive force and return to its original form, for example the strength of a wall to hold up a roof. Essentially it's structural strength.

When considering for armor steel, however, the values you have to pay attention to are Ultimate Tensile Strength and Hardness. Ultimate Tensile Strength (UTS) is, simply put, the amount of force a given metal can resist before it is torn apart, ether by a vice or a projectile slamming into it. Hardness is, for most purposes, an obvious effect and I won't spent the character limit breaking it down. For HY-80/100, these values are a lot closer than their Yield Strengths.

HY-80 has a Rockwell Hardness of 20 and a UTS of 100ksi.
HY-100 has a Rockwell Hardness of 21 and a UTS of 115ksi.
A roughly 13% difference.
So, yes, HY-100 can easily be a significantly better armor material than HY-80, and the nearly Titanium-like HY-130 doing even better... when employed in significant enough thicknesses for that to make a difference. When you are dealing with thinner sheets, such as hull plating, it is generally more economical to design the ship around using a slightly thicker sheet of HY-80 than HY-100 unless the yield strength of the metal is going to come into play, such as with Submarines - and even then, we used to build Submarines out of HY-80. You end up with a slightly heavier ship, a few tons, but it presents a much more economical building plan.



 
Of interest In the Navy briefing on Bonhomme Richard in December prior to the scrapping quoted $4.1 billion as the replacement cost, which will include the shipyard overheads. At at first look makes it look very expensive ship if built in US, compared to the QNLZ, a 60% larger ship cost the same, would inflation account for the difference?
$4.1 billion is total ship cost. And looks to be scaled from LHA-8. Then it comes down to different materials/construction methods.
Ex: LHA uses HY-100 for the flight deck steel vs. the commercial steel (can't remember the grade) used on QNLZ's deck.


CBO base estimates on lightweight displacement cost per ton, using actuals of current surface combatants, Burkes and LCS, costs driven partly by density, Constellation is a lower density ship than a Burke who have over the years been burdened with more equipment eg with Flight III have had to resort to relocating an accommodation block on the rear weapons deck so as to make more room for the additional hardware needed below weapons deck to support the new SPY-6 radar.
The off-array SPY-6 additional hardware isn't likely to differ all that much between SPY-6(v)1 and SPY-6(v)3.
The outfit density and power density for Constellation is much closer (and in the power case worse) to Burke than to its
parent design or any other design. Again, outfit/power density aren't cost drivers of LHA/CVs so...

Freedom class prime contractor was Lockheed and the naval architects Gibbs and Cox, with Constellation Fincantieri are both the prime contractor and naval architect for ship giving them control.
It's the same shipyard; the outfit density/power density will drive labor hours/overhead. So the cost comparisons are valid.

Of interest found some comments on Google by Ray D
There isn't a large difference on the UTS front between HY and HSLA. And HSLA tends to have better
toughness than the comparable HY and Rockwell hardness (what I could find) looks very similar.
Neither are employed in a manner to resist penetration by an ASCM. Rather, they try to contain/resist blast, fragments and fires.
 


CBO base estimates on lightweight displacement cost per ton, using actuals of current surface combatants, Burkes and LCS, costs driven partly by density, Constellation is a lower density ship than a Burke who have over the years been burdened with more equipment eg with Flight III have had to resort to relocating an accommodation block on the rear weapons deck so as to make more room for the additional hardware needed below weapons deck to support the new SPY-6 radar.
The off-array SPY-6 additional hardware isn't likely to differ all that much between SPY-6(v)1 and SPY-6(v)3.
The outfit density and power density for Constellation is much closer (and in the power case worse) to Burke than to its
parent design or any other design. Again, outfit/power density aren't cost drivers of LHA/CVs so.

There is a massive difference between the Burke SPY-6(V)1 and the Constellation SPY(V)3, the Constellation SPY-6(V)3 in only one fifth size of the Burke SPY-6(V)1, the SPY-6 is a scalable radar made up of 2'x 2' RMAs, the (V)1 has (4 x 37) 148 RMAs whereas the Constellation (V)3 (3 x 9) only 27 RMAs.

To fit SPY-6(V)1 radar to the Flight III, with its big increase in power required compared to SPY-1, one of the changes in the Flight III was the additional cooling required for the (V)1, the air conditioning capacity had to be increased from five 200-ton plants to five 300 ton machines.

Freedom class prime contractor was Lockheed and the naval architects Gibbs and Cox, with Constellation Fincantieri are both the prime contractor and naval architect for ship giving them control.
It's the same shipyard; the outfit density/power density will drive labor hours/overhead. So the cost comparisons are valid.

Disagree, Fincantieri shipyards have a long history of delivering cruise liners and warships on time and cost, as far as know no US shipyard has the knowhow/competitiveness/efficiency to build and sell large ships on the world market.

Of interest found some comments on Google by Ray D
There isn't a large difference on the UTS front between HY and HSLA. And HSLA tends to have better
toughness than the comparable HY and Rockwell hardness (what I could find) looks very similar.
Neither are employed in a manner to resist penetration by an ASCM. Rather, they try to contain/resist blast, fragments and fires.

Agree armor used to contain/resist blast, fragments and fires, but Ray D explicitly said "HSLA is comparatively much worse as an armor material than the entire HY-series, possessing a relatively low hardness, lower UTS, and inability to be produced in thickness - in addition to costing more than HY-80 to begin with. Practically the only advantage of HSLA is its weldability." Ray D comes across as a professional which contradicts what your saying, you may also be an expert in steel, I certainly don't have the technical expertize to judge.
 
There is a massive difference between the Burke SPY-6(V)1 and the Constellation SPY(V)3, the Constellation SPY-6(V)3 in only one fifth size of the Burke SPY-6(V)1, the SPY-6 is a scalable radar made up of 2'x 2' RMAs, the (V)1 has (4 x 37) 148 RMAs whereas the Constellation (V)3 (3 x 9) only 27 RMAs.
Note the distinction I made between on-array (RMA) and off-array equipment. The off-array equipment is substantially the same
since it doesn't contribute to array cost which is completely dominated by TRIMM/RMAs.

FFG(X) has claimed power/cooling provisions comparable to a Flight III Burke which implies a much worse power density.

Disagree, Fincantieri shipyards have a long history of delivering cruise liners and warships on time and cost, as far as know no US shipyard has the knowhow/competitiveness/efficiency to build and sell large ships on the world market.
None of which changes the fact that they are building a much denser (outfit/power) warship to a very different standard.
That and their previous record on LCS should give one pause.

"HSLA is comparatively much worse as an armor material than the entire HY-series, possessing a relatively low hardness, lower UTS, and inability to be produced in thickness - in addition to costing more than HY-80 to begin with. Practically the only advantage of HSLA is its weldability.
There are published datasheets and lots of scholarly/industry papers on HSLA and HY. There's been extensive use of HSLA
over the last 25 years. He's totally wrong about HSLA thickness and cost. About the only thing that I've seen that really differs in terms of
material properties seems to be yield strength as a percentage of UTS. Since I didn't make any claims about HY/HSLA suitability for armor
I'm not sure how I can be contradicted. It's all about ballistic tolerance and structural integrity under duress. And in the end, we
are contrasting two USN spec/non-commerical steel grades so....
 
There is a massive difference between the Burke SPY-6(V)1 and the Constellation SPY(V)3, the Constellation SPY-6(V)3 in only one fifth size of the Burke SPY-6(V)1, the SPY-6 is a scalable radar made up of 2'x 2' RMAs, the (V)1 has (4 x 37) 148 RMAs whereas the Constellation (V)3 (3 x 9) only 27 RMAs.
Note the distinction I made between on-array (RMA) and off-array equipment. The off-array equipment is substantially the same
since it doesn't contribute to array cost which is completely dominated by TRIMM/RMAs.

FFG(X) has claimed power/cooling provisions comparable to a Flight III Burke which implies a much worse power density.

You have to look behind the headlines, both ships have ability to generate ~11/12MW of electric power, Burkes three GTGs power purely for its radar and other weapon systems plus hotel loads whereas Constellation four DGs power mainly used for its HED propulsion with shaft mounted electric motors, 7MW?, to give ~16/17 knots before it has to bring its single LM2500 GT online. Burke has seven GTs, four LM2500 and three AG9160 GTGs, Constellation one GT, LM2500 and four DGs plus its drives and electric motors

Disagree, Fincantieri shipyards have a long history of delivering cruise liners and warships on time and cost, as far as know no US shipyard has the knowhow/competitiveness/efficiency to build and sell large ships on the world market.
None of which changes the fact that they are building a much denser (outfit/power) warship to a very different standard.
That and their previous record on LCS should give one pause.

Density and Cost

Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, head of the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division, said at the virtual SNA 2021 on Tuesday, speaking on the LSC, ref the Burkes “We’ve done about all we can do with this ship and we’ve maxed out the space, weight, power and cooling, “It’s time to reset to a new large surface combatant hull.”

Burke only a third larger than Constellation, but has three times the number VLS cells, the 5" main gun fires a shell five times the weight of the 57mm shell, a very large hull mounted sonar, AN/SQS-53C/D, no HMS on Constellation but a VDS which much simpler to install, etc and as pointed out previously its SPY-6 (V)1 is five times the power the Constellation SPY-6 (V)3 and the Burke (V)1 needing five 300 ton air conditioning plants, the Constellation (V)3 will need approx of only a single equivalent of one of the five 300 ton plants, so the off-array costs should be substantially less expensive.

Constellation will be substantially less dense ship and makes for simpler design and build than a Burke, will make it easier and cheaper to build.
"HSLA is comparatively much worse as an armor material than the entire HY-series, possessing a relatively low hardness, lower UTS, and inability to be produced in thickness - in addition to costing more than HY-80 to begin with. Practically the only advantage of HSLA is its weldability.
There are published datasheets and lots of scholarly/industry papers on HSLA and HY. There's been extensive use of HSLA
over the last 25 years. He's totally wrong about HSLA thickness and cost. About the only thing that I've seen that really differs in terms of
material properties seems to be yield strength as a percentage of UTS. Since I didn't make any claims about HY/HSLA suitability for armor
I'm not sure how I can be contradicted. It's all about ballistic tolerance and structural integrity under duress. And in the end, we
are contrasting two USN spec/non-commerical steel grades so....
Appreciate if you could ref to the industry papers
 
You have to look behind the headlines, both ships have ability to generate ~11/12MW of electric power, Burkes three GTGs power purely for its radar and other weapon systems plus hotel loads whereas Constellation four DGs power mainly used for its HED propulsion with shaft mounted electric motors, 7MW?, to give ~16/17 knots before it has to bring its single LM2500 GT online. Burke has seven GTs, four LM2500 and three AG9160 GTGs, Constellation one GT, LM2500 and four DGs plus its drives and electric motors
The power density metric is rather indifferent to how it's generated because its mostly premised on the complexity of conditioning/routing/switching
and by implication cooling.

I'm curious how you are going to connect this to CVLs since power density is not a cost drive there.

Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, head of the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division, said at the virtual SNA 2021 on Tuesday, speaking on the LSC, ref the Burkes “We’ve done about all we can do with this ship and we’ve maxed out the space, weight, power and cooling, “It’s time to reset to a new large surface combatant hull.”
Which is why the CBO report you cited was comparing Constellation to the earlier Burke classes.
so the off-array costs should be substantially less expensive.
The off-array equipment is pretty much everything shown here that's not an octagon or an RMA.
There will be some simplification since you only have three faces vs. four.
450px-AMDR-System-Overview-1.jpg

And you still need all of the same 1000 VDC routing/switching/conditioning. Those all need power, shock-hardened mounts
and those all need to be cooled. And FFG(X) already has built in cooling margins for growth which would
put in close to the AB IIIs. So that's already common to both.

Again, curious how you're going to bring this around to CVLs since none of the above drives their cost.
Appreciate if you could ref to the industry papers
One attached.
 

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@marauder2048 Thanks for your atachment on HLSA

Re the SPY-6 variants and costs, checked the PB FY2021 Navy Justification, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
Burke Flight III - SPY-6 (V)1 - 148 RMAs $169.2 million
FFG - EASR / SPY-6(V)3 - 27 RMAs $59.2 million
LPD Flight II EASR / SPY-6(V)2 - 9 RAMAs $35.0 million

Figures show (V)3 has 18% of capability at cost of 35% of (V)1, (V)2 6% capability at cost of 21% of (V)1. You had previously said the off-array equipment is substantially the same, which agree with, but think with lower power costs will decrease, whatever the figures show (V)3 is $110 million cheaper than the (V)1 and that will be reflected in a lower cost per ton of the FFG compared to the Burke Flight III.

Navy spends much more of its budget on O&M, which excludes personnel costs, than SCN, why think CBO metric of build cost per light ton is a very crude metric to measure ships costs, sustainment ship costs far more than build, did see figures for coast guard ships of ~250% of build, have seen no figures from Navy breaking out sustainment cost by ship/class, Burkes difficult to maintain as so dense, an old 80's design using planned maintenance when world has moved onto new tech condition based maintenance, its propulsion is gas guzzling GT if not operating at 90+% rpm limiting range, so would not be surprised if sustainment cost 350+% or more of its build costs.

Think H_K set it out best in his earlier post of how to control costs of CVL compared to the disaster which is Ford.
Assuming the driver for a CVL compared to CVN’s, is to try to bring carrier costs back to 1980's levels to enable Navy to fund larger and more balanced fleet? In the 1980s, the carrier strike group cost about 14 percent of the total Navy operating cost. Today it’s 31 percent."

Yes this is the crux of the issue - the modern carrier force has become too gold plated to its own good (much like the rest of the USN surface combattant force).

Sadly I don’t think smaller carriers are the answer. They may be part of the answer, but what is needed is a complete 360 rethink of how the USN does carrier warfare:

- Propulsion: Nuclear power is simply uneconomic. The USN needs much better reasons why it continues to cut into other higher priority items like hull numbers to pay for such a capability.

- EMALS, AAG and the fancy new weapons elevators are uneconomic, much like all the other electromagnetic toys that have never proven their worth (rail gun etc). The USN needs to revisit why steam cats and hydraulic systems won’t do until the technology matures.

- Manning is still way too high.

- Shipyards: it’s time to put pressure on Newport News’ monopoly on carrier building. Give some / all the work to other yards like NASSCO.

- Build rates: Investigate the benefits of increasing the build rate.

- Simpler, not smaller, carriers: Maximise systems commonality with other ships (like DDG-1000 propulsion and FFG(X) sensors and combat system). Aim for as few bespoke systems as possible, ruthlessly eliminate any hint of gold plating.

- Reduce forward presence: if this can be done by fewer CVBGs or smaller CVBGs then do it to save on operating costs.

- Increase focus on dual carrier ops for high-intensity warfare... stop trying to cram all the capability you need in only one hull.

If the above approach comes back with a recommendation for slightly smaller, cheaper carriers (60,000-80,000 tons), then so much the better, but don’t start with carrier size as the main objective.
 
question on using the L series

Screen-Shot-2016-08-17-at-2.17.18-PM.png


the USS America already has expanded hangar space, but is there any way to further modify this basic design for pure aircraft carrier purposes for the light carrier concept?

perhaps removing the vehicle stow completely, move the medical down there? or use the bottom floors for more hangar space? add a ski jump?
i guess this could turn about a 20-25 f-35b capacity to maybe 30-35?
 
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You could do something akin to that, though that still leaves you with all the other L-class problems like 24 knots, no E-2, tiny magazines, and a flight deck too small to service the air wing. Fixing those problems would add billions to the final cost figure.
 
You could do something akin to that, though that still leaves you with all the other L-class problems like 24 knots, no E-2, tiny magazines, and a flight deck too small to service the air wing. Fixing those problems would add billions to the final cost figure.
i brought this up in the other section, but how far (if at all) the status of an Awacs version of the Osprey?

also any possibility of simply just license building an existing design?
didn't the they opt for some Italian based frigates recently to replace the LCS?
there's the Cavour, or the Japanese Izumo that can go over 30knots
 
i brought this up in the other section, but how far (if at all) the status of an Awacs version of the Osprey?

Non-existent. The Marines last talked about a radar-carrying Osprey in the form of TOSS -- basically the Cerberus radar from Sea King ASaC.7 repackaged to extend out the rear ramp of the Osprey. But the last reference I find to that is c. 2010. Nothing came of it.
 
The first supercarriers were the ~82,000t Forrestal class designed to be able to launch the A3 Skywarrior, ~70,000 lb gross weight / MTOW 82,000 lb, to deliver a 10,000 lb nuclear bomb with A3 Skywarrior's 1,000 mile radius of action, previously largest carrier the Midway class ~64,000t.


Not quite.

The USN designed the Forrestal class around what they thought was required to carry the large atomic/nuclear bombs of the early 1950s... a 100,000 lb aircraft!

Douglas Aircraft was able to design a 3/4 sized aircraft to carry the same weapon, surprising the USN to the point that they initially didn't want to even look at the design "because it couldn't possibly actually work".

Similarly the A-4 was much smaller than the USN had thought necessary for the mission that aircraft was to fulfill!
 
I suspect an F-35C or F-18E/F doesn't have a spot factor bigger than an F-14, never mind things like A-3s and A-5s. There were always big aircraft on US CVs and I'm amazed they could ever sortie them effectively without ruling out certain types of air ops in certain conditions. That said current USN airwings seem to be much smaller than the capacity of a Nimitz in terms of spot factor. The standardization of airframes and increased sortie rate by having open deck space probably drives this somewhat (an F-18 is basically 90% of the airwing now) but I think budget constraints are the main culprit. It seems to me your average CVW could easily accept another squadron of fighter type aircraft, given the spot limitations 80's CVWs took up. Perhaps adopting UAVs will allow for a larger inventory of cheaper aircraft, starting with the MQ-25s.
Having personal experience* with USN-type carrier aircraft in the 1980s, I can tell you that one of the drivers for the large number of aircraft aboard USN supercarriers in the 1960s - mid-1980s was serviceability rates.

On a normal basis, at least 1/3 of each aircraft type was either unflyable or non-mission-capable for maintenance - virtually all of the aircraft in the hangar were being worked on, and some of those on the flight deck.

The entry of the F/A-18 saw an immediate major jump in the mission-capable rates to over 75%, and even higher as modifications and adjustments to systems came online. This simply means that fewer aircraft are needed to provide the same number of full-mission-capable aircraft at any given time!

Therefore, why continue to carry so many aircraft that flight operations are slowed by the need to move aircraft around in order to free up catapults, elevators, the landing path, etc as they are needed? Why buy that many aircraft when fewer aircraft can not only do the same job, but actually do it better because you can launch, recover, rearm/refuel, and maintain them faster and more-efficiently than before?

While there is a budgetary factor in the reduced aircraft complements aboard USN carriers, that is a secondary effect opened up by the drastic improvement in serviceability and mission-ready rates allowed by the new electronics & systems that came in in the late 1980s and since.


* USMC avionics tech on A-6Es & F/A-18A/Cs 1981-1989, with 2 years attached to CVW-2 aboard USS Ranger CV-61 with VMA(AW)-121.
 
The problem is that even the Americas are not well designed to function as full-time carriers. They don't have the magazine space to really function as a strike carrier for a prolonged period, and they can't do CTOL without major redesign. And without CTOL, you're stuck with STOVL F-35B, no AEW, no EW, probably no tanker support, etc. You could possibly develop the V-22 for AEW and tanker roles (only as a recovery tanker, because it's way too slow to fly along with a strike). But by that point, it's probably cheaper to design a new carrier to use existing aircraft instead.

Tanker capability is already in-process.

2016: https://www.cobhammissionsystems.co...ted-to-develop-aerial-refueling-kit-for-v-22/

2018: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ne...ck-to-turn-the-mv-22-into-a-refueling-tanker/

While the system appears to have missed its planned late 2019 final approval date, procurement of the V-22 Aerial Refueling System (a "roll-on/roll-off palletized refueling kit) is still on the USMC's firm plans, and still fully-budgeted.
 
The problem is that even the Americas are not well designed to function as full-time carriers. They don't have the magazine space to really function as a strike carrier for a prolonged period, and they can't do CTOL without major redesign. And without CTOL, you're stuck with STOVL F-35B, no AEW, no EW, probably no tanker support, etc. You could possibly develop the V-22 for AEW and tanker roles (only as a recovery tanker, because it's way too slow to fly along with a strike). But by that point, it's probably cheaper to design a new carrier to use existing aircraft instead.

Tanker capability is already in-process.

2016: https://www.cobhammissionsystems.co...ted-to-develop-aerial-refueling-kit-for-v-22/

2018: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ne...ck-to-turn-the-mv-22-into-a-refueling-tanker/

While the system appears to have missed its planned late 2019 final approval date, procurement of the V-22 Aerial Refueling System (a "roll-on/roll-off palletized refueling kit) is still on the USMC's firm plans, and still fully-budgeted.

awesome info.
with the F-35Bs able to bring more bring-back loads using a rolling landing
and V-22 for tanker support
all that is left is an AEW variant of the V-22. but with that done, then VTOL carriers can be more viable.
 
Thoughts of Rear Admiral Gregory Harris, Director, Air Warfare Division, N98, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations - U.S. Navy likely has no need to add a proposed small-deck aircraft carrier to its existing amphibious assault ships' “I believe the L-class ships operating with the F-35B fit that bill" (L-class ships include the Wasp- and America-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs and LHAs).

The F-35B is of limited capability compared to the F-35C due to its short range and smaller weapons bay and payload, F-35B will not be able to fit the new missiles specifically sized to fit internally in the F-35A & C weapons bay eg the new AGM-88G / AARGM-ER, JSM etc, and so keep its stealth capability by not carrying the missiles externally.

Would note as all the planning is driven by possible war in the Pacific with China, long range has become a necessity "One criticism – among many – of the Lockheed Martin F-35A & C is that the fighter lacks the range needed to conduct long-range stealth strike missions" Lockheed have mentioned adding conformal fuel tanks, originally an Israeli planned mod to enable range to better attack Iran, the new USAF engines under competitive development as drop in replacements for the PW F135 will feature much improved fuel consumption (GE XA 100 and PW XA 101).

Rr Adm Harris thinking reflects the limited calibre of current Navy Admirals, the zero capability of operating AEW&C a/c from L-class ships doesn't seem to have entered his mind.

 

Tanker capability is already in-process.

2016: https://www.cobhammissionsystems.co...ted-to-develop-aerial-refueling-kit-for-v-22/

2018: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ne...ck-to-turn-the-mv-22-into-a-refueling-tanker/

While the system appears to have missed its planned late 2019 final approval date, procurement of the V-22 Aerial Refueling System (a "roll-on/roll-off palletized refueling kit) is still on the USMC's firm plans, and still fully-budgeted.

I would love for that to be true (seriously) and I'd welcome some sources, but the last thing I can find is this FY20 Presidential Budget document from early 2019. See page 11, where post-FY19 funding for VARS is zeroed out:


FY 2019 to FY 2020 Increase/Decrease Statement: Decrease from FY 2019 to FY 2020 due to the cancellation of the VARS program.

So, unless it got a reprieve somewhere from Congress, it looks like VARS bit the dust sometime in 2019.
 
I have trouble with the mathematics that would enable a V-22 tanker do much to help a an F-35B package. To extend combat radius, I assume the refueling has to take place at some distance. So the V-22 would have to fly rather slowly to a refueling point perhaps 200-300 miles away, off load fuel then return. So how much offload-able fuel could be carried that far? Surely not the full 10k lbs. Even if they could, is that enough to refuel more than one F-35? And who or what protects the rather vulnerable fleet of V-22's that far out?

At a one for one ratio between F-35's and V-22's, that's a lot of tankers for the carrier to accommodate. Each V-22 occupies as much deck space, if not more, than the F-35.

So given we're talking about a smaller carrier to start with, I would probably not want to trade in an F-35 for every tanker. I think I'd be more likely to be talking to LM about the drop tanks which they have under development for the F-35A to see if they would work on the B's :)
 
There was a modified LHA proposed for the HMAS Melbourne replacement during the late 70s that had an indicated air group of 50 helicopters and harriers verses the 30 or the standard LHA. I have no idea how this was planned to be achieved but am assuming the well dock was supressed, vehicle stowage and troop accommodation repurposed, permitting the extension of the hangar forward, with increased magazine and fuel bunkerage below.

It would be interesting to see exactly what this proposal was and whether its configuration would be suitable for a current day CVL?
 
Mentioned in the first but not the second reference and I made that reference, ironically asking the same question about the actual configuration of the modified LHA proposal with its much larger aircraft capacity.

I have wondered about this proposal since first reading of it in Stewarts Wilsons Book on the RAN FAA back in the 90s. The concept, based on the Tarawa Class, seems quite close to what could be achieved in an LHA(R) (USS America) based CVL.
 
Supposedly the same sub crew shortly before their last mission

an instagram of hteir final song

RIP :(

 
I’ve been thinking about this CVL conundrum… using big deck amphibs as “Lightning carriers” just isn’t a satisfactory solution.

So here's my take on a 35,000 ton "Lightning Plus" carrier with ~30 F-35Bs, compared to LHA (below) and CVN (top).

The goal is for this CVL to cost no more than an LHA, so you could buy 3 for the cost of 1 CVN. But with greatly enhanced aviation capability compared to an LHA (e.g. the ability to launch & recover an alpha strike of 20 aircraft, improved flow for higher sortie rates, more workshops and stores).

The basic template is based on Charles de Gaulle with the following changes:

- Half of the nuclear reactor section taken out (hull shrunk by ~50ft amidships), the rest converted to extra bunkerage space
- Main engine rooms converted to a compact CODAG propulsion setup for 27+ knots (2x LM2500 + 2x 8-10MW diesels)
- Moved island to amidships (island size based on Chakri Naruebet due to identical propulsion setup)
- Removed catapults, added ski jump

Aside from the hangar being slightly shrunk by 10%, all other aviation spaces are strictly the same as CdG - this guarantees that there is enough workshop space, magazines, JP5 storage and crew accommodation to handle 30 aircraft + some helos.

Next I'll add back the angled deck to illustrate what the same design would look like with STOBAR capability for more flexibility (eg. to add E-2D AEW if these can be qualified for ski jump launch).
 

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Aside from the hangar being slightly shrunk by 10%, all other aviation spaces are strictly the same as CdG - this guarantees that there is enough workshop space, magazines, JP5 storage and crew accommodation to handle 30 aircraft + some helos
And also cuts you magazine into a fraction of what it is with a Nimitz.

Like the One time the French said we are doing this strike mission in syria ourselfs with no US help...

They lasted like 4 days into the 4 week mission before they had to Beg for a USN ammunition ship to resupple them cause they ran out of weapons.

Meanwhile a cross the way with one of the Nimitz.

"Eyeah we been here for 3 weeks now and just need got our first UNREP. Which is lucky for you Frenchies cause or else it be another 3 weeks before the next resupple ship arrives..."


Eyeah when you factor in time on station with sortie rate...

A full size CVN is cheaper cause it allows you to buy less resupple ships. So while you can buy three CVLs for one CVN...

Its really 2 CVLs and one of the two needed supple ships to feed them...
 
I’ve been thinking about this CVL conundrum… using big deck amphibs as “Lightning carriers” just isn’t a satisfactory solution.

So here's my take on a 35,000 ton "Lightning Plus" carrier with ~30 F-35Bs, compared to LHA (below) and CVN (top).

The goal is for this CVL to cost no more than an LHA, so you could buy 3 for the cost of 1 CVN. But with greatly enhanced aviation capability compared to an LHA (e.g. the ability to launch & recover an alpha strike of 20 aircraft, improved flow for higher sortie rates, more workshops and stores).

The basic template is based on Charles de Gaulle with the following changes:

- Half of the nuclear reactor section taken out (hull shrunk by ~50ft amidships), the rest converted to extra bunkerage space
- Main engine rooms converted to a compact CODAG propulsion setup for 27+ knots (2x LM2500 + 2x 8-10MW diesels)
- Moved island to amidships (island size based on Chakri Naruebet due to identical propulsion setup)
- Removed catapults, added ski jump

Aside from the hangar being slightly shrunk by 10%, all other aviation spaces are strictly the same as CdG - this guarantees that there is enough workshop space, magazines, JP5 storage and crew accommodation to handle 30 aircraft + some helos.

Next I'll add back the angled deck to illustrate what the same design would look like with STOBAR capability for more flexibility (eg. to add E-2D AEW if these can be qualified for ski jump launch).

Why not just buy a Queen Elizabeth Class...

You get way more of everything (bunkerage, magazines, hangar, small crew size, configured for STOVL, deck, speed of 32 knots, modern engines already in service in USN....)

And HMS Prince of Wales was built for £2bn (around $2.7bn) which is already less than a quarter of the cost of a CVN....2 ships have already been built and are operating, so lots of lessons learned from construction and operations, there are no surprises whatsoever...you could even hire some of the personnel who designed and built them for continuity and expertise. Add in that the USN have been monitoring the construction of them for years so are very familiar...plus you've got a cadre of USN/USMC personnel who have actually worked aboard the ship on operations to ask questions of, and build procedures from, and a friendly nation more than happy to help with training in advance....it genuinely doesn't get much better than that in naval procurement...

To buy the design from the UK wouldn't cost much more than $150m (because the French did for £100m years ago...), hell we'd probably give you it for a single F-35B gratis.., thats a whole lot cheaper than designing a new ship. The modular construction method would also favour smaller yards and not tie up a large dry dock for a long period of time.
 
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They could even make the change to catapult equipped while they are at it. Win - win.
 
They could even make the change to catapult equipped while they are at it. Win - win.

They could, but the amount of design work that was actually carried out on the QE Class as a CATOBAR design, is very over-estimated by people. There is of course the space, weight margins etc. available. But you'd probably be adding in at least $1.5bn in one-off,extra design costs to adapt and c$1bn of additional cost per ship. They'd still be at least 1/3rd the cost of a CVN though...roughly 2/5th's the crew as well.
 
And also cuts you magazine into a fraction of what it is with a Nimitz.

Like the One time the French said we are doing this strike mission in syria ourselfs with no US help...

They lasted like 4 days into the 4 week mission before they had to Beg for a USN ammunition ship to resupple them cause they ran out of weapons.

Meanwhile a cross the way with one of the Nimitz.

"Eyeah we been here for 3 weeks now and just need got our first UNREP. Which is lucky for you Frenchies cause or else it be another 3 weeks before the next resupple ship arrives..."
I believe you are conflating a number of things. First of all that was Libya not Syria. There was no US CVN involved. And it was some of the smaller NATO air forces who “ran out of weapons” (Dutch, Belgium etc) and had to ask for emergency resupply for their F-16s.

This has nothing to do with the Charles de Gaulle, which has substantial munitions storage (hundreds of tons), about the same in fact as a Nimitz on a per aircraft basis (and substantially more than the Kitty Hawk or Midway classes, which served just fine for decades).


@timmymagic A Queen Elizabeth sized carrier would be ideal, but unfortunately there is no evidence that a US yard could build one that cheaply. An LHA costs $3.8B (about 30% of a CVN-78)… hard to imagine a QE not costing at least $6B given the size difference. For reference, the bare hull of CVN-78 stripped of all propulsion, electronics and aviation equipment still costs a cool $8B so “steel is cheap” doesn’t really work out.
 
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I believe you are conflating a number of things. First of all that was Libya not Syria. There was no US CVN involved. And it was some of the smaller NATO air forces who “ran out of weapons” (Dutch, Belgium etc) and had to ask for emergency resupply for their F-16s.
Agree with this. When the French were doing their own campaign against Syria they were mainly firing SCALP EG which is clearly not going to be carried on a US replenishment vessel. When they've doen subsequent operations as part of the coalition (and even then the bulk of French operations have been from land bases) they may have received a resupply from a US vessel but that would have been planned in advance...even then I find it hard to believe as the only US munitions Rafale is cleared for is small numbers of GBU-12 munitions from the CdG. They only dropped around 20 bombs (not all GBU-12 either) so the idea that CdG had emptied her magazines is just not credible. They may have needed a top up of aviation fuel, but usually a Durance Class is around when CdG is operating in the Med.
 
A CVL-N could possibly work, there is newer, smaller and more efficient reactor technology. A CVL-N can also store much more jet fuel plus than a conventional CVL plus you get unlimited range and persistence. Of course like any program, you have to manage it properly. Current CVNs also replenish surface ships of the battle group with fuel when required. Also, looking at other foreign Navy vessels which use a combination of gas turbine and diesel propulsion, why? Our USN surface vessels perform very well using just marine gas turbines.
 
Queen Elizabeth sized carrier would be ideal, but unfortunately there is no evidence that a US yard could build one that cheaply
What about an improved Cavour/Trieste?
Marinette Marine shipyards are already hold by Fincantieri....
 
What about an improved Cavour/Trieste?
Might as well just build more LHAs then. Cavour/Trieste are just too small to operate 20+ F-35s. The narrow flight deck is extremely limiting for aircraft flow (same as on an LHA).

The goal for a CVL would be to optimize the aviation capability. This requires a much larger flight deck area with sponsons.

@Hydroman Nuclear is a non starter for cost reasons… CVN-78’s nuke plant costs $2.8 billion dollars! As for diesels, they are in fact present on LHD-8 and the LHAs - they offer a good compromise for cruising endurance, leaving the gas turbines for sprints.
 
Might as well just build more LHAs then. Cavour/Trieste are just too small to operate 20+ F-35s. The narrow flight deck is extremely limiting for aircraft flow (same as on an LHA).
I'm aware of it, that's why I was referring to an "improved" Cavour/Trieste.

Especially Trieste's hull, if your left for good the LHD provisions and enlarge the flight deck, there is enough room to manage 20 F-35B plus some helos and or Ospreys....
Let alone the powerful suit of electronic systems like the Kronos.
 
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They could always get our yards to build the ships as they have the know how and keep the savings. Certainly the cats could be added much more easily as they were originally to have them IMS.
 
How about South Korea coming 35000 tons carriers ? smaller than Q.E, non-nuclear like CdG. In fact roughly the tonnage of LHA.
Except they don't presently exist, of course.
 

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