‘ The Request For Proposal for 126 Combat Aircraft, is likely to be Issued in May 2006 '
FORCE May -2006
Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Chief of Air Staff
According to the recent ministry of defence's annual report 05-06, the IAF has laid emphasis on ‘core competencies', ‘joint operations' and ‘asymmetric nature of warfare'. What exactly is meant by these three phrases, and what role does the air force see for itself in these?
Core Competencies
Any organisation is created for a purpose and to meet that purpose it is endowed with certain ‘essential capabilities’. These are what may be termed as ‘core competencies’; or those disciplines that the organisation must master, those essential capabilities that it must posses in order to justify its ‘raison d’etre’. The IAF’s ‘core competencies’ are ‘air defence’, ‘precision strike’, ‘over the hill vision or ISR’, and ‘air lift’. In other words, the IAF must defend any airspace given to it, from hostile intent and prevent damage to protected assets. Strike the enemy with accuracy where and when required (usually beyond the reach of ground based weapons). Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of enemy locations towards intelligence-gathering, beyond the view of ground-based sensors. Lastly, lend its capability of ‘long reach’ to whatever it carries, from one place to another. To be able to implement those ‘competencies’ in practice, the IAF would need to master many sub-disciplines and related capabilities, such as air traffic control, or airborne weapons, etc. ‘Core competencies’ therefore, lead to a number of related competencies.
In a way these competencies might well apply to most air forces; I therefore must state that the IAF has distinguished itself in two areas. The first of which is operations in the most diverse terrains in the world; from the heights of Siachen to deserts and oceans. This requires special skills and attention. The other is management of a diverse inventory of platforms of different origins and different generations, which tremendously impacts operational utilisation, maintenance and logistic practices. Going back a bit, to develop its ‘core’, the IAF has acquired or is in the process of acquiring in some cases, aerial refuelling capability, to extend reach; long range smart weapons, for safe precision strike; AWACS, for better early warning and assured air defence; net-centricity, for better Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2); heavy-lift helicopters, for support of the army and civil tasks; better training institutions etc.
Joint Operations
This phrase really needs no introduction, but it refers to operations carried out with elements of the other forces. Operations both in peace and war could be conducted ‘jointly’ with the army or navy, or both. This is no new subject; it has only gained in importance over the years, due to heightened awareness and past battle experiences. So how do we do it?
Quite obviously we have to understand each other, plan together, exercise together, train and assimilate together. We need to use each force’s ‘core competencies’ to the fullest, according to the situation. Over the years, we have considerably enhanced our ‘jointness’. We plan to have more realistic joint exercises in future. In this, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff and joint training institutions play an important role.
While technically ‘Joint Operations’ refers to military forces only; ‘Combined Operations’ would include para-military or police forces; but the concept of jointness is relevant in many contexts. To use the term a little loosely, we need jointness at all levels of operations, even at the ministerial level. The MoD, the MHA and MEA must think as one, on matters of national security and formulate ‘joint approaches’. I guess the ministry of finance has to be in it too.
Asymmetric Warfare
‘Asymmetric Warfare’ is warfare between unequal adversaries, between two states or between a state and non-state combatant. A weaker force would not tackle a superior one head on; it would resort to unconventional tactics or face certain destruction. Simply put, it would resort to ‘asymmetric’ methods. It would look for an ‘Achilles’ Heel’ to fell ‘Goliath’. On the flip side, a superior force’s standard tactics may not yield results. How to tackle insurgents/guerrillas, that don’t have a logistic footprint and can live off the land, has been an old problem. Thus, in an insurgency both sides have to resort to asymmetric warfare. The powerful ‘state’ could imaginatively utilise its technological superiority to best the insurgent, while the latter may do a 9/11 to hurt the state. The weaker force would aim to challenge the national will, use the media and shape public opinion.
Given that India faces considerable ‘asymmetric’ challenges, the defence forces will surely have to play a significant role in meeting them; mainly the army but also the IAF. The IAF’s role in such operations would be providing ‘lift’, or ‘destruction’, or ‘surveillance’. We therefore need to develop/acquire requisite capabilities, such as low calibre smart weapons, airborne surveillance sensors, night vision devices, enhanced heli-lift and attack helicopter capability, COMINT capability etc.
While waiting for the government decision on the ‘Aerospace Command’, the IAF has gone ahead with setting up of an ‘Aerospace Directorate’ in the Southern Air Command (SAC). What is the organisation of this Directorate, how and in which areas will it interact with ISRO, and how will it eventually merge with the Aerospace Command when formed?
There is an error in the premise of this question. The IAF has not set-up any ‘Directorate’ at Southern Air Command to shepherd ‘space’ matters. Yes, we had intended to add the responsibilities of ‘space’ to SAC, in our proposal last year. The reasons why SAC was chosen were two-fold; firstly that SAC’s current operational tasks were somewhat limited, compared to that of other Commands. Secondly, we felt that giving SAC additional responsibility might be the quicker path, which might therefore lead to a quicker integration of ‘space’ into air operations. It is our endeavour to evolve into an ‘aerospace force’. I might add, lest it be misperceived, that SAC has an important role for which it was set-up. This role is likely to become ‘busier’ as our interests southward expand and if our capabilities keep pace.
In Delhi ‘officialese’ a directorate is a part of an apex organisation and not of others. At Air HQ, we have had a ‘directorate’ managing ‘space affairs’ for years now. What we have done is to increase its strength a bit. The Air Headquarters element would always remain, even if a ‘Command’ or ‘Group’ comes up. This is because all capabilities must be represented at the Air Headquarters. We are considering the option of an independent body called an ‘Aerospace Group’ instead of the SAC option.
Our ‘Aerospace Group’, if approved and when it comes up would interact with the Department of Space to obtain available space-based capabilities in the areas of SATCOM, Remote Sensing (imagery) of various kinds, Meteorology, Search and Rescue of downed pilots through signals picked up by satellites and on issues related to Position and Navigation, currently available through the US GPS Satellites.
The combat strength of the IAF is coming down: total authorised combat squadrons are 39.5; at present there are 35 squadrons (FORCE interview with CAS in November 2005); according to the Standing Committee on Defence (2005-06), there will be 29 Squadrons at the end of 10th defence plan (2002-07). How do you propose to arrest this downslide in combat strength?
In order to arrest the depletion caused due to the phasing out of the MiG 21 and MiG 23 fleets, the IAF has planned upgrades on its MiG 21 Bis, MiG 27, MiG 29 and Mirage 2000 fleets. While some are nearing completion in this plan period, a major portion would be completed in the 11th Plan period (2007-2012).
Additionally, the proposed compression of delivery schedule of HAL built SU-30 MKI aircraft would considerably check the depletion. A total of seven squadrons of these would be in operational service in the IAF by the end of the 11th Plan period and an additional two squadrons by the middle of the 12th plan period (2012-2017).
The contract for Tejas (LCA) aircraft has been signed on 31 March 2006 for a quantity of 20 aircraft in the IOC configuration. By the end of the 11th Plan, one squadron of LCA would be in operational service in the IAF. An additional two squadron are expected to be in operational service by the end of the 12th Plan period.
With the likely fructification of the M-MRCA in the middle of the 11th Plan period, the effect of depletion would have been arrested, especially since there is a parallel programme to augment the force multipliers such as the FRA, AWACS and UAVs to enhance the flexibility of the combat force. Force multipliers also add substantially to the effectiveness of the force.
When and to which contenders will the Request For Proposal be issued for 126 Combat aircraft, 80 Medium Lift Helicopters, 15 Medium Powered Radars and 19 Low Level Transportable Radar?
The RFPs are likely to be issued, or have been issued to the following contenders: For 126 combat aircraft, the RFP is likely to be issued in May 2006 to M/s Lockheed Martin, M/s Boeing, M/s Gripen International, M/s Eurofighter GmbH, M/s Dassault Aviation and M/s RAC-MiG.
For 80 Medium Lift Helicopters, the RFP is likely to be issued in May 2006 to M/s Rosoboronexport only.
For 15 Medium Powered Radars, the RFP was issued in August 2004, to 14 vendors. It was a long list, which included M/s Thales, Northrop Grumman, EADS, IAI ELTA, Alenia Marconi, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin etc. In response we received three technical proposals from M/s Alenia Marconi Systems of Italy, our own BEL in a joint venture with M/s Thales of France and M/s IAI ELTA of Israel. The technical evaluation is over and we shall shortly identify the lowest bidder. A similar request for 19 Low Level Transportable Radars is likely to be issued this quarter. Names of contenders as well as details of the request are being finalised.
What is happening on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project on which Russia started work in 2002 and we signed a protocol in November 2004?
The initial proposal by Sukhoi Design Bureau (SDB) was only generic in nature. In mid-2005, they further presented some limited details on which further clarifications were sought. In December 2005, both RAC-MiG and SDB made presentations at Air Headquarters. They have now proposed a 50 per cent work share for the Indian design houses, as required by the IAF. We have prepared an ‘approach paper’ on the subject which includes a suggested ‘course of action’, which is under consideration of the MoD.
What is the status on the UAVs whose induction according to the annual report has been completed in June 2005?
The IAF has operationalised its acquired UAV systems and their induction is complete. In response to the current and emerging requirements on the sub-continent, the UAVs are being employed on a variety of missions, in our areas of interest. Specific emphasis is being laid on ‘joint tasks’ and the integration of this ‘Force Enabler’ with other elements. We also envisage that the requirement of these platforms would increase in future due to the emerging regular and asymmetric threats. Hence, we have plans to upgrade these aircraft as well as induct more UAVs with enhanced capabilities and performance.
What is the update on the induction of the planned three squadrons of Prithvi II? Do you see the possibility of acquiring the US’ Patriot missiles?
The induction of the three Prithvi-II missiles systems into the IAF has commenced. The first squadron with ground support equipment has been formed and moved to its intended location. The second squadron is formed up and is engaged in the process of taking over equipment. The three squadrons would be completely formed up by 2008-09.
Regarding Patriot missile, a US government team carried out two classified briefings to the MoD and Service Headquarters in February and September 2005. IAI of Israel had also presented their ARROW missile system at the Air Headquarters in August 2005. The DRDO has also been working on an indigenous missile system. We would therefore continue to engage foreign vendors while awaiting the outcome of the indigenous effort.
Please give an update on the modernisation and upgrades of MiG-27, Jaguar and MiG-29 aircraft?
Well, let me see how I can summarise a subject of some detail. As you know, any weapon platform with residual life cannot be junked away. To keep it contemporary it must be upgraded. Most modern aircraft have upgrades planned from their very induction. Since all our aircraft are of foreign origin, we prepare our own upgrade requirements and have them executed by appropriate contractors.
Now to specifics, the MiG-29 is to be upgraded by the OEM, which is RAC MiG. We have issued a RFP in January 2006. Six aircraft would be upgraded in Russia and the series upgrade of the rest will be done by one of the air force’s BRDs (11 BRD). HAL will assist us in this project in various ways. The enhanced capabilities of the aircraft would be in terms of a better radar, improved avionics and fuel carrying capability. We should have the project wrapped up by 2011.
The MiG-27 is one of our older generation aircraft, inducted in 1986 and has a life till 2015 and beyond. The MiG-27, a strike aircraft, lacked contemporary avionics, navigation and targeting systems. It was imperative that it be upgraded. The upgrade project commenced in April 2002 and is a joint venture of the HAL and DARE. The IAF has made its own choice of equipment to be fitted. Eight aircraft have already rolled out and I expect project completion in 2008/09. The new capabilities include a state of the art ring-laser-gyro based INGPS; improved displays; vastly improved EW systems which include CMDS, RWR and SPJ. The aircraft will carry a modern LDP with FLIR and LRMTS facility. It will also carry modern photo recce equipment.
As you may be aware, we got the Jaguars in 1979 directly from BAe. These had the old NavWASS, which is a ‘poor man’s’ INS. Later we inducted the DARIN NAS fitted aircraft, which were a great improvement. We have therefore begun the upgrade of the NavWASS Jaguars. HAL is doing this for us and they should finish by 2008. With that we would have an aircraft with the contemporary RLG-based INGPS; an advanced digital map display, better MFD and HUD and improved EW systems. The DARIN Jaguars have also had a modern LDP integrated with its NAS and installation of an autopilot is in progress.
What is the update on IACCS? How much is indigenous and what help has been sought from outside?
The IACCS is a completely indigenous project. There were many contractors in the fray and we short-listed two. These are M/s ECIL (Hyderabad) and BEL (Ghaziabad). These ‘prime contractors’ are independently developing prototype solutions. There will be a field evaluation mid-year and one of them would be selected. A major sub-system, the Voice Communication Control System (VCCS) is also being developed by two private vendors, namely AEM (Noida) and ICOMM (Hyderabad). The IAF will select from the prototypes developed. The vendors however are at liberty to avail of consultancy services from Indian and foreign companies if required. We expect the first phase of the IACCS to be operationalised in the western sector by end 2008.
There is a general perception that the induction of capabilities falls far short of the vision that the IAF has for itself. Does this mismatch bother you? Given the slow process of inductions and limited finances, what are the IAF’s acquisition priorities?
Keeping the ‘edge’ of a military force sharp is indeed a challenging task, especially when that ‘edge’ is determined by frontier technology, which is always very expensive. That most of that ‘cutting-edge’ technology is not indigenous, makes the task more daunting. If the ‘competition’ is strong the imperatives are accentuated and the slack limited.
While that is true, a military force’s equipping ‘time-lines’ are determined on the ‘time-lines’ and dimensions of the assessed threat. If that were not so, we would require ‘everything’ and ‘here and now’. In addition, the IAF must also gear-up in keeping with ‘national interests’. In this manner the IAF is working towards achieving its envisioned capabilities. The government too is quite responsive to this endeavour. Of course, it could always be faster, but a developing nation of India’s complexity has a multitude of competing priorities, so there always are hard choices for the government and for us.
The IAF’s acquisition priorities are embodied in its perspective plans. Our XI Plan was forwarded to the MoD early this year. Once these priorities are realised we would be contemporary; but I might add, that with time the definition of contemporary changes. I mean that in a situation of shifting ‘goal-posts’, both vision and priorities remain under constant review.
FORCE May -2006
Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, Chief of Air Staff
According to the recent ministry of defence's annual report 05-06, the IAF has laid emphasis on ‘core competencies', ‘joint operations' and ‘asymmetric nature of warfare'. What exactly is meant by these three phrases, and what role does the air force see for itself in these?
Core Competencies
Any organisation is created for a purpose and to meet that purpose it is endowed with certain ‘essential capabilities’. These are what may be termed as ‘core competencies’; or those disciplines that the organisation must master, those essential capabilities that it must posses in order to justify its ‘raison d’etre’. The IAF’s ‘core competencies’ are ‘air defence’, ‘precision strike’, ‘over the hill vision or ISR’, and ‘air lift’. In other words, the IAF must defend any airspace given to it, from hostile intent and prevent damage to protected assets. Strike the enemy with accuracy where and when required (usually beyond the reach of ground based weapons). Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of enemy locations towards intelligence-gathering, beyond the view of ground-based sensors. Lastly, lend its capability of ‘long reach’ to whatever it carries, from one place to another. To be able to implement those ‘competencies’ in practice, the IAF would need to master many sub-disciplines and related capabilities, such as air traffic control, or airborne weapons, etc. ‘Core competencies’ therefore, lead to a number of related competencies.
In a way these competencies might well apply to most air forces; I therefore must state that the IAF has distinguished itself in two areas. The first of which is operations in the most diverse terrains in the world; from the heights of Siachen to deserts and oceans. This requires special skills and attention. The other is management of a diverse inventory of platforms of different origins and different generations, which tremendously impacts operational utilisation, maintenance and logistic practices. Going back a bit, to develop its ‘core’, the IAF has acquired or is in the process of acquiring in some cases, aerial refuelling capability, to extend reach; long range smart weapons, for safe precision strike; AWACS, for better early warning and assured air defence; net-centricity, for better Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2); heavy-lift helicopters, for support of the army and civil tasks; better training institutions etc.
Joint Operations
This phrase really needs no introduction, but it refers to operations carried out with elements of the other forces. Operations both in peace and war could be conducted ‘jointly’ with the army or navy, or both. This is no new subject; it has only gained in importance over the years, due to heightened awareness and past battle experiences. So how do we do it?
Quite obviously we have to understand each other, plan together, exercise together, train and assimilate together. We need to use each force’s ‘core competencies’ to the fullest, according to the situation. Over the years, we have considerably enhanced our ‘jointness’. We plan to have more realistic joint exercises in future. In this, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff and joint training institutions play an important role.
While technically ‘Joint Operations’ refers to military forces only; ‘Combined Operations’ would include para-military or police forces; but the concept of jointness is relevant in many contexts. To use the term a little loosely, we need jointness at all levels of operations, even at the ministerial level. The MoD, the MHA and MEA must think as one, on matters of national security and formulate ‘joint approaches’. I guess the ministry of finance has to be in it too.
Asymmetric Warfare
‘Asymmetric Warfare’ is warfare between unequal adversaries, between two states or between a state and non-state combatant. A weaker force would not tackle a superior one head on; it would resort to unconventional tactics or face certain destruction. Simply put, it would resort to ‘asymmetric’ methods. It would look for an ‘Achilles’ Heel’ to fell ‘Goliath’. On the flip side, a superior force’s standard tactics may not yield results. How to tackle insurgents/guerrillas, that don’t have a logistic footprint and can live off the land, has been an old problem. Thus, in an insurgency both sides have to resort to asymmetric warfare. The powerful ‘state’ could imaginatively utilise its technological superiority to best the insurgent, while the latter may do a 9/11 to hurt the state. The weaker force would aim to challenge the national will, use the media and shape public opinion.
Given that India faces considerable ‘asymmetric’ challenges, the defence forces will surely have to play a significant role in meeting them; mainly the army but also the IAF. The IAF’s role in such operations would be providing ‘lift’, or ‘destruction’, or ‘surveillance’. We therefore need to develop/acquire requisite capabilities, such as low calibre smart weapons, airborne surveillance sensors, night vision devices, enhanced heli-lift and attack helicopter capability, COMINT capability etc.
While waiting for the government decision on the ‘Aerospace Command’, the IAF has gone ahead with setting up of an ‘Aerospace Directorate’ in the Southern Air Command (SAC). What is the organisation of this Directorate, how and in which areas will it interact with ISRO, and how will it eventually merge with the Aerospace Command when formed?
There is an error in the premise of this question. The IAF has not set-up any ‘Directorate’ at Southern Air Command to shepherd ‘space’ matters. Yes, we had intended to add the responsibilities of ‘space’ to SAC, in our proposal last year. The reasons why SAC was chosen were two-fold; firstly that SAC’s current operational tasks were somewhat limited, compared to that of other Commands. Secondly, we felt that giving SAC additional responsibility might be the quicker path, which might therefore lead to a quicker integration of ‘space’ into air operations. It is our endeavour to evolve into an ‘aerospace force’. I might add, lest it be misperceived, that SAC has an important role for which it was set-up. This role is likely to become ‘busier’ as our interests southward expand and if our capabilities keep pace.
In Delhi ‘officialese’ a directorate is a part of an apex organisation and not of others. At Air HQ, we have had a ‘directorate’ managing ‘space affairs’ for years now. What we have done is to increase its strength a bit. The Air Headquarters element would always remain, even if a ‘Command’ or ‘Group’ comes up. This is because all capabilities must be represented at the Air Headquarters. We are considering the option of an independent body called an ‘Aerospace Group’ instead of the SAC option.
Our ‘Aerospace Group’, if approved and when it comes up would interact with the Department of Space to obtain available space-based capabilities in the areas of SATCOM, Remote Sensing (imagery) of various kinds, Meteorology, Search and Rescue of downed pilots through signals picked up by satellites and on issues related to Position and Navigation, currently available through the US GPS Satellites.
The combat strength of the IAF is coming down: total authorised combat squadrons are 39.5; at present there are 35 squadrons (FORCE interview with CAS in November 2005); according to the Standing Committee on Defence (2005-06), there will be 29 Squadrons at the end of 10th defence plan (2002-07). How do you propose to arrest this downslide in combat strength?
In order to arrest the depletion caused due to the phasing out of the MiG 21 and MiG 23 fleets, the IAF has planned upgrades on its MiG 21 Bis, MiG 27, MiG 29 and Mirage 2000 fleets. While some are nearing completion in this plan period, a major portion would be completed in the 11th Plan period (2007-2012).
Additionally, the proposed compression of delivery schedule of HAL built SU-30 MKI aircraft would considerably check the depletion. A total of seven squadrons of these would be in operational service in the IAF by the end of the 11th Plan period and an additional two squadrons by the middle of the 12th plan period (2012-2017).
The contract for Tejas (LCA) aircraft has been signed on 31 March 2006 for a quantity of 20 aircraft in the IOC configuration. By the end of the 11th Plan, one squadron of LCA would be in operational service in the IAF. An additional two squadron are expected to be in operational service by the end of the 12th Plan period.
With the likely fructification of the M-MRCA in the middle of the 11th Plan period, the effect of depletion would have been arrested, especially since there is a parallel programme to augment the force multipliers such as the FRA, AWACS and UAVs to enhance the flexibility of the combat force. Force multipliers also add substantially to the effectiveness of the force.
When and to which contenders will the Request For Proposal be issued for 126 Combat aircraft, 80 Medium Lift Helicopters, 15 Medium Powered Radars and 19 Low Level Transportable Radar?
The RFPs are likely to be issued, or have been issued to the following contenders: For 126 combat aircraft, the RFP is likely to be issued in May 2006 to M/s Lockheed Martin, M/s Boeing, M/s Gripen International, M/s Eurofighter GmbH, M/s Dassault Aviation and M/s RAC-MiG.
For 80 Medium Lift Helicopters, the RFP is likely to be issued in May 2006 to M/s Rosoboronexport only.
For 15 Medium Powered Radars, the RFP was issued in August 2004, to 14 vendors. It was a long list, which included M/s Thales, Northrop Grumman, EADS, IAI ELTA, Alenia Marconi, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin etc. In response we received three technical proposals from M/s Alenia Marconi Systems of Italy, our own BEL in a joint venture with M/s Thales of France and M/s IAI ELTA of Israel. The technical evaluation is over and we shall shortly identify the lowest bidder. A similar request for 19 Low Level Transportable Radars is likely to be issued this quarter. Names of contenders as well as details of the request are being finalised.
What is happening on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project on which Russia started work in 2002 and we signed a protocol in November 2004?
The initial proposal by Sukhoi Design Bureau (SDB) was only generic in nature. In mid-2005, they further presented some limited details on which further clarifications were sought. In December 2005, both RAC-MiG and SDB made presentations at Air Headquarters. They have now proposed a 50 per cent work share for the Indian design houses, as required by the IAF. We have prepared an ‘approach paper’ on the subject which includes a suggested ‘course of action’, which is under consideration of the MoD.
What is the status on the UAVs whose induction according to the annual report has been completed in June 2005?
The IAF has operationalised its acquired UAV systems and their induction is complete. In response to the current and emerging requirements on the sub-continent, the UAVs are being employed on a variety of missions, in our areas of interest. Specific emphasis is being laid on ‘joint tasks’ and the integration of this ‘Force Enabler’ with other elements. We also envisage that the requirement of these platforms would increase in future due to the emerging regular and asymmetric threats. Hence, we have plans to upgrade these aircraft as well as induct more UAVs with enhanced capabilities and performance.
What is the update on the induction of the planned three squadrons of Prithvi II? Do you see the possibility of acquiring the US’ Patriot missiles?
The induction of the three Prithvi-II missiles systems into the IAF has commenced. The first squadron with ground support equipment has been formed and moved to its intended location. The second squadron is formed up and is engaged in the process of taking over equipment. The three squadrons would be completely formed up by 2008-09.
Regarding Patriot missile, a US government team carried out two classified briefings to the MoD and Service Headquarters in February and September 2005. IAI of Israel had also presented their ARROW missile system at the Air Headquarters in August 2005. The DRDO has also been working on an indigenous missile system. We would therefore continue to engage foreign vendors while awaiting the outcome of the indigenous effort.
Please give an update on the modernisation and upgrades of MiG-27, Jaguar and MiG-29 aircraft?
Well, let me see how I can summarise a subject of some detail. As you know, any weapon platform with residual life cannot be junked away. To keep it contemporary it must be upgraded. Most modern aircraft have upgrades planned from their very induction. Since all our aircraft are of foreign origin, we prepare our own upgrade requirements and have them executed by appropriate contractors.
Now to specifics, the MiG-29 is to be upgraded by the OEM, which is RAC MiG. We have issued a RFP in January 2006. Six aircraft would be upgraded in Russia and the series upgrade of the rest will be done by one of the air force’s BRDs (11 BRD). HAL will assist us in this project in various ways. The enhanced capabilities of the aircraft would be in terms of a better radar, improved avionics and fuel carrying capability. We should have the project wrapped up by 2011.
The MiG-27 is one of our older generation aircraft, inducted in 1986 and has a life till 2015 and beyond. The MiG-27, a strike aircraft, lacked contemporary avionics, navigation and targeting systems. It was imperative that it be upgraded. The upgrade project commenced in April 2002 and is a joint venture of the HAL and DARE. The IAF has made its own choice of equipment to be fitted. Eight aircraft have already rolled out and I expect project completion in 2008/09. The new capabilities include a state of the art ring-laser-gyro based INGPS; improved displays; vastly improved EW systems which include CMDS, RWR and SPJ. The aircraft will carry a modern LDP with FLIR and LRMTS facility. It will also carry modern photo recce equipment.
As you may be aware, we got the Jaguars in 1979 directly from BAe. These had the old NavWASS, which is a ‘poor man’s’ INS. Later we inducted the DARIN NAS fitted aircraft, which were a great improvement. We have therefore begun the upgrade of the NavWASS Jaguars. HAL is doing this for us and they should finish by 2008. With that we would have an aircraft with the contemporary RLG-based INGPS; an advanced digital map display, better MFD and HUD and improved EW systems. The DARIN Jaguars have also had a modern LDP integrated with its NAS and installation of an autopilot is in progress.
What is the update on IACCS? How much is indigenous and what help has been sought from outside?
The IACCS is a completely indigenous project. There were many contractors in the fray and we short-listed two. These are M/s ECIL (Hyderabad) and BEL (Ghaziabad). These ‘prime contractors’ are independently developing prototype solutions. There will be a field evaluation mid-year and one of them would be selected. A major sub-system, the Voice Communication Control System (VCCS) is also being developed by two private vendors, namely AEM (Noida) and ICOMM (Hyderabad). The IAF will select from the prototypes developed. The vendors however are at liberty to avail of consultancy services from Indian and foreign companies if required. We expect the first phase of the IACCS to be operationalised in the western sector by end 2008.
There is a general perception that the induction of capabilities falls far short of the vision that the IAF has for itself. Does this mismatch bother you? Given the slow process of inductions and limited finances, what are the IAF’s acquisition priorities?
Keeping the ‘edge’ of a military force sharp is indeed a challenging task, especially when that ‘edge’ is determined by frontier technology, which is always very expensive. That most of that ‘cutting-edge’ technology is not indigenous, makes the task more daunting. If the ‘competition’ is strong the imperatives are accentuated and the slack limited.
While that is true, a military force’s equipping ‘time-lines’ are determined on the ‘time-lines’ and dimensions of the assessed threat. If that were not so, we would require ‘everything’ and ‘here and now’. In addition, the IAF must also gear-up in keeping with ‘national interests’. In this manner the IAF is working towards achieving its envisioned capabilities. The government too is quite responsive to this endeavour. Of course, it could always be faster, but a developing nation of India’s complexity has a multitude of competing priorities, so there always are hard choices for the government and for us.
The IAF’s acquisition priorities are embodied in its perspective plans. Our XI Plan was forwarded to the MoD early this year. Once these priorities are realised we would be contemporary; but I might add, that with time the definition of contemporary changes. I mean that in a situation of shifting ‘goal-posts’, both vision and priorities remain under constant review.
with the Air Forces of Germany, Italy , Spain and the UK with more than 60 aircraft flying. The Eurofighter consortium has already commenced manufacturing the second tranche of 236 airframes with the first tranche of 148 nearing completion. 
