Jet crash-lands at San Francisco airport

Here in Norway we have this incredibly annoying "trend" where newspaper invite "experts" to comment on any news.

So they invited "plane expert" (yes, just because you were a former pilot make you exactly that) and he commented that "At first glance it reminds of London jan 2008 where the plane had to crash land due to icing in fuel system.

Yes, i am sure exactly that happened this time, sigh.
 
It *looks* like the plane landed short, actually hit the seawall before the beginning of the runway. This would seem to be a massive piloting error. According to CNN, two confirmed dead, 60 unaccounted for (doesn;t mean dead... the passengers likely scattered).

130706170752-san-francisco-plane-crash-13-horizontal-gallery.png
 
Orionblamblam said:
It *looks* like the plane landed short, actually hit the seawall before the beginning of the runway. This would seem to be a massive piloting error. According to CNN, two confirmed dead, 60 unaccounted for (doesn;t mean dead... the passengers likely scattered).

They say the 'tail ripped off' upon landing so you're probably right Scott.
 
There are two dead, and five in critical condition. All passengers and crew are accounted for.
 
"NTSB Investigates Asiana 777 Accident In San Francisco"
By Guy Norris guy.norris@aviationweek.com

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_06_2013_p0-594353.xml

The aircraft, carrying 291 passengers and 16 crew, was operating flight 214 from Seoul to San Francisco and landed short of the threshold of runway 28L at 11:36 a.m. local time. The 777 was badly damaged in the initial crash landing and was subsequently gutted by fire that engulfed the fuselage. Passengers evacuated using principally the left doors L1 and L2, from which slides were deployed, as well as aft left doors. Doors were also opened on the right side of the fuselage though it is not yet known if the fire on the right side of the aircraft prevented any of them being used for evacuation. Of the 307 people onboard, 181 were taken to local hospitals, 49 of them with serious injuries. Yet, despite the severity of the impact and the ensuing blaze, there were only two confirmed fatalities and one person still unaccounted for seven hours after the crash.

The aircraft hit the low seawall which separates the airport from the waters of San Francisco Bay. Images of the debris field indicate the 777 made an initial impact to the right of the centerline, losing its tail section and parts of the landing gear before sliding down the runway and slewing off into the grass to the south of the normal touchdown area. Eyewitnesses report the 777 struck the wall ahead of the displaced threshold area in a nose high attitude, causing the entire empennage to detach aft of the pressure bulkhead. The vertical and horizontal tail were scattered in the displaced threshold area, just ahead of major sections of the landing gear.

Images of the wreck show the left Pratt & Whitney PW4090 engine had been dislodged from its mounting and most of the trailing edge and the outboard section of the leading edges on the left wing was missing. There was no immediate indication of where the remains of the left engine had come to rest. The right engine was visible lying alongside the fuselage forward of the wing root, while the right wing tip section also showed severe damage. The fuselage was buckled forward of the wing-body join as well as aft, close to the exposed rear pressure bulkhead which was also ruptured by the impact.

Weather at the time of the accident was good with light winds of 6-7 kt. from the southwest and visibility of 10 nm. or more. Investigators will focus on several areas including the performance of the aircraft’s equipment, engines, systems and flight crew, as well as other factors concerning the dynamics of the approach. One item of particular focus for investigators is expected to be the status of runway approach guidance facilities. An FAA Notam (notice to airmen) for San Francisco indicates that, at the time of the accident, the instrument landing system glideslope for runway 28L was declared out of service from June 1 to Aug. 22.

The Asiana accident represents only the third hull loss for the 777 since the aircraft entered service in 1995. The first of these was the January 2008 short landing accident of a British Airways 777-200ER at London Heathrow which was traced to fuel starvation caused by ice build-up in the engine’s fuel-oil heat exchangers. The second was a flight deck fire which occurred on an Egyptair 777-200ER whilst on the ground in July 2011. The Asiana accident is also the first involving a 777 which has resulted in a passenger fatality.

The Asiana aircraft written off in the accident, HL7742, was one of 12 777-200ERs operated by the Korean carrier. The aircraft first flew in February 2006 and was registered to the airline the following month.
 
Some people filming landings @ SFO captured the accident on video. Appears to be a case of too low, too slow, and waiting too long to initiate a go around, then giving in to instinct to pull up, increasing AoA, causing stall. NTSB says power was not called for until 7 sec. before impact, go-around decision 1.5 sec before impact.

Stick shaker was operating.

http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/07/us/plane-crash-main/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
 
bobbymike said:


Looks like they made that before the video was available, because it doesn't show what witnesses described (not completely accurate, but what it would appear like to a layman) as the "cartwheel" (at the 26 sec point in the witness video).

At this link the video is a bit clearer and doesn't have all the CNN graphics that were apparent on the first link I sent.

http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/us/2013/07/07/vo-plane-sf-plane-crash-on-cam.courtesy-fred-hayes.html
 
Radical said:
There are two dead, and five in critical condition. All passengers and crew are accounted for.

Which is an incredible tribute to how safe air transport has become, just like the Air France crash of 2005 in Toronto http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_358
(which is strikingly similar in some aspects, despite the much better weather in San Francisco)

Only twenty years ago the death toll would have been much more heavy.
 
Archibald said:
Which is an incredible tribute to how safe air transport has become, just like the Air France crash of 2005 in Toronto http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_358
(which is strikingly similar in some aspects, despite the much better weather in San Francisco)

Only twenty years ago the death toll would have been much more heavy.

Indeed it is, Archibald. I happen to have just researched the statistics in a futile effort to reassure the panicky commentariat at Yahoo News. Here's what I wrote. Hopefully I didn't miss anything:

"Aviation has never been safer. No major US carrier has suffered a fatality since 2005, when a Southwest flight overran the runway and killed a passenger on the ground. The last large US carrier to suffer a serious crash was American Flight 587, which crashed in November of 2001, killing 265.

Including commuter airliners, the Southwest crash-landing, and this Asiana flight, but excluding cargo operators, there have been a total of 123 fatalities involving flights in the United States -- or operated worldwide by US carriers -- from 2002 through 2013.

Details: Air Midwest 5481 (2003): 21 killed, Southwest 1248 (2005): 1 on ground killed, Comair 5191 (2006): 49 killed, Colgan 3407 (2009): 50 killed (including one on the ground).

Meanwhile, from 2002 through 2012 (including 2012 estimates), there have been 426,840 deaths in the United States caused by automobiles. Lightning strikes in the United States killed 400 people in the same time period.

Aviation, especially in the West, is very, very, very safe."
 
according the US investigators first report on Black box

after the data that aircraft were to slow and to low at landing,
it flow below 137 knots, so NTSB chief Deborah Hersman.

After some news agency the pilot had only 47 hours fly experience with a Boeing 777

source:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23222048
 
The 45-47 hours isn't that big a deal, everyone starts off with their first hour on an aircraft. This was his first landing at SFO, but that doesn't explain what happened.


Today reports are, and the video seems to confirm this, that he pulled up at the last second (giving in to instinct?), but having no airspeed to trade for altitude, this only resulted in a stall and the a/c's gear and tail hit the breakwater.
 
Further developing info:

At 200 feet altitude Asiana 214 was at 118 knots(!) Three seconds before impact, the 777 was at 103 knots(!!). Note that at this point, although power was coming up a go-around apparently had not yet been called for. Impact was at 106 knots.

This next part is as yet unconfirmed: There is some discussion that one of the two teenagers killed (the other was apparently ejected) may have been hit/run over by one of the rescue vehicles.

Rest their souls...
 
Welcome to San Francisco.
 

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Although it's not clear, if it contributed to this accident, the reputation of San Francisco
International Airport seems not to be the best. In interviews (German) pilots mentioned
frequent problems with air traffic control, making the airport one of those with a very high
number of go arounds.
 
Jemiba said:
Although it's not clear, if it contributed to this accident, the reputation of San Francisco
International Airport seems not to be the best. In interviews (German) pilots mentioned
frequent problems with air traffic control, making the airport one of those with a very high
number of go arounds.

There's nothing to indicate ATC had anything to do with this. It was about as perfect a day as you get at SFO.

Having at one time been a controller in the Bay Area (though not at SFO, but I have done "guest shots" there), I can say that SFO is an "interesting" airport. There's usually some crosswind, not particularly unmanageable, but SFO is not the easiest airport at which to operate . The layout was fine for the prop airliner days, but is not that good for jets. Thanks to protests from the usual suspects there's no chance that will ever change. The Bay airspace is relatively congested, but pretty much everything is set up to benefit SFO. Noise abatement plays a factor, especially on departures, and things get somewhat more complicated when they have to turn the airport (and airspace) around to use 19 as the arrival runway. Where it gets really interesting is on those rare occasions when they're landing 01. Terrain, noise abatement ("Yeah, the airport's been there 60 years, but I didn't know there would be noise"), unusual procedures and the like all make this a "fun" time.

None of that was in play here. Once you are vectored onto final for 28, it's a straight-in shot. You're nicely lined up, and the terrain (water) isn't tricky. It does get really busy and can be quite a dance, especially if you're pumping on both sets of parallels. During the busiest periods, it requires everyone to be at their best both in the cockpit and in the cab. Missing a turnoff, or not launching quickly when cleared can cause a go around. Frankly, sometimes the controllers may "bet on the come", and then be forced to make corrections, which can also cause "fun". No airliner wants to have a go around on a busy day unless they enjoy taking the scenic tour of the Bay Area to get back to back to final. If you send an airliner around (and I've done it elsewhere), trust me; TRACON is not amused. The use of visual approaches is encouraged on days like that because it makes life easier for everyone, on the ground and in the air, but if someone actually wants do do a full ILS it's always granted (actually, you can't refuse it as long as the equipment is operational).

Frankly, sometimes the controllers talk pretty fast. Although English is the international aviation language it's not the native tongue of many of our international friends and that can play into the dance. Sometimes controllers forget that.

However, none of that was in play here. if you listen to the ATC tapes, this wasn't that busy a situation (Boy, if it had happened at 4-7 PM, that would have been exciting). I can't see at this point where ATC would have any responsibility unless you're of the opinion that the controller should have said, "Cleared to land-- do not crash". That may sound like gallows humor, but this is the land of full employment for lawyers, and I'm sure there are some already trying to find a way to sue for that.
 
F-14D said:
This next part is as yet unconfirmed: There is some discussion that one of the two teenagers killed (the other was apparently ejected) may have been hit/run over by one of the rescue vehicles.

Rest their souls...
Confirmed. From BBC News:
[...] officials now confirm another victim was hit by a fire truck as she lay on the tarmac. Ye Mengyuan, 16, was found covered in fire-fighting foam in the tyre tracks of the truck.
It is not clear if she was still alive when it hit her.
[...]
Ye's cause of death has not yet been established, but county coroners have suggested their findings could be released next week.
"We know for sure she was at least run over one time, but at the time she was under foam, so nobody could have seen her," San Francisco Police Chief Greg Suhr told the San Francisco Chronicle.
She and another Chinese 16-year-old who died, Wang Linjia, had been in the rear of the plane, where many of the most seriously injured passengers were seated. Their bodies were found on the tarmac.
 
There was a 747 (British Airways?) waiting there at the approach end for their turn to take off. Would be fascinating to get their take on what they saw.

Enjoy the Day! Mark
 
Mark Nankivil said:
There was a 747 (British Airways?) waiting there at the approach end for their turn to take off. Would be fascinating to get their take on what they saw.

Enjoy the Day! Mark

I believe the 747 was United, and that the NTSB is talking to them. At this point, there doesn't seem to beat much question as to what happened, the big question is why.
 
If an Airbus was in a similar approach, would their greater trust (than Boeing) in fly by wire systems/automation have taken more control away from the pilot to help avoid the low and slow tail dragging situation? Is this a cause of concern for Boeing that there should be some sort of emergency (ground avoidance, speed, altitude) automation to help correct a pilot error such as this, or will Boeing say more automation is unnecessary?
 
kcran567 said:
If an Airbus was in a similar approach, would their greater trust (than Boeing) in fly by wire systems/automation have taken more control away from the pilot to help avoid the low and slow tail dragging situation? Is this a cause of concern for Boeing that there should be some sort of emergency (ground avoidance, speed, altitude) automation to help correct a pilot error such as this, or will Boeing say more automation is unnecessary?

Keep in mind that this was not that tricky a landing. The degree of automation really shouldn't be a factor in something like this unless you are of the philosophy that pilots should have their hands held for absolutely everything. Arguably it could be said that Airbus' greater reliance on computer judgment and control contributed to the tragedy of AF447, so take your pick.

We don't have all the facts yet, but at initial glance it seems that this was pure pilot error. The issues of training and Crew Resource Management seem to particularly call out for scrutiny.

I am wrestling with whether or not to post something written by a former simulator check pilot for Asiana/KAL. It's particularly relevant as it discusses just these factors in this kind of situation, but I am concerned it's going to upset some people.
 
The damn AF447 pilot had its arm and hand literally frozen on the stick, and he pitched the plane at 45 degree and 100 knots until impact without ever realizing it, nor what really happened.
Neither did the commander or the copilot realized that.
The Airbus literally fell ass-first (or tail-first) like a rock from 39000 feet to zero in four minutes, and it impacted the ocean with the engines at full throttle, all 68 tons of thrust, just because the three were strongly and absolutely convinced the plane would climb if they applied full power. They had zero understanding they were in a deep, deep stall. Even with the alarm shouting "stall" hundreds of times they did not realized by how much of a stall they were in ! And they had no external reference to help them, obviously.
They were (unknowingly) trying to fly their Airbus like a goddam Ariane rocket, or like a fighter with a good thrust to weight ratio in a zoom climb ! I mean, on thrust alone, without the wings. But the odds were against them. :eek:

Arguably it could be said that Airbus' greater reliance on computer judgment and control contributed to the tragedy of AF447, so take your pick.

What is utterly crazy with AF447 is that the crew took the plane to a point in the flight envelope where neither computers or tests pilots have ever gone. Yet the Airbus didn't went into a spin !
 
Archibald said:
The damn AF447 pilot had its arm and hand literally frozen on the stick, and he pitched the plane at 45 degree and 100 knots until impact without ever realizing it, nor what really happened.
Neither did the commander or the copilot realized that.
The Airbus literally fell ass-first (or tail-first) like a rock from 39000 feet to zero in four minutes, and it impacted the ocean with the engines at full throttle, all 68 tons of thrust, just because the three were strongly and absolutely convinced the plane would climb if they applied full power. They had zero understanding they were in a deep, deep stall. Even with the alarm shouting "stall" hundreds of times they did not realized by how much of a stall they were in ! And they had no external reference to help them, obviously.
They were (unknowingly) trying to fly their Airbus like a goddam Ariane rocket, or like a fighter with a good thrust to weight ratio in a zoom climb ! I mean, on thrust alone, without the wings. But the odds were against them. :eek:

Arguably it could be said that Airbus' greater reliance on computer judgment and control contributed to the tragedy of AF447, so take your pick.

What is utterly crazy with AF447 is that the crew took the plane to a point in the flight envelope where neither computers or tests pilots have ever gone. Yet the Airbus didn't went into a spin !

The AF447 tragedy had a number of things going for (or against ) it. When I talked about the Aribus system, I was talking about the blanking of the screens, and the cockpit controls. When one of the joysticks is moved, the other one stays neutral. So, unless the other pilots could see the one pilot's hands, they had no way of knowing he was keeping it pulled back. I also think (but maybe someone more expert than me can confirm) that the power levels respond to force but are not backpowered, so you can't tell by feel or postion when power is changed. Also, I believe there is no force feedback on the controls, so the approaching stall cue of the controls getting mushy or ineffective is not available.


The pilot at the controls kept the stick aft until the angle of attack was such that the computers no longer were getting good data and could no longer make sense of the data they were receiving and blanked out some of the instruments.the stall warning stopped (Airbus does not have an AoA display).

At one point the flying pilot did lower the nose somewhat, and the computers started getting data and resumed their stall warning. Power had been advanced, but that points up another problem with airline training worldwide. In order to minimize altitude loss and more importantly not upset passengers for a number of companies the procedure is to get the nose on the horizon or only slightly below and then get out of the situation with power. If you're flying a Typhoon or SU-35, that'll work; in an airliner, eh not so much. hearing the warning again, he pulled back up, rather than dumping the nose. the Airbus stayed in the stall all the way down. Moments before the end, the other pilots finally realize what's happening, but it's too late.

Other pilot: “Climb… climb… climb… climb…”

Flying pilot: “But I’ve had the stick back the whole time!”

Veteran pilot returned to cockpit: “No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, no.”

Other pilot: “Descend… Give me the controls… Give me the controls!" [he lowers nose, but now too late; low altitude alert now goes off] “Damn it, we’re going to crash… This can’t be happening!”

Pilot who was flying: “But what’s going on?”

Two seconds later the recording stopped.

IMO, that pointed to an example of poor training and operational policies, as well as a worldwide over-reliance on automation instead of piloting skills. .

In my mind, that's also a big part of what happened to Asiana 214. I'm still trying to decide whether to post the discussion from that simulator check pilot I mentioned previously, as well as some thoughts from a West Coast TRACON controller.
 
Orionblamblam said:
Michel Van said:
after the data that aircraft were to slow and to low at landing,
it flow below 137 knots, so NTSB chief Deborah Hersman.

After some news agency the pilot had only 47 hours fly experience with a Boeing 777
3v3vs6.jpg

Is that guy one of the Centauri aliens from Babylon 5?

Bob Clark
 
After all the 777 pilots interviewed in the news media about the crash nobody has yet offered an explanation of how the autothrottle could be armed and not be controlling the speed in a way that an experienced 777 pilot, which the instructor 777 pilot was, would not have been aware of it.
I've seen it mentioned that the autothrottle could be armed but not engaged, but this pilot with thousands of hours of 777 experience would have known that. And in any case other reports on how the autothrottle works suggest it would kick in even when not engaged to prevent the craft from going below a safe speed.


Bob Clark
 
RGClark said:
After all the 777 pilots interviewed in the news media about the crash nobody has yet offered an explanation of how the autothrottle could be armed and not be controlling the speed in a way that an experienced 777 pilot, which the instructor 777 pilot was, would not have been aware of it.
I've seen it mentioned that the autothrottle could be armed but not engaged, but this pilot with thousands of hours of 777 experience would have known that. And in any case other reports on how the autothrottle works suggest it would kick in even when not engaged to prevent the craft from going below a safe speed.


Bob Clark

This sounds like another overreliance on automation, rather than flying the plane. Compounding this is that the automated systems trying to "help" us have become so complex. Remember when all you had to do to tune to another radio station at home or in the car was to twirl the dial? Simple. Easy. You knew about how far you had gone just be how much you rotated the dial. You could get pretty close just be feel, and may only have to glance at the dial for a second or less, if at all. Now, you've got to push mode selectors, hold tuning bars, watch the screen, etc., and it doesn't tune the thing any better than the knob did!

The 777 autothrottles have Five modes! What if they were in the wrong mode or got confused as to which mode to use? If armed, they would normally increase power in response to a low speed situation (unless the bug speed was set too low?) even if they are turned off. Would being in the wrong mode affect this? What if the throttles had been manually moved just enough to disengage the autothrottle (I believe it would remain armed?)? Regardless, not monitoring speed and assuming autothrottle would salvage a bad approach seems to be a training, procedure and CRM issue.

But then, I don't fly 777s so I'm just opining.
 
F-14D said:
This sounds like another overreliance on automation, rather than flying the plane. Compounding this is that the automated systems trying to "help" us have become so complex. Remember when all you had to do to tune to another radio station at home or in the car was to twirl the dial? Simple. Easy. You knew about how far you had gone just be how much you rotated the dial. You could get pretty close just be feel, and may only have to glance at the dial for a second or less, if at all. Now, you've got to push mode selectors, hold tuning bars, watch the screen, etc., and it doesn't tune the thing any better than the knob did!

Rubbish. With the dial system, you had to keep fiddling, adjusting the knob by minute amounts until it was set just right. You had to remember where the radio stations were. Station memory was possible using buttons that would mechanically move the tuning circuit, but these tended to drift.
These days, if you still want to find a station manually, just press + once and it'll seek until it finds a station, then it'll automatically lock in on the optimal frequency. Station memory actually works now, and can be filled in seconds by scanning the whole band automatically. RDS makes this even better and allows a car stereo to automatically follow a station when you move from one transmitter to another.
Radio is a prime example where automation has made things better.
 
Hobbes said:
F-14D said:
This sounds like another overreliance on automation, rather than flying the plane. Compounding this is that the automated systems trying to "help" us have become so complex. Remember when all you had to do to tune to another radio station at home or in the car was to twirl the dial? Simple. Easy. You knew about how far you had gone just be how much you rotated the dial. You could get pretty close just be feel, and may only have to glance at the dial for a second or less, if at all. Now, you've got to push mode selectors, hold tuning bars, watch the screen, etc., and it doesn't tune the thing any better than the knob did!

Rubbish. With the dial system, you had to keep fiddling, adjusting the knob by minute amounts until it was set just right. You had to remember where the radio stations were. Station memory was possible using buttons that would mechanically move the tuning circuit, but these tended to drift.
These days, if you still want to find a station manually, just press once and it'll seek until it finds a station, then it'll automatically lock in on the optimal frequency. Station memory actually works now, and can be filled in seconds by scanning the whole band automatically. RDS makes this even better and allows a car stereo to automatically follow a station when you move from one transmitter to another.
Radio is a prime example where automation has made things better.


Despite what appears at first glance, this discussion is actually relevant to the topic. You are talking underlying technology, I am talking interface.

Digital tuners do all you say. When they came in, though, they still used the good ol' tuning knob (if you weren't using seek or scan). They'd lock onto the precise frequency (which eliminated DX'ing but a worthwhile tradeoff) and do all the rest, but were just easier and or intuitive (could say the same for the volume control too). Maybe you didn't want to have the system populate the memory with the first 6 stations it found. or, maybe you wanted to go up or down the band without stopping at stations that were close to where you were. With the tuning knob interface, you could do that without having to select modes, or hold the button or stare at the screen to make sure that once it started jumping up the band you could stop it where you wanted. You could spin it fast to get all the way up/down the band, or slow just to go a few stations, instead of having to slog all the way across the band at the same speed. You could feel what a quarter turn would do to volume without having to think about it. All the underlying tech and automation brought massive improvements; when digital tuners first came in they were a joy and made things so much better. But then, in the interests of being more "High tech" they messed with the interface and it deteriorated. In the (too many) cars I've owned I've gone through the "wait to warm up and then fiddle with it" phase, the "Now that was easy--Cool!" phase and the "But all I want to do is set a !@!@$% station" phase. Did anyone really say, "I'd sure like nested menus"? I used to be able to turn on the fan in the car with one touch. Now I have to turn it on and then hit the button to turn off the air conditioning because someone decided that whenever I turn on the fan they'd help me and save me the trouble of turning on the ac (interestingly enough, the climate control temperature selector is a knob).


I'm concerned that the same thing is happening in aviation. We're advancing the tech, but making the interface more complex, less intuitive and not always taking into account the way the brain works. Which conveys more info to grasp at a glance? A digital counter that says 446 rounds remaining, or a gauge or circle that shows 2/3 left? I love how the Swedes convey fuel info in the Gripen. I'm not worried about the automation itself, except to the extent we rely on it not to make the job easier and safer, but to do it for us. I am concerned that the latter is growing and coupled with problems in basic knowledge, training and procedures is coming back to bite us.
 
Now I see where you're going, and I agree. Too many interfaces made these days without input from human factors experts.
 
I thought long and hard about this before posting it, and I'm doing it verbatim, a bit nervously, given the international nature of this group. But then, I've been heere a while and many of you "know" me, plus this isn't the Key forum, where lots of screaaming and insuilting takes place. I also had to get permission to use it. I do not personally know who the author of this piece is, although he does let part of his name slip. I'm making no comment or allegations about anyone or anything. This can be taken for whatever each person thinks it's worth. I have heard about this phenomena repeatedly from other sources (including comments from a Delta captain), and from lurking on various airline and pilot forums. I am afraid that these aren't the only organizations that are training their crews to be computer managers rather than pilots. This is going to be a growing problem in the future, all over the world. I'm going to beposting something else from a ATC perspective.

"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the [747]–400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation, with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didn't’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there are virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle) . Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck".
 
The ATC perspective, again verbatim except to delte the name. I have personally heard this kind of story before and it seems to be getting more common, which is a concern of mine as you might note from some of my other posts. Again, take it for what you think it'[s worth.


"Actually I was a bit surprised NorCal gave Asiana a Visual Approach to 28L. Having worked a lot of my career in Chicago and Los Angeles I have seen the consequences of foreign air carriers doing visual approaches. Going back to an Air France 707 landing at Navy Glenview. At LAX, they have prohibited VA's to LAX by foreign carriers for quite some time (more than 20 years). This actually started after several incidents involving KAL. I recall giving a KAL 747 a visual approach to 24R from 10 east of SMO and advise him of traffic that would be remaining south of him for the 25 complex. Well...you guessed it....there were a couple straight ins to 25L and 25R and here comes KAL on base for 24R flying through 24L, 25R and 25L before aligning for 24R. Needless to say...lesson learned. After a few more incidents with foreign carriers the directive came down. No visuals to foreign carriers. I was especially surprised at SFO because of the distance between the runways. Although I have a great deal of time in NASA's 747-400 sim, I am not a rated transport pilot but am certainly in agreement with all of the professional pilots that have commented on the auto-throttle issues and total lack of attentiveness to speed on final. What the hell were they engaged in? Culture issues, 43 hours in type, fatigue, on and on.....I have never witnessed a professional pilot ignore speed on final. Amazing!! During my work at NASA over the past 10 years I have had the opportunity to observe hundreds of airline pilots from all domestic carriers with all levels of experience. There is certainly an increasing number of pilots that have difficulty getting to the airport from 20 miles out after reporting it in sight without flying an ILS or at least vectors to final. As an ATC dinosaur heavily involved in Next Gen research, I observe large movements towards automation and away from those skills that both pilots and controllers have honed to a very high degree at some of the major airports in the world. Pilots and controllers in the future will barely resemble the dinosaurs that many of us are in aviation. I have no doubt that our government in their relentless quest to protect us will be taking a very serious look at visual approaches in the future, once again adjusting the system to accommodate the lowest common denominator." [name deleted]
 
Thanks for the illuminating post. The loss of flying skills and reliance on automation is a bit frightening :eek:
 
The United captain who wrote the piece I quoted has been "outed":

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_19_2013_p0-598906.xml

Also, an article that explains some of the automation issues, but doesn't come flat out and say that, "They needed to FLY the airplane". The post by WJLAviatir is particularly cogent.

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_07_22_2013_p25-597816.xml
 

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