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Hopefully this is the right forum for this. A bit of browsing on the Flight International archive yields this gem from 1974:
http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1974/1974 - 1113.PDF
On the same basis [of preferring twin-engined aircraft], the Iranian requirement for an attack aircraft points to the Fairchild A-10 rather than the single-engined LTV A-7.
Then, five years later,
http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1979/1979 - 0470.PDF
Requests for the A-10 Thunderbolt II from [...] Iran [...] were also turned down.
The second quote indicates that the A-10 probably won the competition. But I can't find anything else other than these two tidbits. Can anyone shed any light on the matter - expected roles, numbers of aircraft envisaged, other competitors?
 
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The Shah of Iran was in the middle of a huge military acquisition order that included 300 F-16's (some of which were already constructed and being prepared for delivery in 1980) when the revolution was taking place. 70 A-10's were ordered and due to be delivered by 1985. I don't know of a competition or set of requirements for the Iranian attack aircraft but I'll keep looking.
 
The trouble with this subject is that the internet is awash with undocumented claims that the Shah ordered this, or that, whizz-bang weapons system. Some of it is wishful thinking, some of it is misinterpreting inquiries as a serious intent to order, some of it is not recognising export control regimes. The Wikipedia article on the subject is an amazing example of this at work.

As a result, the entire experience of researching Iranian plans before the Revolution has taught me to be very careful about sources. The 300 F-16s is well documented. The second link above explicitly says that A-10s were requested (though not in what quantity) but that export authorisation was refused. Without hard documentation, I'm inclined to treat all claims with extreme skepticism.
 
There is a thread here somewhere listing the various things the Iranians were planning on buying before the revolution.
 
Assuming for a moment that the 70 aircraft figure was in the ballpark, then it's likely the actual number of A-10s required was 72, given that the IIAF hewed quite closely to USAF doctrine in most matters (never having gotten around to formally creating it's own doctrine prior to the revolution). That would have equipped three squadrons in a single Tactical Fighter Wing.
 
RLBH said:
The trouble with this subject is that the internet is awash with undocumented claims that the Shah ordered this, or that, whizz-bang weapons system. Some of it is wishful thinking, some of it is misinterpreting inquiries as a serious intent to order, some of it is not recognising export control regimes. The Wikipedia article on the subject is an amazing example of this at work.

As a result, the entire experience of researching Iranian plans before the Revolution has taught me to be very careful about sources. The 300 F-16s is well documented. The second link above explicitly says that A-10s were requested (though not in what quantity) but that export authorisation was refused. Without hard documentation, I'm inclined to treat all claims with extreme skepticism.

No kidding! Notice how the first of the two cited PDFs (1979 - 0470.PDF) reports "Laser-guided smart bombs and cluster bombs cannot be supplied to Iceland." Iceland does not have a military, much less an air force--just a paramilitary Coast Guard and a police force.

But, perhaps they were planning to restart the Cod Wars or go back to the viking tradition?
 
iverson said:
No kidding! Notice how the first of the two cited PDFs (1979 - 0470.PDF) reports "Laser-guided smart bombs and cluster bombs cannot be supplied to Iceland." Iceland does not have a military, much less an air force--just a paramilitary Coast Guard and a police force.

But, perhaps they were planning to restart the Cod Wars or go back to the viking tradition?

Seemingly that request was part of an abortive attempt by the Jóhannesson government to arm the Icelandic Coast Guard's then sole F27-200M (TF-SYR, delivered in 1971).


EDIT: Correction, looks like they got their second F27-200M (TF-SYN) in 1977, rather than in 1980 as I thought.
 
Grey Havoc said:
Assuming for a moment that the 70 aircraft figure was in the ballpark, then it's likely the actual number of A-10s required was 72, given that the IIAF hewed quite closely to USAF doctrine in most matters (never having gotten around to formally creating it's own doctrine prior to the revolution). That would have equipped three squadrons in a single Tactical Fighter Wing.
One of the things the IIAF did, that sets it apart from other regional air forces in the professionalism stakes and makes it comparable to Western air forces, was to have a number of 'overhead' aircraft, typically in the region of 30% - for NATO powers, it's nearer 50%, but most minor nations don't have any overhead allowance at all. A 70-aircraft buy for Iran would equate to about 50 front line aircraft; I'd suggest that it equates to three squadrons of 18 aircraft - Iran's F-5 squadrons were tasked with ground attack amongst other things, and operated in 18-aircraft squadrons, whilst the Imperial Army had three corps headquarters. The idea of one 18-aircraft squadron to support each corps, plus 16 aircraft as allowance for deep maintenance, makes sense, but is of course speculative.
 
Dynoman said:
The Shah of Iran was in the middle of a huge military acquisition order that included 300 F-16's (some of which were already constructed and being prepared for delivery in 1980) when the revolution was taking place. 70 A-10's were ordered and due to be delivered by 1985. I don't know of a competition or set of requirements for the Iranian attack aircraft but I'll keep looking.


Previous discussion on this topic is here:


http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,734.60.html
 
RLBH said:
Grey Havoc said:
Assuming for a moment that the 70 aircraft figure was in the ballpark, then it's likely the actual number of A-10s required was 72, given that the IIAF hewed quite closely to USAF doctrine in most matters (never having gotten around to formally creating it's own doctrine prior to the revolution). That would have equipped three squadrons in a single Tactical Fighter Wing.
One of the things the IIAF did, that sets it apart from other regional air forces in the professionalism stakes and makes it comparable to Western air forces, was to have a number of 'overhead' aircraft, typically in the region of 30% - for NATO powers, it's nearer 50%, but most minor nations don't have any overhead allowance at all. A 70-aircraft buy for Iran would equate to about 50 front line aircraft; I'd suggest that it equates to three squadrons of 18 aircraft - Iran's F-5 squadrons were tasked with ground attack amongst other things, and operated in 18-aircraft squadrons, whilst the Imperial Army had three corps headquarters. The idea of one 18-aircraft squadron to support each corps, plus 16 aircraft as allowance for deep maintenance, makes sense, but is of course speculative.

That makes a lot of sense.
 
I'm wondering if any other display models were prepared for other possible IIAF. equipment, eg. C.5 Galaxy, E.3 Sentry, A.10, etc. :)
 
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The C-5 order was part of the Shah's efforts to revitalise SEATO. Also, pre-revolution, Iran was pretty heavily involved in supporting UN peacekeeping operations.
 
Werner von Braun left NASA in May 1972 and went working for Fairchild - Hiller - Republic. And he was hired to try and sell A-10s to Iran, among others countries. Also the backup ATS-6 NASA comsat. All those efforts went nowhere.
 
The Shah also considered buying the CIA mothballed fleet of A-12 OXCARTs gathering dust at Palmdale since 1969. It would have been a mix ELINT / recon variant to support those AWACS already mentionned.

The Shah arm spree in the 70's was completely insane.
 
The initial proposal was to convert them into F-12 type interceptors! The reconnaissance variant was arguably a sounder acquisition.

As to the military build up, there was method in the Shah's seeming madness. Not only was there genuine threats to Iran, especially the Soviet Union despite a brief detente in the early 1970s, but also the Shah wanted to bootstrap Iran's (already quite decent) Science & Technology base further as well as her industrial infrastructure. Most of his purchases were actually pretty well thought out, including spare sparts and other long term technical support. A major problem however, was that despite major investments in education, technical and otherwise, by the second half of the 1970s the Iranian armed forces in general were increasingly having trouble absorbing the torrent of new equipment and the associated expertise to operate & maintain it fast enough, against a background of political instability contributed to greatly by the Carter administration's often insane policies. The Soviets were very willing indeed to stir the pot that Carter had unwittingly provided them, though that would eventually end up back firing even on them.
 
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Bell developed a couple of Huey helicopters specifically for the Imperial Iranian Air Force: 214A, 214C and 214ST. They all had larger engines and wider main rotor blades to improve hot-and-high performance in Iranian mountains.
The 214A Huey Plus got a single Lycoming LTC4B-8 engine. 296 x 214As and 39 x 214Cs were delivered before the Shah was ousted.

Bell also offered to sell the longer Huey 214 Super Transporter version to Iran. 214 had an extra row of seats (for a total of 20 passengers versus 15 in UH-1H). 214 also got the wider rotor blades plus a pair of the same CT7 engines now installed in H-60 Blackhawk. Civilian 214STs ferried oil workers out to offshore oil platforms.

Ironically 50-odd 214As were eventually sold to Iraq during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. A few ended up logging in British Columbia.

Many of those wide-bladed Huey variants flew against Iran in the hands of private military contractors like Black water.

One disadvantage of those wide blades is that they are so heavily-loaded that they cannot auto-rotate (as per Pierre Fourand).

As an aside, did the Iran-Contra Inquiry ever reveal exactly which types of spare parts USMC Colonel Oliver North sold to Iran?
 
The spare parts were apparently for the HAWK missile system.

Iran had asked for TOW, HAWK, Harpoon, Sidewinder, and Phoenix. They got TOW and HAWK missiles, plus parts for the HAWK system.

The factual findings from the investigation do a pretty good job of listing the various tranches of shipments, if not the specific parts.

 
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It wasn't just the Air Force, cancellations for the Navy included:

Submarines
Tang Class
Kusseh (ex-USS Trout (SS-567): US transfer 17/12/1977 but returned to USN 05/1979
Ex-USS Wahoo (SS-565), ex-USS Gudgeon (SS-567): US transfer cancelled following 1979 Iranian Revolution

Type 209 class
6 subs: ordered 11/03/1978, cancelled following 1979 Iranian Revolution, some components used in construction of Chilean Type 1300 class

Destroyers
Modified Spruance/Kouroush class
Kouroush, Daryush, Nader, Andushirvan: ordered 1974, contracted 23/03/1978, cancelled 03/02/1979 following Iranian Revolution, appropriated by US Congress into USN, commissioned as USS Kidd (DDG-993), Callaghan (DDG-994), Scott (DDG-995) and Chandler (DDG-996) respectively
2 ships: ordered 1974 but cancelled before 23/03/1978 contract issued

Frigates
Kortenaer class
8 ships: cancelled following 1979 Iranian Revolution

Patrol Craft
US 64-foot Mk III class
50 boats: kits for local assembly for Coast Guard, some shipped before 1979 Iranian Revolution, unclear how many were assembled

Amphibious Warfare Ships
Hengam class
2 ships: cancelled following 1979 Iranian Revolution
 
I've finally found some documentary confirmation of the claimed follow-up requirement for 70 additional F-14s, bringing the IIAF to a total of 150, care of the Department of State in 1978, and the Industry and Trade Administration in 1980s. It's probable that the '12 frigates' refers to the eight modified KORTENAERs which were planned. I've seen some suggestion that eight were to be ordered from Dutch yards and four from German yards, but I'm remaining skeptical until evidence shows up.

Also reported in 1976 was an interest in 4 to 10 E-2C aircraft, which were probably an alternative to the E-3, and 12 HH-53 search and rescue helicopters. Note that this is after the Iranian RH-53 order, so would be additional aircraft. It's possible that they were actually interested in additional RH-53s and some confusion crept in on the way to Congress.

Of note, the State Department in about 1977 understood Iran to be forming two additional armoured divisions (for a total of five) by 1985, with the purchase of 1,500 Chieftain tanks from the UK and 800 BMPs from the USSR. We know that the Chieftains were actually 1,350 Shir 1 and Shir 2 tanks, lending credibility to the belief. The BMPs might sound odd, but Iran already had BTR-50 and BTR-60 APCs in service, as well as Soviet artillery.

Other State Department documents are clear about the timescales for F-16 and F-18 procurement, as well as other equipment:
  • 300 F-16s desired in the 1970s, the first 160 to accompany the F-14s and the 140 follow-on aircraft (never authorised) for new bases in the south and east
  • A further 160 F-16s from about 1985 to replace the F-5s
  • 250 F-18s, F-16s or F-15s from the mid-1980s to replace the F-4s.
  • 100 AMST aircraft from the late 1980s to replace the IIAF's C-130 force
This document also clarifies the requirement for eight frigates, and confirms that the often-reported FFG-7 and Type 42 'orders' were actually alternate bids for the requirement the KORTENAER derivative met. It's also interesting for demonstrating that the US was not willing to export anything and everything to Iran, contrary to the popular perception. In fact, the US had deep concerns about Iran's ability to pay for and crew the new equipment, as well as the stability of the regime.
 
Also reported in 1976 was an interest in 4 to 10 E-2C aircraft, which were probably an alternative to the E-3
Any interest in the Hawkeye was short-lived, as I noted here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/grumman-e-2-hawkeye.22239/ in 1977 it was evaluated to have unacceptable performance issues over land and here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/iranian-boeing-e-3k-awacs.38750/ same year, Iran was very much in line for the E-3. That the administraton was in overdrive pushing the NATO AWACS in this period probably didn't help the Hawkeye's chances though.
 
Also reported in 1976 was an interest in 4 to 10 E-2C aircraft, which were probably an alternative to the E-3
Any interest in the Hawkeye was short-lived, as I noted here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/grumman-e-2-hawkeye.22239/ in 1977 it was evaluated to have unacceptable performance issues over land and here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/iranian-boeing-e-3k-awacs.38750/ same year, Iran was very much in line for the E-3. That the administraton was in overdrive pushing the NATO AWACS in this period probably didn't help the Hawkeye's chances though.
Yeah, I think that particular report was clearly made before the evaluation was concluded. I brought it up mostly to illustrate that it was being considered.

A major bugbear of mine is that, very often, if the Iranian government was considering two systems, someone will say they were going to buy both. Combine that with with terminological inexactitude, and there are some really weird ideas out there about what the pre-revolution plans were for the Iranian armed forces.
 
Can anyone provide insight for Iran’s acquisition of BMPs and ZSU-23-4s? The Shilka at least seems pretty advanced to export to Iran, and indirectly the Americans.
 
The Shah buying Soviet stuff in 1977 is even more bizarre considering the fact IRIAF RF-5A and RF-4C were being send in nearly suicidal border penetration flights inside USSR: operation DARK GENE and IBEX. This got pilots killed on both sides, and Mig-25RB overflights in turn being chased by Tomcats.

A pretty dangerous game... but as they say "business is business".
 
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Can anyone provide insight for Iran’s acquisition of BMPs and ZSU-23-4s? The Shilka at least seems pretty advanced to export to Iran, and indirectly the Americans.
I believe it was a deliberate policy on Iran's part of playing both sides to get an advantageous position, in particular by demonstrating that they weren't dependent on the US. Why the Soviets played along, I have no idea; it must have been obvious which way they were leaning.
 
A few more additions to the list. A declassified CIA National Intelligence Estimate from March 1978 gives us eight KORTENAER class, which are well documented, and possibly another four frigates from West Germany, which couldn't be delivered before 1983. That gives confirmation of the total of twelve frigates. Nothing else is new: the fast patrol boats are the LA COMBATTANTE III class, and the SPRUANCE class and TANG class are well documented.

Second, a June 1979 Naval Postgraduate School thesis gives several projects post-1974, referenced to the SIPRI Military Balance 1978-1979. The following are already known:
  • 4 SPRUANCE class destroyers
  • 6 Type 209 submarines
  • 12 fast patrol boats - these are the LA COMBATTANTE III
  • 177 F-4Es - numbers vary depending on which orders you count, I get 176 ordered from 1972 onwards and including the 31 ordered in 1978 when the US refused permission for the F-4G.
  • AWACS - no quantity given, but clearly the E-3 order Opportunistic Minnow has found details of
  • 3 aircraft carriers 'previously considered' - presumably this is the interest in Harriers and the INVINCIBLE class; the 1975 House of Lords discussion suggests that by then the three ships had become one, and by 1979 had clearly been abandoned entirely. Interestingly enough, 25 aircraft gives 18 operational plus spares, which matches up with the capacity of most STOVL carriers.
Potentially new are:
  • 6 LUPO class frigates - given that the source doesn't refer to the KORTENAERs, I suspect that this is the Italian bid for that requirement being reported. We know from the 1977 State Department study referenced above that RFIs were sent to most of the major naval shipbuilders.
  • 7 Boeing refueling tankers - these may have been the later 707s or 747s that Iran received, or new aircraft
  • 39 P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft - this may include the six P-3Fs Iran actually received in 1975-1976
 
Second, a June 1979 Naval Postgraduate School thesis gives several projects post-1974, referenced to the SIPRI Military Balance 1978-1979. The following are already known:
  • 4 SPRUANCE class destroyers
Is it possible the Spruances are actually the Kidds?
 
Second, a June 1979 Naval Postgraduate School thesis gives several projects post-1974, referenced to the SIPRI Military Balance 1978-1979. The following are already known:
  • 4 SPRUANCE class destroyers
Is it possible the Spruances are actually the Kidds?
It isn't possible at all. It's absolutely certain. Until the USN took them over, they're consistently referred to by all sources as modified SPRUANCE class ships. It's only when they enter USN service that they need to be distinguished from the unmodified ships.

Sometimes you'll see references to the Iranians planning 2 TICONDEROGAs, 6 SPRUANCEs and 4 KIDDs. This isn't true: that's triple-counting the same ships - Iran originally planned for two, increased that to six, then cut back to four, and they were to be designated as cruisers in Iranian service.
 
Confirmation of 7 AWACS and mention of an earlier figure of 5 from Mr. Carter here:

Reason from said Mr. President for declining the 140 F-16s order - so as not to jeopardize the AWACS sale:

Hopeless situation for the F-18L as US FMS policy prohibits sale unless in US service 1st:

....and the Iranians won't buy unless accepted into US service:

ETA: A little more from the Shah on the reasoning on the non-selection of the F-18L (and no interest in atomic weapons):
 
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Reason from said Mr. President for declining the 140 F-16s order - so as not to jeopardize the AWACS sale

Hopeless situation for the F-18L as US FMS policy prohibits sale unless in US service 1st:
This kind of thing amuses me, because there's a perception in some that the Shah could get anything he wanted from the US. In fact, once you start looking into it, it's very obvious that he couldn't. Carter obviously had a big thing about arms control, the key policy document being Presidential Directive 13, but as early as 1968 a request for F-111s was rejected as the US didn't believe Iran had a justifiable requirement for them.

As far as the F-18L specifically is concerned, it seems that there had been some thought that development could be sponsored by the US Navy as a derivative of the existing F-18A, though that clearly didn't pass muster. It's likely that, if the Iranian government had persisted with the F-4 replacement, the F-18A or F-16C would have been chosen instead.
 
As far as the F-18L specifically is concerned, it seems that there had been some thought that development could be sponsored by the US Navy as a derivative of the existing F-18A, though that clearly didn't pass muster. It's likely that, if the Iranian government had persisted with the F-4 replacement, the F-18A or F-16C would have been chosen instead.
Presumably these FMS constraints would have applied to West Germany who seemed very keen on the F-18L around the same time? I don't recall seeing this raised in the British files I've seen on the TCA programme of this era though, so was this selective pedantism (F-18A vs F-18L) to deny the Shah the F-18?
 
A few more additions to the list. A declassified CIA National Intelligence Estimate from March 1978 gives us eight KORTENAER class, which are well documented, and possibly another four frigates from West Germany, which couldn't be delivered before 1983. That gives confirmation of the total of twelve frigates.

Not necessarily. Somewhere I've seen the suggestion that this could be another case of duplicate reporting, with Iran considering sourcing Standard frigates from the Netherlands (Kortenear) or from Germany (Bremen/Type 122), or possibly even splitting the order. These were very similar ships, aside from the propulsion plant, and I'm sure German yards could have built them using British turbines as in the Dutch ships, or vice versa (it would have made more sense to use the German Type 122 plant, since at least the turbines would be common to the destroyers.)
 
Presumably these FMS constraints would have applied to West Germany who seemed very keen on the F-18L around the same time?
I haven't come across anything regarding West Germany but Greek interest (or Northrop interest in Greece or both) certainly fell afoul of it. It reads in the documents I've seen as a "new" Carter administration innovation. It makes sense that any and all potential customers would be stymied by it at least for that President's term. Whether it was reversed later or not, I don't know but by then, the damage to the F-18L had been done. The Shah in the link above raises another important point. If the US aren't procuring it, who wants to support an orphan fleet? If the Shah baulked at the prospect.... The F-18L was killed twice.
 
Becoming clearer now why everyone brought F/A-18As...
No wonder Northrop was unhappy, being jibbed by McD and the government!

Is there any mention of Canada? Their New Fighter Aircraft requirement began in 1977 and by 1978 was down to F-18A, F-18L and F-16 but the F/A-18A was not selected until 1980.

This feels odd. The F-16A didn't officially enter USAF service until 1 October 1980 (deliveries began in Jan 1979) yet European co-production began as early as November 1977 and indeed the selection of the F-16A was to a large extent tied to the European selection to replace the Starfighter.
At the time of these telegrams the F-18A had not yet flown in prototype form it is true, but its odd the the L was singled out like this given it was essentially a land-based F-18A at that time.
 

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